draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-clarify-05.txt   rfc8481.txt 
Network Working Group R. Bush Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) R. Bush
Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan Request for Comments: 8481 Internet Initiative Japan
Updates: 6811 (if approved) August 20, 2018 Updates: 6811 September 2018
Intended status: Standards Track Category: Standards Track
Expires: February 21, 2019 ISSN: 2070-1721
BGP RPKI-Based Origin Validation Clarifications Clarifications to BGP Origin Validation Based on
draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-clarify-05 Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
Abstract Abstract
Deployment of Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) based BGP Deployment of BGP origin validation based on Resource Public Key
origin validation is hampered by, among other things, vendor mis- Infrastructure (RPKI) is hampered by, among other things, vendor
implementations in two critical areas: which routes are validated and misimplementations in two critical areas: which routes are validated
whether policy is applied when not specified by configuration. This and whether policy is applied when not specified by configuration.
document is meant to clarify possible misunderstandings causing those This document is meant to clarify possible misunderstandings causing
mis-implementations; and thus updates RFC 6811 by clarifying that all those misimplementations; it thus updates RFC 6811 by clarifying that
prefixes should have their validation state set, and that policy must all prefixes should have their validation state set and that policy
not be applied without operator configuration. must not be applied without operator configuration.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to
be interpreted as described in [RFC8174] only when they appear in all
upper case. They may also appear in lower or mixed case as English
words, without normative meaning.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This is an Internet Standards Track document.
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on February 21, 2019. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Internet-DrafBGP RPKI-Based Origin Validation Clarifications August 2018 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8481.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Evaluate ALL Prefixes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. Set State, Don't Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
8. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Deployment of RPKI-based BGP origin validation is hampered by, among Deployment of RPKI-based BGP origin validation is hampered by, among
other things, vendor mis-implementations in two critical areas: which other things, vendor misimplementations in two critical areas: which
routes are validated and whether policy is applied when not specified routes are validated and whether policy is applied when not specified
by configuration. This document is meant to clarify possible by configuration. This document is meant to clarify possible
misunderstandings causing those mis-implementations. misunderstandings causing those misimplementations.
When a route is distributed into BGP, the origin validation state is When a route is distributed into BGP, the origin validation state is
set to NotFound, Valid, or Invalid per [RFC6811]. Operational set to NotFound, Valid, or Invalid per [RFC6811]. Operational
testing has shown that the specifications of that RFC were not testing has shown that the specifications of that RFC were not
sufficient to avoid divergent implementations. This document sufficient to avoid divergent implementations. This document
attempts to clarify two areas which seem to cause confusion. attempts to clarify two areas which seem to cause confusion.
The implementation issues seem not to be about how to validate, i.e., The implementation issues seem not to be about how to validate, i.e.,
how to decide if a route is NotFound, Valid, or Invalid. The issues how to decide if a route is NotFound, Valid, or Invalid. The issues
seem to be which routes should be evaluated and have their evaluation seem to be which routes should be evaluated and have their evaluation
state set, and whether to apply policy without operator state set, and whether to apply policy without operator
configuration. configuration.
2. Suggested Reading 2. Requirements Language
It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI, The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
[RFC6480], Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs), [RFC6482], and RPKI- "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
based Prefix Validation, [RFC6811]. "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. Evaluate ALL Prefixes 3. Suggested Reading
Significant Clarification: A router MUST evaluate and set the It is assumed that the reader understands BGP [RFC4271], the RPKI
validation state of all routes in BGP coming from any source (eBGP, [RFC6480], Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) [RFC6482], and
iBGP, or redistribution from static, connected, etc.), unless RPKI-based Prefix Validation [RFC6811].
specifically configured otherwise by the operator. Else the operator
does not have the ability to drop Invalid routes coming from every
Internet-DrafBGP RPKI-Based Origin Validation Clarifications August 2018 4. Evaluate ALL Prefixes
potential source; and is therefore liable to complaints from Significant Clarification: A router MUST evaluate and set the
neighbors about propagation of Invalid routes. For this reason, validation state of all routes in BGP coming from any source (e.g.,
eBGP, iBGP, or redistribution from static or connected routes),
unless specifically configured otherwise by the operator. Otherwise,
the operator does not have the ability to drop Invalid routes coming
from every potential source and is therefore liable to complaints
from neighbors about propagation of Invalid routes. For this reason,
[RFC6811] says: [RFC6811] says:
"When a BGP speaker receives an UPDATE from a neighbor, it SHOULD When a BGP speaker receives an UPDATE from a neighbor, it SHOULD
perform a lookup as described above for each of the Routes in the perform a lookup as described above for each of the Routes in the
UPDATE message. The lookup SHOULD also be applied to routes that are UPDATE message. The lookup SHOULD also be applied to routes that
redistributed into BGP from another source, such as another protocol are redistributed into BGP from another source, such as another
or a locally defined static route." protocol or a locally defined static route.
[RFC6811] goes on to say "An implementation MAY provide configuration [RFC6811] goes on to say, "An implementation MAY provide
options to control which routes the lookup is applied to." configuration options to control which routes the lookup is applied
to."
When redistributing into BGP from connected, static, IGP, iBGP, etc., When redistributing into BGP from any source (e.g., IGP, iBGP, or
there is no AS_PATH in the input to allow RPKI validation of the from static or connected routes), there is no AS_PATH in the input to
originating AS. In such cases, the router MUST use the AS of the allow RPKI validation of the originating Autonomous System (AS). In
router's BGP configuration. If that is ambiguous because of such cases, the router MUST use the AS of the router's BGP
confederation, AS migration, or other multi-AS configuration, then configuration. If that is ambiguous because of confederation, AS
the router configuration MUST provide a means of specifying the AS to migration, or other multi-AS configuration, then the router
be used on the redistribution, either per redistribution or globally. configuration MUST provide a means of specifying the AS to be used on
the redistribution, either per redistribution or globally.
4. Set State, Don't Act 5. Set State, Don't Act
Significant Clarification: Once routes are evaluated and have their Significant Clarification: Once routes are evaluated and have their
state set, the operator should be in complete control of any policy state set, the operator should be in complete control of any policy
applied based on the evaluation state. Absent specific operator applied based on the evaluation state. Absent specific operator
configuration, policy MUST NOT be applied. configuration, policy MUST NOT be applied.
Automatic origin validation policy actions such as those described in Automatic origin validation policy actions such as those described in
[RFC8097], BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community" [RFC8097]
MUST NOT be carried out or otherwise applied unless specifically MUST NOT be carried out or otherwise applied unless specifically
configured by the operator. configured by the operator.
5. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
This document does not create security considerations beyond those of This document does not create security considerations beyond those of
[RFC6811]. [RFC6811].
6. IANA Considerations 7. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA Considerations.
7. Acknowledgments
Many thanks to John Scudder who had the patience to give constructive
review multiple times, and to Keyur Patel who noted that the AS might
have to be specified. George Michaelson, Jay Borkenhagen, John
Heasley, and Matthias Waehlisch kindly helped clean up loose wording.
Internet-DrafBGP RPKI-Based Origin Validation Clarifications August 2018 This document has no IANA actions.
8. Normative References 8. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006, DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480, Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>. February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012, DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. [RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013, DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.
[RFC8097] Mohapatra, P., Patel, K., Scudder, J., Ward, D., and R. [RFC8097] Mohapatra, P., Patel, K., Scudder, J., Ward, D., and R.
Bush, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Bush, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended
Community", RFC 8097, DOI 10.17487/RFC8097, March 2017, Community", RFC 8097, DOI 10.17487/RFC8097, March 2017,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8097>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8097>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
Acknowledgments
Many thanks to John Scudder, who had the patience to give
constructive review multiple times, and Keyur Patel, who noted that
the AS might have to be specified. George Michaelson, Jay
Borkenhagen, John Heasley, and Matthias Waehlisch kindly helped clean
up loose wording.
Author's Address Author's Address
Randy Bush Randy Bush
Internet Initiative Japan Internet Initiative Japan
5147 Crystal Springs 5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110
US United States of America
Email: randy@psg.com Email: randy@psg.com
 End of changes. 31 change blocks. 
87 lines changed or deleted 98 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.47. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/