--- 1/draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress-01.txt 2020-03-19 15:13:20.286967983 -0700 +++ 2/draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress-02.txt 2020-03-19 15:13:20.302968379 -0700 @@ -1,21 +1,21 @@ Network Working Group R. Bush Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus Updates: 6811 (if approved) R. Volk Intended status: Standards Track Deutsche Telekom -Expires: September 5, 2020 J. Heitz +Expires: September 20, 2020 J. Heitz Cisco - March 4, 2020 + March 19, 2020 BGP RPKI-Based Origin Validation on Export - draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress-01 + draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress-02 Abstract A BGP speaker may perform RPKI origin validation not only on routes received from BGP neighbors and routes that are redistributed from other routing protocols, but also on routes it sends to BGP neighbors. For egress policy, it is important that the classification uses the effective origin AS of the processed route, which may specifically be altered by the commonly available knobs such as removing private ASs, confederation handling, and other @@ -37,21 +37,21 @@ Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - This Internet-Draft will expire on September 5, 2020. + This Internet-Draft will expire on September 20, 2020. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents @@ -62,42 +62,43 @@ described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Egress Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 - 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 - 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 - 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 - Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1. Introduction This document does not change the protocol or semantics of [RFC6811] of RPKI-based origin validation. It highlights an important use case of origin validation in eBGP egress policies, explaining specifics of correct implementation in this context. - As the origin AS may be modified by outbound policy, policy semantics - based on RPKI Origin Validation state MUST be able to be applied - separately on distribution into BGP and on egress. + As the origin AS of a BGP UPDATE is decided by configuration and + outbound policy of the BGP speaker, a validating BGP speaker MUST + apply Route Origin Validation policy semantics against the origin + Autonomous System number which will actually be put in the AS_PATH + (see [RFC4271] 4.3 Path Attributes:b) of the UPDATE to the peer. - When applied to egress policy, the effective origin AS MUST be used - to determine the Origin Validation state. The effective origin AS is - that which will actually be the origin AS in the announcement. It - might be affected by removal of private AS(s), confederation, AS - migration, etc. If there are any AS_PATH modifications resulting in - origin AS change, then these MUST be taken into account. + This effective origin AS of the announcement might be affected by + removal of private AS(s), confederation, AS migration, etc. Any + AS_PATH modifications resulting in origin AS change MUST be taken + into account. This document updates [RFC6811] by clarifying that implementations must use the effective origin AS to determine the Origin Validation state when applying egress policy. 2. Suggested Reading It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI, [RFC6480], Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs), [RFC6482], RPKI-based Prefix Validation, [RFC6811], and Origin Validation Clarifications, @@ -133,60 +134,66 @@ 5. Security Considerations This document does not create security considerations beyond those of [RFC6811] and [RFC8481]. 6. IANA Considerations This document has no IANA Considerations. -7. References +7. Acknowledgments -7.1. Normative References + Thanks to reviewers and comments from Linda Dunbar, Nick Hilliard, + Chris Morrow, Keyur Patel, Job Snijders, and Robert Sparks. + +8. References + +8.1. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . + [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A + Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, + DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006, + . + [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012, . [RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013, . [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, . [RFC8481] Bush, R., "Clarifications to BGP Origin Validation Based on Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 8481, DOI 10.17487/RFC8481, September 2018, . -7.2. Informative References - - [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A - Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, - DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006, - . +8.2. Informative References [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480, February 2012, . Authors' Addresses + Randy Bush Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus 5147 Crystal Springs Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 US Email: randy@psg.com Ruediger Volk Deutsche Telekom