draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress-02.txt		draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress-03.txt
	Network Working Group R. Bush		Network Working Group R. Bush
	Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus		Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus
	Updates: 6811 (if approved) R. Volk		Updates: 6811 (if approved) R. Volk
	Intended status: Standards Track Deutsche Telekom		Intended status: Standards Track Deutsche Telekom
	Expires: September 20, 2020 J. Heitz		Expires: October 9, 2020 J. Heitz
	Cisco		Cisco
	March 19, 2020		April 7, 2020
	BGP RPKI-Based Origin Validation on Export		BGP RPKI-Based Origin Validation on Export
	draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress-02		draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress-03
	Abstract		Abstract
	A BGP speaker may perform RPKI origin validation not only on routes		A BGP speaker may perform RPKI origin validation not only on routes
	received from BGP neighbors and routes that are redistributed from		received from BGP neighbors and routes that are redistributed from
	other routing protocols, but also on routes it sends to BGP		other routing protocols, but also on routes it sends to BGP
	neighbors. For egress policy, it is important that the		neighbors. For egress policy, it is important that the
	classification uses the effective origin AS of the processed route,		classification uses the 'effective origin AS' of the processed route,
	which may specifically be altered by the commonly available knobs		which may specifically be altered by the commonly available knobs
	such as removing private ASs, confederation handling, and other		such as removing private ASs, confederation handling, and other
	modifications of the origin AS.		modifications of the origin AS. This document updates [RFC6811].
	Requirements Language		Requirements Language
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
	"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP		"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
	14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all		14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
	capitals, as shown here.		capitals, as shown here.
	Status of This Memo		Status of This Memo
	skipping to change at page 1, line 48 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 48 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on September 20, 2020.		This Internet-Draft will expire on October 9, 2020.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	skipping to change at page 2, line 26 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 26 ¶
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	3. Egress Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		3. Egress Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	4. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		4. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	This document does not change the protocol or semantics of [RFC6811]		This document does not change the protocol or semantics of [RFC6811],
	of RPKI-based origin validation. It highlights an important use case		BGP prefix origin validation. It highlights an important use case of
	of origin validation in eBGP egress policies, explaining specifics of		origin validation in eBGP egress policies, explaining specifics of
	correct implementation in this context.		correct implementation in this context.
	As the origin AS of a BGP UPDATE is decided by configuration and		The term 'effective origin AS' as used in this document refers to the
	outbound policy of the BGP speaker, a validating BGP speaker MUST		Autonomous System number which is used by [RFC6811] BGP Prefix Origin
	apply Route Origin Validation policy semantics against the origin		Validation.
	Autonomous System number which will actually be put in the AS_PATH
	(see [RFC4271] 4.3 Path Attributes:b) of the UPDATE to the peer.		As the effective origin AS of a BGP UPDATE is decided by
			configuration and outbound policy of the BGP speaker, a validating
			BGP speaker MUST apply Route Origin Validation policy semantics (see
			[RFC6811] Sec 2 and [RFC8481] Sec 4) against the origin Autonomous
			System number which will actually be used by subsequent [RFC6811] BGP
			Prefix Origin Validation.
	This effective origin AS of the announcement might be affected by		This effective origin AS of the announcement might be affected by
	removal of private AS(s), confederation, AS migration, etc. Any		removal of private ASs, confederation [RFC5065], migration [RFC7705],
	AS_PATH modifications resulting in origin AS change MUST be taken		etc. Any AS_PATH modifications resulting in effective origin AS
	into account.		change MUST be taken into account.
	This document updates [RFC6811] by clarifying that implementations		This document updates [RFC6811] by clarifying that implementations
	must use the effective origin AS to determine the Origin Validation		must use the effective origin AS to determine the Origin Validation
	state when applying egress policy.		state when applying egress policy.
	2. Suggested Reading		2. Suggested Reading
	It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI,		It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI,
	[RFC6480], Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs), [RFC6482], RPKI-based		[RFC6480], Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs), [RFC6482], RPKI-based
	Prefix Validation, [RFC6811], and Origin Validation Clarifications,		Prefix Validation, [RFC6811], and Origin Validation Clarifications,
	[RFC8481].		[RFC8481].
	3. Egress Processing		3. Egress Processing
	BGP implementations supporting RPKI-based origin validation SHOULD		BGP implementations supporting RPKI-based origin validation MUST
	provide the same policy configuration primitives for decisions based		provide the same policy configuration primitives for decisions based
	on validation state available for use in ingress, redistribution, and		on validation state available for use in ingress, redistribution, and
	egress policies. When applied to egress policy, validation state		egress policies. When applied to egress policy, validation state
	MUST be determined using the effective origin AS of the route as it		MUST be determined using the effective origin AS of the route as it
	will (or would) be announced to the peer. The effective origin AS		will (or would) be announced to the peer. The effective origin AS
	may differ from that of the route in the RIB due to commonly		may differ from that of the route in the RIB due to commonly
	available knobs such as: removal of private ASs, AS path		available knobs such as: removal of private ASs, AS path
	manipulation, confederation handling, etc.		manipulation, confederation handling, etc.
	Egress policy handling can provide more robust protection for		Egress policy handling can provide more robust protection for
	outbound eBGP than relying solely on ingress (iBGP, eBGP, connected,		outbound eBGP than relying solely on ingress (iBGP, eBGP, connected,
	static, etc.) redistribution being configured and working correctly -		static, etc.) redistribution being configured and working correctly -
	better support for the robustness principle.		better support for the robustness principle.
	4. Operational Considerations		4. Operational Considerations
	Configurations may have complex policy where the final announced		Configurations may have complex policy where the final announced
	origin AS may not be easily predicted before all policies have been		effective origin AS may not be easily predicted before the outbound
	run. Therefore it SHOULD be possible to specify an origin validation		policies have been run. Therefore it SHOULD be possible to specify
	policy which MUST BE run after such non-deterministic policies.		origin validation policy which will run after all non-validating
			outbound policies.
	An operator SHOULD be able to list what announcements are not sent to		An implementation SHOULD be able to list announcements that were not
	a peer because they were marked Invalid, as long as the router still		sent to a peer, e.g., because they were marked Invalid, as long as
	has them in memory.		the router still has them in memory.
	5. Security Considerations		5. Security Considerations
	This document does not create security considerations beyond those of		This document does not create security considerations beyond those of
	[RFC6811] and [RFC8481].		[RFC6811] and [RFC8481]. By facilitating more correct validation, it
			attempts to improve BGP reliability.
	6. IANA Considerations		6. IANA Considerations
	This document has no IANA Considerations.		This document has no IANA Considerations.
	7. Acknowledgments		7. Acknowledgments
	Thanks to reviewers and comments from Linda Dunbar, Nick Hilliard,		Thanks to reviews and comments from Linda Dunbar, Nick Hilliard,
	Chris Morrow, Keyur Patel, Job Snijders, and Robert Sparks.		Benjamin Kaduk, Chris Morrow, Keyur Patel, Alvaro Retana, Job
			Snijders, Robert Sparks, and Robert Wilton.
	8. References		8. References
	8.1. Normative References		8.1. Normative References
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,		DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
	[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A		[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
	Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,		Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,		DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
			[RFC5065] Traina, P., McPherson, D., and J. Scudder, "Autonomous
			System Confederations for BGP", RFC 5065,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC5065, August 2007,
			<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5065>.
	[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route		[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
	Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,		Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,		DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.
	[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.		[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
	Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,		Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,		DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.
			[RFC7705] George, W. and S. Amante, "Autonomous System Migration
			Mechanisms and Their Effects on the BGP AS_PATH
			Attribute", RFC 7705, DOI 10.17487/RFC7705, November 2015,
			<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7705>.
	[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC		[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
	2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,		2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
	May 2017, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.		May 2017, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
	[RFC8481] Bush, R., "Clarifications to BGP Origin Validation Based		[RFC8481] Bush, R., "Clarifications to BGP Origin Validation Based
	on Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 8481,		on Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 8481,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC8481, September 2018,		DOI 10.17487/RFC8481, September 2018,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8481>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8481>.
	8.2. Informative References		8.2. Informative References
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