draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress-02.txt   draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress-03.txt 
Network Working Group R. Bush Network Working Group R. Bush
Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus
Updates: 6811 (if approved) R. Volk Updates: 6811 (if approved) R. Volk
Intended status: Standards Track Deutsche Telekom Intended status: Standards Track Deutsche Telekom
Expires: September 20, 2020 J. Heitz Expires: October 9, 2020 J. Heitz
Cisco Cisco
March 19, 2020 April 7, 2020
BGP RPKI-Based Origin Validation on Export BGP RPKI-Based Origin Validation on Export
draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress-02 draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress-03
Abstract Abstract
A BGP speaker may perform RPKI origin validation not only on routes A BGP speaker may perform RPKI origin validation not only on routes
received from BGP neighbors and routes that are redistributed from received from BGP neighbors and routes that are redistributed from
other routing protocols, but also on routes it sends to BGP other routing protocols, but also on routes it sends to BGP
neighbors. For egress policy, it is important that the neighbors. For egress policy, it is important that the
classification uses the effective origin AS of the processed route, classification uses the 'effective origin AS' of the processed route,
which may specifically be altered by the commonly available knobs which may specifically be altered by the commonly available knobs
such as removing private ASs, confederation handling, and other such as removing private ASs, confederation handling, and other
modifications of the origin AS. modifications of the origin AS. This document updates [RFC6811].
Requirements Language Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 20, 2020. This Internet-Draft will expire on October 9, 2020.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Egress Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Egress Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document does not change the protocol or semantics of [RFC6811] This document does not change the protocol or semantics of [RFC6811],
of RPKI-based origin validation. It highlights an important use case BGP prefix origin validation. It highlights an important use case of
of origin validation in eBGP egress policies, explaining specifics of origin validation in eBGP egress policies, explaining specifics of
correct implementation in this context. correct implementation in this context.
As the origin AS of a BGP UPDATE is decided by configuration and The term 'effective origin AS' as used in this document refers to the
outbound policy of the BGP speaker, a validating BGP speaker MUST Autonomous System number which is used by [RFC6811] BGP Prefix Origin
apply Route Origin Validation policy semantics against the origin Validation.
Autonomous System number which will actually be put in the AS_PATH
(see [RFC4271] 4.3 Path Attributes:b) of the UPDATE to the peer. As the effective origin AS of a BGP UPDATE is decided by
configuration and outbound policy of the BGP speaker, a validating
BGP speaker MUST apply Route Origin Validation policy semantics (see
[RFC6811] Sec 2 and [RFC8481] Sec 4) against the origin Autonomous
System number which will actually be used by subsequent [RFC6811] BGP
Prefix Origin Validation.
This effective origin AS of the announcement might be affected by This effective origin AS of the announcement might be affected by
removal of private AS(s), confederation, AS migration, etc. Any removal of private ASs, confederation [RFC5065], migration [RFC7705],
AS_PATH modifications resulting in origin AS change MUST be taken etc. Any AS_PATH modifications resulting in effective origin AS
into account. change MUST be taken into account.
This document updates [RFC6811] by clarifying that implementations This document updates [RFC6811] by clarifying that implementations
must use the effective origin AS to determine the Origin Validation must use the effective origin AS to determine the Origin Validation
state when applying egress policy. state when applying egress policy.
2. Suggested Reading 2. Suggested Reading
It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI, It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI,
[RFC6480], Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs), [RFC6482], RPKI-based [RFC6480], Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs), [RFC6482], RPKI-based
Prefix Validation, [RFC6811], and Origin Validation Clarifications, Prefix Validation, [RFC6811], and Origin Validation Clarifications,
[RFC8481]. [RFC8481].
3. Egress Processing 3. Egress Processing
BGP implementations supporting RPKI-based origin validation SHOULD BGP implementations supporting RPKI-based origin validation MUST
provide the same policy configuration primitives for decisions based provide the same policy configuration primitives for decisions based
on validation state available for use in ingress, redistribution, and on validation state available for use in ingress, redistribution, and
egress policies. When applied to egress policy, validation state egress policies. When applied to egress policy, validation state
MUST be determined using the effective origin AS of the route as it MUST be determined using the effective origin AS of the route as it
will (or would) be announced to the peer. The effective origin AS will (or would) be announced to the peer. The effective origin AS
may differ from that of the route in the RIB due to commonly may differ from that of the route in the RIB due to commonly
available knobs such as: removal of private ASs, AS path available knobs such as: removal of private ASs, AS path
manipulation, confederation handling, etc. manipulation, confederation handling, etc.
Egress policy handling can provide more robust protection for Egress policy handling can provide more robust protection for
outbound eBGP than relying solely on ingress (iBGP, eBGP, connected, outbound eBGP than relying solely on ingress (iBGP, eBGP, connected,
static, etc.) redistribution being configured and working correctly - static, etc.) redistribution being configured and working correctly -
better support for the robustness principle. better support for the robustness principle.
4. Operational Considerations 4. Operational Considerations
Configurations may have complex policy where the final announced Configurations may have complex policy where the final announced
origin AS may not be easily predicted before all policies have been effective origin AS may not be easily predicted before the outbound
run. Therefore it SHOULD be possible to specify an origin validation policies have been run. Therefore it SHOULD be possible to specify
policy which MUST BE run after such non-deterministic policies. origin validation policy which will run after all non-validating
outbound policies.
An operator SHOULD be able to list what announcements are not sent to An implementation SHOULD be able to list announcements that were not
a peer because they were marked Invalid, as long as the router still sent to a peer, e.g., because they were marked Invalid, as long as
has them in memory. the router still has them in memory.
5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
This document does not create security considerations beyond those of This document does not create security considerations beyond those of
[RFC6811] and [RFC8481]. [RFC6811] and [RFC8481]. By facilitating more correct validation, it
attempts to improve BGP reliability.
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA Considerations. This document has no IANA Considerations.
7. Acknowledgments 7. Acknowledgments
Thanks to reviewers and comments from Linda Dunbar, Nick Hilliard, Thanks to reviews and comments from Linda Dunbar, Nick Hilliard,
Chris Morrow, Keyur Patel, Job Snijders, and Robert Sparks. Benjamin Kaduk, Chris Morrow, Keyur Patel, Alvaro Retana, Job
Snijders, Robert Sparks, and Robert Wilton.
8. References 8. References
8.1. Normative References 8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006, DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
[RFC5065] Traina, P., McPherson, D., and J. Scudder, "Autonomous
System Confederations for BGP", RFC 5065,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5065, August 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5065>.
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012, DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. [RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013, DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.
[RFC7705] George, W. and S. Amante, "Autonomous System Migration
Mechanisms and Their Effects on the BGP AS_PATH
Attribute", RFC 7705, DOI 10.17487/RFC7705, November 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7705>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8481] Bush, R., "Clarifications to BGP Origin Validation Based [RFC8481] Bush, R., "Clarifications to BGP Origin Validation Based
on Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 8481, on Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 8481,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8481, September 2018, DOI 10.17487/RFC8481, September 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8481>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8481>.
8.2. Informative References 8.2. Informative References
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