draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress-03.txt   draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress-04.txt 
Network Working Group R. Bush Network Working Group R. Bush
Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus
Updates: 6811 (if approved) R. Volk Updates: 6811 (if approved) R. Volk
Intended status: Standards Track Deutsche Telekom Intended status: Standards Track Deutsche Telekom
Expires: October 9, 2020 J. Heitz Expires: October 10, 2020 J. Heitz
Cisco Cisco
April 7, 2020 April 8, 2020
BGP RPKI-Based Origin Validation on Export BGP RPKI-Based Origin Validation on Export
draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress-03 draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress-04
Abstract Abstract
A BGP speaker may perform RPKI origin validation not only on routes A BGP speaker may perform RPKI origin validation not only on routes
received from BGP neighbors and routes that are redistributed from received from BGP neighbors and routes that are redistributed from
other routing protocols, but also on routes it sends to BGP other routing protocols, but also on routes it sends to BGP
neighbors. For egress policy, it is important that the neighbors. For egress policy, it is important that the
classification uses the 'effective origin AS' of the processed route, classification uses the 'effective origin AS' of the processed route,
which may specifically be altered by the commonly available knobs which may specifically be altered by the commonly available knobs
such as removing private ASs, confederation handling, and other such as removing private ASs, confederation handling, and other
skipping to change at page 1, line 48 skipping to change at page 1, line 48
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 9, 2020. This Internet-Draft will expire on October 10, 2020.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
skipping to change at page 2, line 26 skipping to change at page 2, line 26
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Egress Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Egress Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document does not change the protocol or semantics of [RFC6811], This document does not change the protocol or semantics of [RFC6811],
BGP prefix origin validation. It highlights an important use case of BGP prefix origin validation. It highlights an important use case of
origin validation in eBGP egress policies, explaining specifics of origin validation in eBGP egress policies, explaining specifics of
correct implementation in this context. correct implementation in this context.
The term 'effective origin AS' as used in this document refers to the The term 'effective origin AS' as used in this document refers to the
Autonomous System number which is used by [RFC6811] BGP Prefix Origin Route Origin ASN [RFC6811] of the UPDATE to be sent to neighboring
Validation. BGP speakers.
As the effective origin AS of a BGP UPDATE is decided by The effective origin AS of a BGP UPDATE is decided by configuration
configuration and outbound policy of the BGP speaker, a validating and outbound policy of the BGP speaker. A validating BGP speaker
BGP speaker MUST apply Route Origin Validation policy semantics (see MUST apply Route Origin Validation policy semantics (see [RFC6811]
[RFC6811] Sec 2 and [RFC8481] Sec 4) against the origin Autonomous Sec 2 and [RFC8481] Sec 4) after applying any egress configuration
System number which will actually be used by subsequent [RFC6811] BGP and policy.
Prefix Origin Validation.
This effective origin AS of the announcement might be affected by This effective origin AS of the announcement might be affected by
removal of private ASs, confederation [RFC5065], migration [RFC7705], removal of private ASs, confederation [RFC5065], migration [RFC7705],
etc. Any AS_PATH modifications resulting in effective origin AS etc. Any AS_PATH modifications resulting in effective origin AS
change MUST be taken into account. change MUST be taken into account.
This document updates [RFC6811] by clarifying that implementations This document updates [RFC6811] by clarifying that implementations
must use the effective origin AS to determine the Origin Validation must use the effective origin AS to determine the Origin Validation
state when applying egress policy. state when applying egress policy.
skipping to change at page 3, line 40 skipping to change at page 3, line 37
available knobs such as: removal of private ASs, AS path available knobs such as: removal of private ASs, AS path
manipulation, confederation handling, etc. manipulation, confederation handling, etc.
Egress policy handling can provide more robust protection for Egress policy handling can provide more robust protection for
outbound eBGP than relying solely on ingress (iBGP, eBGP, connected, outbound eBGP than relying solely on ingress (iBGP, eBGP, connected,
static, etc.) redistribution being configured and working correctly - static, etc.) redistribution being configured and working correctly -
better support for the robustness principle. better support for the robustness principle.
4. Operational Considerations 4. Operational Considerations
Configurations may have complex policy where the final announced Configurations may have complex policy where the effective origin AS
effective origin AS may not be easily predicted before the outbound may not be easily determined before the outbound policies have been
policies have been run. Therefore it SHOULD be possible to specify run. It SHOULD be possible to specify a selective origin validation
origin validation policy which will run after all non-validating policy to be applied after any existing non-validating outbound
outbound policies. policies.
An implementation SHOULD be able to list announcements that were not An implementation SHOULD be able to list announcements that were not
sent to a peer, e.g., because they were marked Invalid, as long as sent to a peer, e.g., because they were marked Invalid, as long as
the router still has them in memory. the router still has them in memory.
5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
This document does not create security considerations beyond those of This document does not create security considerations beyond those of
[RFC6811] and [RFC8481]. By facilitating more correct validation, it [RFC6811] and [RFC8481]. By facilitating more correct validation, it
attempts to improve BGP reliability. attempts to improve BGP reliability.
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA Considerations. This document has no IANA Considerations.
7. Acknowledgments 7. Acknowledgments
Thanks to reviews and comments from Linda Dunbar, Nick Hilliard, Thanks to reviews and comments from Linda Dunbar, Nick Hilliard,
Benjamin Kaduk, Chris Morrow, Keyur Patel, Alvaro Retana, Job Benjamin Kaduk, Chris Morrow, Keyur Patel, Alvaro Retana, Alvaro
Snijders, Robert Sparks, and Robert Wilton. Retana, Job Snijders, Robert Sparks, and Robert Wilton.
8. References 8. References
8.1. Normative References 8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
 End of changes. 9 change blocks. 
20 lines changed or deleted 19 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.47. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/