draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress-04.txt   rfc8893.txt 
Network Working Group R. Bush Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) R. Bush
Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus Request for Comments: 8893 Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus
Updates: 6811 (if approved) R. Volk Updates: 6811 R. Volk
Intended status: Standards Track Deutsche Telekom Category: Standards Track
Expires: October 10, 2020 J. Heitz ISSN: 2070-1721 J. Heitz
Cisco Cisco
April 8, 2020 September 2020
BGP RPKI-Based Origin Validation on Export Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Origin Validation for BGP
draft-ietf-sidrops-ov-egress-04 Export
Abstract Abstract
A BGP speaker may perform RPKI origin validation not only on routes A BGP speaker may perform Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
received from BGP neighbors and routes that are redistributed from origin validation not only on routes received from BGP neighbors and
other routing protocols, but also on routes it sends to BGP routes that are redistributed from other routing protocols, but also
neighbors. For egress policy, it is important that the on routes it sends to BGP neighbors. For egress policy, it is
classification uses the 'effective origin AS' of the processed route, important that the classification use the 'effective origin AS' of
which may specifically be altered by the commonly available knobs the processed route, which may specifically be altered by the
such as removing private ASs, confederation handling, and other commonly available knobs, such as removing private ASes,
modifications of the origin AS. This document updates [RFC6811]. confederation handling, and other modifications of the origin AS.
This document updates RFC 6811.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This is an Internet Standards Track document.
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference received public review and has been approved for publication by the
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 10, 2020. Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8893.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction
2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Suggested Reading
3. Egress Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Egress Processing
4. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. Operational Considerations
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5. Security Considerations
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6. IANA Considerations
7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7. References
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7.1. Normative References
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7.2. Informative References
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Acknowledgments
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Authors' Addresses
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document does not change the protocol or semantics of [RFC6811], This document does not change the protocol or semantics of [RFC6811],
BGP prefix origin validation. It highlights an important use case of BGP prefix origin validation. It highlights an important use case of
origin validation in eBGP egress policies, explaining specifics of origin validation in external BGP (eBGP) egress policies, explaining
correct implementation in this context. specifics of correct implementation in this context.
The term 'effective origin AS' as used in this document refers to the The term 'effective origin AS' as used in this document refers to the
Route Origin ASN [RFC6811] of the UPDATE to be sent to neighboring Route Origin Autonomous System Number (ASN) [RFC6811] of the UPDATE
BGP speakers. to be sent to neighboring BGP speakers.
The effective origin AS of a BGP UPDATE is decided by configuration The effective origin AS of a BGP UPDATE is decided by configuration
and outbound policy of the BGP speaker. A validating BGP speaker and outbound policy of the BGP speaker. A validating BGP speaker
MUST apply Route Origin Validation policy semantics (see [RFC6811] MUST apply Route Origin Validation policy semantics (see Section 2 of
Sec 2 and [RFC8481] Sec 4) after applying any egress configuration [RFC6811] and Section 4 of [RFC8481]) after applying any egress
and policy. configuration and policy.
This effective origin AS of the announcement might be affected by This effective origin AS of the announcement might be affected by
removal of private ASs, confederation [RFC5065], migration [RFC7705], removal of private ASes, confederation [RFC5065], migration
etc. Any AS_PATH modifications resulting in effective origin AS [RFC7705], etc. Any AS_PATH modifications resulting in effective
change MUST be taken into account. origin AS change MUST be taken into account.
This document updates [RFC6811] by clarifying that implementations This document updates [RFC6811] by clarifying that implementations
must use the effective origin AS to determine the Origin Validation must use the effective origin AS to determine the Origin Validation
state when applying egress policy. state when applying egress policy.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
2. Suggested Reading 2. Suggested Reading
It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI, It is assumed that the reader understands BGP [RFC4271], the RPKI
[RFC6480], Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs), [RFC6482], RPKI-based [RFC6480], Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) [RFC6482], RPKI-based
Prefix Validation, [RFC6811], and Origin Validation Clarifications, Prefix Validation [RFC6811], and Origin Validation Clarifications
[RFC8481]. [RFC8481].
3. Egress Processing 3. Egress Processing
BGP implementations supporting RPKI-based origin validation MUST BGP implementations supporting RPKI-based origin validation MUST
provide the same policy configuration primitives for decisions based provide the same policy configuration primitives for decisions based
on validation state available for use in ingress, redistribution, and on the validation state available for use in ingress, redistribution,
egress policies. When applied to egress policy, validation state and egress policies. When applied to egress policy, validation state
MUST be determined using the effective origin AS of the route as it MUST be determined using the effective origin AS of the route as it
will (or would) be announced to the peer. The effective origin AS will (or would) be announced to the peer. The effective origin AS
may differ from that of the route in the RIB due to commonly may differ from that of the route in the RIB due to commonly
available knobs such as: removal of private ASs, AS path available knobs, such as removal of private ASes, AS path
manipulation, confederation handling, etc. manipulation, confederation handling, etc.
Egress policy handling can provide more robust protection for Egress policy handling can provide more robust protection for
outbound eBGP than relying solely on ingress (iBGP, eBGP, connected, outbound eBGP than relying solely on ingress (iBGP, eBGP, connected,
static, etc.) redistribution being configured and working correctly - static, etc.) redistribution being configured and working correctly
better support for the robustness principle. -- i.e., better support for the robustness principle.
4. Operational Considerations 4. Operational Considerations
Configurations may have complex policy where the effective origin AS Configurations may have a complex policy where the effective origin
may not be easily determined before the outbound policies have been AS may not be easily determined before the outbound policies have
run. It SHOULD be possible to specify a selective origin validation been run. It SHOULD be possible to specify a selective origin
policy to be applied after any existing non-validating outbound validation policy to be applied after any existing non-validating
policies. outbound policies.
An implementation SHOULD be able to list announcements that were not An implementation SHOULD be able to list announcements that were not
sent to a peer, e.g., because they were marked Invalid, as long as sent to a peer, e.g., because they were marked Invalid, as long as
the router still has them in memory. the router still has them in memory.
5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
This document does not create security considerations beyond those of This document does not create security considerations beyond those of
[RFC6811] and [RFC8481]. By facilitating more correct validation, it [RFC6811] and [RFC8481]. By facilitating more correct validation, it
attempts to improve BGP reliability. attempts to improve BGP reliability.
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA Considerations. This document has no IANA actions.
7. Acknowledgments
Thanks to reviews and comments from Linda Dunbar, Nick Hilliard,
Benjamin Kaduk, Chris Morrow, Keyur Patel, Alvaro Retana, Alvaro
Retana, Job Snijders, Robert Sparks, and Robert Wilton.
8. References 7. References
8.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006, DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
[RFC5065] Traina, P., McPherson, D., and J. Scudder, "Autonomous [RFC5065] Traina, P., McPherson, D., and J. Scudder, "Autonomous
System Confederations for BGP", RFC 5065, System Confederations for BGP", RFC 5065,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5065, August 2007, DOI 10.17487/RFC5065, August 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5065>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5065>.
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012, DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. [RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013, DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.
[RFC7705] George, W. and S. Amante, "Autonomous System Migration [RFC7705] George, W. and S. Amante, "Autonomous System Migration
Mechanisms and Their Effects on the BGP AS_PATH Mechanisms and Their Effects on the BGP AS_PATH
Attribute", RFC 7705, DOI 10.17487/RFC7705, November 2015, Attribute", RFC 7705, DOI 10.17487/RFC7705, November 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7705>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7705>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8481] Bush, R., "Clarifications to BGP Origin Validation Based [RFC8481] Bush, R., "Clarifications to BGP Origin Validation Based
on Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 8481, on Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 8481,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8481, September 2018, DOI 10.17487/RFC8481, September 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8481>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8481>.
8.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480, Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>. February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
Acknowledgments
Thanks to reviews and comments from Linda Dunbar, Nick Hilliard,
Benjamin Kaduk, Chris Morrow, Keyur Patel, Alvaro Retana, Job
Snijders, Robert Sparks, and Robert Wilton.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Randy Bush Randy Bush
Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus Internet Initiative Japan & Arrcus
5147 Crystal Springs 5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 Bainbridge Island, WA 98110
US United States of America
Email: randy@psg.com Email: randy@psg.com
Ruediger Volk RĂ¼diger Volk
Deutsche Telekom
Email: rv@nic.dtag.de Email: ietf@rewvolk.de
Jakob Heitz Jakob Heitz
Cisco Cisco
170 West Tasman Drive 170 West Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95134 San Jose, CA 95134
USA United States of America
Email: jheitz@cisco.com Email: jheitz@cisco.com
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