draft-ietf-sidrops-route-server-rpki-light-00.txt   draft-ietf-sidrops-route-server-rpki-light-01.txt 
Network Working Group T. King Network Working Group T. King
Internet-Draft D. Kopp Internet-Draft D. Kopp
Intended status: Standards Track DE-CIX Intended status: Standards Track DE-CIX
Expires: July 17, 2017 A. Lambrianidis Expires: July 20, 2017 A. Lambrianidis
AMS-IX AMS-IX
A. Fenioux A. Fenioux
France-IX France-IX
January 13, 2017 January 16, 2017
Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from a Route-Server to Peers Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from a Route-Server to Peers
draft-ietf-sidrops-route-server-rpki-light-00 draft-ietf-sidrops-route-server-rpki-light-01
Abstract Abstract
This document defines the usage of the BGP Prefix Origin Validation This document defines the usage of the BGP Prefix Origin Validation
State Extended Community [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling] State Extended Community [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling]
to signal prefix origin validation results from a route-server to its to signal prefix origin validation results from a route-server to its
peers. Upon reception of prefix origin validation results peers can peers. Upon reception of prefix origin validation results peers can
use this information in their local routing decision process. use this information in their local routing decision process.
Requirements Language Requirements Language
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 17, 2017. This Internet-Draft will expire on July 20, 2017.
Internet-DrafSignaling Prefix Origin Validation Results fro January 2017 Internet-DrafSignaling Prefix Origin Validation Results fro January 2017
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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Table 1 Table 1
This encoding is re-used. Route-servers providing RPKI-based prefix This encoding is re-used. Route-servers providing RPKI-based prefix
origin validation set the validation state according to the prefix origin validation set the validation state according to the prefix
origin validation result (see [RFC6811]). origin validation result (see [RFC6811]).
3. Operational Recommendations 3. Operational Recommendations
3.1. Local Routing Decision Process 3.1. Local Routing Decision Process
A peer receiving prefix origin validation results from the route A peer receiving prefix origin validation results from the route-
server MAY use the information in its own local routing decision server MAY use the information in its own local routing decision
process. The local routing decision process SHOULD apply to the process. The local routing decision process SHOULD apply to the
rules as described in section 5 [RFC6811]. rules as described in section 5 [RFC6811].
A peer receiving a prefix origin validation result from the route A peer receiving a prefix origin validation result from the route-
server MAY redistribute this information within its own AS. server MAY redistribute this information within its own AS.
3.2. Route-Server Receiving the BGP Prefix Origin Validation State 3.2. Route-Server Receiving the BGP Prefix Origin Validation State
Extended Community Extended Community
An IXP route-server receiving routes from its peers containing the An IXP route-server receiving routes from its peers containing the
BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community MUST remove the BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community MUST remove the
extended community before the route is re-distributed to its peers. extended community before the route is re-distributed to its peers.
This is required regardless of whether the route-server is executing This is required regardless of whether the route-server is executing
prefix origin validation or not. prefix origin validation or not.
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consider the largest value (as described in Table 1) in the consider the largest value (as described in Table 1) in the
validation result field and disregard the other values. Values validation result field and disregard the other values. Values
larger than two in the validation result field MUST be disregarded. larger than two in the validation result field MUST be disregarded.
4. IANA Considerations 4. IANA Considerations
None. None.
5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
A route-server could be misused to spread malicious prefix origin All security considerations described in RFC RFC6811 [RFC6811] fully
validation results. However, peers have to trust the route-server apply to this document.
anyway as it collects and redistributes BGP routing information to
Additionally, threat agents polluting ROA cache server(s) run by IXPs
can cause significant operational impact, since multiple route-server
clients could be affected. Peers should be vigilant as to the
integrity and authenticity of the origin validation results, as they
are provided by a third party, namely the IXP hosting both the route-
server as well as any ROA cache server(s).
Therefore, a route-server could be misused to spread malicious prefix
origin validation results. However, peers already trust route-server
for the collection and redistribution of BGP routing information to
other peers. other peers.
To countermeasure DDoS attacks, it is widespread to provide Similar issues may arise due to inadvertent corruption of the ROA
blackholing services at IXPs (see RFC 7999 [RFC7999]). Peers are cache database.
using blackholing to drop traffic, typically by announcing smaller
subnets, which are unter attack. Assuming, for practical reasons,
peers will not reflect these announcements in their ROAs. In such
situations, the RPKI validation status for a prefixes, providing a
ROA, would be "Invalid". Given that other peers evaluating the RPKI
status, this leads to a degradation of prefixes being blackholed.
It's recommended that peers validating the RPKI status use a adopted
classification for such prefixes.
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To facilitate trust and help with peers establishing appropriate
controls in mitigating the risks mentioned above, IXPs SHOULD provide
out-of-band means for peers to ensure that the ROA validation process
has not been compromised or corrupted.
To countermeasure DDoS attacks, it is common practice to make use of
blackholing services (see RFC 7999 [RFC7999]). Peers are using
blackholing to drop traffic, typically by announcing a more specific
prefix, which is under attack. If no ROA entry exists for the more
specific prefix, its validation status would be "Invalid". This
might be undesirable, in which case it would be recommended for
targeted peers to either create the appropriate ROA entry as
necessary, or use adopted classification for such more specific
prefixes.
The introduction of a mechanisms described in this document does not The introduction of a mechanisms described in this document does not
pose a new class of attack vectors to the relationship between route- pose a new class of attack vectors to the relationship between route-
servers and peers. servers and peers.
6. References 6. References
6.1. Normative References 6.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
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DOI 10.17487/RFC7999, October 2016, DOI 10.17487/RFC7999, October 2016,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7999>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7999>.
6.2. Informative References 6.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-idr-ix-bgp-route-server] [I-D.ietf-idr-ix-bgp-route-server]
Jasinska, E., Hilliard, N., Raszuk, R., and N. Bakker, Jasinska, E., Hilliard, N., Raszuk, R., and N. Bakker,
"Internet Exchange BGP Route Server", draft-ietf-idr-ix- "Internet Exchange BGP Route Server", draft-ietf-idr-ix-
bgp-route-server-12 (work in progress), June 2016. bgp-route-server-12 (work in progress), June 2016.
Internet-DrafSignaling Prefix Origin Validation Results fro January 2017
[I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling] [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling]
Mohapatra, P., Patel, K., Scudder, J., Ward, D., and R. Mohapatra, P., Patel, K., Scudder, J., Ward, D., and R.
Bush, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Bush, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended
Community", draft-ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling-07 Community", draft-ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling-07
(work in progress), November 2015. (work in progress), November 2015.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480, Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>. February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
Internet-DrafSignaling Prefix Origin Validation Results fro January 2017
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Thomas King Thomas King
DE-CIX Management GmbH DE-CIX Management GmbH
Lichtstrasse 43i Lichtstrasse 43i
Cologne 50825 Cologne 50825
DE DE
Email: thomas.king@de-cix.net Email: thomas.king@de-cix.net
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