draft-ietf-sidrops-route-server-rpki-light-01.txt   draft-ietf-sidrops-route-server-rpki-light-02.txt 
Network Working Group T. King Network Working Group T. King
Internet-Draft D. Kopp Internet-Draft D. Kopp
Intended status: Standards Track DE-CIX Intended status: Standards Track DE-CIX
Expires: July 20, 2017 A. Lambrianidis Expires: October 12, 2017 A. Lambrianidis
AMS-IX AMS-IX
A. Fenioux A. Fenioux
France-IX France-IX
January 16, 2017 April 10, 2017
Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from a Route-Server to Peers Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from a Route Server to Peers
draft-ietf-sidrops-route-server-rpki-light-01 draft-ietf-sidrops-route-server-rpki-light-02
Abstract Abstract
This document defines the usage of the BGP Prefix Origin Validation This document defines the usage of the BGP Prefix Origin Validation
State Extended Community [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling] State Extended Community [RFC8097] to signal prefix origin validation
to signal prefix origin validation results from a route-server to its results from a route server to its peers. Upon reception of prefix
peers. Upon reception of prefix origin validation results peers can origin validation results peers can use this information in their
use this information in their local routing decision process. local routing decision process.
Requirements Language Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to
be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] only when they appear in all be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] only when they appear in all
upper case. They may also appear in lower or mixed case as English upper case. They may also appear in lower or mixed case as English
words, without normative meaning. words, without normative meaning.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
skipping to change at page 1, line 46 skipping to change at page 1, line 46
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 20, 2017. This Internet-Draft will expire on October 12, 2017.
Internet-DrafSignaling Prefix Origin Validation Results fro January 2017
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from a Route- 2. BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Utilized at Route-Servers 3
Server to Peers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from a Route
3. Operational Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Server to Peers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Local Routing Decision Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. Operational Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Route-Server Receiving the BGP Prefix Origin Validation 4.1. Local Routing Decision Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
State Extended Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4.2. Route Server Receiving the BGP Prefix Origin Validation
3.3. Information about Validity of a BGP Prefix Origin Not State Extended Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Available at a Route-Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4.3. Information about Validity of a BGP Prefix Origin Not
3.4. Error Handling at Peers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Available at a Route-Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4.4. Error Handling at Peers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
RPKI-based prefix origin validation [RFC6480] can be a significant RPKI-based prefix origin validation [RFC6480] can be a significant
operational burden for BGP peers to implement and adopt. In order to operational burden for BGP peers to implement and adopt. In order to
boost acceptance and usage of prefix origin validation and ultimately boost acceptance and usage of prefix origin validation and ultimately
increase the security of the Internet routing system, IXPs may increase the security of the Internet routing system, IXPs may
provide RPKI-based prefix origin validation at the route-server provide RPKI-based prefix origin validation at the route server
[I-D.ietf-idr-ix-bgp-route-server]. The result of this prefix origin [RFC7947]. The result of this prefix origin validation is signaled
validation is signaled to peers by using the BGP Prefix Origin to peers by using the BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended
Validation State Extended Community as introduced in Community as introduced in [RFC8097].
[I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling].
Peers receiving the prefix origin validation result from the route- Peers receiving the prefix origin validation result from the route
server(s) can use this information in their local routing decision server(s) can use this information in their local routing decision
Internet-DrafSignaling Prefix Origin Validation Results fro January 2017
process for acceptance, rejection, preference, or other traffic process for acceptance, rejection, preference, or other traffic
engineering purposes of a particular route. engineering purposes of a particular route.
2. Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from a Route-Server to 2. BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Utilized at Route-Servers
A route server that is aware of a BGP Prefix Origin Validation state
for a certain route can handle this information in one of the
following modes of operation:
Simple Tagging: The prefix origin validation state is tagged to the
route as described in Section 3.
This mode of operation is like the tradional way route servers
work, however, the prefix origin validation state information is
additionally available for peers.
Dropping and Tagging: Routes for which the prefix origin validation
state is "invalid" (according to [RFC6811]) are dropped by the
route server. Routes which show a prefix origin validation state
of "not found" and "valid" (according to [RFC6811]) are tagged
accordingly to Section 3.
Security is higher rated than questionable reachability of a
prefix by this mode of operation.
Prioritizing and Tagging: If the route server learned for a
particular prefix more than one route it removes firstly the set
of "invalid" routes and secondly the "not found" routes unless
the set of routes is empty. Based on the set of routes left over
the BGP best path section algorithm is executed. The selected
route is marked accordinly to Section 3.
The BGP best path selection algorithm is changed by this mode of
operation in such a way that "valid" routes are preferred even if
they are unfavorable by the traditional best path selection
algorithm. This puts prefix origin validation on top of the best
path selection.
A route server MUST support the Simple Tagging mode of operation.
Other modes of operation are OPTIONAL. The mode of operation MAY be
configured by the route server operator for a route server instance
or for each BGP session with a peer seperately.
These mode of operations might be used in combination with [RFC7911]
in order to allow a peer to receive all routes and take the routing
decision by itself.
3. Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from a Route Server to
Peers Peers
The BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community (as defined The BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community (as defined
in [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling]) is utilized for in [RFC8097]) is utilized for signaling prefix origin validation
signaling prefix origin validation result from a route-server to result from a route server to peers.
peers.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling] proposes an encoding of [RFC8097] proposes an encoding of the prefix origin validation result
the prefix origin validation result [RFC6811] as follows: [RFC6811] as follows:
+-------+-----------+ +-------+-----------------------------+
| Value | Meaning | | Value | Meaning |
+-------+-----------+ +-------+-----------------------------+
| 0 | Valid | | 0 | Lookup result = "valid" |
| 1 | Not found | | 1 | Lookup result = "not found" |
| 2 | Invalid | | 2 | Lookup result = "invalid" |
+-------+-----------+ +-------+-----------------------------+
Table 1 Table 1
This encoding is re-used. Route-servers providing RPKI-based prefix This encoding is re-used. Route servers providing RPKI-based prefix
origin validation set the validation state according to the prefix origin validation set the validation state according to the prefix
origin validation result (see [RFC6811]). origin validation result (see [RFC6811]).
3. Operational Recommendations 4. Operational Recommendations
3.1. Local Routing Decision Process 4.1. Local Routing Decision Process
A peer receiving prefix origin validation results from the route- A peer receiving prefix origin validation results from the route
server MAY use the information in its own local routing decision server MAY use the information in its own local routing decision
process. The local routing decision process SHOULD apply to the process. The local routing decision process SHOULD apply to the
rules as described in section 5 [RFC6811]. rules as described in section 5 [RFC6811].
A peer receiving a prefix origin validation result from the route- A peer receiving a prefix origin validation result from the route
server MAY redistribute this information within its own AS. server MAY redistribute this information within its own AS.
3.2. Route-Server Receiving the BGP Prefix Origin Validation State 4.2. Route Server Receiving the BGP Prefix Origin Validation State
Extended Community Extended Community
An IXP route-server receiving routes from its peers containing the An IXP route server receiving routes from its peers containing the
BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community MUST remove the BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community MUST remove the
extended community before the route is re-distributed to its peers. extended community before the route is re-distributed to its peers.
This is required regardless of whether the route-server is executing This is required regardless of whether the route server is executing
prefix origin validation or not. prefix origin validation or not.
Internet-DrafSignaling Prefix Origin Validation Results fro January 2017
Failure to do so would allow opportunistic peers to advertise routes Failure to do so would allow opportunistic peers to advertise routes
tagged with arbitrary prefix origin validation results via a route- tagged with arbitrary prefix origin validation results via a route
server, influencing maliciously the decision process of other route- server, influencing maliciously the decision process of other route
server peers. server peers.
3.3. Information about Validity of a BGP Prefix Origin Not Available at 4.3. Information about Validity of a BGP Prefix Origin Not Available at
a Route-Server a Route-Server
In case information about the validity of a BGP prefix origin is not In case information about the validity of a BGP prefix origin is not
available at the route-server (e.g., error in the ROA cache, CPU available at the route server (e.g., error in the ROA cache, CPU
overload) the route-server MUST NOT add the BGP Prefix Origin overload) the route server MUST NOT add the BGP Prefix Origin
Validation State Extended Community to the route. Validation State Extended Community to the route.
3.4. Error Handling at Peers 4.4. Error Handling at Peers
A route sent by a route-server SHOULD only contain none or one BGP A route sent by a route server SHOULD only contain none or one BGP
Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community. Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community.
A peer receiving a route from a route-server containing more than one A peer receiving a route from a route server containing more than one
BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community SHOULD only BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community SHOULD only
consider the largest value (as described in Table 1) in the consider the largest value (as described in Table 1) in the
validation result field and disregard the other values. Values validation result field and disregard the other values. Values
larger than two in the validation result field MUST be disregarded. larger than two in the validation result field MUST be disregarded.
4. IANA Considerations 5. IANA Considerations
None. None.
5. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
All security considerations described in RFC RFC6811 [RFC6811] fully All security considerations described in RFC RFC6811 [RFC6811] fully
apply to this document. apply to this document.
Additionally, threat agents polluting ROA cache server(s) run by IXPs Additionally, threat agents polluting ROA cache server(s) run by IXP
can cause significant operational impact, since multiple route-server operators could cause significant operational impact, since multiple
clients could be affected. Peers should be vigilant as to the route server clients could be affected. Peers should be vigilant as
integrity and authenticity of the origin validation results, as they to the integrity and authenticity of the origin validation results,
are provided by a third party, namely the IXP hosting both the route- as they are provided by a third party, namely the IXP operator
server as well as any ROA cache server(s). hosting both the route server as well as any ROA cache server(s).
Therefore, a route-server could be misused to spread malicious prefix
origin validation results. However, peers already trust route-server
for the collection and redistribution of BGP routing information to
other peers.
Similar issues may arise due to inadvertent corruption of the ROA
cache database.
Internet-DrafSignaling Prefix Origin Validation Results fro January 2017 Therefore, a route server could be misused to spread malicious prefix
origin validation results. However, peers already trust the route
server for the collection, filtering (e.g. IRR database filtering),
and redistribution of BGP routing information to other peers. So, no
change in the trust level is needed for this proposal.
To facilitate trust and help with peers establishing appropriate To facilitate trust and help with peers establishing appropriate
controls in mitigating the risks mentioned above, IXPs SHOULD provide controls in mitigating the risks mentioned above, IXPs SHOULD provide
out-of-band means for peers to ensure that the ROA validation process out-of-band means for peers to ensure that the ROA validation process
has not been compromised or corrupted. has not been compromised or corrupted.
To countermeasure DDoS attacks, it is common practice to make use of While beeing under DDoS attacks, it is a common practice for peers
blackholing services (see RFC 7999 [RFC7999]). Peers are using connected to an IXP to make use of blackholing services (see
blackholing to drop traffic, typically by announcing a more specific [RFC7999]). Peers are using blackholing to drop traffic, typically
prefix, which is under attack. If no ROA entry exists for the more by announcing a more specific prefix, which is under attack. A peer
specific prefix, its validation status would be "Invalid". This SHOULD make sure that this prefix is covered by an appropriate ROA.
might be undesirable, in which case it would be recommended for
targeted peers to either create the appropriate ROA entry as
necessary, or use adopted classification for such more specific
prefixes.
The introduction of a mechanisms described in this document does not
pose a new class of attack vectors to the relationship between route-
servers and peers.
6. References 7. References
6.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4360] Sangli, S., Tappan, D., and Y. Rekhter, "BGP Extended [RFC4360] Sangli, S., Tappan, D., and Y. Rekhter, "BGP Extended
Communities Attribute", RFC 4360, DOI 10.17487/RFC4360, Communities Attribute", RFC 4360, DOI 10.17487/RFC4360,
February 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4360>. February 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4360>.
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. [RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013, DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.
[RFC7999] King, T., Dietzel, C., Snijders, J., Doering, G., and G. [RFC7911] Walton, D., Retana, A., Chen, E., and J. Scudder,
Hankins, "BLACKHOLE Community", RFC 7999, "Advertisement of Multiple Paths in BGP", RFC 7911,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7999, October 2016, DOI 10.17487/RFC7911, July 2016,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7999>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7911>.
6.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-idr-ix-bgp-route-server]
Jasinska, E., Hilliard, N., Raszuk, R., and N. Bakker,
"Internet Exchange BGP Route Server", draft-ietf-idr-ix-
bgp-route-server-12 (work in progress), June 2016.
Internet-DrafSignaling Prefix Origin Validation Results fro January 2017
[I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling] [RFC8097] Mohapatra, P., Patel, K., Scudder, J., Ward, D., and R.
Mohapatra, P., Patel, K., Scudder, J., Ward, D., and R.
Bush, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Bush, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended
Community", draft-ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling-07 Community", RFC 8097, DOI 10.17487/RFC8097, March 2017,
(work in progress), November 2015. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8097>.
7.2. Informative References
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480, Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>. February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
[RFC7947] Jasinska, E., Hilliard, N., Raszuk, R., and N. Bakker,
"Internet Exchange BGP Route Server", RFC 7947,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7947, September 2016,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7947>.
[RFC7999] King, T., Dietzel, C., Snijders, J., Doering, G., and G.
Hankins, "BLACKHOLE Community", RFC 7999,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7999, October 2016,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7999>.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Thomas King Thomas King
DE-CIX Management GmbH DE-CIX Management GmbH
Lichtstrasse 43i Lichtstrasse 43i
Cologne 50825 Cologne 50825
DE DE
Email: thomas.king@de-cix.net Email: thomas.king@de-cix.net
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