SIPCORE                                                        E. Burger
Internet-Draft                                     Georgetown University
Intended status: Standards Track                         August 21,                       November 25, 2018
Expires: February 22, May 29, 2019

  A Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Response Code for Rejected Calls


   This document defines the 608 (Rejected) SIP response code.  This
   response code enables calling parties to learn their call was
   rejected by an intermediary and will not be answered.  As a 6xx code,
   the caller will be aware that future attempts to contact the same UAS
   will be likely to fail.  The present use case driving the need for
   the 608 response code is when the intermediary is an analytics
   engine.  In this case, the rejection is by a machine or other
   process.  This contrasts with the 607 (Unwanted) SIP response code,
   which a human at the target UAS indicated the call was not wanted.
   In some jurisdictions this distinction is important and may have
   additional requirements beyond the 607 response code.  Specifically,
   this important.  This document
   defines the use of the Call-Info header in 608 responses to enable
   rejected callers to contact entities that blocked their calls in

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   3.  Protocol Operation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.1.  Intermediary Operation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.2.  UAC Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.3.  Legacy Interoperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.4.  Announcement Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   4.  Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     5.1.  SIP Response Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     5.2.  SIP Feature-Capability Indicator  . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   7.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19

1.  Introduction

   The IETF has been addressing numerous issues surrounding how to
   handle unwanted and, depending on the jurisdiction, illegal calls
   [RFC5039].  Technologies such as STIR [RFC7340] and SHAKEN [SHAKEN]
   address cryptographic signing and attestation, respectively, of
   signaling to ensure the integrity and authenticity of the asserted

   This document describes a new SIP response code, 608, which allows
   calling parties to learn an intermediary rejected their call.  As
   described below, we need a distinct indicator to differentiate
   between a user rejection and an intermediary's rejection of a call.
   In some jurisdictions, calls, even if unwanted by the user, may not
   be blocked unless there is an explicit user request.  Moreover, users
   may misidentify the nature of a caller.  For example, a legitimate
   caller may call a user who finds the call to be unwanted.  However,
   instead of marking the call as unwanted, the user may mark the call
   as illegal.  With that information, an analytics engine may determine
   that all calls from that source should be blocked.  However, in some
   jurisdictions blocking calls from that source for other users may not
   be legal.  Likewise, one can envision jurisdictions that allow an
   operator to block such calls, but only if there is a remediation
   mechanism in place to address false positives.

   Some call blocking services may return responses such as 604 (Does
   Not Exist Anywhere).  This might be a strategy to attempt to get a
   destination's address removed from a calling database.  However,
   other network elements might interpret this to mean the user truly
   does not exist and result in the user not being able to receive calls
   from anyone, even if wanted.  As well, in many jurisdictions,
   providing false signaling is illegal.

   The 608 response code addresses this need of remediating falsely
   blocked calls.  Specifically, this code informs the UAC an
   intermediary blocked the call and, to satisfy some jurisdictional
   requirements for providing a redress mechanism, how to contact the
   operator of the intermediary.

   In the call handling ecosystem, users can explicitly reject a call or
   later mark a call as being unwanted by issuing a 607 SIP response
   code (Unwanted) [RFC8197].  Figure 1 and Figure 2 shows the operation
   of the 607 SIP response code.  The UAS indicates the call was
   unwanted.  As RFC8197 explains, not only does the called party desire
   to reject that call, they may wish to let their proxy know they might
   consider future calls from that source unwanted. unwanted by responding to the
   request with the 607 response.  Upon receipt of the 607 response from
   the UAS, the proxy may send call information to a call analytics
   engine.  For various reasons described in RFC8197, if a network
   operator receives multiple reports of unwanted calls, that may
   indicate the entity placing the calls is likely to be a source of
   unwanted calls for many people.  As such, other users of the service
   provider's service may wish the service provider to automatically
   reject calls on their behalf based on that and other analytics.

   Another value of the 607 rejection is presuming the proxy forwards
   the response code to the UAC, the calling UAC or intervening proxies
   will also learn the user is not interested in receiving calls from
   that sender.

                         |   Call    |
                         | Analytics |
                         |  Engine   |
                            ^     | (likely not SIP)
                            |     v
      +-----+    607     |  Called   |    607    +-----+
      | UAC | <--------- |  Party    | <-------- | UAS |
      +-----+            |  Proxy    |           +-----+

                    Figure 1: Unwanted (607) Call Flow

   For calls rejected with a 607 from a legitimate caller, receiving a
   607 response code can inform the caller to stop attempting to call
   the user.  Moreover, if the legitimate caller believes the user is
   rejecting their calls in error, they can use other channels to
   contact the user.  For example, if a pharmacy calls a user to let
   them know their prescription is available for pickup and the user
   mistakenly thinks the call is unwanted and issues a 607 response
   code, the pharmacy, having an existing relationship with the
   customer, can send the user an email, also noting they the customer might
   consider not rejecting their calls in the future.

   Moreover, many systems that allow the user to mark the call unwanted
   (e.g., with the 607 response code) also allow the user to change
   their mind and unmark such calls.  This is relatively easy to
   implement as the user usually has a direct relationship with the
   provider of the blocking service.

                       +--------+         +-----------+
                       | Called |         |   Call    |
      +-----+          | Party  |         | Analytics |   +-----+
      | UAC |          | Proxy  |         |  Engine   |   | UAS |
      +-----+          +--------+         +-----------+   +-----+
         |  INVITE         |                    |            |
         | --------------> |  INVITE            |            |
         |                 | ------------------------------> |
         |                 |                    |            |
         |                 |                    |       607  |
         |                 | <------------------------------ |
         |                 |                    |            |
         |                 |  Unwanted call     |            |
         |            607  | -----------------> |            |
         | <-------------- |  indicator         |            |
         |                 |                    |            |

                  Figure 2: Unwanted (607) Ladder Diagram

   However, things get more complicated if an intermediary, such as a
   third-party provider of call management services that classify calls
   based on the relative likelihood the call is unwanted, misidentifies
   the call as unwanted.  Figure 3 shows this case.  Note the UAS
   typically does not receive an INVITE as the proxy rejects the call on
   behalf of the user.  In this situation, it would be beneficial for
   the caller to be able to learn who rejected the call, so they might
   be able to correct the misidentification.

   In this situation, one might be tempted to have the intermediary use
   the 607 response code. 607 indicates to the caller the subscriber did
   not get the call and they do not want the call.  However, RFC8197
   specifies that one of the uses of 607 is to inform analytics engines
   that a user (human) has rejected a call.  The problem here is network
   elements downstream from the intermediary might interpret the 607 as
   a user (human) marking the call as unwanted, as opposed to a
   statistical, machine learning, vulnerable to the base rate fallacy
   [BaseRate] algorithm rejecting the call.  In other words, those
   downstream entities should not be relying on another entity
   'deciding' the call is unwanted.  By distinguishing between a (human)
   user rejection and an intermediary's statistical rejection, a
   downstream network element that sees a 607 response code can weight
   it as a human rejection in its call analytics.

                         |   Call    |
                         | Analytics |
                         |  Engine   |
                            ^     | (likely not SIP)
                            |     v
      +-----+    608     |  Called   |           +-----+
      | UAC | <--------- |  Party    |           | UAS |
      +-----+            |  Proxy    |           +-----+

                    Figure 3: Rejected (608) Call Flow

   It is useful for blocked callers to have a redress mechanism.  One
   can imagine that some jurisdictions will require it.  However, we
   must be mindful that most of the calls that will be blocked will, in
   fact, be illegal and eligible for blocking.  Thus, providing
   alternate contact information for a user would be counterproductive
   to protecting that user from illegal communications.  This is another
   reason we do not propose to simply allow alternate contact
   information in a 607 response message.

   One might ask why we cannot use the same mechanism an analytics
   service provider offers their customers that lets them correct a call
   blocked in error?  The reason is whilst there is an existing
   relationship between the customer (called party) and the analytics
   service provider, it is unlikely there is a relationship between the
   caller and the analytics service provider.  Moreover, there are
   numerous call blocking providers in the ecosystem.  As such, we need
   a mechanism for indicating an intermediary rejected a call while
   providing contact information for the operator of the intermediary
   that provides call rejection services to the called party, without
   exposing the target user's contact information.

   The protocol described in this document uses existing IETF protocol
   mechanisms for specifying the redress mechanism.  Specifically, we
   use jCard [RFC7095] encoding of the redress address.  For integrity
   protection, we sign the redress address.  Conveniently, we use jCard
   rather than vCard [RFC6350] as we have a standard marshaling
   mechanism for creating a canonical representation of a JSON [RFC8259]
   object, such as a jCard, and a standard presentation format for such
   an object, namely JWS [RFC7515].  The SIP community is familiar with
   this concept as it is the mechanism used by STIR [RFC8224].

2.  Terminology

   This document uses the terms "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL",
   "OPTIONAL" as described in BCP14 [RFC2119][RFC8174] when, and only
   when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

3.  Protocol Operation

   For clarity, this section uses the term 'intermediary' as the entity
   that acts as a SIP User Agent Server (UAS) on behalf of the user in
   the network, as opposed to the user's UAS (colloquially, but not
   necessarily, their phone).  The intermediary could be a back-to-back
   user agent (B2BUA) or a SIP Proxy.

   Figure 4 shows an overview of the call flow for a rejected call.

                       +--------+         +-----------+
                       | Called |         |   Call    |
      +-----+          | Party  |         | Analytics |   +-----+
      | UAC |          | Proxy  |         |  Engine   |   | UAS |
      +-----+          +--------+         +-----------+   +-----+
         |  INVITE         |                    |            |
         | --------------> |  Information from  |            |
         |                 | -----------------> |            |
         |                 |  INVITE            |            |
         |                 |            Reject  |            |
         |            608  | <----------------- |            |
         | <-------------- |            call    |            |
         |                 |                    |            |

                  Figure 4: Rejected (608) Ladder Diagram

3.1.  Intermediary Operation

   An intermediary MAY issue the 608 response code in a failure response
   for an INVITE, MESSAGE, SUBSCRIBE, or other out-of-dialog SIP
   [RFC3261] request to indicate that an intermediary rejected the
   offered communication as unwanted by the user.  An intermediary MAY
   issue the 608 as the value of the "cause" parameter of a SIP reason-
   value in a Reason header field [RFC3326].

   Unless there are indicators the calling party will use the contents
   of the Call-Info header for malicious purposes (see Section 6), if an
   intermediary issues a 608 code, the intermediary MUST include a Call-
   Info header in the response.

   If there is a Call-Info header, it MUST have the 'purpose' parameter
   of 'card'.  The value of the Call-Info header MUST refer to a valid
   vCard [RFC6350]
   JWS [RFC7515] encoding of a jCard [RFC7095] object.  As for the
   signature algorithms allowed and policies surrounding the issuance
   and publication of public and private keys, one could expect to see
   policies such as defined by SHAKEN [SHAKEN].  However, the
   specification for the signature algorithm and policies for the
   asserted keys are beyond the scope of this document.

   The vCard jCard referenced in the Call-Info header MUST include at least
   one of the URL, EMAIL, TEL, or ADR properties.  UACs supporting this
   specification MUST be prepared to receive a full vCard. jCard.  Call
   originators (at the UAC) can use the information returned by the
   jCard to contact the intermediary that rejected the call to appeal
   the intermediary's blocking of the call attempt.  What the
   intermediary does if the blocked caller contacts the intermediary is
   outside the scope of this document.

   Proxies need to be mindful that a downstream intermediary may reject
   the attempt with a 608 while other paths may still be in progress.
   In this situation, the requirements stated in Section 16.7 of RFC3261
   [RFC3261] apply.  Specifically, the proxy should cancel pending
   transactions and must not create any new branches.  Note this is not
   a new requirement but simply pointing out the existing 6xx protocol
   mechanism in SIP.

3.2.  UAC Operation

   A UAC conforming to this specification MUST include the sip.608
   feature capability tag in the INVITE request.

   Upon receiving a 608 response, UACs perform normal SIP processing for
   6xx responses.

3.3.  Legacy Interoperation

   If the UAC indicates support for 608 and the intermediary issues a
   608, life is good as the UAC will receive all the information it
   needs to remediate an erroneous block by an intermediary.  However,
   what if the UAC does not understand 608?  Besides a UAC predating
   this specification, the could occur for callers from the legacy, non-
   SIP public switched network connecting to the SIP network via a media

   We address this situation by having the first network element that
   conforms with this specification play an announcement in the media.
   See Section 3.4 for requirements on the announcement.  The simple
   rule is a network element that inserts the sip.608 feature capability
   MUST be able to convey at a minimum whom to contact, ideally how to
   contact, the operator of the intermediary that rejected the call

   The degenerate case is the intermediary is the only element that
   understands the semantics of the 608 response code.  Obviously, any
   SIP device will understand that a 608 response code is a 6xx error.
   However, there are no other elements in the call path that understand
   the meaning of the value of the Call-Info header.  The intermediary
   knows this is the case as the INVITE request will not have the
   sip.608 feature capability.  In this case, one can consider the
   intermediary to be the element 'inserting' a virtual sip.608 feature
   capability.  As such, the intermediary MUST play the announcement,
   with the caveats described in Section 3.4 and Section 6.

   Now we take the case where a network element that understands the 608
   response code receives an INVITE for further processing.  A network
   element conforming with this specification MUST insert the sip.608
   feature capability, per the behaviors described in Section 4.2 of
   [RFC6809].  This information will be in the vCard JWS of the jCard
   referenced by the Call-Info header in the 608 response message.  Note
   this specification does not specify the mechanism for such
   notification to the UAC (see Section 3.4).

   Do note that even if a network element plays an announcement
   describing the contents of the 608 response message, the network
   element MUST also send the 608 response code message as the final
   response to the INVITE.

   One aspect of using a feature capability is only the network elements
   that will consume (UAC) or play an announcement (media gateway, SBC,
   or proxy) need understand the sip.608 feature capability.  All other
   (existing) infrastructure can remain without modification, assuming
   they are conformant to Section 16.6 of [RFC3261], specifically they
   will pass headers such as "Feature-Capability: sip.608" unmodified.

3.4.  Announcement Requirements

   There are a few requirements on the element that will be doing the
   announcement for legacy interoperation.

   As noted above, the element that inserts the sip.608 feature
   capability is responsible for conveying the information referenced by
   the Call-Info header in the 608 response message.  However, this
   specification does not mandate the modality for conveying that

   Let us take the case where a telecommunications service provider
   controls the element inserting the sip.608 feature capability.  It
   would be reasonable to expect the service provider would play an
   actual announcement in the media path towards the UAC (caller).  It
   is important to note the network element should be mindful of the
   media type requested by the UAC as it formulates the announcement.
   For example, it would make sense for an INVITE that only indicated
   audio codecs in the SDP [RFC4566] to result in an audio announcement.
   However, if the INVITE only indicated a real-time text codec, for
   example, the network element SHOULD send the information in a text
   format, not an audio format, unless the network element is unable to
   render the information in the requested media format.

   It is also possible for the network element inserting the sip.608
   feature capability to be under the control of the same entity that
   controls the UAC.  For example, a large call center might have legacy
   UACs, but have a modern outbound calling proxy that understands the
   full semantics of the 608 response code.  In this case, it is enough
   for the outbound calling proxy to digest the Call-Info information
   and handle the information digitally, rather than 'transcoding' the
   Call-Info information for presentation to the caller.

4.  Examples

   These examples are not normative, for clarity do not include all
   protocol elements, and may have errors.  Review the protocol
   documents for actual syntax and semantics of the protocol elements.

   Given an INVITE (shamelessly taken from [SHAKEN]):

   Max-Forwards: 69
   Contact: <sip:+12155551212@;rinstance=9da3088f36cc>
   To: <>
   From: "Alice" <>;tag=614bdb40
   P-Asserted-Identity: "Alice"<>,
   CSeq: 2 INVITE
   Content-Type: application/sdp
   Date: Tue, 16 Aug 2016 19:23:38 GMT
   Feature-Caps: sip.608
   Content-Length: 153

   o=- 13103070023943130 1 IN IP4
   c=IN IP4
   t=0 0
   m=audio 54242 RTP/AVP 0

   An intermediary could reply:

   SIP/2.0 608 Rejected
   Via: SIP/2.0/UDP;branch=z9hG4bK-524287-1
   From: "Alice" <>;tag=614bdb40
   To: <>
   CSeq: 2 INVITE
   Call-Info: <>;purpose=card <>;purpose=card

   A minimal vCard, in jCard could be:

       ["version", {}, "text", "4.0"],
       ["fn", {}, "text", "Robocall Adjudication"],
       ["email", {"type":"work"},
                 "text", ""]

   In base64:


   The JWS header of this example jCard could be:

   { {"alg":"ES256"},
     {"x5u":""} }

   In base64:


   The resulting JWS, presuming the base64 encoding of the ECDSA P-256
   SHA-256 digital signature using the certificate mentioned above is,
   the final string after the period in the example below, stored at
   complaints.vcf,, the file could thus

   FN:Robocall Adjudication


   For an intermediary that provides a Web site for adjudication, the
   jCard could contain:

   FN:Robocall Adjudication
   END:VCARD contain the following.  Note the calculation of the JWS
   is not shown; the URI reference in the Call-Info header would be to
   the JWS of the signed jCard.

       ["version", {}, "text", "4.0"],
       ["fn", {}, "text", "Robocall Adjudication"],
       ["url", {"type":"work"},
               "text", ""]

   For an intermediary that provides a telephone number and a postal
   address, the vCard jCard could contain:

   FN:Robocall Adjudication
   ADR;TYPE=work;Argument Clinic;12 contain the following.  Note the calculation
   of the JWS is not shown; the URI reference in the Call-Info header
   would be to the JWS of the signed jCard.

       ["version", {}, "text", "4.0"],
       ["fn", {}, "text", "Robocall Adjudication"],
       ["adr", {"type":"work"}, "text",
         ["Argument Clinic",
          "12 Main St;Anytown;AP;000000;Somewhere
   END:VCARD St","Anytown","AP","000000","Somecountry"]
       ["tel", {"type":"work"}, "uri", "tel:+1-555-555-1212"]

   Note that it is up to the UAC to decide which vCard jCard contact modality,
   if any, it will use.

   Figure 5 depicts a call flow illustrating legacy interoperability.
   In this non-normative example, we see a UAC that does not support the
   full semantics for 608.  However, there is an SBC that does support
   608.  Per RFC6809 [RFC6809], the SBC can insert "sip.608" into the
   Feature-Caps header for the INVITE.  When the intermediary, labeled
   "Called Party Proxy" in the figure, rejects the call, it knows it can
   simply perform the processing described in this document.  Since the
   intermediary saw the sip.608 feature capability, it knows it does not
   need to send any media describing whom to contact in the event of an
   erroneous rejection.

     |  Call   |
     | Engine  |
        ^   |
        |   v
     | Called  |     +-----+     +-----+     +---+     +-----+     +---+
     | Party   | <---|Proxy| <---|Proxy| <---|SBC| <---|Proxy| <---|UAC|
     | Proxy   |     +-----+     +-----+     +---+     +-----+     +---+
     +---------+                               |                     |
          |                                    |              INVITE |
          |                             INVITE |<--------------------|
          |<-----------------------------------|                     |
          |              Feature-Caps: sip.608 |                     |
          |                                    |                     |
          | 608 Rejected                       |                     |
          |----------------------------------->| 183                 |
          | Call-Info: <...>                   |-------------------->|
          |     [path for Call-Info elided     | SDP for media       |
          |      for illustration purposes]    |                     |
          |                                    |=== Announcement ===>|
          |                                    |                     |
          |                                    | 608                 |
          |                                    |-------------------->|
          |                                    | Call-Info: <...>    |

                        Figure 5: Legacy Operation

   When the SBC receives the 608 response code, it correlates that with
   the original INVITE from the UAC.  The SBC remembers that it inserted
   the sip.608 feature capability, which means it is responsible for
   somehow alerting the UAC the call failed and whom to contact.  At
   this point the SBC can play a prompt, either natively or through a
   mechanism such as NETANN [RFC4240], that sends the relevant
   information in the appropriate media to the UAC.

   As an example, the SBC could extract the FN and TEL vCard jCard fields and
   play something like a special information tone (see Telcordia SR-2275
   [SR-2275] section or ITU-T E.180 [ITU.E.180.1998] section
   7), followed by "Your call has been rejected by ...", followed by a
   text-to-speech translation of the FN text, followed by "You can reach
   them on", followed by a text-to-speech translation of the telephone
   number in the TEL field.

   Note the SBC also still sends the full 608 response code, including
   the Call-Info header, towards the UAC.

5.  IANA Considerations

5.1.  SIP Response Code

   This document defines a new SIP response code, 608.  Please register
   the response code in the "Response Codes" subregistry of the "Session
   Initiation Protocol (SIP) Parameters" registry at

   Response code: 608

   Description: Rejected

   Reference: [RFCXXXX]

5.2.  SIP Feature-Capability Indicator

   This document defines the feature capability sip.608 in the "SIP
   Feature-Capability Indicator Registration Tree" registry defined in

   Name: sip.608

   Description: This feature capability indicator, when included in a
   Feature-Caps header field of an INVITE request, indicates that the
   entity that inserted the sip.608 Feature-Caps value will be
   responsible for indicating to the caller any information contained in
   the 608 SIP response code, specifically the value referenced by the
   Call-Info header.

   Reference: [RFCXXXX]

6.  Security Considerations

   Intermediary operators need to be mindful of whom they are sending
   the 608 response to.  There is a risk that a truly malicious caller
   is being rejected.  This raises two issues.  The first is the caller,
   being alerted their call is being automatically rejected, may change
   their call behavior to defeat call blocking systems.  The second, and
   more significant risk, is that by providing a contact modality in the
   Call-Info Call-
   Info field, the intermediary may be giving the malicious caller a
   vector for attack.  In other words, the intermediary will be
   publishing an address that a malicious actor may use to launch an
   attack on the intermediary.  Because of this, intermediary operators
   may wish to configure their response to only include a Call-Info
   field for INVITE or other initiating methods that are signed and pass
   validation by STIR [RFC8224].

   Another risk is for an attacker to purposely not include the sip.608
   feature capability in a flood of INVITE requests, with the first Via
   header direct those
   requests to a victim device.  Worse, proxies known to insert the attacker can format an SDP
   [RFC4566] body with sip.608 feature, and direct
   the IP address of SDP to a victim device in a c-line. device.  Because the mechanism described here can
   result in an audio file being sent to the target of the Contact
   header, an attacker could use the mechanism described by this
   document as an amplification attack, given a SIP INVITE can be under
   1 kilobyte and an audio file can be hundreds of kilobytes.  One
   remediation for this is for intermediate devices that insert a sip.608 feature
   capability only transmit media
   back to what is highly likely to be the
   actual source of the call attempt.  A method for this is to only play
   media in response to an INVITE that is signed and passed validation
   by STIR [RFC8224].

   Yet another risk is a malicious entity or the intermediary itself can
   generate a malicious 608 response with a vCard jCard referring to a
   malicious agent.  For example, the recipient of a 608 may receive a
   TEL URI in the vCard.  When the recipient calls that address, the
   malicious agent could ask for personally identifying information.
   However, instead of using that information to verify the recipient's
   identity, they are pharming the information for nefarious ends.  As
   such, we strongly recommend the recipient validates to whom they are
   communicating with if asking to adjudicate an erroneously rejected
   call attempt.  Unlike the INVITE
   case where  Since we may also be concerned about intermediate
   nodes modifying contact information, we can suggest only responding to STIR-validated requests,
   there is no integrity protection address both of vCard data in such these
   issues with a way single solution.  The remediation is to require the
   intermediary to sign the jCard.  Signing the jCard provides integrity
   protection.  In addition, one can
   trace back imagine mechanisms such as used by
   SHAKEN [SHAKEN] to use signing certificate issuance as a mechanism
   for traceback to the entity issuing the jCard, for example tying the provenance
   identity of the data.  That is an opportunity subject of the certificate to the To field of the
   initial SIP request, as if the intermediary was vouching for
   future work. the From
   field of a SIP request with that identity.

7.  Acknowledgements

   This document liberally lifts from [RFC8197] in its text and
   structure.  However, the mechanism and purpose of 608 is quite
   different than 607.  Any errors are the current editor's and not the
   editor of RFC8197.  Thanks also go to Ken Carlberg of the FCC, Russ
   Housley, Paul Kyzivat, and Tolga Asveren for their suggestions on
   improving the draft.  Tolga's suggestion to provide a mechanism for
   legacy interoperability served to expand the draft by 50%. In
   addition, Tolga came up with the vCard jCard attack.

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,

   [RFC3261]  Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
              A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
              Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002,

   [RFC3326]  Schulzrinne, H., Oran, D., and G. Camarillo, "The Reason
              Header Field for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)",
              RFC 3326, DOI 10.17487/RFC3326, December 2002,

   [RFC6350]  Perreault, S., "vCard Format Specification", RFC 6350,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6350, August 2011,

   [RFC6809]  Holmberg, C., Sedlacek, I., and H. Kaplan, "Mechanism to
              Indicate Support of Features and Capabilities in the
              Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 6809,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6809, November 2012,

   [RFC7095]  Kewisch, P., "jCard: The JSON Format for vCard", RFC 7095,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7095, January 2014,

   [RFC7515]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
              Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
              2015, <>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <>.

8.2.  Informative References

              Bar-Hillel, M., "The Base-Rate Fallacy in Probability
              Judgements", 4 1977,

              International Telecommunications Union, "Technical
              characteristics of tones for the telephone service",
              ITU Recommendation E.180/Q.35, March 1998.

   [RFC4240]  Burger, E., Ed., Van Dyke, J., and A. Spitzer, "Basic
              Network Media Services with SIP", RFC 4240,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4240, December 2005,

   [RFC4566]  Handley, M., Jacobson, V., and C. Perkins, "SDP: Session
              Description Protocol", RFC 4566, DOI 10.17487/RFC4566,
              July 2006, <>.

   [RFC5039]  Rosenberg, J. and C. Jennings, "The Session Initiation
              Protocol (SIP) and Spam", RFC 5039, DOI 10.17487/RFC5039,
              January 2008, <>.

   [RFC6350]  Perreault, S., "vCard Format Specification", RFC 6350,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6350, August 2011,

   [RFC7340]  Peterson, J., Schulzrinne, H., and H. Tschofenig, "Secure
              Telephone Identity Problem Statement and Requirements",
              RFC 7340, DOI 10.17487/RFC7340, September 2014,

   [RFC8197]  Schulzrinne, H., "A SIP Response Code for Unwanted Calls",
              RFC 8197, DOI 10.17487/RFC8197, July 2017,

   [RFC8224]  Peterson, J., Jennings, C., Rescorla, E., and C. Wendt,
              "Authenticated Identity Management in the Session
              Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 8224,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8224, February 2018,

   [RFC8259]  Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
              Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017,

   [SHAKEN]   Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions (ATIS)
              and the SIP Forum, "Signature-based Handling of Asserted
              information using toKENs (SHAKEN)", ATIS 1000074, 1 2017,

   [SR-2275]  Telcordia, "Bellcore Notes on the Networks", Telcordia SR-
              2275, October 2000.

Author's Address

   Eric W. Burger
   Georgetown University
   37th & O St, NW
   Washington, DC  20057