 1/draftietfsmimecamellia00.txt 20060205 01:50:38.000000000 +0100
+++ 2/draftietfsmimecamellia01.txt 20060205 01:50:38.000000000 +0100
@@ 1,20 +1,20 @@
S/MIME Working Group S. Moriai
Internet Draft Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation
Expiration Date: April 2003 A. Kato
+Internet Draft NTT Corporation
+Expiration Date: September 2003 A. Kato
NTT Software Corporation
 October 2002
+ March 2003
Use of the Camellia Encryption Algorithm in CMS

+
Status of this Memo
This document is an InternetDraft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.
InternetDrafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet
Drafts.
@@ 30,71 +30,89 @@
The list of InternetDraft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
Comments or suggestions for improvement may be made on the
"ietfsmime" mailing list, or directly to the author.
Abstract
This document specifies how to incorporate the Camellia encryption
algorithm into the S/MIME Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) as an
 additional algorithm for symmetric encryption. The relevant OIDs
 and processing steps are provided so that Camellia may be included
 in the CMS specification (RFC 3369, RFC 3370) for content and key
 encryption.
+ additional algorithm for symmetric encryption. The relevant object
+ identifiers (OIDs) and processing steps are provided so that
+ Camellia may be used in the CMS specification (RFC 3369, RFC 3370)
+ for content and key encryption.
+
+ The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", "SHOULD
+ NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document (in
+ uppercase, as shown) are to be interpreted as described in
+ [RFC2119].
1. Introduction
This document specifies the conventions for using the Camellia
encryption algorithm [CamelliaSpec][CamelliaID] for encryption with
the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [CMS].
 Camellia is a block cipher with 128bit block size and 128, 192,
 and 256bit keys, i.e. the same interface as the Advanced Encryption
 Standard (AES). Camellia offers excellent efficiency on both
 software and hardware platforms in addition to a high level of
 security [CamelliaTech].

CMS values are generated using ASN.1 (X.20888), using the Basic
Encoding Rules (BER) (X.20988) and the Distinguished Encoding Rules
(DER) (X.50988).
 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", "SHOULD
 NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document (in
 uppercase, as shown) are to be interpreted as described in
 [RFC2119].
+1.1 Camellia
+
+ Camellia was jointly developed by Nippon Telegraph and Telephone
+ Corporation and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation in 2000. Camellia
+ specifies the 128bit block size and 128, 192, and 256bit key
+ sizes, the same interface as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).
+ Camellia is characterized by its suitability for both software and
+ hardware implementations as well as its high level of security.
+ From a practical viewpoint, it is designed to enable flexibility in
+ software and hardware implementations on 32bit processors widely
+ used over the Internet and many applications, 8bit processors used
+ in smart cards, cryptographic hardware, embedded systems, and so on
+ [CamelliaTech]. Moreover, its key setup time is excellent, and its
+ key agility is superior to that of AES.
+
+ Camellia has been scrutinized by the wide cryptographic community
+ during several projects for evaluating crypto algorithms. In
+ particular, Camellia was selected as a recommended cryptographic
+ primitive by the EU NESSIE (New European Schemes for Signatures,
+ Integrity and Encryption) project [NESSIE] and also included in the
+ list of cryptographic techniques for Japanese eGovernment systems
+ which are selected by the Japan CRYPTREC (Cryptography Research and
+ Evaluation Committees) [CRYPTREC].
2. Object Identifiers for Content and Key Encryption
This section provides the OIDs and processing information necessary
for Camellia to be used for content and key encryption in CMS.
Camellia is added to the set of optional symmetric encryption
algorithms in CMS by providing two classes of unique object
identifiers (OIDs). One OID class defines the content encryption
algorithms and the other defines the key encryption algorithms.
Thus a CMS agent can apply Camellia either for content or key
encryption by selecting the corresponding object identifier,
supplying the required parameter, and starting the program code.
2.1 OIDs for Content Encryption
 For content encryption the use of Camellia in cipher block chaining
 (CBC) mode is RECOMMENDED. The Camellia contentencryption
 algorithm, in CBC mode, for the three different key sizes are
 identified by the following object identifiers:
+ Camellia is added to the set of symmetric content encryption
+ algorithms defined in [CMSALG]. The Camellia contentencryption
+ algorithm, in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode, for the three
+ different key sizes are identified by the following object
+ identifiers:
idcamellia128cbc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) memberbody(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
algorithm(1) symmetricencryptionalgorithm(1)
camellia128cbc(2) }

idcamellia192cbc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) memberbody(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
algorithm(1) symmetricencryptionalgorithm(1)
camellia192cbc(3) }
idcamellia256cbc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) memberbody(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
algorithm(1) symmetricencryptionalgorithm(1)
camellia256cbc(4) }
@@ 91,146 +109,455 @@
idcamellia192cbc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) memberbody(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
algorithm(1) symmetricencryptionalgorithm(1)
camellia192cbc(3) }
idcamellia256cbc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) memberbody(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
algorithm(1) symmetricencryptionalgorithm(1)
camellia256cbc(4) }
 To determine the value of IV, the above algorithms take parameter
 as:
+ The AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field MUST be present, and the
+ parameters field MUST contain the value of IV:
CamelliaCBCParameter ::= CamelliaIV  Initialization Vector
CamelliaIV ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(16))
 When these object identifiers are used, plaintext is padded before
 encrypt it. At least 1 padding octet is appended at the end of the
 plaintext to make the length of the plaintext to the multiple of 16
 octets. The value of these octets is as same as the number of
 appended octets. (e.g., If 10 octets are needed to pad, the value
 is 0x0a.)
+ The plain text is padded according to Section 6.3 of [CMS].
2.2 OIDs for Key Encryption
The keywrap/unwrap procedures used to encrypt/decrypt a Camellia
contentencryption key (CEK) with a Camellia keyencryption key
(KEK) are specified in Section 3. Generation and distribution of
keyencryption keys are beyond the scope of this document.
The Camellia keyencryption algorithm has the following object
identifier:
 idcamellia128wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
 { iso(1) memberbody(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
 algorithm(1) keywrapalgorithm(3)
 camellia128wrap(2) }
+ idcamellia128wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
+ { iso(1) memberbody(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
+ algorithm(1) keywrapalgorithm(3)
+ camellia128wrap(2) }
 idcamellia192wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
 { iso(1) memberbody(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
 algorithm(1) keywrapalgorithm(3)
 camellia192wrap(3) }
+ idcamellia192wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
+ { iso(1) memberbody(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
+ algorithm(1) keywrapalgorithm(3)
+ camellia192wrap(3) }
 idcamellia256wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
 { iso(1) memberbody(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
 algorithm(1) keywrapalgorithm(3)
 camellia256wrap(4) }
+ idcamellia256wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
+ { iso(1) memberbody(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
+ algorithm(1) keywrapalgorithm(3)
+ camellia256wrap(4) }
In all cases the parameters field of AlgorithmIdentifier MUST be
 NULL. The OID gives the KEK key size, but does not make any
 statements as to the size of the wrapped Camellia CEK.
+ absent, because the key wrapping procedure itself defines how and
+ when to use an IV. The OID gives the KEK key size, but does not
+ make any statements as to the size of the wrapped Camellia CEK.
Implementations MAY use different KEK and CEK sizes. Implements
MUST support the CEK and the KEK having the same length. If
different lengths are supported, the KEK MUST be of equal or greater
length than the CEK.
 We don't need additional parameter information associated with this
 object identifier contains, because the key wrapping procedure
 itself defines how and when to use an IV.

3. Key Wrap Algorithm
Camellia key wrapping and unwrapping is done in conformance with the
AES key wrap algorithm [AESWRAP][RFC3394], because Camellia and AES
have the same block and key sizes, i.e. the block size of 128 bits
and key sizes of 128, 192, and 256 bits.
3.1 Camellia Key Wrap
+3.1 Notation and Definitions
 Key wrapping with Camellia is identical to [RFC3394], Section 2.2.1,
 with "AES" replaced by "Camellia".
+ The following notation is used in the description of the key
+ wrapping algorithms:
3.2 Camellia Key Unwrap
+ Camellia(K, W)
+ Encrypt W using the Camellia codebook with key K
+ Camellia1(K, W)
+ Decrypt W using the Camellia codebook with key K
+ MSB(j, W) Return the most significant j bits of W
+ LSB(j, W) Return the least significant j bits of W
+ B1 ^ B2 The bitwise exclusive or (XOR) of B1 and B2
+ B1  B2 Concatenate B1 and B2
+ K The keyencryption key K
+ n The number of 64bit key data blocks
+ s The number of steps in the wrapping process, s = 6n
+ P[i] The ith plaintext key data block
+ C[i] The ith ciphertext data block
+ A The 64bit integrity check register
+ R[i] An array of 64bit registers where
+ i = 0, 1, 2, ..., n
+ A[t], R[i][t] The contents of registers A and R[i] after encryption
+ step t.
+ IV The 64bit initial value used during the wrapping
+ process.
 Key unwrapping with Camellia is identical to [RFC3394], Section
 2.2.2, with "AES" replaced by "Camellia".
+ In the key wrap algorithm, the concatenation function will be used
+ to concatenate 64bit quantities to form the 128bit input to the
+ Camellia codebook. The extraction functions will be used to split
+ the 128bit output from the Camellia codebook into two 64bit
+ quantities.
4. Security Considerations
+3.2 Camellia Key Wrap
+
+ Key wrapping with Camellia is identical to Section 2.2.1 of
+ [RFC3394] with "AES" replaced by "Camellia".
+
+ The inputs to the key wrapping process are the KEK and the plaintext
+ to be wrapped. The plaintext consists of n 64bit blocks,
+ containing the key data being wrapped. The key wrapping process is
+ described below.
+
+ Inputs: Plaintext, n 64bit values {P1, P2, ..., Pn}, and
+ Key, K (the KEK).
+ Outputs: Ciphertext, (n+1) 64bit values {C0, C1, ..., Cn}.
+
+ 1) Initialize variables.
+
+ Set A0 to an initial value (see Section 3.4)
+ For i = 1 to n
+ R[0][i] = P[i]
+
+ 2) Calculate intermediate values.
+
+ For t = 1 to s, where s = 6n
+ A[t] = MSB(64, Camellia(K, A[t1]  R[t1][1])) ^ t
+ For i = 1 to n1
+ R[t][i] = R[t1][i+1]
+ R[t][n] = LSB(64, Camellia(K, A[t1]  R[t1][1]))
+
+ 3) Output the results.
+
+ Set C[0] = A[t]
+ For i = 1 to n
+ C[i] = R[t][i]
+
+ An alternative description of the key wrap algorithm involves
+ indexing rather than shifting. This approach allows one to
+ calculate the wrapped key in place, avoiding the rotation in the
+ previous description. This produces identical results and is more
+ easily implemented in software.
+
+ Inputs: Plaintext, n 64bit values {P1, P2, ..., Pn}, and
+ Key, K (the KEK).
+ Outputs: Ciphertext, (n+1) 64bit values {C0, C1, ..., Cn}.
+
+ 1) Initialize variables.
+
+ Set A = IV, an initial value (see Section 3.4)
+ For i = 1 to n
+ R[i] = P[i]
+
+ 2) Calculate intermediate values.
+
+ For j = 0 to 5
+ For i=1 to n
+ B = Camellia(K, A  R[i])
+ A = MSB(64, B) ^ t where t = (n*j)+i
+ R[i] = LSB(64, B)
+
+ 3) Output the results.
+
+ Set C[0] = A
+ For i = 1 to n
+ C[i] = R[i]
+
+3.3 Camellia Key Unwrap
+
+ Key unwrapping with Camellia is identical to Section 2.2.2 of
+ [RFC3394], with "AES" replaced by "Camellia".
+
+ The inputs to the unwrap process are the KEK and (n+1) 64bit blocks
+ of ciphertext consisting of previously wrapped key. It returns n
+ blocks of plaintext consisting of the n 64bit blocks of the
+ decrypted key data.
+
+ Inputs: Ciphertext, (n+1) 64bit values {C0, C1, ..., Cn}, and
+ Key, K (the KEK).
+ Outputs: Plaintext, n 64bit values {P1, P2, ..., Pn}.
+
+ 1) Initialize variables.
+
+ Set A[s] = C[0] where s = 6n
+ For i = 1 to n
+ R[s][i] = C[i]
+
+ 2) Calculate the intermediate values.
+
+ For t = s to 1
+ A[t1] = MSB(64, Camellia1(K, ((A[t] ^ t)  R[t][n]))
+ R[t1][1] = LSB(64, Camellia1(K, ((A[t]^t)  R[t][n]))
+ For i = 2 to n
+ R[t1][i] = R[t][i1]
+
+ 3) Output the results.
+
+ If A[0] is an appropriate initial value (see Section 3.4),
+ Then
+ For i = 1 to n
+ P[i] = R[0][i]
+ Else
+ Return an error
+
+ The unwrap algorithm can also be specified as an index based
+ operation, allowing the calculations to be carried out in place.
+ Again, this produces the same results as the register shifting
+ approach.
+
+ Inputs: Ciphertext, (n+1) 64bit values {C0, C1, ..., Cn}, and
+ Key, K (the KEK).
+ Outputs: Plaintext, n 64bit values {P0, P1, K, Pn}.
+
+ 1) Initialize variables.
+
+ Set A = C[0]
+ For i = 1 to n
+ R[i] = C[i]
+
+ 2) Compute intermediate values.
+
+ For j = 5 to 0
+ For i = n to 1
+ B = Camellia1(K, (A ^ t)  R[i]) where t = n*j+i
+ A = MSB(64, B)
+ R[i] = LSB(64, B)
+
+ 3) Output results.
+
+ If A is an appropriate initial value (see Section 3.4),
+ Then
+ For i = 1 to n
+ P[i] = R[i]
+ Else
+ Return an error
+
+3.4 Key Data Integrity  the Initial Value
+
+ The initial value (IV) refers to the value assigned to A[0] in the
+ first step of the wrapping process. This value is used to obtain an
+ integrity check on the key data. In the final step of the
+ unwrapping process, the recovered value of A[0] is compared to the
+ expected value of A[0]. If there is a match, the key is accepted as
+ valid, and the unwrapping algorithm returns it. If there is not a
+ match, then the key is rejected, and the unwrapping algorithm
+ returns an error.
+
+ The exact properties achieved by this integrity check depend on the
+ definition of the initial value. Different applications may call
+ for somewhat different properties; for example, whether there is
+ need to determine the integrity of key data throughout its lifecycle
+ or just when it is unwrapped. This specification defines a default
+ initial value that supports integrity of the key data during the
+ period it is wrapped (in Section 3.4.1). Provision is also made to
+ support alternative initial values (in Section 3.4.2).
+
+3.4.1 Default Initial Value
+
+ The default initial value (IV) is defined to be the hexadecimal
+ constant:
+
+ A[0] = IV = A6A6A6A6A6A6A6A6
+
+ The use of a constant as the IV supports a strong integrity check on
+ the key data during the period that it is wrapped. If unwrapping
+ produces A[0] = A6A6A6A6A6A6A6A6, then the chance that the key data
+ is corrupt is 2^64. If unwrapping produces A[0] any other value,
+ then the unwrap must return an error and not return any key data.
+
+3.4.2 Alternative Initial Values
+
+ When the key wrap is used as part of a larger key management
+ protocol or system, the desired scope for data integrity may be more
+ than just the key data or the desired duration for more than just
+ the period that it is wrapped. Also, if the key data is not just an
+ Camellia key, it may not always be a multiple of 64 bits.
+ Alternative definitions of the initial value can be used to address
+ such problems. According to [RFC3394], NIST will define alternative
+ initial values in future key management publications as needed. In
+ order to accommodate a set of alternatives that may evolve over
+ time, key wrap implementations that are not applicationspecific
+ will require some flexibility in the way that the initial value is
+ set and tested.
+
+4. SMIMECapabilities Attribute
+
+ An S/MIME client SHOULD announce the set of cryptographic functions
+ it supports by using the S/MIME capabilities attribute. This
+ attribute provides a partial list of OIDs of cryptographic functions
+ and MUST be signed by the client. The functions' OIDs SHOULD be
+ logically separated in functional categories and MUST be ordered
+ with respect to their preference.
+
+ RFC 2633 [RFC2633], Section 2.5.2 defines the SMIMECapabilities
+ signed attribute (defined as a SEQUENCE of SMIMECapability
+ SEQUENCEs) to be used to specify a partial list of algorithms that
+ the software announcing the SMIMECapabilities can support.
+
+ If an S/MIME client is required to support symmetric encryption with
+ Camellia, the capabilities attribute MUST contain the Camellia OID
+ specified above in the category of symmetric algorithms. The
+ parameter associated with this OID MUST be CamelliaSMimeCapability.
+
+ CamelliaSMimeCapabilty ::= NULL
+
+ The SMIMECapability SEQUENCE representing Camellia MUST be
+ DERencoded as the following hexadecimal strings:
+
+ Key Size Capability
+ 128 30 0d 06 0b 2a 83 08 8c 9a 4b 3d 01 01 01 02
+ 196 30 0d 06 0b 2a 83 08 8c 9a 4b 3d 01 01 01 03
+ 256 30 0d 06 0b 2a 83 08 8c 9a 4b 3d 01 01 01 04
+
+ When a sending agent creates an encrypted message, it has to decide
+ which type of encryption algorithm to use. In general the decision
+ process involves information obtained from the capabilities lists
+ included in messages received from the recipient, as well as other
+ information such as private agreements, user preferences, legal
+ restrictions, and so on. If users require Camellia for symmetric
+ encryption, it MUST be supported by the S/MIME clients on both the
+ sending and receiving side, and it MUST be set in the user
+ preferences.
+
+5. Security Considerations
This document specifies the use of Camellia for encrypting the
content of a CMS message and for encrypting the symmetric key used
 to encrypt the content of a CMS message. Since Camellia supports
 the key length of 128, 192 and 256 bits, it provides enough security
 against exhaustive key attacks. Against other attacks Camellia is
 believed to be secure, and it has withstood extensive cryptanalytic
 efforts in several open, worldwide cryptographic evaluation
 projects.
+ to encrypt the content of a CMS message, and the other mechanisms
+ are the same as the existing ones. Therefore, the security
+ considerations described in the CMS specifications [CMS][CMSALG] and
+ the AES key wrap algorithm [AESWRAP][RFC3394] can be applied to
+ this document. As described in Section 3.4, the key wrap algorithm
+ includes a strong integrity check on the key data. If unwrapping
+ produces the expected check value in A[0], then the chance that the
+ key data is corrupt is 2^64. If unwrapping produces an unexpected
+ value, then the algorithm implementation MUST return an error, and
+ it MUST NOT return any key data [AESWRAP][RFC3394]. In this case,
+ the error message should not include detailed information about the
+ error, since attackers can exploit information in the error message
+ to recover the key data.
 For other security considerations, please refer to the security
 considerations of the CMS specifications [CMS][CMSALG] and the AES
 key wrap algorithm [AESWRAP][RFC3394].
+ Implementations must protect the KEK from disclosure. Compromise of
+ the KEK may result in the disclosure of all key data protected with
+ that KEK [RFC3394].
5. Intellectual Property Statement
+ No security problem has been found on Camellia [CRYPTREC][NESSIE].
 Mitsubishi Electric Corporation (Mitsubishi Electric) and Nippon
 Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (NTT) have pending applications
 or filed patents which are essential to Camellia. License policy
 for these essential patents will be available on the IETF page of
 Intellectual Property Rights Notices.
+6. Intellectual Property Statement
+
+ Mitsubishi Electric Corporation and Nippon Telegraph and Telephone
+ Corporation have pending applications or filed patents which are
+ essential to Camellia. License policy for these essential patents
+ will be available on the IETF page of Intellectual Property Rights
+ Notices.
References
+ [AES] National Institute of Standards.
+ FIPS Pub 197: Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). 26
+ November 2001.
+
+ [DES] National Institute of Standards and Technology.
+ FIPS Pub 46: Data Encryption Standard. 15 January 1977.
[AESWRAP] National Institute of Standards and Technology. AES Key
Wrap Specification. 17 November 2001.
http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/kms/keywrap.pdf
[CamelliaID] J. Nakajima and S. Moriai, "A Description of the
Camellia Encryption Algorithm", InternetDraft, July 2001.
draftnakajimacamellia02.txt
[CamelliaSpec] K. Aoki, T. Ichikawa, M. Kanda, M. Matsui, S. Moriai,
 J. Nakajima, and T. Tokita ``Specification of Camellia  a
 128bit Block Cipher''. http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/camellia/
+ J. Nakajima, and T. Tokita "Specification of Camellia  a
+ 128bit Block Cipher". http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/camellia/
+
[CamelliaTech] K. Aoki, T. Ichikawa, M. Kanda, M. Matsui, S. Moriai,
 J. Nakajima, and T. Tokita ``Camellia: A 128Bit Block Cipher
 Suitable for Multiple Platforms  Design and Analysis '', In
+ J. Nakajima, and T. Tokita "Camellia: A 128Bit Block Cipher
+ Suitable for Multiple Platforms  Design and Analysis ", In
Selected Areas in Cryptography, 7th Annual International
Workshop, SAC 2000, August 2000, Proceedings, Lecture Notes in
Computer Science 2012, pp.3956, SpringerVerlag, 2001.
[CMS] R. Housley, "Cryptographic Message Syntax", RFC 3369, August
2002.
[CMSALG] R. Housley, "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
Algorithms", RFC 3370, August 2002.
+ [CRYPTREC] Informationtechnology Promotion Agency (IPA), Japan,
+ CRYPTREC. http://www.ipa.go.jp/security/enc/CRYPTREC/indexe.html
+
+ [NESSIE] New European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity and
+ Encryption (NESSIE) project. http://www.cryptonessie.org
+
[RFC2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
+ [RFC2633] Ramsdell, B., Editor. S/MIME Version 3 Message
+ Specification. RFC 2633. June 1999.
+
[RFC3394] J. Schaad and R. Housley, "Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) Key Wrap Algorithm", RFC 3394, September 2002.
Authors' Address
Shiho Moriai
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation
Phone: +81468592007
FAX: +81468593858
Email: shiho@isl.ntt.co.jp
Akihiro Kato
NTT Software Corporation
Phone: +81452127404
FAX: +81452127410
Email: akato@po.ntts.co.jp
+
+Appendix A ASN.1 Module
+
+DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
+BEGIN
+
+ Camellia using CBCchaining mode for key sizes of 128, 192, 256
+
+idcamellia128cbc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
+ { iso(1) memberbody(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
+ algorithm(1) symmetricencryptionalgorithm(1)
+ camellia128cbc(2) }
+
+idcamellia192cbc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
+ { iso(1) memberbody(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
+ algorithm(1) symmetricencryptionalgorithm(1)
+ camellia192cbc(3) }
+
+idcamellia256cbc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
+ { iso(1) memberbody(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
+ algorithm(1) symmetricencryptionalgorithm(1)
+ camellia256cbc(4) }
+
+ CamelliaIV is a the parameter for all the above object identifiers.
+
+CamelliaIV ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(16))
+
+ Camellia S/MIME Capabilty parameter for all the above object
+ identifiers.
+
+CamelliaSMimeCapability ::= NULL
+
+ Camellia Key Wrap Algorithm identifiers  Parameter is absent
+
+idcamellia128wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
+ { iso(1) memberbody(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
+ algorithm(1) keywrapalgorithm(3)
+ camellia128wrap(2) }
+
+idcamellia192wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
+ { iso(1) memberbody(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
+ algorithm(1) keywrapalgorithm(3)
+ camellia192wrap(3) }
+
+idcamellia256wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
+ { iso(1) memberbody(2) 392 200011 61 security(1)
+ algorithm(1) keywrapalgorithm(3)
+ camellia256wrap(4) }
+
+END