draft-ietf-smime-cms-aes-ccm-and-gcm-01.txt		draft-ietf-smime-cms-aes-ccm-and-gcm-02.txt
	INTERNET DRAFT R. Housley		INTERNET DRAFT R. Housley
	S/MIME Working Group Vigil Security		S/MIME Working Group Vigil Security
	Using AES-CCM and AES-GCM Authenticated Encryption		Using AES-CCM and AES-GCM Authenticated Encryption
	in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)		in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
	<draft-ietf-smime-cms-aes-ccm-and-gcm-01.txt>		<draft-ietf-smime-cms-aes-ccm-and-gcm-02.txt>
	Status of this Memo		Status of this Memo
	By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any		By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
	applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware		applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
	have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes		have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
	aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.		aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other		Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other
	skipping to change at page 3, line 44		skipping to change at page 3, line 44
	encryption key, the nonce value MUST be unique. That is, the set of		encryption key, the nonce value MUST be unique. That is, the set of
	nonce values used with any given key MUST NOT contain any duplicate		nonce values used with any given key MUST NOT contain any duplicate
	values. Using the same nonce for two different messages encrypted		values. Using the same nonce for two different messages encrypted
	with the same key destroys the security properties.		with the same key destroys the security properties.
	AAD is authenticated but not encrypted. Thus, the AAD is not		AAD is authenticated but not encrypted. Thus, the AAD is not
	included in the AES-GCM output. It can be used to authenticate		included in the AES-GCM output. It can be used to authenticate
	plaintext packet headers. In the CMS authenticated-enveloped-data		plaintext packet headers. In the CMS authenticated-enveloped-data
	content type, authenticated attributes comprise the AAD.		content type, authenticated attributes comprise the AAD.
	2. Automatic Key Management		2. Automated Key Management
	The reuse of an AES-CCM or AES-GCM nonce/key combination destroys the		The reuse of an AES-CCM or AES-GCM nonce/key combination destroys the
	security guarantees. As a result, it can be extremely difficult to		security guarantees. As a result, it can be extremely difficult to
	use AES-CCM or AES-GCM securely when using statically configured		use AES-CCM or AES-GCM securely when using statically configured
	keys. For safety's sake, implementations MUST use an automated key		keys. For safety's sake, implementations MUST use an automated key
	management system.		management system [KeyMgmt].
	The CMS authenticated-enveloped-data content type supports four		The CMS authenticated-enveloped-data content type supports four
	general key management techniques:		general key management techniques:
	Key Transport: the content-authenticated-encryption key is		Key Transport: the content-authenticated-encryption key is
	encrypted in the recipient's public key;		encrypted in the recipient's public key;
	Key Agreement: the recipient's public key and the sender's		Key Agreement: the recipient's public key and the sender's
	private key are used to generate a pairwise symmetric key, then		private key are used to generate a pairwise symmetric key, then
	the content-authenticated-encryption key is encrypted in the		the content-authenticated-encryption key is encrypted in the
	skipping to change at page 8, line 27		skipping to change at page 8, line 27
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
	5.2. Informative References		5.2. Informative References
	[BDJR] Bellare, M, Desai, A., Jokipii, E., and P. Rogaway,		[BDJR] Bellare, M, Desai, A., Jokipii, E., and P. Rogaway,
	"A Concrete Security Treatment of Symmetric Encryption:		"A Concrete Security Treatment of Symmetric Encryption:
	Analysis of the DES Modes of Operation", Proceedings		Analysis of the DES Modes of Operation", Proceedings
	38th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer		38th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer
	Science, 1997.		Science, 1997.
			[KEYMGMT] Bellovin, S. and R. Housley, "Guidelines for
			Cryptographic Key Management", RFC 4107, BCP 107,
			June 2005.
	[RANDOM] Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness		[RANDOM] Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
	Recommendations for Security", RFC 4086, June 2005.		Recommendations for Security", RFC 4086, June 2005.
	6. IANA Considerations		6. IANA Considerations
	None.		None.
	{{{ RFC Editor: Please remove this section prior to publication. }}}		{{{ RFC Editor: Please remove this section prior to publication. }}}
	Appendix: ASN.1 Module		Appendix: ASN.1 Module
End of changes. 4 change blocks.
	3 lines changed or deleted		7 lines changed or added
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