draft-ietf-smime-cms-rsaes-oaep-04.txt   draft-ietf-smime-cms-rsaes-oaep-05.txt 
S/MIME Working Group R. Housley S/MIME Working Group R. Housley
Internet Draft RSA Laboratories Internet Draft RSA Laboratories
expires in six months July 2002 expires in six months July 2002
Use of the RSAES-OAEP Key Transport Algorithm in CMS Use of the RSAES-OAEP Key Transport Algorithm in CMS
<draft-ietf-smime-cms-rsaes-oaep-04.txt> <draft-ietf-smime-cms-rsaes-oaep-05.txt>
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. Internet-Drafts are working all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. Internet-Drafts are working
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2002). All Rights Reserved. Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2002). All Rights Reserved.
Abstract Abstract
This document describes the use of the RSAES-OAEP key transport This document describes the use of the RSAES-OAEP key transport
method of key management within the Cryptographic Message Syntax method of key management within the Cryptographic Message Syntax
(CMS). (CMS).
1 Introduction 1. Introduction
This draft is being discussed on the "ietf-smime" mailing list. To This draft is being discussed on the "ietf-smime" mailing list. To
join the list, send a message to <ietf-smime-request@imc.org> with join the list, send a message to <ietf-smime-request@imc.org> with
the single word "subscribe" in the body of the message. Also, there the single word "subscribe" in the body of the message. Also, there
is a Web site for the mailing list at <http://www.imc.org/ietf- is a Web site for the mailing list at <http://www.imc.org/ietf-
smime/>. smime/>.
PKCS #1 Version 1.5 [PKCS#1v1.5] specifies a widely deployed variant PKCS #1 Version 1.5 [PKCS#1v1.5] specifies a widely deployed variant
of the RSA key transport algorithm. PKCS #1 Version 1.5 key of the RSA key transport algorithm. PKCS #1 Version 1.5 key
transport is vulnerable to adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks, transport is vulnerable to adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks,
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The CMS uses ASN.1 [X.208-88], the Basic Encoding Rules (BER) The CMS uses ASN.1 [X.208-88], the Basic Encoding Rules (BER)
[X.209-88], and the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [X.509-88]. [X.209-88], and the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [X.509-88].
Throughout this document, when the terms "MUST," "MUST NOT," Throughout this document, when the terms "MUST," "MUST NOT,"
"SHOULD," and "MAY" are used in capital letters, their use conforms "SHOULD," and "MAY" are used in capital letters, their use conforms
to the definitions in RFC 2119 [STDWORDS]. These key word to the definitions in RFC 2119 [STDWORDS]. These key word
definitions help make the intent of standards documents as clear as definitions help make the intent of standards documents as clear as
possible. These key words are used in this document to help possible. These key words are used in this document to help
implementers achieve interoperability. implementers achieve interoperability.
2 Enveloped-data Conventions 2. Enveloped-data Conventions
The CMS enveloped-data content type consists of an encrypted content The CMS enveloped-data content type consists of an encrypted content
and wrapped content-encryption keys for one or more recipients. The and wrapped content-encryption keys for one or more recipients. The
RSAES-OAEP key transport algorithm is used to wrap the content- RSAES-OAEP key transport algorithm is used to wrap the content-
encryption key for one recipient. encryption key for one recipient.
Compliant software MUST meet the requirements for constructing an Compliant software MUST meet the requirements for constructing an
enveloped-data content type stated in [CMS] Section 6, "Enveloped- enveloped-data content type stated in [CMS] Section 6, "Enveloped-
data Content Type". data Content Type".
A content-encryption key MUST be randomly generated for each instance A content-encryption key MUST be randomly generated for each instance
of an enveloped-data content type. The content-encryption key is of an enveloped-data content type. The content-encryption key is
used to encipher the content. used to encipher the content.
2.1 EnvelopedData Fields 2.1. EnvelopedData Fields
The enveloped-data content type is ASN.1 encoded using the The enveloped-data content type is ASN.1 encoded using the
EnvelopedData syntax. The fields of the EnvelopedData syntax MUST be EnvelopedData syntax. The fields of the EnvelopedData syntax MUST be
populated as described in this section when RSAES-OAEP key transport populated as described in this section when RSAES-OAEP key transport
is employed for one or more recipients. is employed for one or more recipients.
The EnvelopedData version MUST be 0, 2, or 3. The EnvelopedData version MUST be 0, 2, or 3.
The EnvelopedData originatorInfo field is not used for the RSAES-OAEP The EnvelopedData originatorInfo field is not used for the RSAES-OAEP
key transport algorithm. However, this field MAY be present to key transport algorithm. However, this field MAY be present to
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The EnvelopedData recipientInfos CHOICE MUST be The EnvelopedData recipientInfos CHOICE MUST be
KeyTransRecipientInfo. See section 2.2 for further discussion of KeyTransRecipientInfo. See section 2.2 for further discussion of
KeyTransRecipientInfo. KeyTransRecipientInfo.
The EnvelopedData encryptedContentInfo contentEncryptionAlgorithm The EnvelopedData encryptedContentInfo contentEncryptionAlgorithm
field MUST be a symmetric encryption algorithm identifier. field MUST be a symmetric encryption algorithm identifier.
The EnvelopedData unprotectedAttrs MAY be present. The EnvelopedData unprotectedAttrs MAY be present.
2.2 KeyTransRecipientInfo Fields 2.2. KeyTransRecipientInfo Fields
The fields of the KeyTransRecipientInfo syntax MUST be populated as The fields of the KeyTransRecipientInfo syntax MUST be populated as
described in this section when RSAES-OAEP key transport is employed described in this section when RSAES-OAEP key transport is employed
for one or more recipients. for one or more recipients.
The KeyTransRecipientInfo version MUST be 0 or 2. If the The KeyTransRecipientInfo version MUST be 0 or 2. If the
RecipientIdentifier uses the issuerAndSerialNumber alternative, then RecipientIdentifier uses the issuerAndSerialNumber alternative, then
the version MUST be 0. If the RecipientIdentifier uses the the version MUST be 0. If the RecipientIdentifier uses the
subjectKeyIdentifier alternative, then the version MUST be 2. subjectKeyIdentifier alternative, then the version MUST be 2.
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algorithm identifier and the parameter syntax. algorithm identifier and the parameter syntax.
The KeyTransRecipientInfo encryptedKey is the result of encrypting The KeyTransRecipientInfo encryptedKey is the result of encrypting
the content-encryption key in the recipient's RSA public key using the content-encryption key in the recipient's RSA public key using
the RSAES-OAEP algorithm. The RSA public key MUST be at least 1024 the RSAES-OAEP algorithm. The RSA public key MUST be at least 1024
bits in length. When using a Triple-DES [3DES] content-encryption bits in length. When using a Triple-DES [3DES] content-encryption
key, implementations MUST adjust the parity bits to ensure odd parity key, implementations MUST adjust the parity bits to ensure odd parity
for each octet of each DES key comprising the Triple-DES key prior to for each octet of each DES key comprising the Triple-DES key prior to
RSAES-OAEP encryption. RSAES-OAEP encryption.
3 RSAES-OAEP Algorithm Identifiers and Parameters 3. RSAES-OAEP Algorithm Identifiers and Parameters
The RSAES-OAEP key transport algorithm is the RSA encryption scheme The RSAES-OAEP key transport algorithm is the RSA encryption scheme
defined in RFC 2437 [PKCS#1v2.0], where the message to be encrypted defined in RFC 2437 [PKCS#1v2.0], where the message to be encrypted
is the content-encryption key. The algorithm identifier for RSAES- is the content-encryption key. The algorithm identifier for RSAES-
OAEP is: OAEP is:
id-RSAES-OAEP OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) id-RSAES-OAEP OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 7 } us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 7 }
The AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field MUST be present, and the The AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field MUST be present, and the
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us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) } us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) }
id-mgf1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 8 } id-mgf1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 8 }
id-pSpecified OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 9 } id-pSpecified OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 9 }
The fields within RSAES-OAEP-params have the following meanings: The fields within RSAES-OAEP-params have the following meanings:
hashFunc identifies the one-way hash function. Implementations hashFunc identifies the one-way hash function. Implementations
MUST support SHA-1 [SHA1], and implementations MAY support other MUST support SHA-1 [SHA1], and implementations MAY support other
one-way hash functions in addition to SHA-1. The SHA-1 algorithm one-way hash functions. The SHA-1 algorithm identifier is
identifier is comprised of the id-sha1 object identifier and a comprised of the id-sha1 object identifier and a parameter of
parameter of NULL. Implementations that perform encryption MUST NULL. Implementations that perform encryption MUST omit the
omit the hashFunc field when SHA-1 is used, indicating that the hashFunc field when SHA-1 is used, indicating that the default
default algorithm was used. Implementations that perform algorithm was used. Implementations that perform decryption MUST
decryption MUST recognize both the id-sha1 object identifier and recognize both the id-sha1 object identifier and an absent
an absent hashFunc field as an indication that SHA-1 was used. hashFunc field as an indication that SHA-1 was used.
maskGenFunc identifies the mask generation function. maskGenFunc identifies the mask generation function.
Implementations MUST support MFG1 [PKCS#1v2.0]. MFG1 requires a Implementations MUST support MFG1 [PKCS#1v2.0]. MFG1 requires a
one-way hash function, and it is identified in the parameter field one-way hash function, and it is identified in the parameter field
of the MFG1 algorithm identifier. Implementations MUST support of the MFG1 algorithm identifier. Implementations MUST support
SHA-1 [SHA1], and implementations MAY support other one-way hash SHA-1 [SHA1], and implementations MAY support other one-way hash
functions. The MFG1 algorithm identifier is comprised of the id- functions. The MFG1 algorithm identifier is comprised of the id-
mgf1 object identifier and a parameter that contains the algorithm mgf1 object identifier and a parameter that contains the algorithm
identifier of the one-way hash function employed with MFG1. The identifier of the one-way hash function employed with MFG1. The
SHA-1 algorithm identifier is comprised of the id-sha1 object SHA-1 algorithm identifier is comprised of the id-sha1 object
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parameters. The default value for P is an empty string. In this parameters. The default value for P is an empty string. In this
case, pHash in EME-OAEP contains the hash of a zero length string. case, pHash in EME-OAEP contains the hash of a zero length string.
Implementations MUST support a zero length P value. Implementations MUST support a zero length P value.
Implementations that perform encryption MUST omit the pSourceFunc Implementations that perform encryption MUST omit the pSourceFunc
field when a zero length P value is used, indicating that the field when a zero length P value is used, indicating that the
default value was used. Implementations that perform decryption default value was used. Implementations that perform decryption
MUST recognize both the id-pSpecified object identifier and an MUST recognize both the id-pSpecified object identifier and an
absent pSourceFunc field as an indication that a zero length P absent pSourceFunc field as an indication that a zero length P
value was used. value was used.
4 SMIMECapabilities Attribute Conventions 4. SMIMECapabilities Attribute Conventions
RFC 2633 [MSG], Section 2.5.2 defines the SMIMECapabilities signed RFC 2633 [MSG], Section 2.5.2 defines the SMIMECapabilities signed
attribute (defined as a SEQUENCE of SMIMECapability SEQUENCEs) to be attribute (defined as a SEQUENCE of SMIMECapability SEQUENCEs) to be
used to specify a partial list of algorithms that the software used to specify a partial list of algorithms that the software
announcing the SMIMECapabilities can support. When constructing a announcing the SMIMECapabilities can support. When constructing a
signedData object, compliant software MAY include the signedData object, compliant software MAY include the
SMIMECapabilities signed attribute announcing that it supports the SMIMECapabilities signed attribute announcing that it supports the
RSAES-OAEP algorithm. RSAES-OAEP algorithm.
The SMIMECapability SEQUENCE representing RSAES-OAEP MUST include the When all of the default settings are selected, the SMIMECapability
id-RSAES-OAEP object identifier in the capabilityID field and MUST SEQUENCE representing RSAES-OAEP MUST include the id-RSAES-OAEP
include the RSAES-OAEP-Default-Identifier SEQUENCE in the parameters object identifier in the capabilityID field and MUST include an empty
field. SEQUENCE in the parameters field. In this case, RSAES-OAEP is
represented by the rSAES-OAEP-Default-Identifier:
rSAES-OAEP-Default-Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= rSAES-OAEP-Default-Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::=
{ id-RSAES-OAEP, { id-RSAES-OAEP,
{ sha1Identifier, { sha1Identifier,
mgf1SHA1Identifier, mgf1SHA1Identifier,
pSpecifiedEmptyIdentifier } } pSpecifiedEmptyIdentifier } }
When all of the default settings are selected, the SMIMECapability The SMIMECapability SEQUENCE representing rSAES-OAEP-Default-
SEQUENCE representing RSAES-OAEP MUST be DER-encoded as the following Identifier MUST be DER-encoded as the following hexadecimal string:
hexadecimal string:
30 0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 07 30 00 30 0D 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 07 30 00
When settings other than the defaults are selected, the
SMIMECapability SEQUENCE representing RSAES-OAEP MUST include the
id-RSAES-OAEP object identifier in the capabilityID field and MUST
include the RSAES-OAEP-params SEQUENCE that identifies the
non-default settings in the parameters field.
5 References When SHA-256 is used in the hashFunc and SHA-256 is used with MGF1 in
the maskGenFunc, the SMIMECapability SEQUENCE representing RSAES-OAEP
is the rSAES-OAEP-SHA256-Identifier, as specified in Appendix A. The
SMIMECapability SEQUENCE representing rSAES-OAEP-SHA256-Identifier
MUST be DER-encoded as the following hexadecimal string:
30 38 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 07 30 2B 30
0D 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 01 05 00 30 1A
06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 08 30 0D 06 09 60
86 48 01 65 03 04 02 01 05 00
When SHA-384 is used in the hashFunc and SHA-384 is used with MGF1 in
the maskGenFunc, the SMIMECapability SEQUENCE representing RSAES-OAEP
is the rSAES-OAEP-SHA384-Identifier, as specified in Appendix A. The
SMIMECapability SEQUENCE representing rSAES-OAEP-SHA384-Identifier
MUST be DER-encoded as the following hexadecimal string:
30 38 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 07 30 2B 30
0D 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 02 05 00 30 1A
06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 08 30 0D 06 09 60
86 48 01 65 03 04 02 02 05 00
When SHA-512 is used in the hashFunc and SHA-512 is used with MGF1 in
the maskGenFunc, the SMIMECapability SEQUENCE representing RSAES-OAEP
is the rSAES-OAEP-SHA512-Identifier, as specified in Appendix A. The
SMIMECapability SEQUENCE representing rSAES-OAEP-SHA512-Identifier
MUST be DER-encoded as the following hexadecimal string:
30 38 06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 07 30 2B 30
0D 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 03 05 00 30 1A
06 09 2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 01 01 08 30 0D 06 09 60
86 48 01 65 03 04 02 03 05 00
5. References
This section provides normative and informative references. This section provides normative and informative references.
5.1 Normative References 5.1. Normative References
3DES American National Standards Institute. ANSI X9.52-1998, 3DES American National Standards Institute. ANSI X9.52-1998,
Triple Data Encryption Algorithm Modes of Operation. 1998. Triple Data Encryption Algorithm Modes of Operation. 1998.
CMS Housley, R. Cryptographic Message Syntax. RFC <TBD>. CMS Housley, R. Cryptographic Message Syntax. RFC <TBD>.
<TBD DATE>. <TBD DATE>.
MSG Ramsdell, B. S/MIME Version 3 Message Specification. MSG Ramsdell, B. S/MIME Version 3 Message Specification.
RFC 2633. June 1999. RFC 2633. June 1999.
skipping to change at page 7, line 44 skipping to change at page 8, line 35
X.208-88 CCITT. Recommendation X.208: Specification of Abstract X.208-88 CCITT. Recommendation X.208: Specification of Abstract
Syntax Notation One (ASN.1). 1988. Syntax Notation One (ASN.1). 1988.
X.209-88 CCITT. Recommendation X.209: Specification of Basic X.209-88 CCITT. Recommendation X.209: Specification of Basic
Encoding Rules for Abstract Syntax Notation One Encoding Rules for Abstract Syntax Notation One
(ASN.1). 1988. (ASN.1). 1988.
X.509-88 CCITT. Recommendation X.509: The Directory - X.509-88 CCITT. Recommendation X.509: The Directory -
Authentication Framework. 1988. Authentication Framework. 1988.
5.2 Informative References 5.2. Informative References
CRYPTO98 Bleichenbacher, D. "Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against CRYPTO98 Bleichenbacher, D. "Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against
Protocols Based on the RSA Encryption Standard PKCS #1," Protocols Based on the RSA Encryption Standard PKCS #1,"
in H. Krawczyk (editor), Advances in Cryptology - in H. Krawczyk (editor), Advances in Cryptology -
CRYPTO '98 Proceedings, Lecture Notes in Computer CRYPTO '98 Proceedings, Lecture Notes in Computer
Science 1462 (1998), Springer-Verlag, pp. 1-12. Science 1462 (1998), Springer-Verlag, pp. 1-12.
MMA Rescorla, E. Preventing the Million Message Attack on MMA Rescorla, E. Preventing the Million Message Attack on
Cryptographic Message Syntax. RFC 3218. January 2002. Cryptographic Message Syntax. RFC 3218. January 2002.
skipping to change at page 8, line 36 skipping to change at page 9, line 25
Hash Standard." May 2001. Hash Standard." May 2001.
[http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/shs/dfips-180-2.pdf] [http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/shs/dfips-180-2.pdf]
SSL Freier, A., P. Karlton, and P. Kocher. The SSL Protocol, SSL Freier, A., P. Karlton, and P. Kocher. The SSL Protocol,
Version 3.0. Netscape Communications. November 1996. Version 3.0. Netscape Communications. November 1996.
[http://wp.netscape.com/eng/ssl3/draft302.txt] [http://wp.netscape.com/eng/ssl3/draft302.txt]
TLS Dierks, T. and C. Allen. The TLS Protocol Version 1.0. TLS Dierks, T. and C. Allen. The TLS Protocol Version 1.0.
RFC 2246. January 1999. RFC 2246. January 1999.
6 Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
Implementations must protect the RSA private key and the content- Implementations must protect the RSA private key and the content-
encryption key. Compromise of the RSA private key may result in the encryption key. Compromise of the RSA private key may result in the
disclosure of all messages protected with that key. Compromise of disclosure of all messages protected with that key. Compromise of
the content-encryption key may result in disclosure of the associated the content-encryption key may result in disclosure of the associated
encrypted content. encrypted content.
The generation of RSA public/private key pairs relies on a random The generation of RSA public/private key pairs relies on a random
numbers. The use of inadequate pseudo-random number generators numbers. The use of inadequate pseudo-random number generators
(PRNGs) to generate cryptographic keys can result in little or no (PRNGs) to generate cryptographic keys can result in little or no
skipping to change at page 10, line 5 skipping to change at page 10, line 40
A 1024-bit RSA public key and SHA-1 both provide a security level of A 1024-bit RSA public key and SHA-1 both provide a security level of
about 80 bits. In [NISTGUIDE], the National Institute of Standards about 80 bits. In [NISTGUIDE], the National Institute of Standards
and Technology suggests that a security level of 80 bits is adequate and Technology suggests that a security level of 80 bits is adequate
for most applications until 2015. If a security level greater than for most applications until 2015. If a security level greater than
80 bits is needed, then a longer RSA public key and a secure one-way 80 bits is needed, then a longer RSA public key and a secure one-way
hash function with a longer hash value are needed. Again, SHA-256, hash function with a longer hash value are needed. Again, SHA-256,
SHA-384, and SHA-512 are likely candidates for such a one-way hash SHA-384, and SHA-512 are likely candidates for such a one-way hash
function. For this reason, the algorithm identifiers for these one- function. For this reason, the algorithm identifiers for these one-
way hash functions are included in the ASN.1 module in Appendix A. way hash functions are included in the ASN.1 module in Appendix A.
7 Acknowledgments The same one-way hash function should be employed for the hashFunc
and the maskGenFunc, but it is not required. Using the same one-way
hash function reduces the potential for implementation errors.
7. Acknowledgments
This document is the result of contributions from many professionals. This document is the result of contributions from many professionals.
I appreciate the hard work of all members of the IETF S/MIME Working I appreciate the hard work of all members of the IETF S/MIME Working
Group. Further, I extend a special thanks to Burt Kaliski, Jakob Group. Further, I extend a special thanks to Burt Kaliski, Jakob
Jonsson, and Francois Rousseau. Jonsson, Francois Rousseau, and Jim Schaad.
8 Author Address 8. Author Address
Russell Housley Russell Housley
RSA Laboratories RSA Laboratories
918 Spring Knoll Drive 918 Spring Knoll Drive
Herndon, VA 20170 Herndon, VA 20170
USA USA
rhousley@rsasecurity.com rhousley@rsasecurity.com
Appendix A ASN.1 Module Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
CMS-RSAES-OAEP CMS-RSAES-OAEP
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) cms-rsaes-oaep(20) } pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) cms-rsaes-oaep(20) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN BEGIN
-- EXPORTS ALL -- -- EXPORTS ALL --
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id-RSAES-OAEP OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 7 } id-RSAES-OAEP OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 7 }
RSAES-OAEP-params ::= SEQUENCE { RSAES-OAEP-params ::= SEQUENCE {
hashFunc [0] AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT sha1Identifier, hashFunc [0] AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT sha1Identifier,
maskGenFunc [1] AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT mgf1SHA1Identifier, maskGenFunc [1] AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT mgf1SHA1Identifier,
pSourceFunc [2] AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT pSourceFunc [2] AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT
pSpecifiedEmptyIdentifier } pSpecifiedEmptyIdentifier }
sha1Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= { id-sha1, NULL } sha1Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= { id-sha1, NULL }
sha256Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= { id-sha256, NULL } sha256Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= { id-sha256, NULL }
sha384Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= { id-sha384, NULL } sha384Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= { id-sha384, NULL }
sha512Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= { id-sha512, NULL } sha512Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= { id-sha512, NULL }
mgf1SHA1Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= mgf1SHA1Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::=
{ id-mgf1, sha1Identifier } { id-mgf1, sha1Identifier }
mgf1SHA256Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::=
{ id-mgf1, sha256Identifier }
mgf1SHA384Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::=
{ id-mgf1, sha384Identifier }
mgf1SHA512Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::=
{ id-mgf1, sha512Identifier }
pSpecifiedEmptyIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= pSpecifiedEmptyIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::=
{ id-pSpecified, nullOctetString } { id-pSpecified, nullOctetString }
nullOctetString OCTET STRING (SIZE (0)) ::= { ''H } nullOctetString OCTET STRING (SIZE (0)) ::= { ''H }
id-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) id-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) oiw(14) identified-organization(3) oiw(14)
secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26 } secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26 }
id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
skipping to change at page 11, line 42 skipping to change at page 12, line 45
csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 3 } csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 3 }
id-mgf1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 8 } id-mgf1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 8 }
id-pSpecified OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 9 } id-pSpecified OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 9 }
rSAES-OAEP-Default-Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::= rSAES-OAEP-Default-Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::=
{ id-RSAES-OAEP, { id-RSAES-OAEP,
{ sha1Identifier, { sha1Identifier,
mgf1SHA1Identifier, mgf1SHA1Identifier,
pSpecifiedEmptyIdentifier } }
rSAES-OAEP-SHA256-Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::=
{ id-RSAES-OAEP,
{ sha256Identifier,
mgf1SHA256Identifier,
pSpecifiedEmptyIdentifier } }
rSAES-OAEP-SHA384-Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::=
{ id-RSAES-OAEP,
{ sha384Identifier,
mgf1SHA384Identifier,
pSpecifiedEmptyIdentifier } }
rSAES-OAEP-SHA512-Identifier AlgorithmIdentifier ::=
{ id-RSAES-OAEP,
{ sha512Identifier,
mgf1SHA512Identifier,
pSpecifiedEmptyIdentifier } } pSpecifiedEmptyIdentifier } }
END END
Full Copyright Statement Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2002). All Rights Reserved. Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2002). All Rights Reserved.
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
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