wdiff draft-ietf-speermint-architecture-05.txt draft-ietf-speermint-architecture-06.txt

Speermint Working Group R. Penno
Internet Draft Juniper Networks
Intended status: Informational D. Malas
Expires: August September 2008 Level 3 CableLabs
S. Khan
Comcast
A. Uzelac
Global Crossing
February 24,
M. Hammer
Cisco Systems
May 2, 2008

SPEERMINT Peering Architecture
draft-ietf-speermint-architecture-05
draft-ietf-speermint-architecture-06

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Abstract

This document defines the SPEERMINT peering architecture, its
functional components and peering interface functions. It also
describes the steps taken to establish a session between two peering
domains in the context of the functions defined.

Conventions used in this document

The key words "MUST", "MUST "must", "must NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD
"should", "should NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119[1] RFC-2119[1]

Table of Contents

1. Introduction...................................................3
2. Network Context................................................4 Context................................................3
3. Procedures.....................................................5 Procedures.....................................................6
4. Reference SPEERMINT Architecture...............................6
5. Peer Function Examples.........................................8 Recommended SSP Procedures.....................................8
5.1. Originating SSP Procedures................................8
5.1.1. The Location Look-Up Function (LF) of an Initiating Provider......8
5.1.1. (LUF)...........................8
5.1.1.1. Target address analysis..............................8
5.1.2. analysis.........................8
5.1.1.2. User ENUM Lookup.....................................9
5.1.3. Carrier Lookup................................9
5.1.1.3. Infrastructure ENUM lookup.................................10
5.1.4. lookup......................9
5.1.2. Location Routing Table.......................................10
5.1.5. Function (LRF).....................10
5.1.2.1. Routing Table..................................10
5.1.2.2. SIP DNS Resolution..................................10
5.1.6. Resolution.............................10
5.1.2.3. SIP Redirect Server.................................11
5.2. Server............................11
5.1.3. The Location Signaling Function (LF) of (SF).........................11
5.1.3.1. Establishing a Receiving Provider.......11 Trusted Relationship............11
5.1.3.2. Sending the SIP request........................12
5.2. Terminating SSP Procedures...............................12
5.2.1. The Location Function (LF)..........................12
5.2.1.1. Publish ENUM records................................11
5.2.2. records...........................12
5.2.1.2. Publish SIP DNS records.............................11
5.2.3. records........................13
5.2.1.3. Subscribe Notify....................................11
5.3. Signaling Function (SF)..................................11
5.4. The Notify...............................13
5.2.2. Signaling Function (SF) of an Initiating Provider....12
5.4.1. Setup TLS connection................................12
5.4.2. IPSec...............................................12
5.4.3. Co-Location.........................................12
5.4.4. Send the (SF).............................13
5.2.2.1. TLS............................................13
5.2.2.2. Receive SIP request................................12
5.5. The requests...........................13
5.3. Target SSP Procedures....................................14
5.3.1. Signaling Function (SF) of an Initiating Provider....14
5.5.1. Verify TLS connection...............................14
5.5.2. (SF).............................14
5.3.1.1. TLS............................................14
5.3.1.2. Receive SIP requests................................14
5.6. requests...........................14
5.4. Media Function (MF)......................................15
5.7. (MF)......................................14
5.5. Policy Considerations....................................15 Considerations....................................14
6. Call Control and Media Control Deployment Options.............16 Options.............15
7. Address space considerations..................................17
8. Security Considerations.......................................17
9. IANA Considerations...........................................18 Considerations...........................................17
10. Acknowledgments..............................................18 Acknowledgments..............................................17
11. References...................................................19 References...................................................18
11.1. Normative References....................................19 References....................................18
11.2. Informative References..................................20 References..................................19
Author's Addresses...............................................21 Addresses...............................................20
Intellectual Property Statement..................................21 Statement..................................20
Disclaimer of Validity...........................................22 Validity...........................................21

1. Introduction

The objective of this document is to define a reference peering
architecture in the context of Session PEERing for Multimedia
INTerconnect (SPEERMINT). In this process, we define the peering
reference architecture (reference, for short), it's functional
components, and peering interface functions from the perspective of
a SIP [3] Service provider's (SSP) network.

This architecture allows the interconnection of two SSPs in layer 5
peering as defined in the SPEERMINT Requirements [13] and
Terminology [12] documents.

Layer 3 peering is outside the scope of this document. Hence, the
figures in this document do not show routers so that the focus is on
Layer 5 protocol aspects.

This document uses terminology defined in the SPEERMINT Terminology
document [12], so the reader should be familiar with all the terms
defined there.

2. Network Context

Figure 1 shows an example network context. Two SSPs can form a Layer
5 peering over either the public Internet or private Layer3
networks. In addition, two or more providers may form a SIP (Layer
5) federation [13] on either the public Internet or private Layer 3
networks. This document does not make any assumption whether the SIP
providers directly peer to each other or through Layer 3 transit
network as per use case of [16].

Note that Figure 1 allows for the following potential SPEERMINT
peering scenarios:

o Enterprise to Enterprise across the public Internet

o Enterprise to SSP across the public Internet
o SSP to SSP across the public Internet

o Enterprise to enterprise across a private Layer 3 network

o Enterprise to SSP across a private Layer 3 network

o SSP to SSP across a private Layer 3 network

The members of a federation may jointly use a set of functions such
as location function, signaling function, media function, ENUM
database or SIP Registrar, SIP proxies, and/or functions that
synthesize various SIP and non-SIP based applications. Similarly,
two SSPs may jointly use a set of functions. The functions can be
either public or private.

+-------------------+
| |
| Public |
| Peering SIP |
| Function Peering |
| |
+-------------------+
|
-----
+-----------+ / \ +-----------+
|Enterprise | -- -- |Enterprise |
|Provider A |-----------/ \-----------|Provider B |
+-----------+ -- -- +-----------+
/ Public \
| Internet |
\ (Layer 3) /
+-----------+ -- -- +-----------+
|Service |-----------\ /-----------|Service
|
|Provider SSP C |-----------\ /-----------| SSP D |
| | -- -- |Provider D | |
+-----------+ \_____/ +-----------+
| Layer 3 Peering
| Point (out of scope)
-----
+-----------+ / \ +-----------+
|Enterprise | -- -- |Enterprise |
|Provider E |-----------/ \-----------|Provider F |
+-----------+ -- Private -- +-----------+
/ Network \
| (Layer 3) |
\ /
+-----------+ -- -- +-----------+
| SSP G |-----------\ /-----------| SSP H |
| | -- -- | |
+-----------+ \____/ +-----------+
|
+-------------------+
| Private |
| SIP |
| Peering |
| |
+-------------------+

Figure 1: SPEERMINT Network Context

3. Procedures

This document assumes that a in order for call to be establish from a
UAC end user in the initiating peer's network goes through the following steps to
establish a call to a UAS in the
receiving peer's network: network the following steps are taken:

1. The analysis of a the target address.

. If the target address represents an intra-SSP resource,
we go directly the
behavior is out-of-scope with respect to step 4. this draft.

2. the discovery determination of the receiving peering point address, target SSP,

3. the determination of the SF next-hop in the target SSP,

4. the enforcement of authentication and potentially other
policies,

5. the discovery determination of the UAS,

5. the routing of SIP messages,

6. the session establishment,

7. the transfer of media which could include voice, video, text
and others,

8. and the session termination.

The originating SSP would likely perform steps 1-4, and the
terminating SSP would likely perform steps 4-5.

In the case the target SSP is different from the terminating SSP it
would repeat steps 1-4. This is reflected in Figure 2 that shows the
target SSP with its own peering functions.

4. Reference SPEERMINT Architecture

Figure 2 depicts the SPEERMINT architecture and logical functions
that form the peering between two SSPs.

+------+
| DNS, |
+---------->| Db, |<---------+
| | etc | |
| +------+ |
| |
------|-------- -------|-------
/ v \ / v \
| +--LUF-+ | | +--LUF-+ |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| +------+ | | +------+ |
| | | |
| |
| | | | | |
| v | | v |
| +--LRF-+ | | +--LRF-+ |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| +------+ | | +------+ |
| \ | | / |
| `. | | / |
| \ | | .' |
| `. +---SF--+ +---SF--+ / |
| \| | | | / | |
| | SBE | | SBE | |
| Originating | | | | Target |
| +---SF--+ +---SF--+ |
| SSP | | SSP |
| +---MF--+ +---MF--+ |
| | | | | |
| | DBE | | DBE | |
| | | | | |
| +---MF--+ +---MF--+ |
\ / \ /
--------------- ---------------
Figure 2: Reference SPEERMINT Architecture

The procedures presented in Chapter section 3 are implemented by a set of
peering functions:

The Look-Up Function (LUF) provides a mechanism for determining for
a given request the target domain to which the request should be
routed.

The Location Routing Function (LRF) determines for the target domain
of a given request the location of the SF in that domain and
optionally develops other SED Session Establishment Data (SED) required
to route the request to that domain.

Location Function (LF): The Location functions is composed of the
LUF and LRF functions

Signaling Function (SF): Purpose is to perform SIP call routing, to
optionally perform termination and re-initiation of call, to
optionally implement security and policies on SIP messages, and to
assist in discovery/exchange of parameters to be used by the Media
Function (MF).

Media Function (MF): Purpose is to perform media related function
such as media transcoding and media security implementation between
two SIP providers.

The intention of defining these functions is to provide a framework
for design segmentation and allow each one to evolve independently.

5. Peer Function Examples Recommended SSP Procedures

This section describes the functions in more detail and provides
some examples recommendations on the role they would play in a SIP call in a
Layer 5 peering scenario.

Some of the information in the chapter is taken from [14] and is put
here for continuity purposes.

5.1. Originating SSP Procedures

5.1.1. The Location Look-Up Function (LF) of an Initiating Provider (LUF)

Purpose is to determine the SF of the target domain of a given
request and optionally develop Session Establishment Data (SED)
[12]. The LF of an Initiating SSP analyzes target

5.1.1.1. Target address and
discovers the next hop signaling function (SF) in a peering
relationship using the Look-Up Function. The resource to determine
the SF of the target domain might be provided by a third-party as in
the assisted-peering case.

5.1.1. Target address analysis
When analysis

When the initiating SSP receives a request to communicate, it
analyzes the target state data URI to determine whether the call needs to be
terminated internal internally or external externally to its network. The analysis
method is internal to the SSP; thus, outside the scope of SPEERMINT.
Note that the SSP is free to consult any manner of private data
sources to make this determination.

If the target address does not represent a resource inside the
initiating SSP's administrative domain or federation of domains, the
initiating SSP resolves the call routing data by using the Location
Routing Function (LF).

If (LRF).

For example, if the request to communicate is for an im: or pres:
URI type, the initiating peer follows the procedures in [8]. If the
highest priority supported URI scheme is sip: or sips:, the
initiating peer skips to SIP DNS resolution in Section 5.1.5. 5.1.3.
Likewise, if the target address is already a sip: or sips: URI in an
external domain, the initiating peer skips to SIP DNS resolution in
Section 5.1.5. 5.1.2.2.

If the target address corresponds to a specific E.164 address, the
peer may need to perform some form of number plan mapping according
to local policy. For example, in the United States, a dial string
beginning "011 44" could be converted to "+44", or in the United
Kingdom "00 1" could be converted to "+1". Once the peer has an
E.164 address, it can use ENUM.

5.1.2.

5.1.1.2. User ENUM Lookup

If an external E.164 address is the target, the initiating peer
consults the public "User ENUM" rooted at e164.arpa, according to
the procedures described in RFC 3761. The peer MUST must query for the
"E2U+sip" enumservice as described in RFC 3764 [11], but MAY check
for other enumservices. The initiating peer MAY consult a cache or
alternate representation of the ENUM data rather than actual DNS
queries. Also, the peer MAY may skip actual DNS queries if the
initiating peer is sure that the target address country code is not
represented in e164.arpa. If a sip: or sips: URI is chosen the peer
skips to Section 5.1.5. 5.1.6.

If an im: or pres: URI is chosen for retrieved based on an "E2U+im" [10] or
"E2U+pres" [9] enumserver, the peer follows the procedures for
resolving these URIs to URIs for specific protocols such a SIP or
XMPP as described in the previous section.

5.1.3.

5.1.1.3. Infrastructure ENUM lookup

Next the initiating peer checks for a carrier-of-record in a carrier
ENUM domain according to the procedures described in [12]. As in
the previous step, the peer MAY may consult a cache or alternate
representation of the ENUM data in lieu of actual DNS queries. The
peer first checks for records for the "E2U+sip" enumservice, then
for the "E2U+pstn" enumservice as defined in [21]. If a terminal
record is found with a sip: or sips: URI, the peer skips to Section
5.1.5,
5.1.2.2. , otherwise the peer continues processing according to the
next section.

5.1.4.

5.1.2. Location Routing Function (LRF)

The LRF of an Initiating SSP analyzes target address and discovers
the next hop signaling function (SF) in a peering relationship. The
resource to determine the SF of the target domain might be provided
by a third-party as in the assisted-peering case.

5.1.2.1. Routing Table

If there is no user ENUM records and the initiating peer cannot
discover the carrier-of-record or if the initiating peer cannot
reach the carrier-of-record via SIP peering, the initiating peer
still needs to deliver the call to the PSTN or reject it. Note that
the initiating peer MAY may still forward the call to another SSP for
PSTN gateway termination by prior arrangement using the routing
table.

If so, the initiating peer rewrites may rewrite the Request-URI to address
the gateway resource in the target SSP's domain and MAY may forward the
request on to that SSP using the procedures described in the
remainder of these steps.

5.1.5.

Alternatively to Request-URI re-writing, the initiating peer may
populate the Route header with the address of the gateway resource
in the target SSP's domain and forward the request on to that SSP
using the procedures described in the remainder of these steps, but
applied to the Route header.

5.1.2.2. SIP DNS Resolution

Once a sip: or sips: in an external domain is selected as the
target, the initiating peer MAY may apply local policy to decide whether
forwarding requests to the target domain is acceptable. If so, the
initiating peer uses the procedures in RFC 3263 [4] Section 4 to
determine how to contact the receiving peer. To summarize the RFC
3263 procedure: unless these are explicitly encoded in the target
URI, a transport is chosen using NAPTR records, a port is chosen
using SRV records, and an address is chosen using A or AAAA records.
Note that these are queries of records in the global DNS.

When communicating with a public external peer, another SSP, entities compliant to this
document MUST only should select a TLS-protected transport for communication
from the initiating peer to the receiving peer. peer if available. Note
that this is a single-hop requirement. Either peer MAY insist on
using a sips: URI which asserts that each hop is TLS-protected, but
this document does not require protection over each hop.

5.1.6.

5.1.2.3. SIP Redirect Server

A SIP Redirect Server may help in resolving the current address of a
UAS.

5.2.
the next-hop SF in the target domain.

5.1.3. The Location Signaling Function (LF) of a Receiving Provider

5.2.1. Publish ENUM records (SF)

The receiving peer SHOULD participate by publishing "E2U+sip" and
"E2U+pstn" records with sip: or sips: URIs wherever a public carrier
ENUM root purpose of signaling function is available. This assumes that the receiving peer wants to peer by default. When the receiving peer does not want to accept
traffic from specific initiating peers, it MAY still reject requests
on a call-by-call basis.

5.2.2. Publish SIP DNS records

To receive peer requests, the receiving peer MUST insure that it
publishes appropriate NAPTR, SRV, and address (A and/or AAAA)
records in the LF relevant to the peer's SF.

5.2.3. Subscribe Notify

Policies function may also be optionally implemented by dynamic
subscribe, notify, and exchange of policy information and feature
information among SSPs [22].

5.3. Signaling Function (SF)

The purpose of signaling function is to perform routing of SIP
messages, perform routing of SIP
messages, to optionally perform termination and re-initiation of a
call, to optionally implement security and policies on SIP messages,
and to assist in discovery/exchange of parameters to be used by the
Media Function (MF).

The signaling function perform performs the routing of SIP messages. The
optional termination and re-initiation of calls are performed by the
signaling path border element (SBE).

Optionally, a SF may perform additional functions such as Session
Admission Control, SIP Denial of Service protection, SIP Topology
Hiding, SIP header normalization, and SIP security, privacy and
encryption.

The SF can also process SDP payloads for media information such as
media type, bandwidth, and type of codec; then, communicate this
information to the media function. Signaling function may optionally
communicate with the network to pass Layer 3 related policies [10]

5.4. The Signaling Function (SF) of an Initiating Provider

5.4.1. Setup

5.1.3.1. Establishing a Trusted Relationship

Depending on the security needs and trust relationship between SSPs,
different security mechanism can be used to establish SIP calls.
These are discussed in the following subsections.

5.1.3.1.1. TLS connection

Once a transport, port, and address are found, the initiating SSP
will open or find a reusable TLS connection to the peer. The
initiating provider MUST verify the server certificate that SHOULD
be rooted in a well-known certificate authority. The initiating SSP
MUST be prepared to provide a TLS client certificate upon request
during the TLS handshake. The client certificate MUST contain a DNS
or URI choice type in the subjectAltName which corresponds to the
domain asserted in the host production of the From header URI. The
certificate SHOULD be valid and rooted in a well-known certificate
authority.

Note that the client certificate MAY contain a list of entries in
the subjectAltName, only one of which has
procedures to match authenticate the SSP's target domain is specified in the
From header URI.

5.4.2.
[24]

5.1.3.1.2. IPSec

In certain deployments deployments, the use of IPSec between the signaling
functions of the originating and terminating domains can be used as
a security mechanism instead of TLS.

5.4.3.

5.1.3.1.3. Co-Location

In this scenario scenario, the SFs are co-located in a physically secure
location and/or are members of a segregated network. In this case
messages between the originating and terminating SSPs would be sent
as clear text.

5.4.4. Send

5.1.3.2. Sending the SIP request

Once a TLS connection trust relationship between the peers is established, the
initiating peer sends the request. When sending some requests,

5.1.3.2.1. TLS

If the trust relationship was established through TLS, the
initiating peer MUST can optionally verify and assert the senders sender's
identity using the SIP Identity mechanism.

The domain name

In addition, new requests should contain a valid Identity and
Identity-Info header as described in the URI of the From: [12]. The Identity-Info header MUST be
must present a domain
which was present name that is represented in the certificate
provided when establishing the TLS connection for this request, even if over which the user part has an
anonymous value. If the From header contains the user URI parameter
with the value of "phone", the user part of the From header URI MUST
be a complete and valid tel: URI [9] telephone-subscriber
production, and SHOULD be a global-number. For example, the
following are all acceptable and the first three are encouraged:

From: "John Doe" john.doe@example.net

From: "+12125551212" <+12125551212@example.net;user=phone>

From: "Anonymous" <anonymous@example.net>

From: <4092;phone-context=+12125554000@example.net;user=phone>

From: "5551212" <5551212@example.net>

The following are not acceptable:

From: "2125551212" <2125551212@example.net;user=phone>

From: "Anonymous" <anonymous@anonymous.invalid>

In addition, new requests MUST contain a valid Identity and
Identity-Info header as described in [12]. The Identity-Info header
must present a domain name that is represented in the certificate
provided when establishing the TLS connection over which the request
is sent. The initiating peer SHOULD include request
is sent. The initiating peer should include an Identity header on
in-dialog requests as well, well if the From header field value matches an
identity the initiating peer is willing to assert.

5.2. Terminating SSP Procedures

5.2.1. The initiating Location Function (LF)

5.2.1.1. Publish ENUM records

The receiving peer MAY include any SIP option-tags in Supported,
Require, should publish "E2U+SIP" and "E2U+pstn" records
with sip: or Proxy-Require headers according sips: URIs wherever a public carrier ENUM root is
available. In the event that a public root is not available, a
publishing to procedures in
standards-track SIP extensions. Note however a common ENUM registry with the originating peer will
suffice.

This assumes that the initiating receiving peer MUST be prepared wants to fallback peer by default. When
the receiving peer does not want to baseline accept traffic from specific
initiating peers, it may still reject requests on a call-by-call
basis.

5.2.1.2. Publish SIP functionality as
defined by DNS records

To receive peer requests, the mandatory-to-implement features of RFC 3261, RFC
3263,and RFC 3264 [7], except receiving peer must ensure that peers implementing this
specification MUST implement SIP over TLS using it
publishes appropriate NAPTR, SRV, and address (A and/or AAAA)
records in the sip: URI scheme, LF relevant to the SIP Identity header, originating peer's SF.

5.2.1.3. Subscribe Notify

A policy notification function may also be optionally implemented by
dynamic subscribe, notify, and RFC 4320 [10] non-INVITE transaction
fixes.

5.5. The exchange of policy information and
feature information among SSPs [21].

5.2.2. Signaling Function (SF) of an Target Provider

5.5.1. Verify

5.2.2.1. TLS connection

When the receiving peer receives a TLS client hello, it responds
with its certificate. The receiving peer target SSP certificate SHOULD should be valid
and rooted in a well-known certificate authority. The
receiving peer MUST request and verify procedures to
authenticate the client certificate during SSP's originating domain are specified in [24].

The terminating SF verifies that the TLS handshake.

Once Identity header is valid,
corresponds to the initiating peer has been authenticated, message, corresponds to the receiving peer
can authorize communication from this peer based on Identity-Info header,
and that the domain name
of the peer and in the root of its certificate. This allows two
authorization models From header corresponds to be used, together or separately. In the
domain-based model, one of the receiving peer can allow communication from
peers with some trusted administrative domains that use general-
purpose certificate authorities, without explicitly permitting all
domains with certificates rooted in the same authority. It also
allows a certificate authority (CA) based model where every domain
with a valid certificate rooted in some list of CAs is automatically
authorized.

5.5.2. TLS client certificate.

5.2.2.2. Receive SIP requests

Once a TLS connection trust relationship is established, the receiving peer is
prepared to receive incoming SIP requests. For new requests (dialog
forming or not) the receiving peer verifies that if the target (request-URI) (request-
URI) is a domain that for which it is responsible. For these requests, there that for which it is responsible. For these
requests, there should be no remaining Route header field values.
For in-dialog requests, the receiving peer can verify that it
corresponds to the top-most Route header field value.

The receiving peer may reject incoming requests due to local policy.
When a request is rejected because the initiating peer is not
authorized to peer, the receiving peer should respond with a 403
response with the reason phrase "Unsupported Peer".

5.3. Target SSP Procedures

5.3.1. Signaling Function (SF)

5.3.1.1. TLS

When the receiving peer receives a TLS client hello, it responds
with its certificate. The target SSP certificate should be valid
and rooted in a well-known certificate authority. The procedures to
authenticate the SSP's originating domain are specified in [24].

If the requests should be no remaining Route contain a valid Identity and Identity-Info
header field values. Next as described in [12] the receiving target SF verifies that the Identity
header is valid, corresponds to the message, and corresponds to the
Identity-Info header, and that the domain in the From header
corresponds to one of the domains in the TLS client certificate.

For in-dialog requests,

5.3.1.2. Receive SIP requests

The procedures of the receiving peer can verify that it
corresponds to SF of the top-most Route header field value. The peer also
validates any Identity header if present.

The receiving peer MAY reject incoming requests due to local policy.
When a request is rejected because target SSP are the initiating peer is not
authorized to peer, same as the receiving peer SHOULD respond ones
described in section 5.2.2.2 with the addition that it might
establish a 403
response with connection to another target SSP, and in this case use
the reason phrase "Unsupported Peer".

5.6. procedures recommended to an originating SSP (section 5.1).

5.4. Media Function (MF)

The purpose of the MF is to perform media related functions such as
media transcoding and media security implementation between two
SSPs.

An Example of this is to transform a voice payload from one codec
(e.g., G.711) to another (e.g., EvRC). Additionally, the MF MAY may
perform media relaying, media security, privacy, and encryption.

5.7.

5.5. Policy Considerations

In the context of the SPEERMINT working group when two SSPs peer,
there MAY be a desire to exchange peering policy information
dynamically. There are specifications in progress in the SIPPING
working group to define policy exchange between an UA and a domain
[23] and providing profile data to SIP user agents [24] These
considerations borrow from both.

Following the terminology introduced in [12], this package uses the
terms Peering Session-Independent and Session-Specific policies in
the following context.

o Peering Session-Independent policies include Diffserv Marking,
Policing, Session Admission Control, and domain reachabilities,
amongst others. The time period between Peering Session-
Independent policy changes is much greater than the time it
takes to establish a call.

o Peering Session-Specific polices includes supported
connection/call rate, total number of connections/calls
available, current utilization, amongst others. Peering
Session-specific policies can change within the time it takes
to establish a call.

These

Likewise, but orthogonal to session dependency, an SSP may have
policies can that may be Peer dependent peer-dependent or independent, creating peer-independent. That is,
the
following peering policy tree definition:

o Peer Independent
Session dependent
Session independent
o Peer Dependent
Session dependent
Session independent session-dependent and session-independent policies may by
further sub-divided and modified by additional controls that depend
on which peer SSP or federation with which communications is being
established.

6. Call Control and Media Control Deployment Options

The peering functions can either be deployed along the following two
dimensions depending upon how the signaling function and the media
function functions
along with IP functions layer are implemented:

Composed or Decomposed: Addresses the question whether the media
must flow through the same physical and geographic elements as SIP
dialogs and sessions.

Centralized or Distributed: Addresses the question whether the
logical and physical peering points interconnections are in one geographical
location or distributed to multiple physical locations on the SSP's
network.

In a composed model, SF and MF functions are implemented in one
peering logical element.

Provider A Provider B
---------- . . ----------
/ \ . . / \
| | . _ . | |
| +----+ . / \_ . +----+ |
| | SF |<-----/ \------| SF | |
| +-+--+ . /Transit\ . | | |
| | | . / IP \ . | | |
| +-+--+ . \ Provider| . | | |
| | MF |<~~~~\(Option)|~~~~| MF | |
| +----+ . \ / . +----+ |
| | . \__ _/ . | |
\_________ / . . \________ _/
---------- ----------

--- Signal (SIP)
~~~ Bearer (RTP/IP)
... Scope of peering

Figure 3: Decomposed v. Collapsed Peering

The advantage of a collapsed peering architecture is that one-
element solves all peering issues. Disadvantage examples of this
architecture are single point of failure, bottleneck, and complex
scalability.

In a decomposed model, SF and MF are implemented in separate peering
logical elements. SFs are implemented in a proxy and MFs are
implemented in another logical element. The scaling of signaling
versus scaling of media may differ between applications.
Decomposing allows each to follow a separate migration path.

This model allows the implementation of M:N model where one SF is
associated with multiple peering MF and one peering MF is associated
with multiple peering proxies. SFs. Generally, a vertical protocol associates the
relationship between a SF and a MF. This architecture reduces the
potential of a single point of failure. It allows separation of the
policy decision point and the policy enforcement point. An example
of disadvantages is the scaling complexity because of the M:N
relationship and latency due to the vertical control messages
between entities.

7. Address space considerations

Peering must occur in a common IP address space, which is defined by
the federation, which may be entirely on the public Internet, or
some private address space. The origination or termination networks
may or may not entirely be in that the same address space. If they are
not, then a network address translation (NAT) or similar function
may be needed before the signaling or media is presented correctly
to the federation. The only requirement is that all associated
entities across the peering interface are reachable.

8. Security Considerations

In all cases, cryptographic-based security should be maintained as
an optional requirement between peering providers conditioned on the
presence or absence of underlying physical security of peer
connections, e.g. within the same secure physical building.

In order to maintain a consistent approach, unique and specialized
security requirements common for the majority of peering
relationships, should be standardized within the IETF. These
standardized methods may enable capabilities such as dynamic peering
relationships across publicly maintained interconnections.

TODO: Address RFC-3552 BCP items.

9. IANA Considerations

There are no IANA considerations at this time.

10. Acknowledgments

The working group thanks Sohel Khan for his initial architecture
draft that helped to initiate work on this draft.

A significant portion of this draft is taken from [14] with permission from the
author R. Mahy. The other important contributor is Otmar Lendl.

11.

References

11.1.

10.1. Normative References

[1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

[2] Mealling, M. and R. Daniel, "The Naming Authority Pointer
(NAPTR) DNS Resource Record", RFC 2915, September 2000.

[3] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A.,
Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, "SIP:
Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, June 2002.

[4] Rosenberg, J. and H. Schulzrinne, "Session Initiation Protocol
(SIP): Locating SIP Servers", RFC 3263, June 2002.

[5] Blake-Wilson, S., Nystrom, M., Hopwood, D., Mikkelsen, J., and
T. Wright, "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions", RFC
4366, April 2006.

[6] Schulzrinne, H., Casner, S., Frederick, R., and V. Jacobson,
"RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time Applications", STD
64, RFC 3550, July 2003.

[7] Peterson, J., Liu, H., Yu, J., and B. Campbell, "Using E.164
numbers with the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 3824,
June 2004.

[8] Peterson, J., "Address Resolution for Instant Messaging and
Presence",RFC 3861, August 2004.

[9] Peterson, J., "Telephone Number Mapping (ENUM) Service
Registration for Presence Services", RFC 3953, January 2005.

[10] ETSI TS 102 333: " Telecommunications and Internet converged
Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); Gate
control protocol".

[11] Peterson, J., "enumservice registration for Session Initiation
Protocol (SIP) Addresses-of-Record", RFC 3764, April 2004.

[12] Livingood, J. and R. Shockey, "IANA Registration for an
Enumservice Containing PSTN Signaling Information", RFC 4769,
November 2006.

11.2.

10.2. Informative References

[13] Malas, D., "SPEERMINT Terminology", draft-ietf-speermint-
terminology-16 (work in progress), February 2008.

[14] Mule, J-F., "SPEERMINT Requirements for SIP-based VoIP
Interconnection", draft-ietf-speermint-requirements-03.txt,
November 2007. draft-ietf-speermint-requirements-04.txt,
February 2008.

[15] Mahy, R., "A Minimalist Approach to Direct Peering", draft-
mahy-speermint-direct-peering-02.txt, July 2007.

[16] Penno, R., et al., "SPEERMINT Routing Architecture Message
Flows", draft-ietf-speermint-flows-02.txt", April 2007.

[17] Houri, A., et al., "RTC Provisioning Requirements", draft-
houri-speermint-rtc-provisioning-reqs-00.txt, June, 2006.

[18] Habler, M., et al., "A Federation based VOIP Peering
Architecture", draft-lendl-speermint-federations-03.txt,
September 2006.

[19] Mahy, R., "A Telephone Number Mapping (ENUM) Service
Registration for Instant Messaging (IM) Services", RFC 5028 draft-ietf-
enum-im-service-03 (work in progress), March 2006.

[20] Haberler, M. and R. Stastny, "Combined User and Carrier ENUM
in the e164.arpa tree", draft-haberler-carrier-enum-03 (work
in progress), March 2006.

[21] Penno, R., Malas D., and Melampy, P., "A Session Initiation
Protocol (SIP) Event package for Peering", draft-penno-
sipping-peering-package-01
sipping-peering-package-00 (work in progress), September 2006.

[22] Hollander, D., Bray, T., and A. Layman, "Namespaces in XML",
W3C REC REC-xml-names-19990114, January 1999.

[23] Burger, E (Ed.), "A Mechanism for Content Indirection in
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Messages", RFC 4483, May
2006

[24] Gurbani, V., Lawrence, S., and B. Laboratories, "Domain
Certificates in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)", draft-
ietf-sip-domain-certs-00 (work in progress), November 2007.

Author's Addresses

Reinaldo Penno (Editor)
Juniper Networks
1194 N Mathilda Avenue
Sunnyvale, CA
USA
Email: rpenno@juniper.net

Mike Hammer
Cisco Systems
13615 Dulles Technology Drive
Herndon, VA 20171
USA
Email: mhammer@cisco.com

Sohel Khan, Ph.D.
Comcast Cable Communications
U.S.A
Email: sohel_khan@cable.comcast.com

Daryl Malas
Level 3 Communications LLC
1025 Eldorado Blvd.
Broomfield,
CableLabs
858 Coal Creek Circle
Louisville, CO 80021
USA
EMail: daryl.malas@level3.com

Reinaldo Penno (Editor)
Juniper Networks
1194 N Mathilda Avenue
Sunnyvale, CA
USA 80027
Email: rpenno@juniper.net d.malas@cablelabs.com

Adam Uzelac
Global Crossing
1120 Pittsford Victor Road
PITTSFORD, NY 14534
USA
Email: adam.uzelac@globalcrossing.com

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