draft-ietf-stir-passport-rcd-00.txt   draft-ietf-stir-passport-rcd-01.txt 
Network Working Group J. Peterson Network Working Group J. Peterson
Internet-Draft Neustar Internet-Draft Neustar Inc.
Intended status: Informational C. Wendt Intended status: Informational C. Wendt
Expires: January 4, 2018 Comcast Expires: April 25, 2019 Comcast
July 3, 2017 October 22, 2018
PASSporT Extension for Rich Call Data PASSporT Extension for Rich Call Data
draft-ietf-stir-passport-rcd-00.txt draft-ietf-stir-passport-rcd-01
Abstract Abstract
This document extends PASSporT, a token for conveying This document extends PASSporT, a token for conveying
cryptographically-signed information about personal communications, cryptographically-signed information about personal communications,
to include rich data that can be rendered to users, such as a human- to include rich data that can be rendered to users, such as a human-
readable display name comparable to the "Caller ID" function common readable display name comparable to the "Caller ID" function common
on the telephone network. The element defined for this purpose is on the telephone network. The element defined for this purpose is
extensible to include related information about calls that helps extensible to include related information about calls that helps
people decide whether to pick up the phone. people decide whether to pick up the phone.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. PASSporT 'rcd' Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. PASSporT 'rcd' Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Further Information Associated with Callers . . . . . . . . . 4 4. Further Information Associated with Callers . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Third-Party Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. Third-Party Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.1. Signing as a Third Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5.1. Signing as a Third Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Levels of Assurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6. Levels of Assurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Using 'rcd' in SIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7. Using 'rcd' in SIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.1. Authentication Service Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7.1. Authentication Service Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.2. Verification Service Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7.2. Verification Service Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 8. Using 'rcd' as additional claims to other PASSporT extensions 8
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 8.1. Procedures for applying 'rcd' as claims only . . . . . . 9
9.1. JSON Web Token Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 8.2. Example for applying 'rcd' as claims only . . . . . . . . 9
9.2. PASSporT Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9.3. PASSporT RCD Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 10.1. JSON Web Token Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
11. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 10.2. PASSporT Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 10.3. PASSporT RCD Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
PASSporT [I-D.ietf-stir-passport] is a token format based on JWT PASSporT [RFC8225] is a token format based on JWT [RFC7519] for
[RFC7519] for conveying cryptographically-signed information about conveying cryptographically-signed information about the people
the people involved in personal communications; it is used with STIR involved in personal communications; it is used to convey a signed
[I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] to convey a signed assertion of the assertion of the identity of the participants in real-time
identity of the participants in real-time communications established communications established via a protocol like SIP [RFC8224]. The
via a protocol like SIP. The STIR problem statement [RFC7340] STIR problem statement [RFC7340] declared securing the display name
declared securing the display name of callers outside of STIR's of callers outside of STIR's initial scope, so baseline STIR provides
initial scope, so baseline STIR provides no features for caller name. no features for caller name. This specification documents an
This specification documents an optional mechanism for PASSporT and optional mechanism for PASSporT and the associated STIR mechanisms
the associated STIR mechanisms which extends PASSporT to carry which extends PASSporT to carry additional elements conveying richer
additional elements conveying richer information: information that is information: information that is intended to be rendered to an end
intended to be rendered to an end user to assist a called party in user to assist a called party in determining whether to accept or
determining whether to accept or trust incoming communications. This trust incoming communications. This includes the name of the person
includes the name of the person on one side of a communications on one side of a communications session, the traditional "Caller ID"
session, the traditional "Caller ID" of the telephone network, along of the telephone network, along with related display information that
with related display information that would be rendered to the called would be rendered to the called party during alerting, or potentially
party during alerting, or potentially used by an automaton to used by an automaton to determine whether and how to alert a called
determine whether and how to alert a called party. party.
In the traditional telephone network, the display name associated In the traditional telephone network, the display name associated
with a call is typically provided in one of three ways: by a third- with a call is typically provided in one of three ways: by a third-
party service queried at the terminating side, by the originator of party service queried at the terminating side, by the originator of
the call, or through a local address book maintained by a device on the call, or through a local address book maintained by a device on
the terminating side. The STIR architecture lends itself especially the terminating side. The STIR architecture lends itself especially
to the first of these approaches, as it assumes that an authority on to the first of these approaches, as it assumes that an authority on
the originating side of the call provides a cryptographic assurance the originating side of the call provides a cryptographic assurance
of the validity of the calling party number in order to prevent of the validity of the calling party number in order to prevent
impersonation attacks. That same authority could sign for a display impersonation attacks. That same authority could sign for a display
skipping to change at page 3, line 28 skipping to change at page 3, line 33
"Caller ID" more secure even when there is no first-party attestation "Caller ID" more secure even when there is no first-party attestation
of a display name. For these cases, this specification outlines of a display name. For these cases, this specification outlines
various ways that a display name for a calling party could be various ways that a display name for a calling party could be
determined at the terminating side in a secure fashion. determined at the terminating side in a secure fashion.
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
In this document, the key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", In this document, the key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED",
"SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT
RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to be interpreted as RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to be interpreted as
described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119] and RFC 6919 [RFC6919]. described in [RFC2119] and [RFC6919].
3. PASSporT 'rcd' Claim 3. PASSporT 'rcd' Claim
This specification defines a new JSON Web Token claim for "rcd", Rich This specification defines a new JSON Web Token claim for "rcd", Rich
Call Data, the value of which is an array of JSON subelements. The Call Data, the value of which is an array of JSON subelements. The
initial subelement defined here is a display name, "nam", associated initial subelement defined here is a display name, "nam", associated
with the originator of personal communications, which may for example with the originator of personal communications, which may for example
derive from the display-name component of the From header field value derive from the display-name component of the From header field value
of a SIP request, or a similar field in other PASSporT using of a SIP request, or a similar field in other PASSporT using
protocols. protocols.
skipping to change at page 4, line 10 skipping to change at page 4, line 15
{ "typ":"passport", { "typ":"passport",
"ppt":"rcd", "ppt":"rcd",
"alg":"ES256", "alg":"ES256",
"x5u":"https://www.example.com/cert.cer" } "x5u":"https://www.example.com/cert.cer" }
The PASSporT claims object will then contain the "rcd" key with its The PASSporT claims object will then contain the "rcd" key with its
corresponding value. The value of "rcd" is an array of JSON objects, corresponding value. The value of "rcd" is an array of JSON objects,
of which one, the "nam" object, is mandatory. The key syntax of of which one, the "nam" object, is mandatory. The key syntax of
"nam" follows the display-name ABNF given in [RFC3261]. "nam" follows the display-name ABNF given in [RFC3261].
{ "orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}, { "orig":{"tn":"12155551212"},
"dest":{"tn":"12155551213"}, "dest":{"tn":"12155551213"},
"iat":1443208345, "iat":1443208345,
"iss":"Example, Inc.", "iss":"Example, Inc.",
"rcd":{"nam":"Alice Atlanta"} } "rcd":{"nam":"Alice Atlanta"} }
After the header and claims PASSporT objects have been constructed, After the header and claims PASSporT objects have been constructed,
their signature is generated normally per the guidance in their signature is generated normally per the guidance in [RFC8225].
[I-D.ietf-stir-passport].
4. Further Information Associated with Callers 4. Further Information Associated with Callers
Beyond naming information, there may be additional human-readable Beyond naming information, there may be additional human-readable
information about the calling party that should be rendered to the information about the calling party that should be rendered to the
end user in order to help the called party decide whether or not to end user in order to help the called party decide whether or not to
pick up the phone. This is not limited to information about the pick up the phone. This is not limited to information about the
caller, but includes information about the call itself, which may caller, but includes information about the call itself, which may
derive from analytics that determine based on call patterns or derive from analytics that determine based on call patterns or
similar data if the call is likely to be one the called party wants similar data if the call is likely to be one the called party wants
skipping to change at page 4, line 49 skipping to change at page 5, line 4
information that will be processed by an application before information that will be processed by an application before
rendering it to a user, like social networking data that shows rendering it to a user, like social networking data that shows
that an unknown caller is a friend-of-a-friend, or reputation that an unknown caller is a friend-of-a-friend, or reputation
scores derived from crowdsourcing, or confidence scores based on scores derived from crowdsourcing, or confidence scores based on
broader analytics about the caller and callee. broader analytics about the caller and callee.
All of these data elements would benefit from the secure attestations All of these data elements would benefit from the secure attestations
provided by the STIR and PASSporT frameworks. A new IANA registry provided by the STIR and PASSporT frameworks. A new IANA registry
has been defined to hold potential values of the "rcd" array; see has been defined to hold potential values of the "rcd" array; see
Section 9.3. Specific extensions to the "rcd" PASSporT claim are Section 10.3. Specific extensions to the "rcd" PASSporT claim are
left for future specification. left for future specification.
While in the traditional telephone network, the business relationship While in the traditional telephone network, the business relationship
between calling customers and their telephone service providers is between calling customers and their telephone service providers is
the ultimate root of information about a calling party's name, some the ultimate root of information about a calling party's name, some
other forms of data like crowdsourced reputation scores might derive other forms of data like crowdsourced reputation scores might derive
from third parties. It is more likely that when those elements are from third parties. It is more likely that when those elements are
present, they will be in a third-party "rcd" PASSporT. present, they will be in a third-party "rcd" PASSporT.
5. Third-Party Uses 5. Third-Party Uses
skipping to change at page 5, line 26 skipping to change at page 5, line 28
the call path could also acquire rich call data by querying a third- the call path could also acquire rich call data by querying a third-
party service. In telephone operations today, a third-party party service. In telephone operations today, a third-party
information service is commonly queried with the calling party's information service is commonly queried with the calling party's
number in order to learn the name of the calling party, and number in order to learn the name of the calling party, and
potentially other helpful information could also be passed over that potentially other helpful information could also be passed over that
interface. The value of using a PASSporT to convey this information interface. The value of using a PASSporT to convey this information
from third parties lies largely in the preservation of the original from third parties lies largely in the preservation of the original
authority's signature over the data, and the potential for the authority's signature over the data, and the potential for the
PASSporT to be conveyed from intermediaries to endpoint devices. PASSporT to be conveyed from intermediaries to endpoint devices.
Effectively, these use cases form of subcase of out-of-band Effectively, these use cases form of subcase of out-of-band
[I-D.rescorla-stir-fallback] use cases. The manner in which third- [I-D.ietf-stir-oob] use cases. The manner in which third-party
party services are discovered is outside the scope of this document. services are discovered is outside the scope of this document.
An intermediary use case might look as follows: a SIP INVITE carries An intermediary use case might look as follows: a SIP INVITE carries
a display name in its From header field value and an initial PASSporT a display name in its From header field value and an initial PASSporT
object without the "rcd" claim. When the a terminating verification object without the "rcd" claim. When the a terminating verification
service implemented at a SIP proxy server receives this request, and service implemented at a SIP proxy server receives this request, and
determines that the signature is valid, it might query a third-party determines that the signature is valid, it might query a third-party
service that maps telephone numbers to calling party names. Upon service that maps telephone numbers to calling party names. Upon
receiving the PASSport in a response from that third-party service, receiving the PASSport in a response from that third-party service,
the terminating side could add a new Identity header field to the the terminating side could add a new Identity header field to the
request for the "rcd" PASSporT object provided by the third-party request for the "rcd" PASSporT object provided by the third-party
skipping to change at page 7, line 15 skipping to change at page 7, line 22
7.1. Authentication Service Behavior 7.1. Authentication Service Behavior
An authentication service creating a PASSporT containing a "rcd" An authentication service creating a PASSporT containing a "rcd"
claim MAY include a "ppt" for "rcd" or not. Third-party claim MAY include a "ppt" for "rcd" or not. Third-party
authentication services following the behavior in Section 5.1 MUST authentication services following the behavior in Section 5.1 MUST
include a "ppt" of "rcd". If "ppt" does contain a "rcd", then any include a "ppt" of "rcd". If "ppt" does contain a "rcd", then any
SIP authentication services MUST add a "ppt" parameter to the SIP authentication services MUST add a "ppt" parameter to the
Identity header containing that PASSporT with a value of "rcd". The Identity header containing that PASSporT with a value of "rcd". The
resulting Identity header might look as follows: resulting Identity header might look as follows:
Identity: "sv5CTo05KqpSmtHt3dcEiO/1CWTSZtnG3iV+1nmurLXV/HmtyNS7Ltrg9dlxkWzo Identity: "sv5CTo05KqpSmtHt3dcEiO/1CWTSZtnG3iV+1nmurLXV/HmtyNS7Ltrg9dlxkWzo
eU7d7OV8HweTTDobV3itTmgPwCFjaEmMyEI3d7SyN21yNDo2ER/Ovgtw0Lu5csIp eU7d7OV8HweTTDobV3itTmgPwCFjaEmMyEI3d7SyN21yNDo2ER/Ovgtw0Lu5csIp
pPqOg1uXndzHbG7mR6Rl9BnUhHufVRbp51Mn3w0gfUs="; \ pPqOg1uXndzHbG7mR6Rl9BnUhHufVRbp51Mn3w0gfUs="; \
info=<https://biloxi.example.org/biloxi.cer>;alg=ES256;ppt="rcd" info=<https://biloxi.example.org/biloxi.cer>;alg=ES256;ppt="rcd"
This specification assumes that by default, a SIP authentication This specification assumes that by default, a SIP authentication
service will derive the value of "rcd" from the display-name service will derive the value of "rcd" from the display-name
component of the From header field value of the request. It is component of the From header field value of the request. It is
however a matter of authentication service policy to decide how it however a matter of authentication service policy to decide how it
populates the value of "rcd", which MAY also derive from other fields populates the value of "rcd", which MAY also derive from other fields
in the request, from customer profile data, or from access to in the request, from customer profile data, or from access to
external services. If the authentication service generates a external services. If the authentication service generates a
PASSporT object containing "rcd" with a value that is not equivalent PASSporT object containing "rcd" with a value that is not equivalent
to the From header field display-name value, it MUST use the full to the From header field display-name value, it MUST use the full
form of the PASSporT object in SIP. form of the PASSporT object in SIP.
7.2. Verification Service Behavior 7.2. Verification Service Behavior
[I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] Section 6.2 Step 5 requires that [RFC8224] Section 6.2 Step 5 requires that specifications defining
specifications defining "ppt" values describe any additional verifier "ppt" values describe any additional verifier behavior. The behavior
behavior. The behavior specified for the "ppt" values of "rcd" is as specified for the "ppt" values of "rcd" is as follows. If the
follows. If the PASSporT is in compact form, then the verification PASSporT is in compact form, then the verification service SHOULD
service SHOULD extract the display-name from the From header field extract the display-name from the From header field value, if any,
value, if any, and use that as the value for the "rcd" key when it and use that as the value for the "rcd" key when it recomputes the
recomputes the header and claims of the PASSporT object. If the header and claims of the PASSporT object. If the signature validates
signature validates over the recomputed object, then the verification over the recomputed object, then the verification should be
should be considered successful. considered successful.
However, if the PASSport is in full form with a "ppt" value of "rcd", However, if the PASSport is in full form with a "ppt" value of "rcd",
then the verification service MUST extract the value associated with then the verification service MUST extract the value associated with
the "rcd" "nam" key in the object. If the signature validates, then the "rcd" "nam" key in the object. If the signature validates, then
the verification service can use the value of the "rcd" "nam" key as the verification service can use the value of the "rcd" "nam" key as
the display name of calling party, which would in turn be rendered to the display name of calling party, which would in turn be rendered to
alerted users or otherwise leveraged in accordance with local policy. alerted users or otherwise leveraged in accordance with local policy.
This will allow SIP networks that convey the display name through a This will allow SIP networks that convey the display name through a
field other than the From header field to interoperate with this field other than the From header field to interoperate with this
specification. specification.
skipping to change at page 8, line 36 skipping to change at page 8, line 42
has some other reason to trust the signer. No further guidance on has some other reason to trust the signer. No further guidance on
verification service authorization policy is given here. verification service authorization policy is given here.
The behavior of a SIP UAS upon receiving an INVITE containing a The behavior of a SIP UAS upon receiving an INVITE containing a
PASSporT object with a "rcd" claim will largely remain a matter of PASSporT object with a "rcd" claim will largely remain a matter of
implementation policy. In most cases, implementations would render implementation policy. In most cases, implementations would render
this calling party name information to the user while alerting. Any this calling party name information to the user while alerting. Any
user interface additions to express confidence in the veracity of user interface additions to express confidence in the veracity of
this information are outside the scope of this specification. this information are outside the scope of this specification.
8. Acknowledgments 8. Using 'rcd' as additional claims to other PASSporT extensions
Rich Call Data, including, for example, calling name information, is
often data that is additive data to the personal communications
information defined in the core PASSporT data required to support the
security properties defined in [RFC8225]. For cases where the entity
that is originating the personal communications and additionally is
supporting the authentication service and also is the authority of
the Rich Call Data, rather than creating multiple identity headers
with multiple PASSporT extensions or defining multiple combinations
and permutations of PASSporT extension definitions, the
authentication service can alternatively directly add the 'rcd'
claims to the PASSporT it is creating, whether it is constructed with
a PASSporT extension or not.
8.1. Procedures for applying 'rcd' as claims only
For a given PASSporT using some other extension than 'rcd,' the
Authentication Service MAY additionally include the 'rcd' claim as
defined in this document. This would result in a set of claims that
correspond to the original intended extension with the addition of
the 'rcd' claim.
The Verification service that receives the PASSporT, if it supports
this specification and chooses to, should interpret the 'rcd' claim
as simply just an additional claim intended to deliver and/or
validate delivered Rich Call Data.
8.2. Example for applying 'rcd' as claims only
In the case of [I-D.ietf-stir-passport-shaken] which is the PASSporT
extension supporting the SHAKEN specification [ATIS-1000074], a
common case for an Authenication service to co-exist in a CSP network
along with the authority over the calling name used for the call.
Rather than require two identity headers, the CSP Authenticaton
Service can apply both the SHAKEN PASSporT claims and extension and
simply add the 'rcd' required claims defined in this document.
For example, the PASSporT claims for the 'shaken' PASSporT with 'rcd'
claims would be as follows:
Protected Header
{
"alg":"ES256",
"typ":"passport",
"ppt":"shaken",
"x5u":"https://cert.example.org/passport.cer"
}
Payload
{
"attest":"A"
"dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]}
"iat":"1443208345",
"orig":{"tn":"12155551212"},
"origid":"123e4567-e89b-12d3-a456-426655440000"
"rcd":{"nam":"Alice Atlanta"} }
}
A Verification Service that supports 'rcd' and 'shaken' PASSporT
extensions will be able to receive the above PASSporT and interpret
both the 'shaken' claims as well as the 'rcd' defined claim.
If the Verification Service only understands the 'shaken' extension
claims but doesn't support 'rcd', the 'rcd' can simply be ignored and
disregarded.
9. Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Robert Sparks for helpful suggestions. We would like to thank Robert Sparks for helpful suggestions.
9. IANA Considerations 10. IANA Considerations
9.1. JSON Web Token Claims 10.1. JSON Web Token Claim
This specification requests that the IANA add a new claim to the JSON This specification requests that the IANA add a new claim to the JSON
Web Token Claims registry as defined in [RFC7519]. Web Token Claims registry as defined in [RFC7519].
Claim Name: "rcd" Claim Name: "rcd"
Claim Description: Caller Name Information Claim Description: Caller Name Information
Change Controller: IESG Change Controller: IESG
Specification Document(s): [RFCThis] Specification Document(s): [RFCThis]
9.2. PASSporT Types 10.2. PASSporT Types
This specification requests that the IANA add a new entry to the This specification requests that the IANA add a new entry to the
PASSporT Types registry for the type "rcd" which is specified in PASSporT Types registry for the type "rcd" which is specified in
[RFCThis]. [RFCThis].
9.3. PASSporT RCD Types 10.3. PASSporT RCD Types
This document requests that the IANA create a new registry for This document requests that the IANA create a new registry for
PASSporT RCD types. Registration of new PASSporT RCD types shall be PASSporT RCD types. Registration of new PASSporT RCD types shall be
under the Specification Required policy. under the Specification Required policy.
This registry is to be initially populated with a single value for This registry is to be initially populated with a single value for
"nam" which is specified in [RFCThis]. "nam" which is specified in [RFCThis].
10. Security Considerations 11. Security Considerations
Revealing information such as the name, location, and affiliation of Revealing information such as the name, location, and affiliation of
a person necessarily entails certain privacy risks. Baseline a person necessarily entails certain privacy risks. Baseline
PASSporT has no particular confidentiality requirement, as the PASSporT has no particular confidentiality requirement, as the
information it signs over in a using protocol like SIP is all information it signs over in a using protocol like SIP is all
information that SIP carries in the clear anyway. Transport-level information that SIP carries in the clear anyway. Transport-level
security can hide those SIP fields from eavesdroppers, and the same security can hide those SIP fields from eavesdroppers, and the same
confidentiality mechanisms would protect any PASSporT(s) carried in confidentiality mechanisms would protect any PASSporT(s) carried in
SIP. SIP.
More TBD. More TBD.
11. Informative References 12. References
[I-D.ietf-stir-passport]
Wendt, C. and J. Peterson, "Personal Assertion Token
(PASSporT)", draft-ietf-stir-passport-11 (work in
progress), February 2017.
[I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis]
Peterson, J., Jennings, C., Rescorla, E., and C. Wendt,
"Authenticated Identity Management in the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP)", draft-ietf-stir-rfc4474bis-16
(work in progress), February 2017.
[I-D.rescorla-stir-fallback] 12.1. Normative References
Rescorla, E. and J. Peterson, "STIR Out of Band
Architecture and Use Cases", draft-rescorla-stir-
fallback-02 (work in progress), June 2017.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [I-D.ietf-stir-oob]
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Rescorla, E. and J. Peterson, "STIR Out-of-Band
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, Architecture and Use Cases", draft-ietf-stir-oob-03 (work
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. in progress), July 2018.
[RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, [RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002, DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261>.
[RFC6919] Barnes, R., Kent, S., and E. Rescorla, "Further Key Words [RFC6919] Barnes, R., Kent, S., and E. Rescorla, "Further Key Words
for Use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", RFC 6919, for Use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", RFC 6919,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6919, April 2013, DOI 10.17487/RFC6919, April 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6919>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6919>.
[RFC7340] Peterson, J., Schulzrinne, H., and H. Tschofenig, "Secure [RFC7340] Peterson, J., Schulzrinne, H., and H. Tschofenig, "Secure
Telephone Identity Problem Statement and Requirements", Telephone Identity Problem Statement and Requirements",
RFC 7340, DOI 10.17487/RFC7340, September 2014, RFC 7340, DOI 10.17487/RFC7340, September 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7340>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7340>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token [RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015, (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC8224] Peterson, J., Jennings, C., Rescorla, E., and C. Wendt,
"Authenticated Identity Management in the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 8224,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8224, February 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8224>.
[RFC8225] Wendt, C. and J. Peterson, "PASSporT: Personal Assertion
Token", RFC 8225, DOI 10.17487/RFC8225, February 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8225>.
12.2. Informative References
[ATIS-1000074]
ATIS/SIP Forum NNI Task Group, "Signature-based Handling
of Asserted information using toKENs (SHAKEN)
<https://access.atis.org/apps/group_public/
download.php/32237/ATIS-1000074.pdf>", January 2017.
[I-D.ietf-stir-passport-shaken]
Wendt, C. and M. Barnes, "PASSporT SHAKEN Extension
(SHAKEN)", draft-ietf-stir-passport-shaken-04 (work in
progress), October 2018.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Jon Peterson Jon Peterson
Neustar, Inc. Neustar Inc.
1800 Sutter St Suite 570 1800 Sutter St Suite 570
Concord, CA 94520 Concord, CA 94520
US US
Email: jon.peterson@neustar.biz Email: jon.peterson@neustar.biz
Chris Wendt Chris Wendt
Comcast Comcast
One Comcast Center Comcast Technology Center
Philadelphia, PA 19103 Philadelphia, PA 19103
USA USA
Email: chris-ietf@chriswendt.net Email: chris-ietf@chriswendt.net
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