draft-ietf-stir-passport-00.txt   draft-ietf-stir-passport-01.txt 
STIR C. Wendt, Ed. STIR C. Wendt
Internet-Draft Comcast Internet-Draft Comcast
Intended status: Standards Track J. Peterson Intended status: Standards Track J. Peterson
Expires: August 24, 2016 Neustar Inc. Expires: September 24, 2016 Neustar Inc.
February 21, 2016 March 23, 2016
Persona Assertion Token Persona Assertion Token
draft-ietf-stir-passport-00 draft-ietf-stir-passport-01
Abstract Abstract
This document defines a token format for verifying with non- This document defines a token format for verifying with non-
repudiation the sender of and authorization to send information repudiation the sender of and authorization to send information
related to the originator of personal communications. A related to the originator of personal communications. A
cryptographic signature is defined to protect the integrity of the cryptographic signature is defined to protect the integrity of the
information used to identify the originator of a personal information used to identify the originator of a personal
communications session toward a terminating entity. The communications session (e.g. the telephone number or URI) and verify
the accuracy of this information at the destination. The
cryptographic signature is defined with the intention that it can cryptographic signature is defined with the intention that it can
confidently verify the originating persona even when the signature is confidently verify the originating persona even when the signature is
sent to the terminating party over a potentially unsecure channel. sent to the destination party over an unsecure channel. The Persona
The Persona Assertion Token (PASSporT) is particularly useful for Assertion Token (PASSporT) is particularly useful for many personal
many personal communications applications over IP networks and other communications applications over IP networks and other multi-hop
multi-hop interconnection scenarios where the originating and interconnection scenarios where the originating and destination
terminating parties may not have a direct trusted relationship. parties may not have a direct trusted relationship.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Token Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Token Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. PASSporT Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. PASSporT Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. PASSporT Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. PASSporT Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1.1. "typ" (Type) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1.1. "typ" (Type) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1.2. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1.2. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.3. "x5u" (X.509 URL) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1.3. "x5u" (X.509 URL) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. PASSporT Token Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2. PASSporT Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. PASSporT Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2.1. JWT defined claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Extending PASSporT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.2.1.1. "iat" - Issued at claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. "ppt" (PASSporT) header parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.2.2. PASSporT specific claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. Extended PASSporT Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.2.2.1. Originating and Destination Identities . . . . . 6
4.3. Alternate PASSporT Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.2.2.2. "mky" - Media Key claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.4. Registering PASSporT Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.2.3. Multi-party Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Deterministic JSON Serialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.3. PASSporT Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Human Readability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4. Extending PASSporT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.1. "ppt" (PASSporT) header parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.1. Avoidance of replay and cut and paste attacks . . . . . . 8 4.2. Extended PASSporT Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.2. Solution Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.3. Alternate PASSporT Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.4. Registering PASSporT Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.1. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5. Deterministic JSON Serialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.1.1. Media Type Registry Contents Additions Requested . . 9 5.1. Example PASSport deterministic JSON form . . . . . . . . 9
8.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 10 6. Human Readability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.2.1. Registry Contents Additions Requested . . . . . . . . 10 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 7.1. Avoidance of replay and cut and paste attacks . . . . . . 10
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7.2. Solution Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 7.3. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.1. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.1.1. Media Type Registry Contents Additions Requested . . 11
8.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.2.1. Registry Contents Additions Requested . . . . . . . . 12
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Appendix A. Appendix A. Example PASSporT JWS Serialization and
Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix B. Appendix B. X.509 Private Key Certificate for
Example in Appendix A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Appendix C. Appendix C. X.509 Public Key Certificate for Example
in Appendix A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
In today's IP-enabled telecommunications world, there is a growing In today's IP-enabled telecommunications world, there is a growing
concern about the ability to trust incoming invitations for concern about the ability to trust incoming invitations for
communications sessions, including video, voice and messaging. As an communications sessions, including video, voice and messaging. As an
example, modern telephone networks provide the ability to spoof the example, modern telephone networks provide the ability to spoof the
telephone number for many legitimate purposes including providing calling party telephone number for many legitimate purposes including
network features and services on the behalf of a legitimate telephone providing network features and services on the behalf of a legitimate
number. However, as we have seen, bad actors have taken advantage of telephone number. However, as we have seen, bad actors have taken
this ability for illegitimate and fraudulent purposes meant to trick advantage of this ability for illegitimate and fraudulent purposes
telephone users to believe they are someone they are not. This meant to trick telephone users to believe they are someone they are
problem can be extended to many emerging forms of personal not. This problem can be extended to many emerging forms of personal
communications. communications.
This document defines a common method for creating and validating a This document defines a common method for creating and validating a
token that cryptographically verifies an originating identity, or token that cryptographically verifies an originating identity, or
more generally a URI or application specific identity string more generally a URI or application specific identity string
representing the originator of personal communications. Through representing the originator of personal communications. Through
extended profiles other information associated with the originating extended profiles other information relevant to the personal
party or the transport of the personal communications can be attached communications can also be attached to the token. The primary goal
to the token. The primary goal of PASSporT is to provide a common of PASSporT is to provide a common framework for signing persona
framework for signing persona related information in an extensible related information in an extensible way. A secondary goal is to
way. A secondary goal is to provide this functionality independent provide this functionality independent of any specific personal
of any specific personal communications signaling call logic, so that communications signaling call logic, so that creation and
creation and verification of persona information can be implemented verification of persona information can be implemented in a flexible
in a flexible way and can be used in many personal communications way and can be used in many personal communications applications
applications including end-to-end applications that require different including end-to-end applications that require different signaling
signaling protocol interworking. It is anticipated that signaling protocols. It is anticipated that signaling protocol specific
protocol specific guidance will be provided in other related guidance will be provided in other related documents and
documents and specifications to specify how to use and transport specifications to specify how to use and transport PASSporT tokens,
PASSporT tokens, however this is intentionally out of scope for this however this is intentionally out of scope for this document.
document.
Note: As of the authoring of this document, Note: As of the authoring of this document,
[I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] provides details of how to use PASSporT [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] provides details of how to use PASSporT
within SIP signaling for the signing and verification of telephone within SIP signaling for the signing and verification of telephone
numbers and there is a parallel. numbers.
2. Token Overview 2. Token Overview
Tokens are a convenient way of encapsulating information with Tokens are a convenient way of encapsulating information with
associated digital signatures. They are used in many applications associated digital signatures. They are used in many applications
that require authentication, authorization, encryption and other use that require authentication, authorization, encryption, non-
cases. JSON Web Token (JWT) [RFC7519] and JSON Web Signature (JWS) repudiation and other use cases. JSON Web Token (JWT) [RFC7519] and
[RFC7515] are designed to provide a compact form for many of these JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515] are designed to provide a compact
purposes and define a specific method and syntax for signing a form for many of these purposes and define a specific method and
specific set of information or "claims" within the token and syntax for signing a specific set of information or "claims" within
therefore providing an extensible set of claims. Additionally, JWS the token and therefore providing an extensible set of claims.
provides extensible mechanisms for specifying the method and Additionally, JWS provides extensible mechanisms for specifying the
cryptographic algorithms used for the associated digital signatures. method and cryptographic algorithms used for the associated digital
signatures.
3. PASSporT Definition 3. PASSporT Definition
The PASSporT is constructed based on JWT [RFC7519] and JWS [RFC7515] The PASSporT is constructed based on JWT [RFC7519] and JWS [RFC7515]
specifications. JWS defines the use of JSON data structures in a specifications. JWS defines the use of JSON data structures in a
specified canonical format for signing data corresponding to JOSE specified canonical format for signing data corresponding to JOSE
header, JWS Payload, and JWS Signature. JWT defines specific set of header, JWS Payload, and JWS Signature. JWT defines specific set of
claims that are represented by specified key value pairs which can be claims that are represented by specified key value pairs which can be
extended with custom keys for specific applications. extended with custom keys for specific applications.
3.1. PASSporT Header 3.1. PASSporT Header
The JWS token header is a JOSE header [RFC7515] that defines the type The JWS token header is a JOSE header [RFC7515] that defines the type
and encryption algorithm used in the token. and encryption algorithm used in the token.
An example of the header for the case of a RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 SHA-256 An example of the header for the case of a RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 SHA-256
digital signature would be the following, digital signature would be the following,
{ "typ":"passport", {
"alg":"RS256", "typ":"passport",
"x5u":"https://cert.example.org/passport.crt" } "alg":"RS256",
"x5u":"https://cert.example.org/passport.crt"
}
3.1.1. "typ" (Type) Header Parameter 3.1.1. "typ" (Type) Header Parameter
JWS defines the "typ" (Type) Header Parameter to declare the media JWS defines the "typ" (Type) Header Parameter to declare the media
type [IANA.MediaTypes] of the JWS. type [IANA.MediaTypes] of the JWS.
This represents that the encoded token is a JWT, and the JWT is a JWS This represents that the encoded token is a JWT, and the JWT is a JWS
using the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 SHA-256 algorithm. using the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 SHA-256 algorithm.
For PASSporT Token the "typ" header MUST minimally include and begin For PASSporT Token the "typ" header MUST minimally include and begin
skipping to change at page 5, line 5 skipping to change at page 5, line 23
As defined in JWS, the "x5u" header parameter is used to provide a As defined in JWS, the "x5u" header parameter is used to provide a
URI [RFC3986] referring to the resource for the X.509 public key URI [RFC3986] referring to the resource for the X.509 public key
certificate or certificate chain [RFC5280] corresponding to the key certificate or certificate chain [RFC5280] corresponding to the key
used to digitally sign the JWS. Note: The definition of what the URI used to digitally sign the JWS. Note: The definition of what the URI
represents in terms of the actor serving the X.509 public key is out represents in terms of the actor serving the X.509 public key is out
of scope of this document. However, generally this would correspond of scope of this document. However, generally this would correspond
to an HTTPS or DNSSEC resource with the guidance that it MUST be a to an HTTPS or DNSSEC resource with the guidance that it MUST be a
TLS protected, per JWS spec. TLS protected, per JWS spec.
3.2. PASSporT Token Claim 3.2. PASSporT Payload
The token claim should consist of the information which needs to be The token payload claims should consist of the information which
verified at the terminating party. This claim should correspond to a needs to be verified at the destination party. This claim should
JWT claim and be encoded as defined by the JWS Payload. correspond to a JWT claim [RFC7519] and be encoded as defined by the
JWS Payload [RFC7519]
The PASSporT defines the use of a number of standard JWT defined The PASSporT defines the use of a number of standard JWT defined
headers as well as two new custom headers corresponding to the two headers as well as two new custom headers corresponding to the two
parties associated with personal communications, the originator and parties associated with personal communications, the originator and
terminator. These headers or key value pairs are detailed below. terminator. These headers or key value pairs are detailed below.
3.2.1. JWT defined claims
3.2.1.1. "iat" - Issued at claim
The JSON claim MUST include the following registered JWT defined The JSON claim MUST include the following registered JWT defined
claims: claims:
o "iat" - issued at, time the JWT was issued, used for expiration. o "iat" - issued at, time the JWT was issued, used for expiration.
This is included for securing the token against replay and cut and This is included for securing the token against replay and cut and
paste attacks, as explained further in the security considerations paste attacks, as explained further in the security considerations
in section 7. in section 7.
Verified Token specific claims that MUST be included: 3.2.2. PASSporT specific claims
3.2.2.1. Originating and Destination Identities
o "orig" - the originating identity claimed. (e.g. for SIP, the FROM Baseline PASSporT defines claims that convey the identity of the
or P-AssertedID [RFC3325] associated e.164 telephone number, TEL origination and destination of personal communications represented as
or SIP URI) This SHOULD be in URI format as defined in [RFC3986] either telephone numbers or Uniform Resource Indicators (URIs). Some
if appropriate but could also be an application specific identity using protocols may require other identifiers for personae; these may
string. be specified as claims through the PASSporT extensibility mechanisms.
But for telephone numbers and URIs, the following claims should be
used:
o "term" - the terminating identity claimed as the intended 3.2.2.1.1. "otn" and "dtn" - Originating and Destination Telephone
destination by the originating party. (e.g. for SIP, the TO Number claim
associated e.164 telephone number, TEL or SIP URI) This SHOULD be
in URI format as defined in [RFC3986] if appropriate but could
also be an application specific identity string.
An example claim is as follows, If the originating identity is a telephone number, the claim "otn"
SHOULD be included. If the destination identity is a telephone
number, the claim "dtn" SHOULD be included.
{ "iat": 1443208345, Telephone Number strings for "otn" and "dtn" claims MUST be
"orig":"+12155551212", canonicalized according to the procedures specified in
"term":"sip:+12155551213@example.com" } [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] Section 6.1.1.
3.2.2.1.2. "ouri" and "duri" - Originating and Destination URI claims
If the originating identity is not a telephone number, the claim
"ouri" SHOULD be included with the string cooresponding to the URI
form of the identity as defined in [RFC3986], alternatively it could
also contain an application specific identity string, if URI format
is not appropriate.
If the destination identity is not a telephone number, the claim
"duri" SHOULD be included. The same string format rules apply as
stated for "ouri".
3.2.2.2. "mky" - Media Key claim
Some protocols that use PASSporT convey hashes for media security
keys within their signaling in order to bind those keys to the
identities established in the signaling layers. One example would be
the DTLS-SRTP key fingerprints carried in SDP via the "a=fingerprint"
attribute; multiple instances of that fingerprint may appear in a
single SDP body corresponding to difference media streams offered.
The "mky" value of PASSporT contains a hexadecimal key presentation
of any hash(es) necessary to establish media security via DTLS-SRTP.
Note that per guidance of Section 5 of this document any whitespace
and line feeds must be removed, however the exception is that a
single space (' ') character between the hash algorithm and the hash
should remain. If multiple key fingerprints are associated with a
sessions establishment, then all non-identical key representations
MUST be concatenated, with a semicolon seperation (';') character,
after sorting the values in alphanumeric order, before inserting them
into the "mky" value in PASSporT.
An example claim with "mky" claim is as follows:
For an SDP offer that includes the following fingerprint values,
a=fingerprint:sha-256 02:1A:CC:54:27:AB:EB:9C:53:3F:3E:4B:65:2E:7D:46:3F:
54:42:CD:54:F1:7A:03:A2:7D:F9:B0:7F:46:19:B2
a=fingerprint:sha-256 4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E:5D:49:6B:19:
E5:7C:AB:3E:4B:65:2E:7D:46:3F:54:42:CD:54:F1
the PASSporT Payload object would be:
{
"iat":"1443208345",
"otn":"12155551212",
"duri":"sip:alice@example.com",
"mky":"sha-256 02:1A:CC:54:27:AB:EB:9C:53:3F:3E:4B:65:2E:7D:
46:3F:54:42:CD:54:F1:7A:03:A2:7D:F9:B0:7F:46:19:B2;sha-256 4A:AD:B9:
B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E:5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB:3E:4B:
65:2E:7D:46:3F:54:42:CD:54:F1"
}
3.2.3. Multi-party Communications
Personal communications in the context of PASSporT can certainly
extend to multi-party scenerios where there is more than one
destination identity. In the future, it is anticipated that PASSporT
will be extended to support these cases.
3.3. PASSporT Signature 3.3. PASSporT Signature
The signature of the PASSporT is created as specified by JWS using The signature of the PASSporT is created as specified by JWS using
the private key corresponding to the X.509 public key certificate the private key corresponding to the X.509 public key certificate
referenced by the "x5u" header parameter. referenced by the "x5u" header parameter.
4. Extending PASSporT 4. Extending PASSporT
PASSporT represents the bare minimum set of claims needed to assert PASSporT represents the bare minimum set of claims needed to assert
the originating identity, however there will certainly be new and the originating identity, however there will certainly be new and
extended applications and usage of PASSPorT that will need to extended applications and usage of PASSPorT that will need to extend
extending claims to represent other information specific to the the claims to represent other information specific to the origination
origination identities beyond the identity itself. identities beyond the identity itself.
There are two mechanisms defined to extend PASSporT. The first There are two mechanisms defined to extend PASSporT. The first
includes an extension of the base passport claims to include includes an extension of the base passport claims to include
additional claims. An alternative method of extending PASSporT is additional claims. An alternative method of extending PASSporT is
for applications of PASSporT unrelated to the base set of claims, for applications of PASSporT unrelated to the base set of claims,
that will define it's own set of claims. Both are described below. that will define it's own set of claims. Both are described below.
4.1. "ppt" (PASSporT) header parameter 4.1. "ppt" (PASSporT) header parameter
For extended profiles of PASSporT, a new JWS header parameter "ppt" For extended profiles of PASSporT, a new JWS header parameter "ppt"
MUST be used with a string that uniquely identifies the profile MUST be used with a string that uniquely identifies the profile
specification that defines any new claims that would extend the base specification that defines any new claims that would extend the base
set of claims of PASSporT. set of claims of PASSporT.
An example header with an extended PASSporT profile of "foo" is as An example header with an extended PASSporT profile of "foo" is as
follows: follows:
{ "typ":"passport", {
"ppt":"foo", "typ":"passport",
"alg":"RS256", "ppt":"foo",
"x5u":"https://tel.example.org/passport.crt" } "alg":"RS256",
"x5u":"https://tel.example.org/passport.crt"
}
4.2. Extended PASSporT Claims 4.2. Extended PASSporT Claims
Future specifications that define such extensions to the PASSporT Future specifications that define such extensions to the PASSporT
mechanism MUST explicitly designate what claims they include, the mechanism MUST explicitly designate what claims they include, the
order in which they will appear, and any further information order in which they will appear, and any further information
necessary to implement the extension. All extensions MUST necessary to implement the extension. All extensions MUST
incorporate the baseline JWT elements specified in Section 3; claims incorporate the baseline JWT elements specified in Section 3; claims
may only be appended to the claims object specified in there, they may only be appended to the claims object specified; they can never
can never be subtracted re-ordered. Specifying new claims follows be subtracted or re-ordered. Specifying new claims follows the
the baseline JWT procedures ([RFC7519] Section 10.1). Note that baseline JWT procedures ([RFC7519] Section 10.1). Note that
understanding an extension as a verifier is always optional for understanding an extension as a verifier is always optional for
compliance with this specification (though future specifications or compliance with this specification (though future specifications or
profiles for deployment environments may make other "ppt" values profiles for deployment environments may make other "ppt" values
mandatory). The creator of a PASSporT object cannot assume that mandatory). The creator of a PASSporT object cannot assume that
verifiers will understand any given extension. Verifiers that do verifiers will understand any given extension. Verifiers that do
support an extension may then trigger appropriate application-level support an extension may then trigger appropriate application-level
behavior in the presence of an extension; authors of extensions behavior in the presence of an extension; authors of extensions
should provide appropriate extension-specific guidance to application should provide appropriate extension-specific guidance to application
developers on this point. developers on this point.
4.3. Alternate PASSporT Extension 4.3. Alternate PASSporT Extension
Some applications may want to use the mechanism of the PASSporT Some applications may want to use the mechanism of the PASSporT
digital signature that is not a superset of the base set of claims of digital signature that is not a superset of the base set of claims of
the PASSporT token as defined in Section 3. Rather, a specification the PASSporT token as defined in Section 3. Rather, a specification
may use PASSporT with its own defined set of claims. may use PASSporT with its own defined set of claims.
In this case, the specification should define its own MIME media type In this case, the specification SHOULD define its own MIME media type
[RFC2046] in the "Media Types" registry [IANA.MediaTypes]. It is [RFC2046] in the "Media Types" registry [IANA.MediaTypes]. The MIME
recommended that the MIME subtype start with the string "passport-" subtype SHOULD start with the string "passport-" to signify that it
to signify that it is related to the PASSporT token. For example, is related to the PASSporT token. For example, for the "foo"
for the "foo" application the MIME type/sub-type could be defined as application the MIME type/sub-type could be defined as "application/
"application/passport-foo". passport-foo".
4.4. Registering PASSporT Extensions 4.4. Registering PASSporT Extensions
In order for interoperability and maintaining uniqueness of the Toward interoperability and to maintain uniqueness of the extended
extended PASSporT profile header parameter string, there SHOULD be an PASSporT profile header parameter string, there SHOULD be an industry
industry registry that tracks the definition of the profile strings. registry that tracks the definition of the profile strings.
5. Deterministic JSON Serialization 5. Deterministic JSON Serialization
In order to provide a deterministic representation of the PASSporT In order to provide a deterministic representation of the PASSporT
Header and Claims, particularly if PASSporT is used across multiple Header and Claims, particularly if PASSporT is used across multiple
signaling environments, the JSON header object and JSON Claim object signaling environments, the JSON header object and JSON Claim object
MUST be computed as follows. MUST be computed as follows.
The JSON object MUST follow the rules for the construction of the The JSON object MUST follow the rules for the construction of the
thumbprint of a JSON Web Key (JWK) as defined in [RFC7638] Section 3. thumbprint of a JSON Web Key (JWK) as defined in [RFC7638] Section 3.
Each JSON object MUST contain no whitespace or line breaks before or Each JSON object MUST contain no whitespace or line breaks before or
after any syntactic elements and with the required members ordered after any syntactic elements and with the required members ordered
lexicographically by the Unicode [UNICODE] code points of the member lexicographically by the Unicode [UNICODE] code points of the member
names. names.
In addition, the JSON header and claim members MUST follow the In addition, the JSON header and claim members MUST follow the
lexicographical ordering and character and string rules defined in lexicographical ordering and character and string rules defined in
[RFC7638] Section 3.3. [RFC7638] Section 3.3.
5.1. Example PASSport deterministic JSON form
For the example PASSporT Payload shown in Section 3.2.2.2, the
following is the deterministic JSON object form.
{"iat": 1443208345,"otn":"12155551212","duri":"sip:alice@example.com",
"mky":"sha-256 02:1A:CC:54:27:AB:EB:9C:53:3F:3E:4B:65:2E:7D:46:3F:54:
42:CD:54:F1:7A:03:A2:7D:F9:B0:7F:46:19:B2;sha-256 4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:
18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E:5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB:3E:4B:65:2E:7D:46:3F:54:42:
CD:54:F1"}
6. Human Readability 6. Human Readability
For many applications, JWT [RFC7519] and JWS [RFC7515] can use Base64 JWT [RFC7519] and JWS [RFC7515] are defined to use Base64 and/or UTF8
encoding to the Header and Claims sections as specified. However, encoding to the Header, Payload, and Signature sections. However,
many personal communications protocols, such as SIP and XMPP, use a many personal communications protocols, such as SIP and XMPP, use a
"human readable" format to allow for ease of use and ease of "human readable" format to allow for ease of use and ease of
operational debugging and monitoring. As such, specifications using operational debugging and monitoring. As such, specifications using
PASSporT may provide guidance on whether Base64 encoding or plain PASSporT may provide guidance on whether Base64 encoding or plain
text will be used for the construction of the PASSporT Header and text will be used for the construction of the PASSporT Header and
Claim sections. Claim sections.
7. Security Considerations 7. Security Considerations
7.1. Avoidance of replay and cut and paste attacks 7.1. Avoidance of replay and cut and paste attacks
There are a number of security considerations for use of the token There are a number of security considerations for use of the token
for avoidance of replay and cut and paste attacks. Verified tokens for avoidance of replay and cut and paste attacks. PASSporT tokens
must be sent along with other application level protocol information must be sent along with other application level protocol information
(e.g. for SIP an INVITE as defined in [RFC3261]). There should be a (e.g. for SIP an INVITE as defined in [RFC3261]). There should be a
link between various information provided in the token and link between various information provided in the token and
information provided by the application level protocol information. information provided by the application level protocol information.
These would include: These would include:
o "iat" claim should closely correspond to a date/time the message o "iat" claim should closely correspond to a date/time the message
was originated. It should also be within a relative delta time was originated. It should also be within a relative delta time
that is reasonable for clock drift and transmission time that is reasonable for clock drift and transmission time
characteristics associated with the application using the verified characteristics associated with the application using the PASSporT
token. token.
o "term" claim is included to prevent the ability to use a o either "dtn" claim or "duri" claim is included to prevent the
previously originated message to send to another terminating party ability to use a previously originated message to send to another
destination party
7.2. Solution Considerations 7.2. Solution Considerations
It should be recognized that the use of this token should not, in It should be recognized that the use of this token should not, in
it's own right, be considered a full solution for absolute non- it's own right, be considered a full solution for absolute non-
repudiation of the persona being asserted. This only provides non- repudiation of the persona being asserted. This only provides non-
repudiation of the signer of PASSporT. If the signer and the persona repudiation of the signer of PASSporT. If the signer and the persona
are not one in the same, which can and often can be the case in are not one in the same, which can and often will be the case in
telecommunications networks today, protecting the terminating party telecommunications networks today, protecting the destination party
for being spoofed may take some interpretation or additional from being spoofed may take some interpretation or additional
verification of the link between the PASSporT signature and the verification of the link between the PASSporT signature and the
persona being asserted. persona being asserted.
In addition, the telecommunications systems and specifications that In addition, the telecommunications systems and specifications that
use PASSporT should in practice provide mechanisms for: use PASSporT should in practice provide mechanisms for:
o Managing X.509 certificates and X.509 certificate chains to an o Managing X.509 certificates and X.509 certificate chains to an
authorized trust anchor that can be a trusted entity to all authorized trust anchor that can be a trusted entity to all
participants in the telecommunications network participants in the telecommunications network
o Accounting for entities that may route calls from other peer or o Accounting for entities that may route calls from other peer or
interconnected telecommunications networks that are not part of interconnected telecommunications networks that are not part of
the "trusted" communications network or may not be following the the "trusted" communications network or may not be following the
usage of PASSporT or the profile of PASSporT appropriate to that usage of PASSporT or the profile of PASSporT appropriate to that
network network
o Following best practices around management and security of X.509 o Following best practices around management and security of X.509
certificates certificates
7.3. Privacy Considerations
Because PASSporT explicity includes claims of identitifiers of
parties involved in communications, times, and potentially other call
detail, care should be taken outside of traditional protected or
private telephony communications paths where there may be concerns
about exposing information to either unintended or illegitimately
intented actors. These identifiers are often exposed through many
communications signaling protocols as of today, but appropriate
precautions should be taken.
8. IANA Considerations 8. IANA Considerations
8.1. Media Type Registration 8.1. Media Type Registration
8.1.1. Media Type Registry Contents Additions Requested 8.1.1. Media Type Registry Contents Additions Requested
This section registers the "application/passport" media type This section registers the "application/passport" media type
[RFC2046] in the "Media Types" registry [IANA.MediaTypes] in the [RFC2046] in the "Media Types" registry [IANA.MediaTypes] in the
manner described in [RFC6838], which can be used to indicate that the manner described in [RFC6838], which can be used to indicate that the
content is a PASSporT defined JWT and JWS. content is a PASSporT defined JWT and JWS.
skipping to change at page 10, line 22 skipping to change at page 12, line 36
o Author: Chris Wendt, chris-ietf@chriswendt.net o Author: Chris Wendt, chris-ietf@chriswendt.net
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Provisional registration? No o Provisional registration? No
8.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registration 8.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registration
8.2.1. Registry Contents Additions Requested 8.2.1. Registry Contents Additions Requested
o Claim Name: "orig" o Claim Name: "otn"
o Claim Description: Originating Identity String o Claim Description: Originating Telephone Number String
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of draft-ietf-stir- o Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of draft-ietf-stir-
passport-00 passport-00
o Claim Name: "term" o Claim Name: "dtn"
o Claim Description: Terminating Identity String o Claim Description: Destination Telephone Number String
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of draft-ietf-stir-
passport-00
o Claim Name: "ouri"
o Claim Description: Originating URI String
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of draft-ietf-stir-
passport-00
o Claim Name: "duri"
o Claim Description: Destination URI String
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of draft-ietf-stir-
passport-00
o Claim Name: "mky"
o Claim Description: Media Key Fingerprint String
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of draft-ietf-stir- o Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of draft-ietf-stir-
passport-00 passport-00
9. Acknowledgements 9. Acknowledgements
Particular thanks to members of the ATIS and SIP Forum NNI Task Group Particular thanks to members of the ATIS and SIP Forum NNI Task Group
including Jim McEchern, Martin Dolly, Richard Shockey, John Barnhill, including Jim McEchern, Martin Dolly, Richard Shockey, John Barnhill,
Christer Holmberg, Victor Pascual Avila, Mary Barnes, and Eric Burger Christer Holmberg, Victor Pascual Avila, Mary Barnes, and Eric Burger
for their review, ideas, and contributions. Also thanks to Henning for their review, ideas, and contributions. Also thanks to Henning
Schulzrinne, Russ Housley, Alan Johnston, and Richard Barnes for Schulzrinne, Russ Housley, Alan Johnston, and Richard Barnes for
valuable feedback on the technical and security aspects of the valuable feedback on the technical and security aspects of the
document. document. Additional thanks to Harsha Bellur for assistance in
coding the example tokens.
10. References 10. References
[I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis]
Peterson, J., Jennings, C., Rescorla, E., and C. Wendt, Peterson, J., Jennings, C., Rescorla, E., and C. Wendt,
"Authenticated Identity Management in the Session "Authenticated Identity Management in the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP)", draft-ietf-stir-rfc4474bis-07 Initiation Protocol (SIP)", draft-ietf-stir-rfc4474bis-07
(work in progress), February 2016. (work in progress), February 2016.
[IANA.MediaTypes] [IANA.MediaTypes]
skipping to change at page 12, line 20 skipping to change at page 15, line 12
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015, (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC7638] Jones, M. and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Key (JWK) [RFC7638] Jones, M. and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Key (JWK)
Thumbprint", RFC 7638, DOI 10.17487/RFC7638, September Thumbprint", RFC 7638, DOI 10.17487/RFC7638, September
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7638>. 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7638>.
[UNICODE] "The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard"", [UNICODE] "The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard"",
<http://www.unicode.org/versions/latest/>. <http://www.unicode.org/versions/latest/>.
Appendix A. Appendix A. Example PASSporT JWS Serialization and
Signature
For PASSporT, there will always be a JWS with the following members:
o "protected", with the value BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header))
o "payload", with the value BASE64URL (JWS Payload)
o "signature", with the value BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
Note: there will never be a JWS Unprotected Header for PASSporT.
First, an example PASSporT Protected Header is as follows:
{
"typ":"passport",
"alg":"RS256",
"x5u":"https://cert.example.org/passport.crt"
}
This would be serialized to the form:
{"typ":"passport","alg":"RS256","x5u":"https://cert.example.org/passport.crt"}
Encoding this with UTF8 and BASE64 encoding produces this value:
eyJ0eXAiOiJwYXNzcG9ydCIsImFsZyI6IlJTMjU2IiwieDV1IjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9j
ZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUub3JnL3Bhc3Nwb3J0LmNydCJ9
Second, an example PASSporT Payload is as follows:
{
"iat":"1443208345",
"otn":"12155551212",
"duri":"sip:alice@example.com"
}
This would be serialized to the form:
{"iat":"1443208345","otn":"12155551212","duri":"sip:alice@example.com"}
Encoding this with the UTF8 and BASE64 encoding produces this value:
eyJpYXQiOiIxNDQzMjA4MzQ1Iiwib3RuIjoiMTIxNTU1NTEyMTIiLCJkdXJpIjoi
c2lwOmFsaWNlQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tIn0
Computing the digital signature of the PASSporT Signing Input
ASCII(BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)) || '.' || BASE64URL(JWS
Payload))
AaeXRqm7kHnkZu2j6cQmDCiomZRiaE55bYWhFgnX8xMqpBFq96M0xgMM5OLa9_LM
rkuKv2ivK5GZz8OlFrmAirucRlAh8YdUkj5Cr5xPRr-gg9acD9jqJUnQ-ZxpL1yq
-FFVLhvpbsE5NMPHXUp5lpt62rD-S0NlhwHNCeMqZHxt6T5BmZBXITEd1PRRij_6
FhE3wxWEhZMthWJuEbcPpRMZDu-R7lTNddn62nUKjn3s00R3gm25Dto5Z0dzfQpA
ysJvnbc1QRimfsYqJPUFc57lnglVLf4WrpeZCc8-LcoXeSr_dseDgsrmg2EuHmn5
h1nTOmLgF16ZHm121ZVjiXz2sMFvs9RaIxw0AFkM7rnV56OxAFCRuzMNldiEVf8p
lRZVvqZ4BfVQlCNXNyyVgPOUtNr3ta6yD2H0oANQvvHtwjuSwB9Kruj4Wsu5N7Ik
i4MBs6SWJDmcUV-NW_AHYLaao-IvFVe4oCkJNjsqwwXuLv1TO2sDHdc5sQO5zm21
019PPxw1udHVtywsRVNKLo0RzE0TqYUF7XclCDur7MMOx9SnStV2PFIM7Jejyn9x
54RtJEjOnchaSalfIFr_UXqXgVmRZVTzLDQIlcmHjlhhLnCnNx3sYsAANen8Y8jt
fgJ2ewjGotB4Lq8VYe1FacBKKk0VyCfImXba0u1hB8Q
The final PASSporT token is produced by concatenating the values in
the order Header.Payload.Signature with period (',') characters. For
the above example values this would produce the following:
eyJ0eXAiOiJwYXNzcG9ydCIsImFsZyI6IlJTMjU2IiwieDV1IjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9j
ZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUub3JnL3Bhc3Nwb3J0LmNydCJ9
.
eyJpYXQiOiIxNDQzMjA4MzQ1Iiwib3RuIjoiMTIxNTU1NTEyMTIiLCJkdXJpIjoi
c2lwOmFsaWNlQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tIn0
.
AaeXRqm7kHnkZu2j6cQmDCiomZRiaE55bYWhFgnX8xMqpBFq96M0xgMM5OLa9_LM
rkuKv2ivK5GZz8OlFrmAirucRlAh8YdUkj5Cr5xPRr-gg9acD9jqJUnQ-ZxpL1yq
-FFVLhvpbsE5NMPHXUp5lpt62rD-S0NlhwHNCeMqZHxt6T5BmZBXITEd1PRRij_6
FhE3wxWEhZMthWJuEbcPpRMZDu-R7lTNddn62nUKjn3s00R3gm25Dto5Z0dzfQpA
ysJvnbc1QRimfsYqJPUFc57lnglVLf4WrpeZCc8-LcoXeSr_dseDgsrmg2EuHmn5
h1nTOmLgF16ZHm121ZVjiXz2sMFvs9RaIxw0AFkM7rnV56OxAFCRuzMNldiEVf8p
lRZVvqZ4BfVQlCNXNyyVgPOUtNr3ta6yD2H0oANQvvHtwjuSwB9Kruj4Wsu5N7Ik
i4MBs6SWJDmcUV-NW_AHYLaao-IvFVe4oCkJNjsqwwXuLv1TO2sDHdc5sQO5zm21
019PPxw1udHVtywsRVNKLo0RzE0TqYUF7XclCDur7MMOx9SnStV2PFIM7Jejyn9x
54RtJEjOnchaSalfIFr_UXqXgVmRZVTzLDQIlcmHjlhhLnCnNx3sYsAANen8Y8jt
fgJ2ewjGotB4Lq8VYe1FacBKKk0VyCfImXba0u1hB8Q
Appendix B. Appendix B. X.509 Private Key Certificate for Example in
Appendix A
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
Appendix C. Appendix C. X.509 Public Key Certificate for Example in
Appendix A
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MIICIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAg8AMIICCgKCAgEAsrKb3NsMgrXTzEcNlg3v
aBbI12mG3D9QBn61H8PpsVFIh3MAXNXjkV64he/eEQou3STTEgSqUXj5kj+jnnVF
F0Cd0T6j7SuRvpq5YaiKfXgdUlsvF3LjTRGyoKRNOf16f/zEFiyJBX10vj/LKvnW
os1vVTSqBeui2dNLynr0+f1n8b0+0FZwACceo3qaVwuSNIJWSQgM1qAINBpPEKnr
Ipdt5fa7mUorJ5gjITys3gjNJ4eesjqUEu5ZGXDgMshVtH2iMceC1393sK6rJ7z+
g3jVziSo6vy9lA2wveKMuoqQTwp0V0IrkzExU7vpTzyx0E3mJNmlgmDp7Whp2HCv
KjeG+iPfsuPMDRggUrdy9qG6QTFqQORzLywTpu78ExYMSfqt94NVhf2Dv+QEPoyt
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-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Chris Wendt (editor) Chris Wendt
Comcast Comcast
One Comcast Center One Comcast Center
Philadelphia, PA 19103 Philadelphia, PA 19103
USA USA
Email: chris-ietf@chriswendt.net Email: chris-ietf@chriswendt.net
Jon Peterson Jon Peterson
Neustar Inc. Neustar Inc.
1800 Sutter St Suite 570 1800 Sutter St Suite 570
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