draft-ietf-stir-passport-02.txt   draft-ietf-stir-passport-03.txt 
STIR C. Wendt STIR C. Wendt
Internet-Draft Comcast Internet-Draft Comcast
Intended status: Standards Track J. Peterson Intended status: Standards Track J. Peterson
Expires: November 25, 2016 Neustar Inc. Expires: December 15, 2016 Neustar Inc.
May 24, 2016 June 13, 2016
Persona Assertion Token Persona Assertion Token
draft-ietf-stir-passport-02 draft-ietf-stir-passport-03
Abstract Abstract
This document defines a token format for verifying with non- This document defines a token format for verifying with non-
repudiation the sender of and authorization to send information repudiation the sender of and authorization to send information
related to the originator of personal communications. A related to the originator of personal communications. A
cryptographic signature is defined to protect the integrity of the cryptographic signature is defined to protect the integrity of the
information used to identify the originator of a personal information used to identify the originator of a personal
communications session (e.g. the telephone number or URI) and verify communications session (e.g. the telephone number or URI) and verify
the accuracy of this information at the destination. The the accuracy of this information at the destination. The
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 25, 2016. This Internet-Draft will expire on December 15, 2016.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Token Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Token Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. PASSporT Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. PASSporT Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. PASSporT Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. PASSporT Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1.1. "typ" (Type) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1.1. "typ" (Type) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1.2. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1.2. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.3. "x5u" (X.509 URL) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1.3. "x5u" (X.509 URL) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. PASSporT Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2. PASSporT Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2.1. JWT defined claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2.1. JWT defined claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2.1.1. "iat" - Issued at claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.2.1.1. "iat" - Issued at claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2.2. PASSporT specific claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.2.2. PASSporT specific claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2.2.1. Originating and Destination Identities . . . . . 6 3.2.2.1. Originating and Destination Identities . . . . . 6
3.2.2.2. "mky" - Media Key claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.2.2.2. "mky" - Media Key claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2.3. Multi-party Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.3. PASSporT Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.3. PASSporT Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Extending PASSporT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4. Extending PASSporT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1. "ppt" (PASSporT) header parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.1. "ppt" (PASSporT) header parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2. Extended PASSporT Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.2. Extended PASSporT Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.3. Alternate PASSporT Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.3. Alternate PASSporT Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.4. Registering PASSporT Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.4. Registering PASSporT Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. Deterministic JSON Serialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5. Deterministic JSON Serialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1. Example PASSport deterministic JSON form . . . . . . . . 10 5.1. Example PASSport deterministic JSON form . . . . . . . . 10
6. Human Readability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 6. Human Readability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.1. Avoidance of replay and cut and paste attacks . . . . . . 10 7.1. Avoidance of replay and cut and paste attacks . . . . . . 10
7.2. Solution Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7.2. Solution Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.3. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7.3. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.1. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 8.1. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.1.1. Media Type Registry Contents Additions Requested . . 12 8.1.1. Media Type Registry Contents Additions Requested . . 12
8.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 13 8.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 13
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6. Human Readability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 6. Human Readability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.1. Avoidance of replay and cut and paste attacks . . . . . . 10 7.1. Avoidance of replay and cut and paste attacks . . . . . . 10
7.2. Solution Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7.2. Solution Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.3. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7.3. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.1. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 8.1. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.1.1. Media Type Registry Contents Additions Requested . . 12 8.1.1. Media Type Registry Contents Additions Requested . . 12
8.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 13 8.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.2.1. Registry Contents Additions Requested . . . . . . . . 13 8.2.1. Registry Contents Additions Requested . . . . . . . . 13
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Appendix A. Example ES256 base PASSporT JWS Serialization and Appendix A. Example PASSporT JWS Serialization and Signature . . 15
Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 A.1. X.509 Private Key Certificate for Example . . . . . . . . 17
A.1. X.509 Private Key Certificate for Example in Appendix A . 17 A.2. X.509 Public Key Certificate for Example . . . . . . . . 17
A.2. X.509 Public Key Certificate for Example in Appendix A . 17 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Appendix B. Example RS256 base PASSporT JWS Serialization and
Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
B.1. X.509 Private Key Certificate for Example in Appendix A . 19
B.2. X.509 Public Key Certificate for Example in Appendix A . 20
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
In today's IP-enabled telecommunications world, there is a growing In today's IP-enabled telecommunications world, there is a growing
concern about the ability to trust incoming invitations for concern about the ability to trust incoming invitations for
communications sessions, including video, voice and messaging. As an communications sessions, including video, voice and messaging. As an
example, modern telephone networks provide the ability to spoof the example, modern telephone networks provide the ability to spoof the
calling party telephone number for many legitimate purposes including calling party telephone number for many legitimate purposes including
providing network features and services on the behalf of a legitimate providing network features and services on the behalf of a legitimate
telephone number. However, as we have seen, bad actors have taken telephone number. However, as we have seen, bad actors have taken
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The JWS token header is a JOSE header [RFC7515] that defines the type The JWS token header is a JOSE header [RFC7515] that defines the type
and encryption algorithm used in the token. and encryption algorithm used in the token.
An example of the header for the case of an ECDSA P-256 digital An example of the header for the case of an ECDSA P-256 digital
signature would be the following, signature would be the following,
{ {
"typ":"passport", "typ":"passport",
"alg":"ES256", "alg":"ES256",
"x5u":"https://cert.example.org/passport.crt" "x5u":"https://cert.example.org/passport.cer"
} }
3.1.1. "typ" (Type) Header Parameter 3.1.1. "typ" (Type) Header Parameter
JWS defines the "typ" (Type) Header Parameter to declare the media JWS defines the "typ" (Type) Header Parameter to declare the media
type [IANA.MediaTypes] of the JWS. type [IANA.MediaTypes] of the JWS.
For PASSporT Token the "typ" header MUST minimally include and begin For PASSporT Token the "typ" header MUST minimally include and begin
with "passport". This represents that the encoded token is a JWT of with "passport". This represents that the encoded token is a JWT of
type passport. Note with extensions explained later in this type passport. Note with extensions explained later in this
document, the typ may be another value if defined as a passport document, the typ may be another value if defined as a passport
extension. extension.
3.1.2. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter 3.1.2. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter
For PASSporT, the "alg" should be defined as follows, for the For PASSporT, the "alg" should be defined as follows, for the
creation of PASSporT tokens and their corresponding digital creation and verification of PASSporT tokens and their digital
signatures, signatures ES256 MUST be implemented.
o ES256 MUST be implemented.
o RS256 SHOULD be implemented
For the verification of PASSporT tokens, both ES256 and RS256 MUST be
supported.
Note that JWA [RFC7518] defines other algorithms that may be utilized Note that JWA [RFC7518] defines other algorithms that may be utilized
or updated in the future depending on cryptographic strength or updated in the future depending on cryptographic strength
requirements guided by current security best practice. requirements guided by current security best practice.
3.1.3. "x5u" (X.509 URL) Header Parameter 3.1.3. "x5u" (X.509 URL) Header Parameter
As defined in JWS, the "x5u" header parameter is used to provide a As defined in JWS, the "x5u" header parameter is used to provide a
URI [RFC3986] referring to the resource for the X.509 public key URI [RFC3986] referring to the resource for the X.509 public key
certificate or certificate chain [RFC5280] corresponding to the key certificate or certificate chain [RFC5280] corresponding to the key
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If the originating identity is not a telephone number, the claim If the originating identity is not a telephone number, the claim
"ouri" SHOULD be included with the string cooresponding to the URI "ouri" SHOULD be included with the string cooresponding to the URI
form of the identity as defined in [RFC3986], alternatively it could form of the identity as defined in [RFC3986], alternatively it could
also contain an application specific identity string, if URI format also contain an application specific identity string, if URI format
is not appropriate. is not appropriate.
If the destination identity is not a telephone number, the claim If the destination identity is not a telephone number, the claim
"duri" SHOULD be included. The same string format rules apply as "duri" SHOULD be included. The same string format rules apply as
stated for "ouri". stated for "ouri".
3.2.2.1.3. "dgrp" - Multiple destination identities
There are multi-party, group, or conference types of calls where
there is a single originating identity or alterntively a "moderator"
identity and a number of destination identities or participants in
the multi-party call. For these scenerios, the "dgrp" key should be
used with a JSON object containing multiple "dtn" or "duri"
identities as defined above.
An example PASSporT payload object with multiple destination
identities would be as follows:
{
"iat":"1443208345",
"otn":"12155551212",
"dgrp":{
"duri":"sip:alice@example.com",
"dtn":"12125551212",
"duri":"sip:bob@example.net"
}
}
3.2.2.2. "mky" - Media Key claim 3.2.2.2. "mky" - Media Key claim
Some protocols that use PASSporT convey hashes for media security Some protocols that use PASSporT convey hashes for media security
keys within their signaling in order to bind those keys to the keys within their signaling in order to bind those keys to the
identities established in the signaling layers. One example would be identities established in the signaling layers. One example would be
the DTLS-SRTP key fingerprints carried in SDP via the "a=fingerprint" the DTLS-SRTP key fingerprints carried in SDP via the "a=fingerprint"
attribute; multiple instances of that fingerprint may appear in a attribute; multiple instances of that fingerprint may appear in a
single SDP body corresponding to difference media streams offered. single SDP body corresponding to difference media streams offered.
The "mky" value of PASSporT contains a hexadecimal key presentation The "mky" value of PASSporT contains a hexadecimal key presentation
of any hash(es) necessary to establish media security via DTLS-SRTP. of any hash(es) necessary to establish media security via DTLS-SRTP.
This mky value should be formated in a JSON form including the This mky value should be formated in a JSON form including the 'alg'
'algorithm' and 'digest' keys with the corresponding algorithm and and 'dig' keys with the corresponding algorithm and hexadecimal
hexadecimal values. Note that per guidance of Section 5 of this values. Note that per guidance of Section 5 of this document any
document any whitespace and line feeds must be removed. If there is whitespace and line feeds must be removed. If there is multiple
multiple fingerprint values, more than one, the fingerprint values fingerprint values, more than one, the fingerprint values should be
should be constructed as a JSON array denoted by bracket characters. constructed as a JSON array denoted by bracket characters. For the
'dig' key value, the hash value should be the hexadecimal value
without any colons, in order to provide a more efficient, compact
form to be encoded in PASSporT token claim.
An example claim with "mky" claim is as follows: An example claim with "mky" claim is as follows:
For an SDP offer that includes the following fingerprint values, For an SDP offer that includes the following fingerprint values,
a=fingerprint:sha-256 02:1A:CC:54:27:AB:EB:9C:53:3F:3E:4B:65: a=fingerprint:sha-256 02:1A:CC:54:27:AB:EB:9C:53:3F:3E:4B:65:
2E:7D:46:3F:54:42:CD:54:F1:7A:03:A2:7D:F9:B0:7F:46:19:B2 2E:7D:46:3F:54:42:CD:54:F1:7A:03:A2:7D:F9:B0:7F:46:19:B2
a=fingerprint:sha-256 4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E: a=fingerprint:sha-256 4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E:
5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB:3E:4B:65:2E:7D:46:3F:54:42:CD:54:F1 5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB:3E:4B:65:2E:7D:46:3F:54:42:CD:54:F1
the PASSporT Payload object would be: the PASSporT Payload object would be:
{ {
"iat":"1443208345", "iat":"1443208345",
"otn":"12155551212", "otn":"12155551212",
"duri":"sip:alice@example.com", "duri":"sip:alice@example.com",
"mky":"[ "mky":[
{ {
"algorithm":"sha-256", "alg":"sha-256",
"digest":"02:1A:CC:54:27:AB:EB:9C:53:3F:3E:4B:65:2E:7D: "dig":"021ACC5427ABEB9C533F3E4B652E7D463F5442CD54
46:3F:54:42:CD:54:F1:7A:03:A2:7D:F9:B0:7F:46:19:B2" F17A03A27DF9B07F4619B2"
}, },
{ {
"algorithm":"sha-256", "alg":"sha-256",
"digest":"4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E:5D:49: "dig":"4AADB9B13F82183B540212DF3E5D496B19E57C
6B:19:E5:7C:AB:3E:4B:65:2E:7D:46:3F:54:42:CD:54:F1" AB3E4B652E7D463F5442CD54F1"
}]" }
]
} }
3.2.3. Multi-party Communications
Personal communications in the context of PASSporT can certainly
extend to multi-party scenerios where there is more than one
destination identity. In the future, it is anticipated that PASSporT
will be extended to support these cases.
3.3. PASSporT Signature 3.3. PASSporT Signature
The signature of the PASSporT is created as specified by JWS using The signature of the PASSporT is created as specified by JWS using
the private key corresponding to the X.509 public key certificate the private key corresponding to the X.509 public key certificate
referenced by the "x5u" header parameter. referenced by the "x5u" header parameter.
4. Extending PASSporT 4. Extending PASSporT
PASSporT represents the bare minimum set of claims needed to assert PASSporT represents the bare minimum set of claims needed to assert
the originating identity, however there will certainly be new and the originating identity, however there will certainly be new and
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specification that defines any new claims that would extend the base specification that defines any new claims that would extend the base
set of claims of PASSporT. set of claims of PASSporT.
An example header with an extended PASSporT profile of "foo" is as An example header with an extended PASSporT profile of "foo" is as
follows: follows:
{ {
"typ":"passport", "typ":"passport",
"ppt":"foo", "ppt":"foo",
"alg":"ES256", "alg":"ES256",
"x5u":"https://tel.example.org/passport.crt" "x5u":"https://tel.example.org/passport.cer"
} }
4.2. Extended PASSporT Claims 4.2. Extended PASSporT Claims
Future specifications that define such extensions to the PASSporT Future specifications that define such extensions to the PASSporT
mechanism MUST explicitly designate what claims they include, the mechanism MUST explicitly designate what claims they include, the
order in which they will appear, and any further information order in which they will appear, and any further information
necessary to implement the extension. All extensions MUST necessary to implement the extension. All extensions MUST
incorporate the baseline JWT elements specified in Section 3; claims incorporate the baseline JWT elements specified in Section 3; claims
may only be appended to the claims object specified; they can never may only be appended to the claims object specified; they can never
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In addition, the JSON header and claim members MUST follow the In addition, the JSON header and claim members MUST follow the
lexicographical ordering and character and string rules defined in lexicographical ordering and character and string rules defined in
[RFC7638] Section 3.3. [RFC7638] Section 3.3.
5.1. Example PASSport deterministic JSON form 5.1. Example PASSport deterministic JSON form
For the example PASSporT Payload shown in Section 3.2.2.2, the For the example PASSporT Payload shown in Section 3.2.2.2, the
following is the deterministic JSON object form. following is the deterministic JSON object form.
{"iat": 1443208345,"otn":"12155551212","duri": {"iat": 1443208345,"otn":"12155551212","duri":
"sip:alice@example.com","mky":{"algorithm":"sha-256","digest": "sip:alice@example.com","mky":[{"alg":"sha-256","dig":"021ACC
"02:1A:CC:54:27:AB:EB:9C:53:3F:3E:4B:65:2E:7D:46:3F:54:42:CD:54: 5427ABEB9C533F3E4B652E7D463F5442CD54F17A03A27DF9B07F4619B2"},
F1:7A:03:A2:7D:F9:B0:7F:46:19:B2;sha-256 4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18: {"alg":"sha-256","dig":"4AADB9B13F82183B540212DF3E5D496B19E5
3B:54:02:12:DF:3E:5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB:3E:4B:65:2E:7D:46:3F:54: 7CAB3E4B652E7D463F5442CD54F1"}]}
42:CD:54:F1"}}
6. Human Readability 6. Human Readability
JWT [RFC7519] and JWS [RFC7515] are defined to use Base64 and/or UTF8 JWT [RFC7519] and JWS [RFC7515] are defined to use Base64 and/or UTF8
encoding to the Header, Payload, and Signature sections. However, encoding to the Header, Payload, and Signature sections. However,
many personal communications protocols, such as SIP and XMPP, use a many personal communications protocols, such as SIP and XMPP, use a
"human readable" format to allow for ease of use and ease of "human readable" format to allow for ease of use and ease of
operational debugging and monitoring. As such, specifications using operational debugging and monitoring. As such, specifications using
PASSporT may provide guidance on whether Base64 encoding or plain PASSporT may provide guidance on whether Base64 encoding or plain
text will be used for the construction of the PASSporT Header and text will be used for the construction of the PASSporT Header and
skipping to change at page 15, line 35 skipping to change at page 15, line 40
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015, (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC7638] Jones, M. and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Key (JWK) [RFC7638] Jones, M. and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Key (JWK)
Thumbprint", RFC 7638, DOI 10.17487/RFC7638, September Thumbprint", RFC 7638, DOI 10.17487/RFC7638, September
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7638>. 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7638>.
[UNICODE] "The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard"", [UNICODE] "The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard"",
<http://www.unicode.org/versions/latest/>. <http://www.unicode.org/versions/latest/>.
Appendix A. Example ES256 base PASSporT JWS Serialization and Signature Appendix A. Example PASSporT JWS Serialization and Signature
For PASSporT, there will always be a JWS with the following members: For PASSporT, there will always be a JWS with the following members:
o "protected", with the value BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)) o "protected", with the value BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header))
o "payload", with the value BASE64URL (JWS Payload) o "payload", with the value BASE64URL (JWS Payload)
o "signature", with the value BASE64URL(JWS Signature) o "signature", with the value BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
Note: there will never be a JWS Unprotected Header for PASSporT. Note: there will never be a JWS Unprotected Header for PASSporT.
First, an example PASSporT Protected Header is as follows: First, an example PASSporT Protected Header is as follows:
{ {
"typ":"passport", "typ":"passport",
"alg":"ES256", "alg":"ES256",
"x5u":"https://cert.example.org/passport.crt" "x5u":"https://cert.example.org/passport.cer"
} }
This would be serialized to the form: This would be serialized to the form:
{"typ":"passport","alg":"ES256","x5u":"https://cert.example.org/ {"typ":"passport","alg":"ES256","x5u":"https://cert.example.org/
passport.crt"} passport.cer"}
Encoding this with UTF8 and BASE64 encoding produces this value: Encoding this with UTF8 and BASE64 encoding produces this value:
eyJ0eXAiOiJwYXNzcG9ydCIsImFsZyI6IkVTMjU2IiwieDV1IjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9j eyJ0eXAiOiJwYXNzcG9ydCIsImFsZyI6IkVTMjU2IiwieDV1IjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9j
ZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUub3JnL3Bhc3Nwb3J0LmNydCJ9 ZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUub3JnL3Bhc3Nwb3J0LmNlciJ9
Second, an example PASSporT Payload is as follows: Second, an example PASSporT Payload is as follows:
{ {
"iat":"1443208345", "iat":"1443208345",
"otn":"12155551212", "otn":"12155551212",
"duri":"sip:alice@example.com" "duri":"sip:alice@example.com"
} }
This would be serialized to the form: This would be serialized to the form:
skipping to change at page 16, line 43 skipping to change at page 16, line 43
Encoding this with the UTF8 and BASE64 encoding produces this value: Encoding this with the UTF8 and BASE64 encoding produces this value:
eyJpYXQiOiIxNDQzMjA4MzQ1Iiwib3RuIjoiMTIxNTU1NTEyMTIiLCJkdXJp eyJpYXQiOiIxNDQzMjA4MzQ1Iiwib3RuIjoiMTIxNTU1NTEyMTIiLCJkdXJp
Ijoic2lwOmFsaWNlQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tIn0 Ijoic2lwOmFsaWNlQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tIn0
Computing the digital signature of the PASSporT Signing Input Computing the digital signature of the PASSporT Signing Input
ASCII(BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)) || '.' || BASE64URL(JWS ASCII(BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)) || '.' || BASE64URL(JWS
Payload)) Payload))
KK89q2RFY-BkKQQhiB0z6-fIaFUy6NDyUboKXOix9XnYLxTCjdw1UHjCbw4Ce SQ3r3U9kew2e4Ej-tS4vbWQgs9kSQzHgzqK_xP4TL70al7XwWwF4R2mP9sxQey9n
feKwH_t7W-bnGlZz4pI-rMjfQ pZQoYTNx_WZslJJpIc_f_A
The final PASSporT token is produced by concatenating the values in The final PASSporT token is produced by concatenating the values in
the order Header.Payload.Signature with period (',') characters. For the order Header.Payload.Signature with period (',') characters. For
the above example values this would produce the following: the above example values this would produce the following:
eyJ0eXAiOiJwYXNzcG9ydCIsImFsZyI6IkVTMjU2IiwieDV1IjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9j eyJ0eXAiOiJwYXNzcG9ydCIsImFsZyI6IkVTMjU2IiwieDV1IjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9j
ZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUub3JnL3Bhc3Nwb3J0LmNydCJ9 ZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUub3JnL3Bhc3Nwb3J0LmNydCJ9
. .
eyJpYXQiOiIxNDQzMjA4MzQ1Iiwib3RuIjoiMTIxNTU1NTEyMTIiLCJkdXJpIjoi eyJpYXQiOiIxNDQzMjA4MzQ1Iiwib3RuIjoiMTIxNTU1NTEyMTIiLCJkdXJpIjoi
c2lwOmFsaWNlQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tIn0 c2lwOmFsaWNlQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tIn0
. .
KK89q2RFY-BkKQQhiB0z6-fIaFUy6NDyUboKXOix9XnYLxTCjdw1UHjCbw4CefeK SQ3r3U9kew2e4Ej-tS4vbWQgs9kSQzHgzqK_xP4TL70al7XwWwF4R2mP9sxQey9n
wH_t7W-bnGlZz4pI-rMjfQ pZQoYTNx_WZslJJpIc_f_A
A.1. X.509 Private Key Certificate for Example in Appendix A A.1. X.509 Private Key Certificate for Example
-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY----- -----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
MHcCAQEEIFeZ1R208QCvcu5GuYyMfG4W7sH4m99/7eHSDLpdYllFoAoGCCqGSM49 MHcCAQEEIFeZ1R208QCvcu5GuYyMfG4W7sH4m99/7eHSDLpdYllFoAoGCCqGSM49
AwEHoUQDQgAE8HNbQd/TmvCKwPKHkMF9fScavGeH78YTU8qLS8I5HLHSSmlATLcs AwEHoUQDQgAE8HNbQd/TmvCKwPKHkMF9fScavGeH78YTU8qLS8I5HLHSSmlATLcs
lQMhNC/OhlWBYC626nIlo7XeebYS7Sb37g== lQMhNC/OhlWBYC626nIlo7XeebYS7Sb37g==
-----END EC PRIVATE KEY----- -----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
A.2. X.509 Public Key Certificate for Example in Appendix A A.2. X.509 Public Key Certificate for Example
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----- -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE8HNbQd/TmvCKwPKHkMF9fScavGeH MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE8HNbQd/TmvCKwPKHkMF9fScavGeH
78YTU8qLS8I5HLHSSmlATLcslQMhNC/OhlWBYC626nIlo7XeebYS7Sb37g== 78YTU8qLS8I5HLHSSmlATLcslQMhNC/OhlWBYC626nIlo7XeebYS7Sb37g==
-----END PUBLIC KEY----- -----END PUBLIC KEY-----
Appendix B. Example RS256 base PASSporT JWS Serialization and Signature
For PASSporT, there will always be a JWS with the following members:
o "protected", with the value BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header))
o "payload", with the value BASE64URL (JWS Payload)
o "signature", with the value BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
Note: there will never be a JWS Unprotected Header for PASSporT.
First, an example PASSporT Protected Header is as follows:
{
"typ":"passport",
"alg":"RS256",
"x5u":"https://cert.example.org/passport.crt"
}
This would be serialized to the form:
{"typ":"passport","alg":"RS256","x5u":"https://cert.example.org/
passport.crt"}
Encoding this with UTF8 and BASE64 encoding produces this value:
eyJ0eXAiOiJwYXNzcG9ydCIsImFsZyI6IlJTMjU2IiwieDV1IjoiaHR0cHM
6Ly9jZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUub3JnL3Bhc3Nwb3J0LmNydCJ9
Second, an example PASSporT Payload is as follows:
{
"iat":"1443208345",
"otn":"12155551212",
"duri":"sip:alice@example.com"
}
This would be serialized to the form:
{"iat":"1443208345","otn":"12155551212","duri":
"sip:alice@example.com"}
Encoding this with the UTF8 and BASE64 encoding produces this value:
eyJpYXQiOiIxNDQzMjA4MzQ1Iiwib3RuIjoiMTIxNTU1NTEyMTIiLCJkdXJp
Ijoic2lwOmFsaWNlQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tIn0
Computing the digital signature of the PASSporT Signing Input
ASCII(BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)) || '.' || BASE64URL(JWS
Payload))
AaeXRqm7kHnkZu2j6cQmDCiomZRiaE55bYWhFgnX8xMqpBFq96M0xgMM5OLa9
_LMrkuKv2ivK5GZz8OlFrmAirucRlAh8YdUkj5Cr5xPRr-gg9acD9jqJUnQ-Z
xpL1yq-FFVLhvpbsE5NMPHXUp5lpt62rD-S0NlhwHNCeMqZHxt6T5BmZBXITE
d1PRRij_6FhE3wxWEhZMthWJuEbcPpRMZDu-R7lTNddn62nUKjn3s00R3gm25
Dto5Z0dzfQpAysJvnbc1QRimfsYqJPUFc57lnglVLf4WrpeZCc8-LcoXeSr_d
seDgsrmg2EuHmn5h1nTOmLgF16ZHm121ZVjiXz2sMFvs9RaIxw0AFkM7rnV56
OxAFCRuzMNldiEVf8plRZVvqZ4BfVQlCNXNyyVgPOUtNr3ta6yD2H0oANQvvH
twjuSwB9Kruj4Wsu5N7Iki4MBs6SWJDmcUV-NW_AHYLaao-IvFVe4oCkJNjsq
wwXuLv1TO2sDHdc5sQO5zm21019PPxw1udHVtywsRVNKLo0RzE0TqYUF7XclC
Dur7MMOx9SnStV2PFIM7Jejyn9x54RtJEjOnchaSalfIFr_UXqXgVmRZVTzLD
QIlcmHjlhhLnCnNx3sYsAANen8Y8jtfgJ2ewjGotB4Lq8VYe1FacBKKk0VyCf
ImXba0u1hB8Q
The final PASSporT token is produced by concatenating the values in
the order Header.Payload.Signature with period (',') characters. For
the above example values this would produce the following:
eyJ0eXAiOiJwYXNzcG9ydCIsImFsZyI6IlJTMjU2IiwieDV1IjoiaHR0cHM6L
y9jZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUub3JnL3Bhc3Nwb3J0LmNydCJ9
.
eyJpYXQiOiIxNDQzMjA4MzQ1Iiwib3RuIjoiMTIxNTU1NTEyMTIiLCJkdXJpI
joic2lwOmFsaWNlQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tIn0
.
AaeXRqm7kHnkZu2j6cQmDCiomZRiaE55bYWhFgnX8xMqpBFq96M0xgMM5OLa9
_LMrkuKv2ivK5GZz8OlFrmAirucRlAh8YdUkj5Cr5xPRr-gg9acD9jqJUnQ-Z
xpL1yq-FFVLhvpbsE5NMPHXUp5lpt62rD-S0NlhwHNCeMqZHxt6T5BmZBXITE
d1PRRij_6FhE3wxWEhZMthWJuEbcPpRMZDu-R7lTNddn62nUKjn3s00R3gm25
Dto5Z0dzfQpAysJvnbc1QRimfsYqJPUFc57lnglVLf4WrpeZCc8-LcoXeSr_d
seDgsrmg2EuHmn5h1nTOmLgF16ZHm121ZVjiXz2sMFvs9RaIxw0AFkM7rnV56
OxAFCRuzMNldiEVf8plRZVvqZ4BfVQlCNXNyyVgPOUtNr3ta6yD2H0oANQvvH
twjuSwB9Kruj4Wsu5N7Iki4MBs6SWJDmcUV-NW_AHYLaao-IvFVe4oCkJNjsq
wwXuLv1TO2sDHdc5sQO5zm21019PPxw1udHVtywsRVNKLo0RzE0TqYUF7XclC
Dur7MMOx9SnStV2PFIM7Jejyn9x54RtJEjOnchaSalfIFr_UXqXgVmRZVTzLD
QIlcmHjlhhLnCnNx3sYsAANen8Y8jtfgJ2ewjGotB4Lq8VYe1FacBKKk0VyCf
ImXba0u1hB8Q
B.1. X.509 Private Key Certificate for Example in Appendix A
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
B.2. X.509 Public Key Certificate for Example in Appendix A
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MIICIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAg8AMIICCgKCAgEAsrKb3NsMgrXTzEcNlg3v
aBbI12mG3D9QBn61H8PpsVFIh3MAXNXjkV64he/eEQou3STTEgSqUXj5kj+jnnVF
F0Cd0T6j7SuRvpq5YaiKfXgdUlsvF3LjTRGyoKRNOf16f/zEFiyJBX10vj/LKvnW
os1vVTSqBeui2dNLynr0+f1n8b0+0FZwACceo3qaVwuSNIJWSQgM1qAINBpPEKnr
Ipdt5fa7mUorJ5gjITys3gjNJ4eesjqUEu5ZGXDgMshVtH2iMceC1393sK6rJ7z+
g3jVziSo6vy9lA2wveKMuoqQTwp0V0IrkzExU7vpTzyx0E3mJNmlgmDp7Whp2HCv
KjeG+iPfsuPMDRggUrdy9qG6QTFqQORzLywTpu78ExYMSfqt94NVhf2Dv+QEPoyt
T1avN6bwGu/R/84g2z0YMfum5roSTG5PGP4H56vjML8wNTd6v8Ny8SLAgzG/XBaV
7c8Ll2awLEj4FSeBpNzTyDgnLrth7Tk0LmM8EtO1aozDDEaMFrNy4/L+Uuwxp/wc
FADawE9N7VdHa9endEo9V/bu1tkqecv1Ma+G4NvJZzD8JTBRVsHNc3zvI0qD0KWC
jqPvaIMiiVATVAIW9ZEtUZNm5UVuDzhcY7QrXNRpGE6ULIXgim66mbfUQ0LFq4G+
zUjoRZTA92rFBn4vDKvsPs8CAwEAAQ==
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Chris Wendt Chris Wendt
Comcast Comcast
One Comcast Center One Comcast Center
Philadelphia, PA 19103 Philadelphia, PA 19103
USA USA
Email: chris-ietf@chriswendt.net Email: chris-ietf@chriswendt.net
Jon Peterson Jon Peterson
Neustar Inc. Neustar Inc.
 End of changes. 26 change blocks. 
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