draft-ietf-stir-passport-03.txt   draft-ietf-stir-passport-04.txt 
STIR C. Wendt STIR C. Wendt
Internet-Draft Comcast Internet-Draft Comcast
Intended status: Standards Track J. Peterson Intended status: Standards Track J. Peterson
Expires: December 15, 2016 Neustar Inc. Expires: January 9, 2017 Neustar Inc.
June 13, 2016 July 8, 2016
Persona Assertion Token Persona Assertion Token
draft-ietf-stir-passport-03 draft-ietf-stir-passport-04
Abstract Abstract
This document defines a token format for verifying with non- This document defines a token format for verifying with non-
repudiation the sender of and authorization to send information repudiation the sender of and authorization to send information
related to the originator of personal communications. A related to the originator of personal communications. A
cryptographic signature is defined to protect the integrity of the cryptographic signature is defined to protect the integrity of the
information used to identify the originator of a personal information used to identify the originator of a personal
communications session (e.g. the telephone number or URI) and verify communications session (e.g. the telephone number or URI) and verify
the accuracy of this information at the destination. The the accuracy of this information at the destination. The
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 15, 2016. This Internet-Draft will expire on January 9, 2017.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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2. Token Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Token Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. PASSporT Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. PASSporT Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. PASSporT Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. PASSporT Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1.1. "typ" (Type) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1.1. "typ" (Type) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1.2. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1.2. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.3. "x5u" (X.509 URL) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1.3. "x5u" (X.509 URL) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. PASSporT Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2. PASSporT Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2.1. JWT defined claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2.1. JWT defined claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2.1.1. "iat" - Issued at claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2.1.1. "iat" - Issued at claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2.2. PASSporT specific claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.2.2. PASSporT specific claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2.2.1. Originating and Destination Identities . . . . . 6 3.2.2.1. Originating and Destination Identity Claims . . . 6
3.2.2.2. "mky" - Media Key claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.2.2.2. "mky" - Media Key claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3. PASSporT Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.3. PASSporT Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Extending PASSporT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4. Extending PASSporT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1. "ppt" (PASSporT) header parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.1. "ppt" (PASSporT) header parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2. Extended PASSporT Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.2. Extended PASSporT Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.3. Alternate PASSporT Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5. Deterministic JSON Serialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.4. Registering PASSporT Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. Deterministic JSON Serialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1. Example PASSport deterministic JSON form . . . . . . . . 10 5.1. Example PASSport deterministic JSON form . . . . . . . . 10
6. Human Readability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 6. Human Readability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.1. Avoidance of replay and cut and paste attacks . . . . . . 10 7.1. Avoidance of replay and cut and paste attacks . . . . . . 10
7.2. Solution Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7.2. Solution Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.3. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7.3. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.1. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 8.1. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.1.1. Media Type Registry Contents Additions Requested . . 12 8.1.1. Media Type Registry Contents Additions Requested . . 11
8.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 13 8.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.2.1. Registry Contents Additions Requested . . . . . . . . 13 8.2.1. Registry Contents Additions Requested . . . . . . . . 13
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Appendix A. Example PASSporT JWS Serialization and Signature . . 15 Appendix A. Example PASSporT JWS Serialization and Signature . . 15
A.1. X.509 Private Key Certificate for Example . . . . . . . . 17 A.1. X.509 Private Key Certificate for Example . . . . . . . . 16
A.2. X.509 Public Key Certificate for Example . . . . . . . . 17 A.2. X.509 Public Key Certificate for Example . . . . . . . . 17
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
In today's IP-enabled telecommunications world, there is a growing In today's IP-enabled telecommunications world, there is a growing
concern about the ability to trust incoming invitations for concern about the ability to trust incoming invitations for
communications sessions, including video, voice and messaging. As an communications sessions, including video, voice and messaging.
example, modern telephone networks provide the ability to spoof the [RFC7340] As an example, modern telephone networks provide the
calling party telephone number for many legitimate purposes including ability to spoof the calling party telephone number for many
providing network features and services on the behalf of a legitimate legitimate purposes including providing network features and services
telephone number. However, as we have seen, bad actors have taken on the behalf of a legitimate telephone number. However, as we have
advantage of this ability for illegitimate and fraudulent purposes seen, bad actors have taken advantage of this ability for
meant to trick telephone users to believe they are someone they are illegitimate and fraudulent purposes meant to trick telephone users
not. This problem can be extended to many emerging forms of personal to believe they are someone they are not. This problem can be
communications. extended to many emerging forms of personal communications.
This document defines a common method for creating and validating a This document defines a common method for creating and validating a
token that cryptographically verifies an originating identity, or token that cryptographically verifies an originating identity, or
more generally a URI or application specific identity string more generally a URI or application specific identity string
representing the originator of personal communications. Through representing the originator of personal communications. Through
extended profiles other information relevant to the personal extended profiles other information relevant to the personal
communications can also be attached to the token. The primary goal communications can also be attached to the token. The primary goal
of PASSporT is to provide a common framework for signing persona of PASSporT is to provide a common framework for signing persona
related information in an extensible way. A secondary goal is to related information in an extensible way. A secondary goal is to
provide this functionality independent of any specific personal provide this functionality independent of any specific personal
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{ {
"typ":"passport", "typ":"passport",
"alg":"ES256", "alg":"ES256",
"x5u":"https://cert.example.org/passport.cer" "x5u":"https://cert.example.org/passport.cer"
} }
3.1.1. "typ" (Type) Header Parameter 3.1.1. "typ" (Type) Header Parameter
JWS defines the "typ" (Type) Header Parameter to declare the media JWS defines the "typ" (Type) Header Parameter to declare the media
type [IANA.MediaTypes] of the JWS. type of the JWS.
For PASSporT Token the "typ" header MUST minimally include and begin For PASSporT Token the "typ" header MUST minimally include and begin
with "passport". This represents that the encoded token is a JWT of with "passport". This represents that the encoded token is a JWT of
type passport. Note with extensions explained later in this type passport.
document, the typ may be another value if defined as a passport
extension.
3.1.2. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter 3.1.2. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter
For PASSporT, the "alg" should be defined as follows, for the For PASSporT, the "alg" should be defined as follows, for the
creation and verification of PASSporT tokens and their digital creation and verification of PASSporT tokens and their digital
signatures ES256 MUST be implemented. signatures ES256 MUST be implemented.
Note that JWA [RFC7518] defines other algorithms that may be utilized Note that JWA [RFC7518] defines other algorithms that may be utilized
or updated in the future depending on cryptographic strength or updated in the future depending on cryptographic strength
requirements guided by current security best practice. requirements guided by current security best practice.
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The JSON claim MUST include the "iat" [RFC7519] defined claim issued The JSON claim MUST include the "iat" [RFC7519] defined claim issued
at. As defined this should be set to a date cooresponding to the at. As defined this should be set to a date cooresponding to the
origination of the personal communications. The time value should be origination of the personal communications. The time value should be
of the format defined in [RFC7519] Section 2 NumericDate. This is of the format defined in [RFC7519] Section 2 NumericDate. This is
included for securing the token against replay and cut and paste included for securing the token against replay and cut and paste
attacks, as explained further in the security considerations in attacks, as explained further in the security considerations in
section 7. section 7.
3.2.2. PASSporT specific claims 3.2.2. PASSporT specific claims
3.2.2.1. Originating and Destination Identities 3.2.2.1. Originating and Destination Identity Claims
Baseline PASSporT defines claims that convey the identity of the Baseline PASSporT defines claims that convey the identity of the
origination and destination of personal communications represented as origination and destination of personal communications. There are
either telephone numbers or Uniform Resource Indicators (URIs). Some two claims that are required for PASSporT, the "orig" and "dest"
using protocols may require other identifiers for personae; these may claims. Both "orig" and "dest" should have values that are JSON
be specified as claims through the PASSporT extensibility mechanisms. objects that include identities represented by key value pairs, where
But for telephone numbers and URIs, the following claims should be the key represents an identity type and the value is the identity
used: string. Currently, these identities can be represented as either
telephone numbers or Uniform Resource Indicators (URIs). The
definition of how telephone numbers or URIs and examples are provided
below.
3.2.2.1.1. "otn" and "dtn" - Originating and Destination Telephone The "orig" JSON object MUST only have one key value pair representing
Number claim the asserted identity of any type (currently either "tn" or "uri") of
the originator of the personal communications signaling.
If the originating identity is a telephone number, the claim "otn" The "dest" JSON object MUST at least have one key value pair, but
SHOULD be included. If the destination identity is a telephone could have an arbitrary number of destination identities of any type.
number, the claim "dtn" SHOULD be included.
Telephone Number strings for "otn" and "dtn" claims MUST be 3.2.2.1.1. "tn" - Telephone Number identity
canonicalized according to the procedures specified in
[I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] Section 6.1.1.
3.2.2.1.2. "ouri" and "duri" - Originating and Destination URI claims If the originating or destination identity is a telephone number, the
key representing the identity should be "tn".
If the originating identity is not a telephone number, the claim Telephone Number strings for "tn" MUST be canonicalized according to
"ouri" SHOULD be included with the string cooresponding to the URI the procedures specified in [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] Section 7.2.
form of the identity as defined in [RFC3986], alternatively it could
also contain an application specific identity string, if URI format
is not appropriate.
If the destination identity is not a telephone number, the claim 3.2.2.1.2. "uri" - URI identity
"duri" SHOULD be included. The same string format rules apply as
stated for "ouri".
3.2.2.1.3. "dgrp" - Multiple destination identities If any of the originating or destination identities is of the form
URI, as defined in [RFC3986], the key representing the identity
should be "uri" URI form of the identity.
There are multi-party, group, or conference types of calls where 3.2.2.1.3. Future identity forms
there is a single originating identity or alterntively a "moderator"
identity and a number of destination identities or participants in
the multi-party call. For these scenerios, the "dgrp" key should be
used with a JSON object containing multiple "dtn" or "duri"
identities as defined above.
An example PASSporT payload object with multiple destination We recognize that in the future there may be other standard
identities would be as follows: mechanisms for representing identities. The "orig" and "dest" JSON
objects with "tn" and "uri" allow for other identity types with
unique keys to represent these forms.
{ 3.2.2.1.4. Examples
Single Originator to Single Destination example:
{
"iat":"1443208345", "iat":"1443208345",
"otn":"12155551212", "orig":{"tn":"12155551212"},
"dgrp":{ "dest":{"uri":"sip:alice@example.com"}
"duri":"sip:alice@example.com", }
"dtn":"12125551212",
"duri":"sip:bob@example.net" Single Originator to Multiple Destination Identities example:
{
"iat":"1443208345",
"orig":{"tn":"12155551212"},
"dest":{
"uri":"sip:alice@example.com",
"tn":"12125551212",
"uri":"sip:bob@example.net"
} }
} }
3.2.2.2. "mky" - Media Key claim 3.2.2.2. "mky" - Media Key claim
Some protocols that use PASSporT convey hashes for media security Some protocols that use PASSporT convey hashes for media security
keys within their signaling in order to bind those keys to the keys within their signaling in order to bind those keys to the
identities established in the signaling layers. One example would be identities established in the signaling layers. One example would be
the DTLS-SRTP key fingerprints carried in SDP via the "a=fingerprint" the DTLS-SRTP key fingerprints carried in SDP via the "a=fingerprint"
attribute; multiple instances of that fingerprint may appear in a attribute; multiple instances of that fingerprint may appear in a
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For an SDP offer that includes the following fingerprint values, For an SDP offer that includes the following fingerprint values,
a=fingerprint:sha-256 02:1A:CC:54:27:AB:EB:9C:53:3F:3E:4B:65: a=fingerprint:sha-256 02:1A:CC:54:27:AB:EB:9C:53:3F:3E:4B:65:
2E:7D:46:3F:54:42:CD:54:F1:7A:03:A2:7D:F9:B0:7F:46:19:B2 2E:7D:46:3F:54:42:CD:54:F1:7A:03:A2:7D:F9:B0:7F:46:19:B2
a=fingerprint:sha-256 4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E: a=fingerprint:sha-256 4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E:
5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB:3E:4B:65:2E:7D:46:3F:54:42:CD:54:F1 5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB:3E:4B:65:2E:7D:46:3F:54:42:CD:54:F1
the PASSporT Payload object would be: the PASSporT Payload object would be:
{ {
"iat":"1443208345", "iat":"1443208345",
"otn":"12155551212", "orig":{"tn":"12155551212"},
"duri":"sip:alice@example.com", "dest":{"uri":"sip:alice@example.com"},
"mky":[ "mky":[
{ {
"alg":"sha-256", "alg":"sha-256",
"dig":"021ACC5427ABEB9C533F3E4B652E7D463F5442CD54 "dig":"021ACC5427ABEB9C533F3E4B652E7D463F5442CD54
F17A03A27DF9B07F4619B2" F17A03A27DF9B07F4619B2"
}, },
{ {
"alg":"sha-256", "alg":"sha-256",
"dig":"4AADB9B13F82183B540212DF3E5D496B19E57C "dig":"4AADB9B13F82183B540212DF3E5D496B19E57C
AB3E4B652E7D463F5442CD54F1" AB3E4B652E7D463F5442CD54F1"
} }
] ]
} }
3.3. PASSporT Signature 3.3. PASSporT Signature
The signature of the PASSporT is created as specified by JWS using The signature of the PASSporT is created as specified by JWS using
the private key corresponding to the X.509 public key certificate the private key corresponding to the X.509 public key certificate
referenced by the "x5u" header parameter. referenced by the "x5u" header parameter.
4. Extending PASSporT 4. Extending PASSporT
PASSporT represents the bare minimum set of claims needed to assert PASSporT represents the bare minimum set of claims needed to assert
the originating identity, however there will certainly be new and the originating identity and support the secure propoerties discussed
extended applications and usage of PASSPorT that will need to extend in various parts of this document, however there will certainly be
the claims to represent other information specific to the origination both new uses and ways of extending the application and usage of
identities beyond the identity itself. PASSPorT that requires the ability to extend the defined base set of
claims to represent other information requiring assertion or
There are two mechanisms defined to extend PASSporT. The first validation beyond the identity itself.
includes an extension of the base passport claims to include
additional claims. An alternative method of extending PASSporT is
for applications of PASSporT unrelated to the base set of claims,
that will define it's own set of claims. Both are described below.
4.1. "ppt" (PASSporT) header parameter 4.1. "ppt" (PASSporT) header parameter
For extended profiles of PASSporT, a new JWS header parameter "ppt" For the extension of the base set of claims defined in this document,
MUST be used with a string that uniquely identifies the profile a new JWS header parameter "ppt" MUST be used with a string that
specification that defines any new claims that would extend the base uniquely identifies and points to a profile specification that
set of claims of PASSporT. defines any new claims that would extend the base set of claims of
PASSporT.
An example header with an extended PASSporT profile of "foo" is as An example header with an extended PASSporT profile of "foo" is as
follows: follows:
{ {
"typ":"passport", "typ":"passport",
"ppt":"foo", "ppt":"foo",
"alg":"ES256", "alg":"ES256",
"x5u":"https://tel.example.org/passport.cer" "x5u":"https://tel.example.org/passport.cer"
} }
4.2. Extended PASSporT Claims 4.2. Extended PASSporT Claims
Future specifications that define such extensions to the PASSporT Future specifications that define such extensions to the PASSporT
mechanism MUST explicitly designate what claims they include, the mechanism MUST explicitly designate what claims they include beyond
order in which they will appear, and any further information the base set of claims from this document, the order in which they
necessary to implement the extension. All extensions MUST will appear, and any further information necessary to implement the
incorporate the baseline JWT elements specified in Section 3; claims extension. All extensions MUST incorporate the baseline JWT elements
may only be appended to the claims object specified; they can never specified in Section 3; claims may only be appended to the claims
be subtracted or re-ordered. Specifying new claims follows the object specified; they can never be subtracted or re-ordered.
baseline JWT procedures ([RFC7519] Section 10.1). Note that Specifying new claims follows the baseline JWT procedures ([RFC7519]
understanding an extension as a verifier is always optional for Section 10.1). Note that understanding an extension as a verifier is
compliance with this specification (though future specifications or always optional for compliance with this specification (though future
profiles for deployment environments may make other "ppt" values specifications or profiles for deployment environments may make other
mandatory). The creator of a PASSporT object cannot assume that "ppt" values mandatory). The creator of a PASSporT object cannot
verifiers will understand any given extension. Verifiers that do assume that verifiers will understand any given extension. Verifiers
support an extension may then trigger appropriate application-level that do support an extension may then trigger appropriate
behavior in the presence of an extension; authors of extensions application-level behavior in the presence of an extension; authors
should provide appropriate extension-specific guidance to application of extensions should provide appropriate extension-specific guidance
developers on this point. to application developers on this point.
4.3. Alternate PASSporT Extension
Some applications may want to use the mechanism of the PASSporT
digital signature that is not a superset of the base set of claims of
the PASSporT token as defined in Section 3. Rather, a specification
may use PASSporT with its own defined set of claims.
In this case, the specification SHOULD define its own MIME media type
[RFC2046] in the "Media Types" registry [IANA.MediaTypes]. The MIME
subtype SHOULD start with the string "passport-" to signify that it
is related to the PASSporT token. For example, for the "foo"
application the MIME type/sub-type could be defined as "application/
passport-foo".
4.4. Registering PASSporT Extensions
Toward interoperability and to maintain uniqueness of the extended
PASSporT profile header parameter string, there SHOULD be an industry
registry that tracks the definition of the profile strings.
5. Deterministic JSON Serialization 5. Deterministic JSON Serialization
In order to provide a deterministic representation of the PASSporT In order to provide a deterministic representation of the PASSporT
Header and Claims, particularly if PASSporT is used across multiple Header and Claims, particularly if PASSporT is used across multiple
signaling environments, the JSON header object and JSON Claim object signaling environments, the JSON header object and JSON Claim object
MUST be computed as follows. MUST be computed as follows.
The JSON object MUST follow the rules for the construction of the The JSON object MUST follow the rules for the construction of the
thumbprint of a JSON Web Key (JWK) as defined in [RFC7638] Section 3. thumbprint of a JSON Web Key (JWK) as defined in [RFC7638] Section 3.
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In addition, the JSON header and claim members MUST follow the In addition, the JSON header and claim members MUST follow the
lexicographical ordering and character and string rules defined in lexicographical ordering and character and string rules defined in
[RFC7638] Section 3.3. [RFC7638] Section 3.3.
5.1. Example PASSport deterministic JSON form 5.1. Example PASSport deterministic JSON form
For the example PASSporT Payload shown in Section 3.2.2.2, the For the example PASSporT Payload shown in Section 3.2.2.2, the
following is the deterministic JSON object form. following is the deterministic JSON object form.
{"iat": 1443208345,"otn":"12155551212","duri": {"iat": 1443208345,"orig":{"tn":"12155551212"},"dest":
"sip:alice@example.com","mky":[{"alg":"sha-256","dig":"021ACC {"uri":"sip:alice@example.com"},"mky":[{"alg":"sha-256","dig":
5427ABEB9C533F3E4B652E7D463F5442CD54F17A03A27DF9B07F4619B2"}, "021ACC5427ABEB9C533F3E4B652E7D463F5442CD54F17A03A27DF9B07F4619
{"alg":"sha-256","dig":"4AADB9B13F82183B540212DF3E5D496B19E5 B2"},{"alg":"sha-256","dig":"4AADB9B13F82183B540212DF3E5D496B19
7CAB3E4B652E7D463F5442CD54F1"}]} E57CAB3E4B652E7D463F5442CD54F1"}]}
6. Human Readability 6. Human Readability
JWT [RFC7519] and JWS [RFC7515] are defined to use Base64 and/or UTF8 JWT [RFC7519] and JWS [RFC7515] are defined to use Base64 and/or UTF8
encoding to the Header, Payload, and Signature sections. However, encoding to the Header, Payload, and Signature sections. However,
many personal communications protocols, such as SIP and XMPP, use a many personal communications protocols, such as SIP and XMPP, use a
"human readable" format to allow for ease of use and ease of "human readable" format to allow for ease of use and ease of
operational debugging and monitoring. As such, specifications using operational debugging and monitoring. As such, specifications using
PASSporT may provide guidance on whether Base64 encoding or plain PASSporT may provide guidance on whether Base64 encoding or plain
text will be used for the construction of the PASSporT Header and text will be used for the construction of the PASSporT Header and
skipping to change at page 11, line 15 skipping to change at page 10, line 46
information provided by the application level protocol information. information provided by the application level protocol information.
These would include: These would include:
o "iat" claim should closely correspond to a date/time the message o "iat" claim should closely correspond to a date/time the message
was originated. It should also be within a relative delta time was originated. It should also be within a relative delta time
that is reasonable for clock drift and transmission time that is reasonable for clock drift and transmission time
characteristics associated with the application using the PASSporT characteristics associated with the application using the PASSporT
token. token.
o either "dtn" claim or "duri" claim is included to prevent the o "dest" claim is included to prevent the ability to use a
ability to use a previously originated message to send to another previously originated message to send to another destination party
destination party
7.2. Solution Considerations 7.2. Solution Considerations
It should be recognized that the use of this token should not, in It should be recognized that the use of this token should not, in
it's own right, be considered a full solution for absolute non- it's own right, be considered a full solution for absolute non-
repudiation of the persona being asserted. This only provides non- repudiation of the persona being asserted. This only provides non-
repudiation of the signer of PASSporT. If the signer and the persona repudiation of the signer of PASSporT. If the signer and the persona
are not one in the same, which can and often will be the case in are not one in the same, which can and often will be the case in
telecommunications networks today, protecting the destination party telecommunications networks today, protecting the destination party
from being spoofed may take some interpretation or additional from being spoofed may take some interpretation or additional
skipping to change at page 12, line 17 skipping to change at page 11, line 51
communications signaling protocols as of today, but appropriate communications signaling protocols as of today, but appropriate
precautions should be taken. precautions should be taken.
8. IANA Considerations 8. IANA Considerations
8.1. Media Type Registration 8.1. Media Type Registration
8.1.1. Media Type Registry Contents Additions Requested 8.1.1. Media Type Registry Contents Additions Requested
This section registers the "application/passport" media type This section registers the "application/passport" media type
[RFC2046] in the "Media Types" registry [IANA.MediaTypes] in the [RFC2046] in the "Media Types" registry in the manner described in
manner described in [RFC6838], which can be used to indicate that the
content is a PASSporT defined JWT and JWS. [RFC6838], which can be used to indicate that the content is a
PASSporT defined JWT and JWS.
o Type name: application o Type name: application
o Subtype name: passport o Subtype name: passport
o Required parameters: n/a o Required parameters: n/a
o Optional parameters: n/a o Optional parameters: n/a
o Encoding considerations: 8bit; application/passport values are o Encoding considerations: 8bit; application/passport values are
skipping to change at page 13, line 23 skipping to change at page 13, line 9
o Author: Chris Wendt, chris-ietf@chriswendt.net o Author: Chris Wendt, chris-ietf@chriswendt.net
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Provisional registration? No o Provisional registration? No
8.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registration 8.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registration
8.2.1. Registry Contents Additions Requested 8.2.1. Registry Contents Additions Requested
o Claim Name: "otn" o Claim Name: "orig"
o Claim Description: Originating Telephone Number String
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of draft-ietf-stir-
passport-00
o Claim Name: "dtn"
o Claim Description: Destination Telephone Number String o Claim Description: Originating Identity String
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of draft-ietf-stir- o Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of draft-ietf-stir-
passport-00 passport-00
o Claim Name: "ouri" o Claim Name: "dest"
o Claim Description: Originating URI String
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of draft-ietf-stir-
passport-00
o Claim Name: "duri" o Claim Description: Destination Identity String
o Claim Description: Destination URI String
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of draft-ietf-stir- o Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of draft-ietf-stir-
passport-00 passport-00
o Claim Name: "mky" o Claim Name: "mky"
o Claim Description: Media Key Fingerprint String o Claim Description: Media Key Fingerprint String
skipping to change at page 14, line 32 skipping to change at page 14, line 4
Particular thanks to members of the ATIS and SIP Forum NNI Task Group Particular thanks to members of the ATIS and SIP Forum NNI Task Group
including Jim McEchern, Martin Dolly, Richard Shockey, John Barnhill, including Jim McEchern, Martin Dolly, Richard Shockey, John Barnhill,
Christer Holmberg, Victor Pascual Avila, Mary Barnes, and Eric Burger Christer Holmberg, Victor Pascual Avila, Mary Barnes, and Eric Burger
for their review, ideas, and contributions. Also thanks to Henning for their review, ideas, and contributions. Also thanks to Henning
Schulzrinne, Russ Housley, Alan Johnston, and Richard Barnes for Schulzrinne, Russ Housley, Alan Johnston, and Richard Barnes for
valuable feedback on the technical and security aspects of the valuable feedback on the technical and security aspects of the
document. Additional thanks to Harsha Bellur for assistance in document. Additional thanks to Harsha Bellur for assistance in
coding the example tokens. coding the example tokens.
10. References 10. References
10.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis]
Peterson, J., Jennings, C., Rescorla, E., and C. Wendt, Peterson, J., Jennings, C., Rescorla, E., and C. Wendt,
"Authenticated Identity Management in the Session "Authenticated Identity Management in the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP)", draft-ietf-stir-rfc4474bis-07 Initiation Protocol (SIP)", draft-ietf-stir-rfc4474bis-10
(work in progress), February 2016. (work in progress), July 2016.
[IANA.MediaTypes]
"IANA, "Media Types"", <Media Types>.
[RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail [RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046, Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996, DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2046>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2046>.
[RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform [RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005, RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC6838] Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type [RFC6838] Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type
Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13, Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13,
RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, January 2013, RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6838>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6838>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web [RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>. 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
[RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518, [RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518,
skipping to change at page 15, line 40 skipping to change at page 14, line 46
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015, (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC7638] Jones, M. and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Key (JWK) [RFC7638] Jones, M. and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Key (JWK)
Thumbprint", RFC 7638, DOI 10.17487/RFC7638, September Thumbprint", RFC 7638, DOI 10.17487/RFC7638, September
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7638>. 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7638>.
[UNICODE] "The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard"", [UNICODE] "The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard"",
<http://www.unicode.org/versions/latest/>. <http://www.unicode.org/versions/latest/>.
10.2. Informative References
[RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC7340] Peterson, J., Schulzrinne, H., and H. Tschofenig, "Secure
Telephone Identity Problem Statement and Requirements",
RFC 7340, DOI 10.17487/RFC7340, September 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7340>.
Appendix A. Example PASSporT JWS Serialization and Signature Appendix A. Example PASSporT JWS Serialization and Signature
For PASSporT, there will always be a JWS with the following members: For PASSporT, there will always be a JWS with the following members:
o "protected", with the value BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)) o "protected", with the value BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header))
o "payload", with the value BASE64URL (JWS Payload) o "payload", with the value BASE64URL (JWS Payload)
o "signature", with the value BASE64URL(JWS Signature) o "signature", with the value BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
skipping to change at page 16, line 23 skipping to change at page 16, line 5
{"typ":"passport","alg":"ES256","x5u":"https://cert.example.org/ {"typ":"passport","alg":"ES256","x5u":"https://cert.example.org/
passport.cer"} passport.cer"}
Encoding this with UTF8 and BASE64 encoding produces this value: Encoding this with UTF8 and BASE64 encoding produces this value:
eyJ0eXAiOiJwYXNzcG9ydCIsImFsZyI6IkVTMjU2IiwieDV1IjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9j eyJ0eXAiOiJwYXNzcG9ydCIsImFsZyI6IkVTMjU2IiwieDV1IjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9j
ZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUub3JnL3Bhc3Nwb3J0LmNlciJ9 ZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUub3JnL3Bhc3Nwb3J0LmNlciJ9
Second, an example PASSporT Payload is as follows: Second, an example PASSporT Payload is as follows:
{ {
"iat":"1443208345", "iat":"1443208345",
"otn":"12155551212", "orig":{"tn":"12155551212"},
"duri":"sip:alice@example.com" "dest":{"uri":"sip:alice@example.com"}
} }
This would be serialized to the form: This would be serialized to the form:
{"iat":"1443208345","otn":"12155551212","duri": {"iat":"1443208345","orig":{"tn":"12155551212"},"dest":
"sip:alice@example.com"} {"uri":"sip:alice@example.com"}}
Encoding this with the UTF8 and BASE64 encoding produces this value: Encoding this with the UTF8 and BASE64 encoding produces this value:
eyJpYXQiOiIxNDQzMjA4MzQ1Iiwib3RuIjoiMTIxNTU1NTEyMTIiLCJkdXJp eyJpYXQiOiIxNDQzMjA4MzQ1Iiwib3JpZyI6eyJ0biI6IjEyMTU1NTUxMjEyIn0s
Ijoic2lwOmFsaWNlQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tIn0 ImRlc3QiOnsidXJpIjoic2lwOmFsaWNlQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tIn19
Computing the digital signature of the PASSporT Signing Input Computing the digital signature of the PASSporT Signing Input
ASCII(BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)) || '.' || BASE64URL(JWS ASCII(BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)) || '.' || BASE64URL(JWS
Payload)) Payload))
SQ3r3U9kew2e4Ej-tS4vbWQgs9kSQzHgzqK_xP4TL70al7XwWwF4R2mP9sxQey9n 2bbTbLeDIf52Vv0yESUqebUBYrKIuouOfKQME6MD9kfgZ59dMAvvrIC94XsKdzV0
pZQoYTNx_WZslJJpIc_f_A 3evDS8wd6CubUqSalM7Dpg
The final PASSporT token is produced by concatenating the values in The final PASSporT token is produced by concatenating the values in
the order Header.Payload.Signature with period (',') characters. For the order Header.Payload.Signature with period (',') characters. For
the above example values this would produce the following: the above example values this would produce the following:
eyJ0eXAiOiJwYXNzcG9ydCIsImFsZyI6IkVTMjU2IiwieDV1IjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9j eyJ0eXAiOiJwYXNzcG9ydCIsImFsZyI6IkVTMjU2IiwieDV1IjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9j
ZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUub3JnL3Bhc3Nwb3J0LmNydCJ9 ZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUub3JnL3Bhc3Nwb3J0LmNlciJ9
. .
eyJpYXQiOiIxNDQzMjA4MzQ1Iiwib3RuIjoiMTIxNTU1NTEyMTIiLCJkdXJpIjoi eyJpYXQiOiIxNDQzMjA4MzQ1Iiwib3JpZyI6eyJ0biI6IjEyMTU1NTUxMjEyIn0s
c2lwOmFsaWNlQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tIn0 ImRlc3QiOnsidXJpIjoic2lwOmFsaWNlQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tIn19
. .
SQ3r3U9kew2e4Ej-tS4vbWQgs9kSQzHgzqK_xP4TL70al7XwWwF4R2mP9sxQey9n 2bbTbLeDIf52Vv0yESUqebUBYrKIuouOfKQME6MD9kfgZ59dMAvvrIC94XsKdzV0
pZQoYTNx_WZslJJpIc_f_A 3evDS8wd6CubUqSalM7Dpg
A.1. X.509 Private Key Certificate for Example A.1. X.509 Private Key Certificate for Example
-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY----- -----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
MHcCAQEEIFeZ1R208QCvcu5GuYyMfG4W7sH4m99/7eHSDLpdYllFoAoGCCqGSM49 MHcCAQEEIFeZ1R208QCvcu5GuYyMfG4W7sH4m99/7eHSDLpdYllFoAoGCCqGSM49
AwEHoUQDQgAE8HNbQd/TmvCKwPKHkMF9fScavGeH78YTU8qLS8I5HLHSSmlATLcs AwEHoUQDQgAE8HNbQd/TmvCKwPKHkMF9fScavGeH78YTU8qLS8I5HLHSSmlATLcs
lQMhNC/OhlWBYC626nIlo7XeebYS7Sb37g== lQMhNC/OhlWBYC626nIlo7XeebYS7Sb37g==
-----END EC PRIVATE KEY----- -----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
A.2. X.509 Public Key Certificate for Example A.2. X.509 Public Key Certificate for Example
 End of changes. 47 change blocks. 
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