draft-ietf-stir-passport-06.txt   draft-ietf-stir-passport-07.txt 
STIR C. Wendt STIR C. Wendt
Internet-Draft Comcast Internet-Draft Comcast
Intended status: Standards Track J. Peterson Intended status: Standards Track J. Peterson
Expires: February 23, 2017 Neustar Inc. Expires: March 13, 2017 Neustar Inc.
August 22, 2016 September 9, 2016
Persona Assertion Token Persona Assertion Token
draft-ietf-stir-passport-06 draft-ietf-stir-passport-07
Abstract Abstract
This document defines a canonical string object or 'token' for This document defines a canonical string object or 'token' including
verifying with non-repudiation the author of the token, their a digital signature for verifying the author of the token, their
authority to author the token and, minimally, the asserted authority to author the token and the information asserted in the
originating identity or persona contained within the token token, minimally, the originating identity or 'persona' corresponding
corresponding specifically to the originator of 'personal specifically to the originator of 'personal communications', or
communications', or any signalled communications between a set of signalled communications between a set of parties with identities.
parties with identities. A cryptographic signature is defined to The PASSporT token is cryptographically signed to protect the
protect the integrity of the information used to identify the integrity of the identify the originator of a personal communications
originator of a personal communications session (e.g. the telephone session (e.g. the telephone number or URI) and verify the assertion
number or URI) and verify the assertion of the identity information of the identity information at the destination. The cryptographic
at the destination. The cryptographic signature is defined with the signature is defined with the intention that it can confidently
intention that it can confidently verify the originating persona even verify the originating persona even when the signature is sent to the
when the signature is sent to the destination party over an insecure destination party over an insecure channel. PASSporT is particularly
channel. The Persona Assertion Token (PASSporT) is particularly
useful for many personal communications applications over IP networks useful for many personal communications applications over IP networks
and other multi-hop interconnection scenarios where the originating and other multi-hop interconnection scenarios where the originating
and destination parties may not have a direct trusted relationship. and destination parties may not have a direct trusted relationship.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on February 23, 2017. This Internet-Draft will expire on March 13, 2017.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. PASSporT Token Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. PASSporT Token Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. PASSporT Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. PASSporT Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. PASSporT Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. "typ" (Type) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1.1. "typ" (Type) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.2. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1.2. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . 4 3.3. "x5u" (X.509 URL) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.3. "x5u" (X.509 URL) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . 4 3.4. Example PASSporT header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. PASSporT Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. PASSporT Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2.1. JWT defined claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.1. JWT defined claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2.1.1. "iat" - Issued At claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.1.1. "iat" - Issued At claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2.2. PASSporT specific claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.2. PASSporT specific claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2.2.1. Originating and Destination Identity Claims . . . 5 4.2.1. Originating and Destination Identity Claims . . . . . 6
3.2.2.2. "mky" - Media Key claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.2.1.1. "tn" - Telephone Number identity . . . . . . . . 7
3.3. PASSporT Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.2.1.2. "uri" - URI identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Extending PASSporT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.2.1.3. Future identity forms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. "ppt" (PASSporT) header parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.2.1.4. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2. Extended PASSporT Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.2.2. "mky" - Media Key claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Deterministic JSON Serialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5. PASSporT Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1. Example PASSport deterministic JSON form . . . . . . . . 10 6. Extending PASSporT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 6.1. "ppt" (PASSporT) header parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.1. Avoidance of replay and cut and paste attacks . . . . . . 10 6.2. Extended PASSporT Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.2. Solution Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 7. Deterministic JSON Serialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.3. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7.1. Example PASSport deterministic JSON form . . . . . . . . 11
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.1. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 8.1. Avoidance of replay and cut and paste attacks . . . . . . 12
7.1.1. Media Type Registry Contents Additions Requested . . 11 8.2. Solution Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 12 8.3. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.2.1. Registry Contents Additions Requested . . . . . . . . 12 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 9.1. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 9.1.1. Media Type Registry Contents Additions Requested . . 13
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 9.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 9.2.1. Registry Contents Additions Requested . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix A. Example PASSporT JWS Serialization and Signature . . 14 10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A.1. X.509 Private Key Certificate for Example . . . . . . . . 16 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A.2. X.509 Public Key Certificate for Example . . . . . . . . 16 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Appendix A. Example PASSporT JWS Serialization and Signature . . 17
A.1. X.509 Private Key Certificate for Example . . . . . . . . 19
A.2. X.509 Public Key Certificate for Example . . . . . . . . 19
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
In today's IP-enabled telecommunications world, there is a growing In today's IP-enabled telecommunications world, there is a growing
concern about the ability to trust incoming invitations for concern about the ability to trust incoming invitations for
communications sessions, including video, voice and messaging. communications sessions, including video, voice and messaging.
[RFC7340] As an example, modern telephone networks provide the [RFC7340] As an example, modern telephone networks provide the
ability to spoof the calling party telephone number for many ability to spoof the calling party telephone number for many
legitimate purposes including providing network features and services legitimate purposes including providing network features and services
on the behalf of a legitimate telephone number. However, as we have on the behalf of a legitimate telephone number. However, as we have
seen, bad actors have taken advantage of this ability for seen, bad actors have taken advantage of this ability for
illegitimate and fraudulent purposes meant to trick telephone users illegitimate and fraudulent purposes meant to trick telephone users
to believe they are someone they are not. This problem can be to believe they are someone they are not. This problem can be
extended to many emerging forms of personal communications. extended to many emerging forms of personal communications.
This document defines a method for creating and validating a token This document defines a method for creating and validating a token
that cryptographically verifies an originating identity, or more that cryptographically verifies an originating identity, or more
generally a URI or telephone number representing the originator of generally a URI or telephone number representing the originator of
personal communications. Through extensions defined in this personal communications. Through extensions defined in this
document, other information relevant to the personal communications document, in Section 5.2, other information relevant to the personal
can also be added to the token. The goal of PASSporT is to provide a communications can also be added to the token. The goal of PASSporT
common framework for signing originating identity related information is to provide a common framework for signing originating identity
in an extensible way. Additionally, this functionality is related information in an extensible way. Additionally, this
independent of any specific personal communications signaling call functionality is independent of any specific personal communications
logic, so that the assertion of originating identity related signaling call logic, so that the assertion of originating identity
information can be implemented in a flexible way and can be used in related information can be implemented in a flexible way and can be
applications including end-to-end applications that require different used in applications including end-to-end applications that require
signaling protocols or gateways between different communications different signaling protocols or gateways between different
systems. It is anticipated that signaling protocol specific guidance communications systems. It is anticipated that signaling protocol
will be provided in other related documents and specifications to specific guidance will be provided in other related documents and
specify how to use and transport PASSporT tokens, however this is specifications to specify how to use and transport PASSporT tokens,
intentionally out of scope for this document. however this is intentionally out of scope for this document.
Note: As of the authoring of this document, [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] provides details of the use of PASSporT
[I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] provides details of how to use PASSporT within the SIP [RFC3261] signaling protocol for the signing and
within SIP signaling for the signing and verification of telephone verification of telephone numbers.
numbers.
2. PASSporT Token Overview 2. PASSporT Token Overview
JSON Web Token (JWT) [RFC7519] and JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515] JSON Web Token (JWT) [RFC7519] and JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515]
and related specifications define a standard token format that can be and related specifications define a standard token format that can be
used as a way of encapsulating claimed or asserted information with used as a way of encapsulating claimed or asserted information with
an associated digital signature using X.509 based certificates. JWT an associated digital signature using X.509 based certificates. JWT
provides a set of claims in JSON format that can conveniently provides a set of claims in JSON format that can conveniently
accomidate asserted originating identity information and is easily accommodate asserted originating identity information and is easily
extensible for extension mechanisms defined below. Additionally, JWS extensible for extension mechanisms defined below. Additionally, JWS
provides a path for updating methods and cryptographic algorithms provides a path for updating methods and cryptographic algorithms
used for the associated digital signatures. used for the associated digital signatures.
3. PASSporT Components JWS defines the use of JSON data structures in a specified canonical
format for signing data corresponding to JOSE header, JWS Payload,
The PASSporT is constructed based on JWT [RFC7519] and JWS [RFC7515] and JWS Signature. JWT defines a set of claims that are represented
specifications. JWS defines the use of JSON data structures in a by specified key value pairs which can be extended with custom keys
specified canonical format for signing data corresponding to JOSE for specific applications. The next sections define the header and
header, JWS Payload, and JWS Signature. JWT defines specific set of claims that MUST be minimally used with JWT and JWS for PASSporT.
claims that are represented by specified key value pairs which can be
extended with custom keys for specific applications.
3.1. PASSporT Header 3. PASSporT Header
The JWS token header is a JOSE header [RFC7515] that defines the type The JWS token header is a JOSE header [RFC7515] Section 4, that
and encryption algorithm used in the token. defines the type and encryption algorithm used in the token.
PASSporT header should include, at a minimum, the following header PASSporT header should include, at a minimum, the following header
parameters defined the the next three subsections. parameters defined the the next three subsections.
3.1.1. "typ" (Type) Header Parameter 3.1. "typ" (Type) Header Parameter
JWS defines the "typ" (Type) Header Parameter to declare the media The "typ" (Type) Header Parameter is defined in JWS Section 4.1.9. to
type of the JWS. declare the media type of the complete JWS.
For PASSporT Token the "typ" header MUST be the string "passport". For PASSporT Token the "typ" header MUST be the string "passport".
This represents that the encoded token is a JWT of type passport. This represents that the encoded token is a JWT of type passport.
3.1.2. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter 3.2. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter
For PASSporT, the "alg" should be defined as follows, for the The "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter is defined in JWS
creation and verification of PASSporT tokens and their digital Section 4.1.1. This definition includes the ability to specify the
signatures ES256 MUST be implemented. use of a cryptographic algorithm for the signature part of the JWS.
It also refers to a list of defined "alg" values as part of a
registry established by JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) [RFC7518] and
defined in Section 3.1.
Note that JWA [RFC7518] defines other algorithms that may be utilized For the creation and verification of PASSporT tokens and their
or updated in the future depending on cryptographic strength digital signatures ES256 MUST be implemented as defined in JWA
Section 3.4
Note that JWA defines other algorithms that may be utilized or
updated in the future depending on cryptographic strength
requirements guided by current security best practice. requirements guided by current security best practice.
3.1.3. "x5u" (X.509 URL) Header Parameter 3.3. "x5u" (X.509 URL) Header Parameter
As defined in JWS, the "x5u" header parameter is used to provide a As defined in JWS Section 4.1.5., the "x5u" header parameter defines
URI [RFC3986] referring to the resource for the X.509 public key a URI [RFC3986] referring to the resource for the X.509 public key
certificate or certificate chain [RFC5280] corresponding to the key certificate or certificate chain [RFC5280] corresponding to the key
used to digitally sign the JWS. Generally this would correspond to used to digitally sign the JWS. Generally, as defined in JWS section
an HTTPS or DNSSEC resource with the guidance that it MUST be TLS 4.1.5, this would correspond to an HTTPS or DNSSEC resource using
protected, per JWS spec. integrity protection.
An example of the header, would be the following, 3.4. Example PASSporT header
{ An example of the header, would be the following, including the
"typ":"passport", specified passport type, ES256 algorithm, and a URI referencing the
"alg":"ES256", network location of the certificate needed to validate the PASSporT
"x5u":"https://cert.example.org/passport.cer" signature.
}
3.2. PASSporT Payload {
"typ":"passport",
"alg":"ES256",
"x5u":"https://cert.example.org/passport.cer"
}
4. PASSporT Payload
The token claims consist of the information which needs to be The token claims consist of the information which needs to be
verified at the destination party. These claims follow the verified at the destination party. These claims follow the
definition of a JWT claim [RFC7519] and be encoded as defined by the definition of a JWT claim [RFC7519] Section 4 and be encoded as
JWS Payload [RFC7515]. defined by the JWS Payload [RFC7515] Section 3.
PASSporT defines the use of a standard JWT defined claim as well as PASSporT defines the use of a standard JWT defined claim as well as
custom claims corresponding to the two parties associated with custom claims corresponding to the two parties associated with
personal communications, the originator and destination as detailed personal communications, the originator and destination as detailed
below. below.
Key values outside the US-ASCII range should be encoded using percent Any claim key values outside the US-ASCII range should be encoded
encoding as described in section 2.1 of [RFC3986], case normalized as using percent encoding as described in section 2.1 of [RFC3986], case
described in 6.2.2.1 of [RFC3986]. Matching of these values should normalized as described in 6.2.2.1 of [RFC3986].
use string exact match.
3.2.1. JWT defined claims
3.2.1.1. "iat" - Issued At claim 4.1. JWT defined claims
4.1.1. "iat" - Issued At claim
The JSON claim MUST include the "iat" [RFC7519] Section 4.1.6 defined The JSON claim MUST include the "iat" [RFC7519] Section 4.1.6 defined
claim Issued At. As defined this should be set to the date and time claim Issued At. As defined this should be set to the date and time
of the origination of the personal communications. The time value of the origination of the personal communications. The time value
should be of the format defined in [RFC7519] Section 2 NumericDate. should be of the format defined in [RFC7519] Section 2 NumericDate.
This is included for securing the token against replay and cut and This is included for securing the token against replay and cut and
paste attacks, as explained further in the security considerations in paste attacks, as explained further in the security considerations in
section 6. section 6.
3.2.2. PASSporT specific claims 4.2. PASSporT specific claims
3.2.2.1. Originating and Destination Identity Claims 4.2.1. Originating and Destination Identity Claims
PASSporT defines claims that convey the identity of the origination PASSporT defines claims that convey the identity of the origination
and destination of personal communications. There are two claims and destination of personal communications. Origination in the
that are required for PASSporT, the "orig" and "dest" claims. Both context of PASSporT and for a given application's use of PASSporT is
"orig" and "dest" MUST have claims where the key represents an the point in the network that has the authority to assert the callers
identity. This authority is represented in PASSporT by the
certificate holder and is signed at the applications choice of
authoritative point(s) in the network, for example, at a device that
has authenticated with a user, or at a network entity with an
authenticated trust relationship with that device and its user.
Destination represents the intended destination of the personal
communications, i.e. the identity(s) being called by the caller, The
destination point(s) determined by the application must have the
capability to verify the PASSporT token and the digital signature.
The PASSporT associated certificate is used to validate the authority
of the originating signer, generally via a certificate chain to the
trust anchor for that application.
The origination and destination identities are represented by two
claims that are required for PASSporT, the "orig" and "dest" claims.
Both "orig" and "dest" MUST have claims where the key represents an
identity type and the value is the identity string, both defined in identity type and the value is the identity string, both defined in
subsecquent subsections. Currently, these identities can be subsequent subsections. Currently, these identities can be
represented as either telephone numbers or Uniform Resource represented as either telephone numbers or Uniform Resource
Indicators (URIs). Indicators (URIs).
The "orig" JSON object MUST only have one key value pair representing The "orig" JSON object MUST only have one key value pair representing
the asserted identity of any type (currently either "tn" or "uri") of the asserted identity of any type (currently either "tn" or "uri") of
the originator of the personal communications signaling. the originator of the personal communications signaling.
The "dest" JSON object MUST have at least have one key value pair, The "dest" JSON object MUST have at least have one key value pair,
but could have multiple identity types (i.e. "tn" and/or "uri") but but could have multiple identity types (i.e. "tn" and/or "uri") but
only one of each. Additionaly, in the case of "dest" only, the only one of each. If both "tn" and "uri" are included, the JSON
object should list the "tn" array first and the "uri" array second.
Within the "tn" and "uri" arrays, the identity strings should be put
in lexicographical order including the scheme-specific portion of the
URI characters. Additionally, in the case of "dest" only, the
identity type key value MUST be an array signaled by standard JSON identity type key value MUST be an array signaled by standard JSON
brackets, even when there is a single identity value in the identity brackets, even when there is a single identity value in the identity
type key value. type key value.
3.2.2.1.1. "tn" - Telephone Number identity 4.2.1.1. "tn" - Telephone Number identity
If the originating or destination identity is a telephone number, the If the originating or destination identity is a telephone number, the
key representing the identity MUST be "tn". key representing the identity MUST be "tn".
Telephone Number strings for "tn" MUST be canonicalized according to Telephone Number strings for "tn" MUST be canonicalized according to
the procedures specified in [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] Section 7.2. the procedures specified in [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] Section 8.3.
3.2.2.1.2. "uri" - URI identity 4.2.1.2. "uri" - URI identity
If any of the originating or destination identities is of the form If any of the originating or destination identities is of the form
URI, as defined in [RFC3986], the key representing the identity MUST URI, as defined in [RFC3986], the key representing the identity MUST
be "uri" URI form of the identity. be "uri" URI form of the identity.
3.2.2.1.3. Future identity forms 4.2.1.3. Future identity forms
We recognize that in the future there may be other standard We recognize that in the future there may be other standard
mechanisms for representing identities. The "orig" and "dest" claims mechanisms for representing identities. The "orig" and "dest" claims
currently support "tn" and "uri" but could be extended in the future currently support "tn" and "uri" but could be extended in the future
to allow for other identity types with new IANA registered unique to allow for other identity types with new IANA registered unique
types to represent these forms. types to represent these forms.
3.2.2.1.4. Examples 4.2.1.4. Examples
Single Originator, with telephone number identity +12155551212, to Single Originator, with telephone number identity +12155551212, to
Single Destination, with URI identity 'sip:alice@example.com', Single Destination, with URI identity 'sip:alice@example.com',
example: example:
{ {
"dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]}, "dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]},
"iat":"1443208345", "iat":"1443208345",
"orig":{"tn":"12155551212"} "orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}
} }
skipping to change at page 7, line 26 skipping to change at page 8, line 15
{ {
"dest":{ "dest":{
"tn":["12125551212"], "tn":["12125551212"],
"uri":["sip:alice@example.com", "uri":["sip:alice@example.com",
"sip:bob@example.net"] "sip:bob@example.net"]
}, },
"iat":"1443208345", "iat":"1443208345",
"orig":{"tn":"12155551212"} "orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}
} }
3.2.2.2. "mky" - Media Key claim 4.2.2. "mky" - Media Key claim
Some protocols that use PASSporT convey hashes for media security Some protocols that use PASSporT may also want to protect media
keys within their signaling in order to bind those keys to the security keys delivered within their signaling in order to bind those
identities established in the signaling layers. One example would be keys to the identities established in the signaling layers. The
the DTLS-SRTP key fingerprints carried in SDP [RFC4566] via the "mky" is an optional PASSporT claim defining the assertion of media
"a=fingerprint" attribute; multiple instances of that fingerprint may key fingerprints carried in SDP [RFC4566] via the "a=fingerprint"
appear in a single SDP body corresponding to media streams offered. attribute [RFC4572] Section 5. This claim can support either a
single or multiple fingerprints appearing in a single SDP body
corresponding to one or more media streams offered.
The "mky" claim MUST be formated in a JSON form including the 'alg' The "mky" claim MUST be formated in a JSON form including the "alg"
and 'dig' keys with the corresponding algorithm and hexadecimal and "dig" keys with the corresponding algorithm and hexadecimal
values. If there is multiple fingerprint values, for example values. If there are more that one fingerprint values associated
associated with different media streams in SDP, the fingerprint with different media streams in SDP, the fingerprint values MUST be
values MUST be constructed as a JSON array denoted by bracket constructed as a JSON array denoted by bracket characters.
characters.
For the 'dig' key value, the hash value MUST be the hexadecimal value For the "dig" key value, the hash value MUST be the hexadecimal value
without any colons. without any colons. The "mky" array MUST order the JSON objects
containing both "alg" and "dig" key values in lexicographic order of
the "alg" string first followed by the corresponding lexicographic
order of the "dig" string values. Within each of those objects the
JSON keys MUST have "alg" first and "dig" second.
An example claim with "mky" claim is as follows: An example claim with "mky" claim is as follows:
For an SDP offer that includes the following fingerprint values, For an SDP offer that includes the following fingerprint values,
a=fingerprint:sha-256 02:1A:CC:54:27:AB:EB:9C:53:3F:3E:4B:65:
2E:7D:46:3F:54:42:CD:54:F1:7A:03:A2:7D:F9:B0:7F:46:19:B2
a=fingerprint:sha-256 4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E: a=fingerprint:sha-256 4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E:
5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB:3E:4B:65:2E:7D:46:3F:54:42:CD:54:F1 5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB:3E:4B:65:2E:7D:46:3F:54:42:CD:54:F1
a=fingerprint:sha-256 02:1A:CC:54:27:AB:EB:9C:53:3F:3E:4B:65:
2E:7D:46:3F:54:42:CD:54:F1:7A:03:A2:7D:F9:B0:7F:46:19:B2
the PASSporT Payload object would be: the PASSporT Payload object would be:
{ {
"dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]}, "dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]},
"iat":"1443208345", "iat":"1443208345",
"mky":[ "mky":[
{ {
"alg":"sha-256", "alg":"sha-256",
"dig":"021ACC5427ABEB9C533F3E4B652E7D463F5442CD54 "dig":"021ACC5427ABEB9C533F3E4B652E7D463F5442CD54
skipping to change at page 8, line 25 skipping to change at page 9, line 23
}, },
{ {
"alg":"sha-256", "alg":"sha-256",
"dig":"4AADB9B13F82183B540212DF3E5D496B19E57C "dig":"4AADB9B13F82183B540212DF3E5D496B19E57C
AB3E4B652E7D463F5442CD54F1" AB3E4B652E7D463F5442CD54F1"
} }
], ],
"orig":{"tn":"12155551212"} "orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}
} }
3.3. PASSporT Signature 5. PASSporT Signature
The signature of the PASSporT is created as specified by JWS using The signature of the PASSporT is created as specified by JWS
the private key corresponding to the X.509 public key certificate [RFC7515] Section 5.1 Steps 1 through 6. PASSporT MUST use the JWS
referenced by the "x5u" header parameter. Protected Header. For the JWS Payload and the JWS Protected Header,
the lexicographic ordering and white space rules described above, and
JSON serialization rules in Section 6 of this document MUST be
followed.
4. Extending PASSporT Appendix A of this document has a detailed example of how to follow
the steps to create the JWS Signature.
JWS [RFC7515] Section 5.1 Step 7 JWS JSON serialization is not
supported for PASSporT.
JWS [RFC7515] Section 5.1 Step 8 describes the method to create the
final JWS Compact Serialization form of the PASSporT Token.
6. Extending PASSporT
PASSporT includes the bare minimum set of claims needed to securely PASSporT includes the bare minimum set of claims needed to securely
assert the originating identity and support the secure propoerties assert the originating identity and support the secure properties
discussed in various parts of this document. JWT supports a straight discussed in various parts of this document. JWT supports a straight
forward way to add additional claims by simply adding new claim key forward way to add additional claims by simply adding new claim key
pairs. PASSporT can be extended beyond the defined base set of pairs. PASSporT can be extended beyond the defined base set of
claims to represent other information requiring assertion or claims to represent other information requiring assertion or
validation beyond the originating identity itself as needed. validation beyond the originating identity itself as needed.
4.1. "ppt" (PASSporT) header parameter 6.1. "ppt" (PASSporT) header parameter
For extension of the base set of claims defined in this document, a For extension of the base set of claims defined in this document, a
new JWS header parameter "ppt" MUST be used with a unique string. new JWS header parameter "ppt" MUST be used with a unique string.
Any PASSporT extension should be defined in a specification Any PASSporT extension should be defined in a specification
describing the PASSporT extension and the string used in the "ppt" describing the PASSporT extension and the string used in the "ppt"
hedaer string that defines any new claims that would extend the base header string that defines any new claims that would extend the base
set of claims of PASSporT. set of claims of PASSporT.
An example header with a PASSporT extension type of "foo" is as An example header with a PASSporT extension type of "foo" is as
follows: follows:
{ {
"alg":"ES256", "alg":"ES256",
"ppt":"foo", "ppt":"foo",
"typ":"passport", "typ":"passport",
"x5u":"https://tel.example.org/passport.cer" "x5u":"https://tel.example.org/passport.cer"
} }
4.2. Extended PASSporT Claims 6.2. Extended PASSporT Claims
Specifications that define extensions to the PASSporT mechanism MUST Specifications that define extensions to the PASSporT mechanism MUST
explicitly specify what claims they include beyond the base set of explicitly specify what claims they include beyond the base set of
claims from this document, the order in which they will appear, and claims from this document, the order in which they will appear, and
any further information necessary to implement the extension. All any further information necessary to implement the extension. All
extensions MUST include the baseline JWT elements specified in extensions MUST include the baseline JWT elements specified in
Section 3; claims may only be appended to the claims object Section 3; claims may only be appended to the claims object
specified; they can never be removed or re-ordered. Specifying new specified; they can never be removed or re-ordered. Specifying new
claims follows the baseline JWT procedures ([RFC7519] Section 10.1). claims follows the baseline JWT procedures ([RFC7519] Section 10.1).
Understanding an extension or new claims defined by the extension on Understanding an extension or new claims defined by the extension on
the destination verification of the PASSporT token is optional. The the destination verification of the PASSporT token is optional. The
creator of a PASSporT object cannot assume that destination systems creator of a PASSporT object cannot assume that destination systems
will understand any given extension. Verification of PASSporT tokens will understand any given extension. Verification of PASSporT tokens
by destination systems that do support an extension may then trigger by destination systems that do support an extension may then trigger
appropriate application-level behavior in the presence of an appropriate application-level behavior in the presence of an
extension; authors of extensions should provide appropriate extension; authors of extensions should provide appropriate
extension-specific guidance to application developers on this point. extension-specific guidance to application developers on this point.
5. Deterministic JSON Serialization An example set of extended claims, extending the first example in
Section 4.1.2.4. using "bar" as the newly defined claim would be as
follows:
{
"bar":"beyond all recognition"
"dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]},
"iat":"1443208345",
"orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}
}
7. Deterministic JSON Serialization
JSON, as a canonical format, can include spaces, line breaks and key JSON, as a canonical format, can include spaces, line breaks and key
value pairs can occur in any order and therefore makes it, from a value pairs can occur in any order and therefore makes it, from a
string format, non-deterministic. In order to make the digitial string format, non-deterministic. In order to make the digital
signature verification work deterministically, the JSON signature verification work deterministically, the JSON
representation of the PASSporT Header and Claims, particularly if representation of the PASSporT Header and Claims, particularly if
PASSporT is used across multiple signaling environments, specifically PASSporT is used across multiple signaling environments, specifically
the JSON header object and JSON Claim object MUST be computed as the JWS Protected Header object and JWS Payload object MUST be
follows. computed as follows.
The JSON object MUST follow the rules for the construction of the The JSON object MUST follow the rules for the construction of the
thumbprint of a JSON Web Key (JWK) as defined in [RFC7638] Section 3. thumbprint of a JSON Web Key (JWK) as defined in [RFC7638] Section 3
Each JSON object MUST contain no whitespace or line breaks before or Step 1 only. Step 2 MUST NOT be performed; as noted in JWK this is
after any syntactic elements and with the required members ordered still a legal JWK object.
lexicographically by the Unicode [UNICODE] code points of the member
names.
In addition, the JSON header and claim members MUST follow the The PASSporT header and claim direct members MUST follow the
lexicographical ordering and character and string rules defined in lexicographical ordering rules. Any top level JSON members that
[RFC7638] Section 3.3. contain JSON objects or arrays, such as "dest" or "mky" MUST follow
their own lexicographical ordering and whitespace and line break
rules for the sub-elements. This includes any header or claims
defined in future specifications using PASSporT.
5.1. Example PASSport deterministic JSON form 7.1. Example PASSport deterministic JSON form
For the example PASSporT Payload shown in Section 3.2.2.2, the This section demonstrate the deterministic JSON serialization for the
following is the deterministic JSON object form. example PASSporT Payload shown in Section 4.2.2.
{"dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"],"iat": 1443208345,"mky" The initial JSON object is shown here:
:[{"alg":"sha-256","dig":"021ACC5427ABEB9C533F3E4B652E7D463F5442
CD54F17A03A27DF9B07F4619B2"},{"alg":"sha-256","dig":"4AADB9B13F8 {
2183B540212DF3E5D496B19E57CAB3E4B652E7D463F5442CD54F1"}], "dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]},
"orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}
"iat":"1443208345",
"mky":[
{
"alg":"sha-256",
"dig":"021ACC5427ABEB9C533F3E4B652E7D463F5442CD54
F17A03A27DF9B07F4619B2"
},
{
"alg":"sha-256",
"dig":"4AADB9B13F82183B540212DF3E5D496B19E57C
AB3E4B652E7D463F5442CD54F1"
}
],
}
The parent members of the JSON object are as follows:
o "dest"
o "orig"
o "iat"
o "mky"
Their lexicographic order is:
o "dest"
o "iat"
o "mky"
o "orig"
The final constructed deterministic JSON serialization
representation, with whitespace and line breaks removed, (with line
breaks used for display purposes only) is:
{"dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"],"iat":1443208345,"mky":
[{"alg":"sha-256","dig":"021ACC5427ABEB9C533F3E4B652E7D463F5442
CD54F17A03A27DF9B07F4619B2"},{"alg":"sha-256","dig":"4AADB9B13F
82183B540212DF3E5D496B19E57CAB3E4B652E7D463F5442CD54F1"}],
"orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}} "orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}}
6. Security Considerations 8. Security Considerations
6.1. Avoidance of replay and cut and paste attacks 8.1. Avoidance of replay and cut and paste attacks
There are a number of security considerations for use of the token There are a number of security considerations for use of the token
for avoidance of replay and cut and paste attacks. PASSporT tokens for avoidance of replay and cut and paste attacks. PASSporT tokens
should be sent with other application level protocol information should be sent with other application level protocol information
(e.g. for SIP an INVITE as defined in [RFC3261]). In order to make (e.g. for SIP an INVITE as defined in [RFC3261]). In order to make
the token signature unique to a specific origination of personal the token signature unique to a specific origination of personal
communications there should be a link between various information communications there should be a link between various information
provided in the token and information provided by the application provided in the token and information provided by the application
level protocol information. This uniqueness specified using the level protocol information. This uniqueness specified using the
following two claims: following two claims:
skipping to change at page 10, line 34 skipping to change at page 13, line 4
the token signature unique to a specific origination of personal the token signature unique to a specific origination of personal
communications there should be a link between various information communications there should be a link between various information
provided in the token and information provided by the application provided in the token and information provided by the application
level protocol information. This uniqueness specified using the level protocol information. This uniqueness specified using the
following two claims: following two claims:
o 'iat' claim should correspond to a date/time the message was o 'iat' claim should correspond to a date/time the message was
originated. It should also be within a relative time that is originated. It should also be within a relative time that is
reasonable for clock drift and transmission time characteristics reasonable for clock drift and transmission time characteristics
associated with the application using the PASSporT token. associated with the application using the PASSporT token.
Therefore, validation of the token should consider date and time Therefore, validation of the token should consider date and time
correlation, which could be influenced by signaling protocol correlation, which could be influenced by signaling protocol
specific use and network time differences. specific use and network time differences.
o 'dest' claim is included to prevent the valid re-use of a o 'dest' claim is included to prevent the valid re-use of a
previously originated message to send to another destination previously originated message to send to another destination
party. party.
6.2. Solution Considerations 8.2. Solution Considerations
It should be recognized that the use of this token should not, in
it's own right, be considered a full solution for absolute non-
repudiation of the persona being asserted. This only provides non-
repudiation of the signer of PASSporT. If the signer and the persona
are not one in the same, which can and often will be the case in
telecommunications networks today, protecting the destination party
from being spoofed may take some interpretation or additional
verification of the link between the PASSporT signature and the
persona being asserted.
In addition, the telecommunications systems and specifications that
use PASSporT should in practice provide mechanisms for:
o Managing X.509 certificates and X.509 certificate chains to an
authorized trust anchor that can be a trusted entity to all
participants in the telecommunications network
o Accounting for entities that may route calls from other peer or
interconnected telecommunications networks that are not part of
the "trusted" communications network or may not be following the
usage of PASSporT or the profile of PASSporT appropriate to that
network
o Following best practices around management and security of X.509 The use of PASSporT tokens based on the validation of the digital
certificates signature and the associated certificate requires consideration of
the authentication and authority or reputation of the signer to
attest to the identity being asserted. It should be recognized that
the use of this token should not, in it's own right, be considered a
full solution for absolute non-repudiation of the identity being
asserted. It can and often is the case that the end user that the
identity represents and signer are not one in the same. However,
applications that use PASSporT should ensure the signer is in an
authoritative position to represent the user and authenticate the
user onto the communications network and should be the responsible
party for protecting the destination party from potential identity
spoofing in addition to other abuse of the communications network
outside of PASSporT.
6.3. Privacy Considerations 8.3. Privacy Considerations
Because PASSporT explicitly includes claims of identifiers of parties Because PASSporT explicitly includes claims of identifiers of parties
involved in communications, date and times, and potentially other involved in communications, date and times, and potentially other
call detail, care should be taken outside of traditional protected or call detail, care should be taken outside of traditional protected or
private telephony communications paths where there may be concerns private telephony communications paths where there may be concerns
about exposing information to either unintended or illegitimate about exposing information to either unintended or illegitimate
actors. These identifiers are often exposed through many actors. These identifiers are often exposed through many
communications signaling protocols as of today, but appropriate communications signaling protocols as of today, but appropriate
precautions should be taken. precautions should be taken.
7. IANA Considerations 9. IANA Considerations
7.1. Media Type Registration 9.1. Media Type Registration
7.1.1. Media Type Registry Contents Additions Requested 9.1.1. Media Type Registry Contents Additions Requested
This section registers the "application/passport" media type This section registers the "application/passport" media type
[RFC2046] in the "Media Types" registry in the manner described in [RFC2046] in the "Media Types" registry in the manner described in
[RFC6838], which can be used to indicate that the content is a [RFC6838], which can be used to indicate that the content is a
PASSporT defined JWT and JWS. PASSporT defined JWT and JWS.
o Type name: application o Type name: application
o Subtype name: passport o Subtype name: passport
o Required parameters: n/a o Required parameters: n/a
o Optional parameters: n/a o Optional parameters: n/a
o Encoding considerations: 8bit; application/passport values outside o Encoding considerations: 8bit; application/passport values outside
the US-ASCII range are encoded using percent encoding as described the US-ASCII range are encoded using percent encoding as described
in section 2.1 of RFC 3986 (some values may be the empty string), in section 2.1 of RFC 3986 (some values may be the empty string),
each separated from the next by a single period ('.') character. each separated from the next by a single period ('.') character.
skipping to change at page 12, line 40 skipping to change at page 15, line 5
o Intended usage: COMMON o Intended usage: COMMON
o Restrictions on usage: none o Restrictions on usage: none
o Author: Chris Wendt, chris-ietf@chriswendt.net o Author: Chris Wendt, chris-ietf@chriswendt.net
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Provisional registration? No o Provisional registration? No
7.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registration 9.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registration
7.2.1. Registry Contents Additions Requested 9.2.1. Registry Contents Additions Requested
o Claim Name: "orig" o Claim Name: "orig"
o Claim Description: Originating Identity String o Claim Description: Originating Identity String
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of draft-ietf-stir- o Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of draft-ietf-stir-
passport-05 passport-05
skipping to change at page 13, line 23 skipping to change at page 15, line 36
o Claim Name: "mky" o Claim Name: "mky"
o Claim Description: Media Key Fingerprint String o Claim Description: Media Key Fingerprint String
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of draft-ietf-stir- o Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of draft-ietf-stir-
passport-05 passport-05
8. Acknowledgements 10. Acknowledgements
Particular thanks to members of the ATIS and SIP Forum NNI Task Group Particular thanks to members of the ATIS and SIP Forum NNI Task Group
including Jim McEchern, Martin Dolly, Richard Shockey, John Barnhill, including Jim McEchern, Martin Dolly, Richard Shockey, John Barnhill,
Christer Holmberg, Victor Pascual Avila, Mary Barnes, Eric Burger for Christer Holmberg, Victor Pascual Avila, Mary Barnes, Eric Burger for
their review, ideas, and contributions also thanks to Henning their review, ideas, and contributions also thanks to Henning
Schulzrinne, Russ Housley, Alan Johnston, Richard Barnes, Mark Schulzrinne, Russ Housley, Alan Johnston, Richard Barnes, Mark
Miller, and Ted Hardie for valuable feedback on the technical and Miller, Ted Hardie, Dave Crocker, Robert Sparks for valuable feedback
security aspects of the document. Additional thanks to Harsha Bellur on the technical and security aspects of the document. Additional
for assistance in coding the example tokens. thanks to Harsha Bellur for assistance in coding the example tokens.
9. References
9.1. Normative References 11. References
11.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis]
Peterson, J., Jennings, C., Rescorla, E., and C. Wendt, Peterson, J., Jennings, C., Rescorla, E., and C. Wendt,
"Authenticated Identity Management in the Session "Authenticated Identity Management in the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP)", draft-ietf-stir-rfc4474bis-10 Initiation Protocol (SIP)", draft-ietf-stir-rfc4474bis-12
(work in progress), July 2016. (work in progress), August 2016.
[RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail [RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046, Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996, DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2046>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2046>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform [RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005, RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[RFC4566] Handley, M., Jacobson, V., and C. Perkins, "SDP: Session
Description Protocol", RFC 4566, DOI 10.17487/RFC4566,
July 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4566>.
[RFC4572] Lennox, J., "Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the
Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session
Description Protocol (SDP)", RFC 4572,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4572, July 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4572>.
[RFC6838] Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type [RFC6838] Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type
Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13, Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13,
RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, January 2013, RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6838>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6838>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web [RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>. 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
[RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518, [RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518,
skipping to change at page 14, line 26 skipping to change at page 17, line 5
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token [RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015, (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC7638] Jones, M. and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Key (JWK) [RFC7638] Jones, M. and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Key (JWK)
Thumbprint", RFC 7638, DOI 10.17487/RFC7638, September Thumbprint", RFC 7638, DOI 10.17487/RFC7638, September
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7638>. 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7638>.
[UNICODE] "The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard"", 11.2. Informative References
<http://www.unicode.org/versions/latest/>.
9.2. Informative References
[RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, [RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002, DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
skipping to change at page 15, line 4 skipping to change at page 17, line 29
[RFC7340] Peterson, J., Schulzrinne, H., and H. Tschofenig, "Secure [RFC7340] Peterson, J., Schulzrinne, H., and H. Tschofenig, "Secure
Telephone Identity Problem Statement and Requirements", Telephone Identity Problem Statement and Requirements",
RFC 7340, DOI 10.17487/RFC7340, September 2014, RFC 7340, DOI 10.17487/RFC7340, September 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7340>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7340>.
Appendix A. Example PASSporT JWS Serialization and Signature Appendix A. Example PASSporT JWS Serialization and Signature
For PASSporT, there will always be a JWS with the following members: For PASSporT, there will always be a JWS with the following members:
o "protected", with the value BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)) o "protected", with the value BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header))
o "payload", with the value BASE64URL (JWS Payload) o "payload", with the value BASE64URL (JWS Payload)
o "signature", with the value BASE64URL(JWS Signature) o "signature", with the value BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
Note: there will never be a JWS Unprotected Header for PASSporT. This example will follow the steps in JWS [RFC7515] Section 5.1,
steps 1-6 and 8 and incorporates the additional serialization steps
required for PASSporT.
First, an example PASSporT Protected Header is as follows: Step 1 for JWS references the JWS Payload, an example PASSporT
Payload is as follows:
{ {
"typ":"passport", "dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]}
"alg":"ES256", "iat":"1443208345",
"x5u":"https://cert.example.org/passport.cer" "orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}
} }
This would be serialized to the form: This would be serialized to the form (with line break used for
display purposes only):
{"alg":"ES256","typ":"passport","x5u":"https://cert.example.org/ {"dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]},"iat":"1443208345",
passport.cer"} "orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}}
Encoding this with UTF8 and BASE64 encoding produces this value: Step 2 Computes the BASE64URL(JWS Payload) producing this value (with
line break used for display purposes only):
eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6InBhc3Nwb3J0IiwieDV1IjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9j eyJkZXN0Ijp7InVyaSI6WyJzaXA6YWxpY2VAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iXX0sImlhd
ZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUub3JnL3Bhc3Nwb3J0LmNlciJ9 CI6IjE0NDMyMDgzNDUiLCJvcmlnIjp7InRuIjoiMTIxNTU1NTEyMTIifX0
Second, an example PASSporT Payload is as follows: For Step 3, an example PASSporT Protected Header comprising the JOSE
Header is as follows:
{ {
"dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]} "typ":"passport",
"iat":"1443208345", "alg":"ES256",
"orig":{"tn":"12155551212"} "x5u":"https://cert.example.org/passport.cer"
} }
This would be serialized to the form: This would be serialized to the form (with line break used for
display purposes only):
{"dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]},"iat":"1443208345", {"alg":"ES256","typ":"passport","x5u":"https://cert.example.org/
"orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}} passport.cer"}
Encoding this with the UTF8 and BASE64 encoding produces this value: Step 4 Performs the BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)) operation
and encoding produces this value (with line break used for display
purposes only):
eyJkZXN0Ijp7InVyaSI6WyJzaXA6YWxpY2VAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iXX0sImlhd eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6InBhc3Nwb3J0IiwieDV1IjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9j
CI6IjE0NDMyMDgzNDUiLCJvcmlnIjp7InRuIjoiMTIxNTU1NTEyMTIifX0 ZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUub3JnL3Bhc3Nwb3J0LmNlciJ9
Computing the digital signature of the PASSporT Signing Input Step 5 and Step 6 performs the computation of the digital signature
ASCII(BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)) || '.' || BASE64URL(JWS of the PASSporT Signing Input ASCII(BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected
Payload)) Header)) || '.' || BASE64URL(JWS Payload)) using ES256 as the
algorithm and the BASE64URL(JWS Signature).
rq3pjT1hoRwakEGjHCnWSwUnshd0-zJ6F1VOgFWSjHBr8Qjpjlk-cpFYpFYso rq3pjT1hoRwakEGjHCnWSwUnshd0-zJ6F1VOgFWSjHBr8Qjpjlk-cpFYpFYso
jNCpTzO3QfPOlckGaS6hEck7w jNCpTzO3QfPOlckGaS6hEck7w
The final PASSporT token is produced by concatenating the values in Step 8 describes how to create the final PASSporT token,
the order Header.Payload.Signature with period (',') characters. For concatenating the values in the order Header.Payload.Signature with
the above example values this would produce the following: period ('.') characters. For the above example values this would
produce the following (with line breaks between period used for
readability purposes only):
eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6InBhc3Nwb3J0IiwieDV1IjoiaHR0cHM6Ly eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6InBhc3Nwb3J0IiwieDV1IjoiaHR0cHM6Ly
9jZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUub3JnL3Bhc3Nwb3J0LmNlciJ9 9jZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUub3JnL3Bhc3Nwb3J0LmNlciJ9
. .
eyJkZXN0Ijp7InVyaSI6WyJzaXA6YWxpY2VAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iXX0sImlhd eyJkZXN0Ijp7InVyaSI6WyJzaXA6YWxpY2VAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iXX0sImlhd
CI6IjE0NDMyMDgzNDUiLCJvcmlnIjp7InRuIjoiMTIxNTU1NTEyMTIifX0 CI6IjE0NDMyMDgzNDUiLCJvcmlnIjp7InRuIjoiMTIxNTU1NTEyMTIifX0
. .
rq3pjT1hoRwakEGjHCnWSwUnshd0-zJ6F1VOgFWSjHBr8Qjpjlk-cpFYpFYso rq3pjT1hoRwakEGjHCnWSwUnshd0-zJ6F1VOgFWSjHBr8Qjpjlk-cpFYpFYso
jNCpTzO3QfPOlckGaS6hEck7w jNCpTzO3QfPOlckGaS6hEck7w
 End of changes. 90 change blocks. 
245 lines changed or deleted 355 lines changed or added

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