draft-ietf-stir-passport-07.txt   draft-ietf-stir-passport-08.txt 
STIR C. Wendt STIR C. Wendt
Internet-Draft Comcast Internet-Draft Comcast
Intended status: Standards Track J. Peterson Intended status: Standards Track J. Peterson
Expires: March 13, 2017 Neustar Inc. Expires: March 30, 2017 Neustar Inc.
September 9, 2016 September 26, 2016
Persona Assertion Token Personal Assertion Token (PASSporT)
draft-ietf-stir-passport-07 draft-ietf-stir-passport-08
Abstract Abstract
This document defines a canonical string object or 'token' including This document defines a method for creating and validating a token
a digital signature for verifying the author of the token, their that cryptographically verifies an originating identity, or more
authority to author the token and the information asserted in the generally a URI or telephone number representing the originator of
token, minimally, the originating identity or 'persona' corresponding personal communications. The PASSporT token is cryptographically
specifically to the originator of 'personal communications', or signed to protect the integrity of the identity the originator and to
signalled communications between a set of parties with identities. verify the assertion of the identity information at the destination.
The PASSporT token is cryptographically signed to protect the The cryptographic signature is defined with the intention that it can
integrity of the identify the originator of a personal communications confidently verify the originating persona even when the signature is
session (e.g. the telephone number or URI) and verify the assertion sent to the destination party over an insecure channel. PASSporT is
of the identity information at the destination. The cryptographic particularly useful for many personal communications applications
signature is defined with the intention that it can confidently over IP networks and other multi-hop interconnection scenarios where
verify the originating persona even when the signature is sent to the the originating and destination parties may not have a direct trusted
destination party over an insecure channel. PASSporT is particularly relationship.
useful for many personal communications applications over IP networks
and other multi-hop interconnection scenarios where the originating
and destination parties may not have a direct trusted relationship.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on March 13, 2017. This Internet-Draft will expire on March 30, 2017.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. PASSporT Token Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. PASSporT Token Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. PASSporT Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. PASSporT Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. "typ" (Type) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. "typ" (Type) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.2. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. "x5u" (X.509 URL) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.3. "x5u" (X.509 URL) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.4. Example PASSporT header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.4. Example PASSporT header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. PASSporT Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. PASSporT Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. JWT defined claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.1. JWT defined claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1.1. "iat" - Issued At claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.1.1. "iat" - Issued At claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. PASSporT specific claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.2. PASSporT specific claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2.1. Originating and Destination Identity Claims . . . . . 6 4.2.1. Originating and Destination Identity Claims . . . . . 6
4.2.1.1. "tn" - Telephone Number identity . . . . . . . . 7
4.2.1.2. "uri" - URI identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2.1.3. Future identity forms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2.1.4. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2.2. "mky" - Media Key claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.2.2. "mky" - Media Key claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. PASSporT Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5. PASSporT Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Extending PASSporT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 6. Compact form of PASSporT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.1. "ppt" (PASSporT) header parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 6.1. Example Compact form PASSporT Token . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.2. Extended PASSporT Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 7. Extending PASSporT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. Deterministic JSON Serialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7.1. "ppt" (PASSporT) header parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.1. Example PASSport deterministic JSON form . . . . . . . . 11 7.2. Example extended PASSporT header . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 7.3. Extended PASSporT Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.1. Avoidance of replay and cut and paste attacks . . . . . . 12 8. Deterministic JSON Serialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.2. Solution Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 8.1. Example PASSport deterministic JSON form . . . . . . . . 12
8.3. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 9.1. Avoidance of replay and cut and paste attacks . . . . . . 14
9.1. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 9.2. Solution Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9.1.1. Media Type Registry Contents Additions Requested . . 13 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 15 10.1. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9.2.1. Registry Contents Additions Requested . . . . . . . . 15 10.1.1. Media Type Registry Contents Additions Requested . . 15
10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 10.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 16
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 10.2.1. Registry Contents Additions Requested . . . . . . . 16
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 10.3. JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameter
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Appendix A. Example PASSporT JWS Serialization and Signature . . 17 10.3.1. Registry Contents Additions Requested . . . . . . . 16
A.1. X.509 Private Key Certificate for Example . . . . . . . . 19 11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
A.2. X.509 Public Key Certificate for Example . . . . . . . . 19 12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Appendix A. Example ES256 based PASSporT JWS Serialization and
Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
A.1. X.509 Private Key for ES256 Example** . . . . . . . . . . 20
A.2. X.509 Public Key for ES256 Example** . . . . . . . . . . 20
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
In today's IP-enabled telecommunications world, there is a growing In today's IP-enabled telecommunications world, there is a growing
concern about the ability to trust incoming invitations for concern about the ability to trust incoming invitations for
communications sessions, including video, voice and messaging. communications sessions, including video, voice and messaging
[RFC7340] As an example, modern telephone networks provide the [RFC7340]. As an example, modern telephone networks provide the
ability to spoof the calling party telephone number for many ability to spoof the calling party telephone number for many
legitimate purposes including providing network features and services legitimate purposes including providing network features and services
on the behalf of a legitimate telephone number. However, as we have on the behalf of a legitimate telephone number. However, as we have
seen, bad actors have taken advantage of this ability for seen, bad actors have taken advantage of this ability for
illegitimate and fraudulent purposes meant to trick telephone users illegitimate and fraudulent purposes meant to trick telephone users
to believe they are someone they are not. This problem can be to believe they are someone they are not. This problem can be
extended to many emerging forms of personal communications. extended to many emerging forms of personal communications.
This document defines a method for creating and validating a token This document defines a method for creating and validating a token
that cryptographically verifies an originating identity, or more that cryptographically verifies an originating identity, or more
generally a URI or telephone number representing the originator of generally a URI or telephone number representing the originator of
personal communications. Through extensions defined in this personal communications. Through extensions defined in this
document, in Section 5.2, other information relevant to the personal document, in Section 7, other information relevant to the personal
communications can also be added to the token. The goal of PASSporT communications can also be added to the token. The goal of PASSporT
is to provide a common framework for signing originating identity is to provide a common framework for signing originating identity
related information in an extensible way. Additionally, this related information in an extensible way. Additionally, this
functionality is independent of any specific personal communications functionality is independent of any specific personal communications
signaling call logic, so that the assertion of originating identity signaling call logic, so that the assertion of originating identity
related information can be implemented in a flexible way and can be related information can be implemented in a flexible way and can be
used in applications including end-to-end applications that require used in applications including end-to-end applications that require
different signaling protocols or gateways between different different signaling protocols or gateways between different
communications systems. It is anticipated that signaling protocol communications systems. It is anticipated that signaling protocol
specific guidance will be provided in other related documents and specific guidance will be provided in other related documents and
specifications to specify how to use and transport PASSporT tokens, specifications to specify how to use and transport PASSporT tokens,
however this is intentionally out of scope for this document. however this is intentionally out of scope for this document.
[I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] provides details of the use of PASSporT [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] provides details of the use of PASSporT
within the SIP [RFC3261] signaling protocol for the signing and within SIP [RFC3261] signaling protocol for the signing and
verification of telephone numbers. verification of telephone numbers and SIP URIs.
2. PASSporT Token Overview 2. PASSporT Token Overview
JSON Web Token (JWT) [RFC7519] and JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515] JSON Web Token (JWT) [RFC7519] and JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515]
and related specifications define a standard token format that can be and related specifications define a standard token format that can be
used as a way of encapsulating claimed or asserted information with used as a way of encapsulating claimed or asserted information with
an associated digital signature using X.509 based certificates. JWT an associated digital signature using X.509 based certificates. JWT
provides a set of claims in JSON format that can conveniently provides a set of claims in JSON format that can conveniently
accommodate asserted originating identity information and is easily accommodate asserted originating identity information and is easily
extensible for extension mechanisms defined below. Additionally, JWS extensible for extension mechanisms defined below. Additionally, JWS
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JWS defines the use of JSON data structures in a specified canonical JWS defines the use of JSON data structures in a specified canonical
format for signing data corresponding to JOSE header, JWS Payload, format for signing data corresponding to JOSE header, JWS Payload,
and JWS Signature. JWT defines a set of claims that are represented and JWS Signature. JWT defines a set of claims that are represented
by specified key value pairs which can be extended with custom keys by specified key value pairs which can be extended with custom keys
for specific applications. The next sections define the header and for specific applications. The next sections define the header and
claims that MUST be minimally used with JWT and JWS for PASSporT. claims that MUST be minimally used with JWT and JWS for PASSporT.
3. PASSporT Header 3. PASSporT Header
The JWS token header is a JOSE header [RFC7515] Section 4, that The JWS token header is a JOSE header, [RFC7515] Section 4, that
defines the type and encryption algorithm used in the token. defines the type and encryption algorithm used in the token.
PASSporT header should include, at a minimum, the following header PASSporT header should include, at a minimum, the header parameters
parameters defined the the next three subsections. defined in the next three subsections.
3.1. "typ" (Type) Header Parameter 3.1. "typ" (Type) Header Parameter
The "typ" (Type) Header Parameter is defined in JWS Section 4.1.9. to The "typ" (Type) Header Parameter is defined in JWS [RFC7515]
declare the media type of the complete JWS. Section 4.1.9. to declare the media type of the complete JWS.
For PASSporT Token the "typ" header MUST be the string "passport". For PASSporT Token the "typ" header MUST be the string "passport".
This represents that the encoded token is a JWT of type passport. This represents that the encoded token is a JWT of type passport.
3.2. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter 3.2. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter
The "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter is defined in JWS The "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter is defined in JWS [RFC7515]
Section 4.1.1. This definition includes the ability to specify the Section 4.1.1. This definition includes the ability to specify the
use of a cryptographic algorithm for the signature part of the JWS. use of a cryptographic algorithm for the signature part of the JWS.
It also refers to a list of defined "alg" values as part of a It also refers to a list of defined "alg" values as part of a
registry established by JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) [RFC7518] and registry established by JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) [RFC7518]
defined in Section 3.1. Section 3.1.
For the creation and verification of PASSporT tokens and their For the creation and verification of PASSporT tokens and their
digital signatures ES256 MUST be implemented as defined in JWA digital signatures, implementations MUST support ES256 as defined in
Section 3.4 JWA [RFC7518] Section 3.4. Implementations MAY support other
Note that JWA defines other algorithms that may be utilized or algorithms registered in the JSON Web Signature and Encryption
updated in the future depending on cryptographic strength Algorithms registry created by [RFC7518]. The contents of that
requirements guided by current security best practice. registry may be updated in the future depending on cryptographic
strength requirements guided by current security best practice. The
mandatory-to-support algorithm for PASSporT tokens may likewise be
updated in future updates to this document.
3.3. "x5u" (X.509 URL) Header Parameter 3.3. "x5u" (X.509 URL) Header Parameter
As defined in JWS Section 4.1.5., the "x5u" header parameter defines As defined in JWS [RFC7515] Section 4.1.5., the "x5u" header
a URI [RFC3986] referring to the resource for the X.509 public key parameter defines a URI [RFC3986] referring to the resource for the
certificate or certificate chain [RFC5280] corresponding to the key X.509 public key certificate or certificate chain [RFC5280]
used to digitally sign the JWS. Generally, as defined in JWS section corresponding to the key used to digitally sign the JWS. Generally,
4.1.5, this would correspond to an HTTPS or DNSSEC resource using as defined in JWS [RFC7515] section 4.1.5, this would correspond to
integrity protection. an HTTPS or DNSSEC resource using integrity protection.
3.4. Example PASSporT header 3.4. Example PASSporT header
An example of the header, would be the following, including the An example of the header, would be the following, including the
specified passport type, ES256 algorithm, and a URI referencing the specified passport type, ES256 algorithm, and a URI referencing the
network location of the certificate needed to validate the PASSporT network location of the certificate needed to validate the PASSporT
signature. signature.
{ {
"typ":"passport", "typ":"passport",
"alg":"ES256", "alg":"ES256",
"x5u":"https://cert.example.org/passport.cer" "x5u":"https://cert.example.org/passport.cer"
} }
4. PASSporT Payload 4. PASSporT Payload
The token claims consist of the information which needs to be The token claims consist of the information which needs to be
verified at the destination party. These claims follow the verified at the destination party. These claims follow the
definition of a JWT claim [RFC7519] Section 4 and be encoded as definition of a JWT claim [RFC7519] Section 4 and are encoded as
defined by the JWS Payload [RFC7515] Section 3. defined by the JWS Payload [RFC7515] Section 3.
PASSporT defines the use of a standard JWT defined claim as well as PASSporT defines the use of a standard JWT defined claim as well as
custom claims corresponding to the two parties associated with custom claims corresponding to the two parties associated with
personal communications, the originator and destination as detailed personal communications, the originator and destination as detailed
below. below.
Any claim key values outside the US-ASCII range should be encoded Any claim key values outside the US-ASCII range should be encoded
using percent encoding as described in section 2.1 of [RFC3986], case using percent encoding as described in Section 2.1 of [RFC3986], case
normalized as described in 6.2.2.1 of [RFC3986]. normalized as described in 6.2.2.1 of [RFC3986].
4.1. JWT defined claims 4.1. JWT defined claims
4.1.1. "iat" - Issued At claim 4.1.1. "iat" - Issued At claim
The JSON claim MUST include the "iat" [RFC7519] Section 4.1.6 defined The JSON claim MUST include the "iat" [RFC7519] Section 4.1.6 defined
claim Issued At. As defined this should be set to the date and time claim Issued At. As defined the "iat" should be set to the date and
of the origination of the personal communications. The time value time of issuance of the JWT and MUST the origination of the personal
should be of the format defined in [RFC7519] Section 2 NumericDate. communications. The time value should be of the format defined in
This is included for securing the token against replay and cut and [RFC7519] Section 2 NumericDate. This is included for securing the
paste attacks, as explained further in the security considerations in token against replay and cut and paste attacks, as explained further
section 6. in the security considerations in Section 9.
4.2. PASSporT specific claims 4.2. PASSporT specific claims
4.2.1. Originating and Destination Identity Claims 4.2.1. Originating and Destination Identity Claims
PASSporT defines claims that convey the identity of the origination PASSporT defines claims that convey the identity of the origination
and destination of personal communications. Origination in the and destination of personal communications. Origination in the
context of PASSporT and for a given application's use of PASSporT is context of PASSporT and for a given application's use of PASSporT is
the point in the network that has the authority to assert the callers the point in the network that has the authority to assert the callers
identity. This authority is represented in PASSporT by the identity. This authority is represented in PASSporT by the
certificate holder and is signed at the applications choice of certificate holder and is signed at the applications choice of
authoritative point(s) in the network, for example, at a device that authoritative point(s) in the network, for example, at a device that
has authenticated with a user, or at a network entity with an has authenticated with a user, or at a network entity with an
authenticated trust relationship with that device and its user. authenticated trust relationship with that device and it's user.
Destination represents the intended destination of the personal Destination represents the intended destination of the personal
communications, i.e. the identity(s) being called by the caller, The communications, i.e. the identity(s) being called by the caller. The
destination point(s) determined by the application must have the destination point(s) determined by the application need to have the
capability to verify the PASSporT token and the digital signature. capability to verify the PASSporT token and the digital signature.
The PASSporT associated certificate is used to validate the authority The PASSporT associated certificate is used to validate the authority
of the originating signer, generally via a certificate chain to the of the originating signer, generally via a certificate chain to the
trust anchor for that application. trust anchor for that application.
The origination and destination identities are represented by two The origination and destination identities are represented by two
claims that are required for PASSporT, the "orig" and "dest" claims. claims that are required for PASSporT, the "orig" and "dest" claims.
Both "orig" and "dest" MUST have claims where the key represents an Both "orig" and "dest" MUST have claims where the key represents an
identity type and the value is the identity string, both defined in identity type and the value is the identity string, both defined in
subsequent subsections. Currently, these identities can be subsequent subsections. Currently, these identities can be
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currently support "tn" and "uri" but could be extended in the future currently support "tn" and "uri" but could be extended in the future
to allow for other identity types with new IANA registered unique to allow for other identity types with new IANA registered unique
types to represent these forms. types to represent these forms.
4.2.1.4. Examples 4.2.1.4. Examples
Single Originator, with telephone number identity +12155551212, to Single Originator, with telephone number identity +12155551212, to
Single Destination, with URI identity 'sip:alice@example.com', Single Destination, with URI identity 'sip:alice@example.com',
example: example:
{ {
"dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]}, "dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]},
"iat":"1443208345", "iat":"1443208345",
"orig":{"tn":"12155551212"} "orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}
} }
Single Originator, with telephone number identity +12155551212, to Single Originator, with telephone number identity +12155551212, to
Multiple Destination Identities, with telephone number identity Multiple Destination Identities, with telephone number identity
+12125551212 and two URI identities, sip:alice@example.com and +12125551212 and two URI identities, sip:alice@example.com and
sip:bob@example.com, example: sip:bob@example.com, example:
{ {
"dest":{ "dest":{
"tn":["12125551212"], "tn":["12125551212"],
"uri":["sip:alice@example.com", "uri":["sip:alice@example.com",
"sip:bob@example.net"] "sip:bob@example.net"]
}, },
"iat":"1443208345", "iat":"1443208345",
"orig":{"tn":"12155551212"} "orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}
} }
4.2.2. "mky" - Media Key claim 4.2.2. "mky" - Media Key claim
Some protocols that use PASSporT may also want to protect media Some protocols that use PASSporT may also want to protect media
security keys delivered within their signaling in order to bind those security keys delivered within their signaling in order to bind those
keys to the identities established in the signaling layers. The keys to the identities established in the signaling layers. The
"mky" is an optional PASSporT claim defining the assertion of media "mky" is an optional PASSporT claim defining the assertion of media
key fingerprints carried in SDP [RFC4566] via the "a=fingerprint" key fingerprints carried in SDP [RFC4566] via the "a=fingerprint"
attribute [RFC4572] Section 5. This claim can support either a attribute [RFC4572] Section 5. This claim can support either a
single or multiple fingerprints appearing in a single SDP body single or multiple fingerprints appearing in a single SDP body
corresponding to one or more media streams offered. corresponding to one or more media streams offered. The "mky" claim
MUST be formatted in a JSON form including the "alg" and "dig" keys
The "mky" claim MUST be formated in a JSON form including the "alg" with the corresponding algorithm and hexadecimal values. If there is
and "dig" keys with the corresponding algorithm and hexadecimal more than one fingerprint value associated with different media
values. If there are more that one fingerprint values associated streams in SDP, the fingerprint values MUST be constructed as a JSON
with different media streams in SDP, the fingerprint values MUST be array denoted by bracket characters. For the "dig" key value, the
constructed as a JSON array denoted by bracket characters. hash value MUST be the hexadecimal value without any colons. The
"mky" array MUST order the JSON objects containing both "alg" and
For the "dig" key value, the hash value MUST be the hexadecimal value "dig" key values in lexicographic order of the "alg" string first
without any colons. The "mky" array MUST order the JSON objects followed by the corresponding lexicographic order of the "dig" string
containing both "alg" and "dig" key values in lexicographic order of values. Within each of those objects the JSON keys MUST have "alg"
the "alg" string first followed by the corresponding lexicographic first and "dig" second.
order of the "dig" string values. Within each of those objects the
JSON keys MUST have "alg" first and "dig" second.
An example claim with "mky" claim is as follows: An example claim with "mky" claim is as follows:
For an SDP offer that includes the following fingerprint values, For an SDP offer that includes the following fingerprint values,
a=fingerprint:sha-256 4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E: a=fingerprint:sha-256 4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E:
5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB:3E:4B:65:2E:7D:46:3F:54:42:CD:54:F1 5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB:3E:4B:65:2E:7D:46:3F:54:42:CD:54:F1
a=fingerprint:sha-256 02:1A:CC:54:27:AB:EB:9C:53:3F:3E:4B:65: a=fingerprint:sha-256 02:1A:CC:54:27:AB:EB:9C:53:3F:3E:4B:65
2E:7D:46:3F:54:42:CD:54:F1:7A:03:A2:7D:F9:B0:7F:46:19:B2 :2E:7D:46:3F:54:42:CD:54:F1:7A:03:A2:7D:F9:B0:7F:46:19:B2
the PASSporT Payload object would be: the PASSporT Payload object would be:
{ {
"dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]}, "dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]},
"iat":"1443208345", "iat":"1443208345",
"mky":[ "mky":[
{ {
"alg":"sha-256", "alg":"sha-256",
"dig":"021ACC5427ABEB9C533F3E4B652E7D463F5442CD54 "dig":"021ACC5427ABEB9C533F3E4B652E7D463F5442CD54
F17A03A27DF9B07F4619B2" F17A03A27DF9B07F4619B2"
}, },
{ {
"alg":"sha-256", "alg":"sha-256",
"dig":"4AADB9B13F82183B540212DF3E5D496B19E57C "dig":"4AADB9B13F82183B540212DF3E5D496B19E57C
AB3E4B652E7D463F5442CD54F1" AB3E4B652E7D463F5442CD54F1"
} }
], ],
"orig":{"tn":"12155551212"} "orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}
} }
5. PASSporT Signature 5. PASSporT Signature
The signature of the PASSporT is created as specified by JWS The signature of the PASSporT is created as specified by JWS
[RFC7515] Section 5.1 Steps 1 through 6. PASSporT MUST use the JWS [RFC7515] Section 5.1 Steps 1 through 6. PASSporT MUST use the JWS
Protected Header. For the JWS Payload and the JWS Protected Header, Protected Header. For the JWS Payload and the JWS Protected Header,
the lexicographic ordering and white space rules described above, and the lexicographic ordering and white space rules described above, and
JSON serialization rules in Section 6 of this document MUST be JSON serialization rules in Section 8 of this document MUST be
followed. followed.
Appendix A of this document has a detailed example of how to follow Appendix A of this document has a detailed example of how to follow
the steps to create the JWS Signature. the steps to create the JWS Signature.
JWS [RFC7515] Section 5.1 Step 7 JWS JSON serialization is not JWS [RFC7515] Section 5.1 Step 7 JWS JSON serialization is not
supported for PASSporT. supported for PASSporT.
JWS [RFC7515] Section 5.1 Step 8 describes the method to create the JWS [RFC7515] Section 5.1 Step 8 describes the method to create the
final JWS Compact Serialization form of the PASSporT Token. final JWS Compact Serialization form of the PASSporT Token.
6. Extending PASSporT 6. Compact form of PASSporT
For a using protocol of PASSporT, the PASSporT Claims as well as the
PASSporT Header may include redundant or default information that
could be reconstructed at the destination based on information
provided in the signaling protocol transporting the PASSporT object.
In this case, it may be advantageous to have a more compact form of
PASSporT to save the transmission of the bytes needed to represent
the header and claims.
We define the compact form of the PASSporT token, in the spirit of
form defined in [RFC7515] Appendix F, with the use of '..', two
periods to represent the header and claim objects being removed,
followed by PASSporT signature as defined in Section 5, and the need
for the destination to reconstruct the header and claim objects in
order to verify the signature.
In order to construct the Compact form of the PASSporT string, the
procedure described in Section 5 with the exception of Step 8
described in JWS [RFC7515] Section 5.1. This step would be replaced
by the following construction of the compact form of PASSporT,
'..' || BASE64URL(JWS Signature).
The using protocol of the compact form of PASSporT MUST be
accompanied by a specification for how the header and claims objects
can be reconstructed from information in the signaling protocol being
used.
6.1. Example Compact form PASSporT Token
The compact form of the following example token (with line breaks
between period used for readability purposes only)
eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6InBhc3Nwb3J0IiwieDV1IjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9j
ZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUub3JnL3Bhc3Nwb3J0LmNlciJ9
.
eyJkZXN0Ijp7InVyaSI6WyJzaXA6YWxpY2VAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iXX0sImlhdCI
6IjE0NDMyMDgzNDUiLCJvcmlnIjp7InRuIjoiMTIxNTU1NTEyMTIifX0
.
rq3pjT1hoRwakEGjHCnWSwUnshd0-zJ6F1VOgFWSjHBr8Qjpjlk-cpFYpFYsojN
CpTzO3QfPOlckGaS6hEck7w
would be as follows (with line breaks between period used for
readability purposes only)
..rq3pjT1hoRwakEGjHCnWSwUnshd0-zJ6F1VOgFWSjHBr8Qjpjlk-cpFYpFYsojN
CpTzO3QfPOlckGaS6hEck7w
7. Extending PASSporT
PASSporT includes the bare minimum set of claims needed to securely PASSporT includes the bare minimum set of claims needed to securely
assert the originating identity and support the secure properties assert the originating identity and support the secure properties
discussed in various parts of this document. JWT supports a straight discussed in various parts of this document. JWT supports a straight
forward way to add additional claims by simply adding new claim key forward way to add additional claims by simply adding new claim key
pairs. PASSporT can be extended beyond the defined base set of pairs. PASSporT can be extended beyond the defined base set of
claims to represent other information requiring assertion or claims to represent other information requiring assertion or
validation beyond the originating identity itself as needed. validation beyond the originating identity itself as needed.
6.1. "ppt" (PASSporT) header parameter 7.1. "ppt" (PASSporT) header parameter
For extension of the base set of claims defined in this document, a Any using protocol can extend the payload of PASSporT with additional
new JWS header parameter "ppt" MUST be used with a unique string. JWT claims. JWT claims are managed by an existing IANA registry as
Any PASSporT extension should be defined in a specification defined in [RFC7519] Section 10.1. Implementations of PASSporT MUST
describing the PASSporT extension and the string used in the "ppt" support the baseline claims defined in Section 4.2, and MAY support
header string that defines any new claims that would extend the base extended claims. If it is necessary for an extension to PASSporT to
set of claims of PASSporT. require that a relying party support a particular extended claim or
set of claims in the PASSporT object, it can do so by specifying a
"ppt" element for the PASSporT JOSE header. All values of "ppt" need
to be defined in a specification which associates the new value of
the "ppt" element with the required claims and behaviors. Relying
parties MUST fail to validate PASSporT objects containing an
unsupported "ppt".
Using protocols that carry the compact form of PASSporT, defined in
Section 6, instead of the full form MUST use only mandatory
extensions signaled with "ppt" - if a using protocol were to add
additional optional claims to a PASSporT object it carried in compact
form, relying parties would have no way to reconstruct the token.
Moreover, using protocols that support the compact form of PASSporT
MUST have some field to signal "ppt" to relying parties, as the
compact form of PASSporT omits the JOSE header.
7.2. Example extended PASSporT header
An example header with a PASSporT extension type of "foo" is as An example header with a PASSporT extension type of "foo" is as
follows: follows:
{ {
"alg":"ES256", "alg":"ES256",
"ppt":"foo", "ppt":"foo",
"typ":"passport", "typ":"passport",
"x5u":"https://tel.example.org/passport.cer" "x5u":"https://tel.example.org/passport.cer"
} }
6.2. Extended PASSporT Claims 7.3. Extended PASSporT Claims
Specifications that define extensions to the PASSporT mechanism MUST Specifications that define extensions to the PASSporT mechanism MUST
explicitly specify what claims they include beyond the base set of explicitly specify what claims they include beyond the base set of
claims from this document, the order in which they will appear, and claims from this document, the order in which they will appear, and
any further information necessary to implement the extension. All any further information necessary to implement the extension. All
extensions MUST include the baseline JWT elements specified in extensions MUST include the baseline PASSporT claim elements
Section 3; claims may only be appended to the claims object specified in Section 4; claims may only be appended to the claims
specified; they can never be removed or re-ordered. Specifying new object specified; they can never be removed or re-ordered.
claims follows the baseline JWT procedures ([RFC7519] Section 10.1). Specifying new claims follows the baseline JWT procedures ([RFC7519]
Understanding an extension or new claims defined by the extension on Section 10.1). Understanding an extension or new claims defined by
the destination verification of the PASSporT token is optional. The the extension on the destination verification of the PASSporT token
creator of a PASSporT object cannot assume that destination systems is optional. The creator of a PASSporT object cannot assume that
will understand any given extension. Verification of PASSporT tokens destination systems will understand any given extension.
by destination systems that do support an extension may then trigger Verification of PASSporT tokens by destination systems that do
appropriate application-level behavior in the presence of an support an extension may then trigger appropriate application-level
extension; authors of extensions should provide appropriate behavior in the presence of an extension; authors of extensions
extension-specific guidance to application developers on this point. should provide appropriate extension-specific guidance to application
developers on this point.
An example set of extended claims, extending the first example in An example set of extended claims, extending the first example in
Section 4.1.2.4. using "bar" as the newly defined claim would be as Section 4.2.1.4 using "bar" as the newly defined claim would be as
follows: follows:
{ {
"bar":"beyond all recognition" "bar":"beyond all recognition"
"dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]}, "dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]},
"iat":"1443208345", "iat":"1443208345",
"orig":{"tn":"12155551212"} "orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}
} }
7. Deterministic JSON Serialization 8. Deterministic JSON Serialization
JSON, as a canonical format, can include spaces, line breaks and key JSON, as a canonical format, can include spaces and line breaks, and
value pairs can occur in any order and therefore makes it, from a key value pairs can occur in any order. It is therefore a non-
string format, non-deterministic. In order to make the digital deterministic string format. In order to make the digital signature
signature verification work deterministically, the JSON verification work deterministically, the JSON representation of the
representation of the PASSporT Header and Claims, particularly if JWS Protected Header object and JWS Payload object MUST be computed
PASSporT is used across multiple signaling environments, specifically as follows.
the JWS Protected Header object and JWS Payload object MUST be
computed as follows.
The JSON object MUST follow the rules for the construction of the The JSON object MUST follow the rules for the construction of the
thumbprint of a JSON Web Key (JWK) as defined in [RFC7638] Section 3 thumbprint of a JSON Web Key (JWK) as defined in [RFC7638] Section 3
Step 1 only. Step 2 MUST NOT be performed; as noted in JWK this is Step 1 only. Step 2 should not be performed; as noted in JWK this is
still a legal JWK object. still a legal JWK object.
The PASSporT header and claim direct members MUST follow the The PASSporT header and claim direct members MUST follow the
lexicographical ordering rules. Any top level JSON members that lexicographical ordering rules. Any top level JSON members that
contain JSON objects or arrays, such as "dest" or "mky" MUST follow contain JSON objects or arrays, such as "dest" or "mky" MUST follow
their own lexicographical ordering and whitespace and line break their own lexicographical ordering and whitespace and line break
rules for the sub-elements. This includes any header or claims rules for the sub-elements. This includes any header or claims
defined in future specifications using PASSporT. defined in future specifications using PASSporT.
7.1. Example PASSport deterministic JSON form 8.1. Example PASSport deterministic JSON form
This section demonstrate the deterministic JSON serialization for the This section demonstrate the deterministic JSON serialization for the
example PASSporT Payload shown in Section 4.2.2. example PASSporT Payload shown in Section 4.2.1.4.
The initial JSON object is shown here: The initial JSON object is shown here:
{
"dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]},
"orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}
"iat":"1443208345",
"mky":[
{ {
"dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]}, "alg":"sha-256",
"orig":{"tn":"12155551212"} "dig":"021ACC5427ABEB9C533F3E4B652E7D463F5442CD54
"iat":"1443208345", F17A03A27DF9B07F4619B2"
"mky":[ },
{ {
"alg":"sha-256", "alg":"sha-256",
"dig":"021ACC5427ABEB9C533F3E4B652E7D463F5442CD54 "dig":"4AADB9B13F82183B540212DF3E5D496B19E57C
F17A03A27DF9B07F4619B2" AB3E4B652E7D463F5442CD54F1"
},
{
"alg":"sha-256",
"dig":"4AADB9B13F82183B540212DF3E5D496B19E57C
AB3E4B652E7D463F5442CD54F1"
}
],
} }
],
}
The parent members of the JSON object are as follows: The parent members of the JSON object are as follows:
o "dest" o "dest"
o "orig" o "orig"
o "iat" o "iat"
o "mky" o "mky"
skipping to change at page 12, line 29 skipping to change at page 13, line 47
o "iat" o "iat"
o "mky" o "mky"
o "orig" o "orig"
The final constructed deterministic JSON serialization The final constructed deterministic JSON serialization
representation, with whitespace and line breaks removed, (with line representation, with whitespace and line breaks removed, (with line
breaks used for display purposes only) is: breaks used for display purposes only) is:
{"dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"],"iat":1443208345,"mky": {"dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"],"iat":1443208345,"mky":
[{"alg":"sha-256","dig":"021ACC5427ABEB9C533F3E4B652E7D463F5442 [{"alg":"sha-256","dig":"021ACC5427ABEB9C533F3E4B652E7D463F5442CD5
CD54F17A03A27DF9B07F4619B2"},{"alg":"sha-256","dig":"4AADB9B13F 4F17A03A27DF9B07F4619B2"},{"alg":"sha-256","dig":"4AADB9B13F82183B5
82183B540212DF3E5D496B19E57CAB3E4B652E7D463F5442CD54F1"}], 40212DF3E5D496B19E57CAB3E4B652E7D463F5442CD54F1"}],
"orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}} "orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}}
8. Security Considerations 9. Security Considerations
8.1. Avoidance of replay and cut and paste attacks 9.1. Avoidance of replay and cut and paste attacks
There are a number of security considerations for use of the token There are a number of security considerations for use of the token
for avoidance of replay and cut and paste attacks. PASSporT tokens for avoidance of replay and cut and paste attacks. PASSporT tokens
should be sent with other application level protocol information SHOULD only be sent with application level protocol information (e.g.
(e.g. for SIP an INVITE as defined in [RFC3261]). In order to make for SIP an INVITE as defined in [RFC3261]) corresponding to the
the token signature unique to a specific origination of personal required fields in the token. A uniqueness of the set of token
communications there should be a link between various information claims and token signature is constructed using the originating
provided in the token and information provided by the application identity being asserted with the 'orig' claim along with the the
level protocol information. This uniqueness specified using the
following two claims: following two claims:
o 'iat' claim should correspond to a date/time the message was o 'iat' claim should correspond to a date/time the message was
originated. It should also be within a relative time that is originated. It should also be within a relative time that is
reasonable for clock drift and transmission time characteristics reasonable for clock drift and transmission time characteristics
associated with the application using the PASSporT token. associated with the application using the PASSporT token.
Therefore, validation of the token should consider date and time Therefore, validation of the token should consider date and time
correlation, which could be influenced by signaling protocol correlation, which could be influenced by signaling protocol
specific use and network time differences. specific use and network time differences.
o 'dest' claim is included to prevent the valid re-use of a o 'dest' claim is included to prevent the valid re-use of a
previously originated message to send to another destination previously originated message to send to another destination
party. party.
8.2. Solution Considerations 9.2. Solution Considerations
The use of PASSporT tokens based on the validation of the digital The use of PASSporT tokens based on the validation of the digital
signature and the associated certificate requires consideration of signature and the associated certificate requires consideration of
the authentication and authority or reputation of the signer to the authentication and authority or reputation of the signer to
attest to the identity being asserted. It should be recognized that attest to the identity being asserted. The following considerations
the use of this token should not, in it's own right, be considered a should be recognized when using PASSporT: * The use of this token
full solution for absolute non-repudiation of the identity being should not, in it's own right, be considered a full solution for
asserted. It can and often is the case that the end user that the absolute non-repudiation of the identity being asserted. * In many
identity represents and signer are not one in the same. However, applications, the end user the asserted identity represents and
applications that use PASSporT should ensure the signer is in an signer may not be one in the same. For example, when a service
authoritative position to represent the user and authenticate the provider signs and validates the token on the behalf of the user
user onto the communications network and should be the responsible consuming the service, the provider MUST have an authenticated and
party for protecting the destination party from potential identity secure relationship with the end user or the device initiating and
spoofing in addition to other abuse of the communications network terminating the communications signaling. * Applications that use
outside of PASSporT. PASSporT should ensure the verification of the signature includes the
means of verifying the signer is authoritative through the use of an
8.3. Privacy Considerations application or service specific set of common trust anchors for the
application.
Because PASSporT explicitly includes claims of identifiers of parties
involved in communications, date and times, and potentially other
call detail, care should be taken outside of traditional protected or
private telephony communications paths where there may be concerns
about exposing information to either unintended or illegitimate
actors. These identifiers are often exposed through many
communications signaling protocols as of today, but appropriate
precautions should be taken.
9. IANA Considerations 10. IANA Considerations
9.1. Media Type Registration 10.1. Media Type Registration
9.1.1. Media Type Registry Contents Additions Requested 10.1.1. Media Type Registry Contents Additions Requested
This section registers the "application/passport" media type This section registers the "application/passport" media type
[RFC2046] in the "Media Types" registry in the manner described in [RFC2046] in the "Media Types" registry in the manner described in
[RFC6838], which can be used to indicate that the content is a [RFC6838], which can be used to indicate that the content is a
PASSporT defined JWT and JWS. PASSporT defined JWT and JWS.
o Type name: application o Type name: application
o Subtype name: passport o Subtype name: passport
o Required parameters: n/a o Required parameters: n/a
o Optional parameters: n/a o Optional parameters: n/a
o Encoding considerations: 8bit; application/passport values outside o Encoding considerations: 8bit; application/passport values outside
the US-ASCII range are encoded using percent encoding as described the US-ASCII range are encoded using percent encoding as described
in section 2.1 of RFC 3986 (some values may be the empty string), in Section 2.1 of [RFC3986] (some values may be the empty string),
each separated from the next by a single period ('.') character. each separated from the next by a single period ('.') character.
o Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section o Security considerations: See the Security Considerations
of RFC 7515. Section of [RFC7515].
o Interoperability considerations: n/a o Interoperability considerations: n/a
o Published specification: draft-ietf-stir-passport-05 o Published specification: [RFCThis]
o Applications that use this media type: STIR and other applications o Applications that use this media type: STIR and other applications
that require identity related assertion that require identity related assertion
o Fragment identifier considerations: n/a o Fragment identifier considerations: n/a
o Additional information: o Additional information:
* Magic number(s): n/a Magic number(s): n/a File extension(s): n/a Macintosh file type
code(s): n/a
* File extension(s): n/a
* Macintosh file type code(s): n/a
o Person and email address to contact for further information: Chris o Person & email address to contact for further information: Chris
Wendt, chris-ietf@chriswendt.net Wendt, chris-ietf@chriswendt.net
o Intended usage: COMMON o Intended usage: COMMON
o Restrictions on usage: none o Restrictions on usage: none
o Author: Chris Wendt, chris-ietf@chriswendt.net o Author: Chris Wendt, chris-ietf@chriswendt.net
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Provisional registration? No o Provisional registration? No
9.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registration 10.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registration
9.2.1. Registry Contents Additions Requested 10.2.1. Registry Contents Additions Requested
o Claim Name: "orig" o Claim Name: "orig"
o Claim Description: Originating Identity String o Claim Description: Originating Identity String
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of draft-ietf-stir- o Specification Document(s): Section 4.2.1 of [RFCThis]
passport-05
o Claim Name: "dest" o Claim Name: "dest"
o Claim Description: Destination Identity String o Claim Description: Destination Identity String
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of draft-ietf-stir- o Specification Document(s): Section 4.2.1 of [RFCThis]
passport-05
o Claim Name: "mky" o Claim Name: "mky"
o Claim Description: Media Key Fingerprint String o Claim Description: Media Key Fingerprint String
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of draft-ietf-stir- o Specification Document(s): Section 4.2.2 of [RFCThis]
passport-05
10. Acknowledgements 10.3. JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameter Registry
10.3.1. Registry Contents Additions Requested
Header Parameter Name: "ppt"
o Header Parameter Description: PASSporT extension identifier
o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWS
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 7.1 of [RFCThis]
11. Acknowledgements
Particular thanks to members of the ATIS and SIP Forum NNI Task Group Particular thanks to members of the ATIS and SIP Forum NNI Task Group
including Jim McEchern, Martin Dolly, Richard Shockey, John Barnhill, including Jim McEchern, Martin Dolly, Richard Shockey, John Barnhill,
Christer Holmberg, Victor Pascual Avila, Mary Barnes, Eric Burger for Christer Holmberg, Victor Pascual Avila, Mary Barnes, Eric Burger for
their review, ideas, and contributions also thanks to Henning their review, ideas, and contributions also thanks to Henning
Schulzrinne, Russ Housley, Alan Johnston, Richard Barnes, Mark Schulzrinne, Russ Housley, Alan Johnston, Richard Barnes, Mark
Miller, Ted Hardie, Dave Crocker, Robert Sparks for valuable feedback Miller, Ted Hardie, Dave Crocker, Robert Sparks for valuable feedback
on the technical and security aspects of the document. Additional on the technical and security aspects of the document. Additional
thanks to Harsha Bellur for assistance in coding the example tokens. thanks to Harsha Bellur for assistance in coding the example tokens.
11. References 12. References
11.1. Normative References
12.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis]
Peterson, J., Jennings, C., Rescorla, E., and C. Wendt, Peterson, J., Jennings, C., Rescorla, E., and C. Wendt,
"Authenticated Identity Management in the Session "Authenticated Identity Management in the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP)", draft-ietf-stir-rfc4474bis-12 Initiation Protocol (SIP)", draft-ietf-stir-rfc4474bis-12
(work in progress), August 2016. (work in progress), September 2016.
[RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail [RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046, Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996, DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2046>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2046>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform [RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005, RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
skipping to change at page 17, line 5 skipping to change at page 18, line 21
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token [RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015, (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC7638] Jones, M. and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Key (JWK) [RFC7638] Jones, M. and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Key (JWK)
Thumbprint", RFC 7638, DOI 10.17487/RFC7638, September Thumbprint", RFC 7638, DOI 10.17487/RFC7638, September
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7638>. 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7638>.
11.2. Informative References 12.2. Informative References
[RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, [RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002, DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC7340] Peterson, J., Schulzrinne, H., and H. Tschofenig, "Secure [RFC7340] Peterson, J., Schulzrinne, H., and H. Tschofenig, "Secure
Telephone Identity Problem Statement and Requirements", Telephone Identity Problem Statement and Requirements",
RFC 7340, DOI 10.17487/RFC7340, September 2014, RFC 7340, DOI 10.17487/RFC7340, September 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7340>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7340>.
Appendix A. Example PASSporT JWS Serialization and Signature Appendix A. Example ES256 based PASSporT JWS Serialization and
Signature
For PASSporT, there will always be a JWS with the following members: For PASSporT, there will always be a JWS with the following members:
o "protected", with the value BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)) o "protected", with the value BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header))
o "payload", with the value BASE64URL (JWS Payload) o "payload", with the value BASE64URL (JWS Payload)
o "signature", with the value BASE64URL(JWS Signature) o "signature", with the value BASE64URL(JWS Signature)
This example will follow the steps in JWS [RFC7515] Section 5.1, This example will follow the steps in JWS [RFC7515] Section 5.1,
steps 1-6 and 8 and incorporates the additional serialization steps steps 1-6 and 8 and incorporates the additional serialization steps
required for PASSporT. required for PASSporT.
Step 1 for JWS references the JWS Payload, an example PASSporT Step 1 for JWS references the JWS Payload, an example PASSporT
Payload is as follows: Payload is as follows:
{ {
"dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]} "dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]}
"iat":"1443208345", "iat":"1443208345",
"orig":{"tn":"12155551212"} "orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}
} }
This would be serialized to the form (with line break used for This would be serialized to the form (with line break used for
display purposes only): display purposes only):
{"dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]},"iat":"1443208345", {"dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]},"iat":"1443208345",
"orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}} "orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}}
Step 2 Computes the BASE64URL(JWS Payload) producing this value (with Step 2 Computes the BASE64URL(JWS Payload) producing this value (with
line break used for display purposes only): line break used for display purposes only):
eyJkZXN0Ijp7InVyaSI6WyJzaXA6YWxpY2VAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iXX0sImlhd eyJkZXN0Ijp7InVyaSI6WyJzaXA6YWxpY2VAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iXX0sImlhdCI
CI6IjE0NDMyMDgzNDUiLCJvcmlnIjp7InRuIjoiMTIxNTU1NTEyMTIifX0 6IjE0NDMyMDgzNDUiLCJvcmlnIjp7InRuIjoiMTIxNTU1NTEyMTIifX0
For Step 3, an example PASSporT Protected Header comprising the JOSE For Step 3, an example PASSporT Protected Header comprising the JOSE
Header is as follows: Header is as follows:
{ {
"typ":"passport", "alg":"ES256",
"alg":"ES256", "typ":"passport",
"x5u":"https://cert.example.org/passport.cer" "x5u":"https://cert.example.org/passport.cer"
} }
This would be serialized to the form (with line break used for This would be serialized to the form (with line break used for
display purposes only): display purposes only):
{"alg":"ES256","typ":"passport","x5u":"https://cert.example.org/ {"alg":"ES256","typ":"passport","x5u":"https://cert.example.org
passport.cer"} /passport.cer"}
Step 4 Performs the BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)) operation Step 4 Performs the BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)) operation
and encoding produces this value (with line break used for display and encoding produces this value (with line break used for display
purposes only): purposes only):
eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6InBhc3Nwb3J0IiwieDV1IjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9j eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6InBhc3Nwb3J0IiwieDV1IjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9j
ZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUub3JnL3Bhc3Nwb3J0LmNlciJ9 ZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUub3JnL3Bhc3Nwb3J0LmNlciJ9
Step 5 and Step 6 performs the computation of the digital signature Step 5 and Step 6 performs the computation of the digital signature
of the PASSporT Signing Input ASCII(BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected of the PASSporT Signing Input ASCII(BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected
Header)) || '.' || BASE64URL(JWS Payload)) using ES256 as the Header)) || '.' || BASE64URL(JWS Payload)) using ES256 as the
algorithm and the BASE64URL(JWS Signature). algorithm and the BASE64URL(JWS Signature).
rq3pjT1hoRwakEGjHCnWSwUnshd0-zJ6F1VOgFWSjHBr8Qjpjlk-cpFYpFYso rq3pjT1hoRwakEGjHCnWSwUnshd0-zJ6F1VOgFWSjHBr8Qjpjlk-cpFYpFYsojN
jNCpTzO3QfPOlckGaS6hEck7w CpTzO3QfPOlckGaS6hEck7w
Step 8 describes how to create the final PASSporT token, Step 8 describes how to create the final PASSporT token,
concatenating the values in the order Header.Payload.Signature with concatenating the values in the order Header.Payload.Signature with
period ('.') characters. For the above example values this would period ('.') characters. For the above example values this would
produce the following (with line breaks between period used for produce the following (with line breaks between period used for
readability purposes only): readability purposes only):
eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6InBhc3Nwb3J0IiwieDV1IjoiaHR0cHM6Ly eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6InBhc3Nwb3J0IiwieDV1IjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9j
9jZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUub3JnL3Bhc3Nwb3J0LmNlciJ9 ZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUub3JnL3Bhc3Nwb3J0LmNlciJ9
. .
eyJkZXN0Ijp7InVyaSI6WyJzaXA6YWxpY2VAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iXX0sImlhd eyJkZXN0Ijp7InVyaSI6WyJzaXA6YWxpY2VAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iXX0sImlhdCI
CI6IjE0NDMyMDgzNDUiLCJvcmlnIjp7InRuIjoiMTIxNTU1NTEyMTIifX0 6IjE0NDMyMDgzNDUiLCJvcmlnIjp7InRuIjoiMTIxNTU1NTEyMTIifX0
. .
rq3pjT1hoRwakEGjHCnWSwUnshd0-zJ6F1VOgFWSjHBr8Qjpjlk-cpFYpFYso rq3pjT1hoRwakEGjHCnWSwUnshd0-zJ6F1VOgFWSjHBr8Qjpjlk-cpFYpFYsojN
jNCpTzO3QfPOlckGaS6hEck7w CpTzO3QfPOlckGaS6hEck7w
A.1. X.509 Private Key Certificate for Example A.1. X.509 Private Key for ES256 Example**
-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY----- -----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
MHcCAQEEIFeZ1R208QCvcu5GuYyMfG4W7sH4m99/7eHSDLpdYllFoAoGCCqGSM49 MHcCAQEEIFeZ1R208QCvcu5GuYyMfG4W7sH4m99/7eHSDLpdYllFoAoGCCqGSM49
AwEHoUQDQgAE8HNbQd/TmvCKwPKHkMF9fScavGeH78YTU8qLS8I5HLHSSmlATLcs AwEHoUQDQgAE8HNbQd/TmvCKwPKHkMF9fScavGeH78YTU8qLS8I5HLHSSmlATLcs
lQMhNC/OhlWBYC626nIlo7XeebYS7Sb37g== lQMhNC/OhlWBYC626nIlo7XeebYS7Sb37g==
-----END EC PRIVATE KEY----- -----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
A.2. X.509 Public Key Certificate for Example A.2. X.509 Public Key for ES256 Example**
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY----- -----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE8HNbQd/TmvCKwPKHkMF9fScavGeH MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE8HNbQd/TmvCKwPKHkMF9fScavGeH
78YTU8qLS8I5HLHSSmlATLcslQMhNC/OhlWBYC626nIlo7XeebYS7Sb37g== 78YTU8qLS8I5HLHSSmlATLcslQMhNC/OhlWBYC626nIlo7XeebYS7Sb37g==
-----END PUBLIC KEY----- -----END PUBLIC KEY-----
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Chris Wendt Chris Wendt
Comcast Comcast
One Comcast Center One Comcast Center
Philadelphia, PA 19103 Philadelphia, PA 19103
USA USA
Email: chris-ietf@chriswendt.net Email: chris-ietf@chriswendt.net
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