draft-ietf-stir-passport-08.txt   draft-ietf-stir-passport-09.txt 
STIR C. Wendt STIR C. Wendt
Internet-Draft Comcast Internet-Draft Comcast
Intended status: Standards Track J. Peterson Intended status: Standards Track J. Peterson
Expires: March 30, 2017 Neustar Inc. Expires: April 20, 2017 Neustar Inc.
September 26, 2016 October 17, 2016
Personal Assertion Token (PASSporT) Personal Assertion Token (PASSporT)
draft-ietf-stir-passport-08 draft-ietf-stir-passport-09
Abstract Abstract
This document defines a method for creating and validating a token This document defines a method for creating and validating a token
that cryptographically verifies an originating identity, or more that cryptographically verifies an originating identity, or more
generally a URI or telephone number representing the originator of generally a URI or telephone number representing the originator of
personal communications. The PASSporT token is cryptographically personal communications. The PASSporT token is cryptographically
signed to protect the integrity of the identity the originator and to signed to protect the integrity of the identity the originator and to
verify the assertion of the identity information at the destination. verify the assertion of the identity information at the destination.
The cryptographic signature is defined with the intention that it can The cryptographic signature is defined with the intention that it can
skipping to change at page 1, line 43 skipping to change at page 1, line 43
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Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. PASSporT Token Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. PASSporT Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. PASSporT Token Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. "typ" (Type) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. PASSporT Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4.1. "typ" (Type) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. "x5u" (X.509 URL) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.2. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.4. Example PASSporT header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.3. "x5u" (X.509 URL) Header Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. PASSporT Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.4. Example PASSporT header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. JWT defined claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. PASSporT Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1.1. "iat" - Issued At claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5.1. JWT defined claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. PASSporT specific claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5.1.1. "iat" - Issued At claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2.1. Originating and Destination Identity Claims . . . . . 6 5.2. PASSporT specific claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2.2. "mky" - Media Key claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.2.1. Originating and Destination Identity Claims . . . . . 6
5. PASSporT Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5.2.2. "mky" - Media Key claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Compact form of PASSporT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 6. PASSporT Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.1. Example Compact form PASSporT Token . . . . . . . . . . . 10 7. Compact form of PASSporT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. Extending PASSporT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 7.1. Example Compact form PASSporT Token . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.1. "ppt" (PASSporT) header parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 8. Extending PASSporT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.2. Example extended PASSporT header . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 8.1. "ppt" (PASSporT) header parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.3. Extended PASSporT Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 8.2. Example extended PASSporT header . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. Deterministic JSON Serialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 8.3. Extended PASSporT Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.1. Example PASSport deterministic JSON form . . . . . . . . 12 9. Deterministic JSON Serialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 9.1. Example PASSport deterministic JSON form . . . . . . . . 13
9.1. Avoidance of replay and cut and paste attacks . . . . . . 14 10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9.2. Solution Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 10.1. Avoidance of replay and cut and paste attacks . . . . . 14
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 10.2. Solution Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
10.1. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
10.1.1. Media Type Registry Contents Additions Requested . . 15 11.1. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
10.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 16 11.1.1. Media Type Registry Contents Additions Requested . . 15
10.2.1. Registry Contents Additions Requested . . . . . . . 16 11.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 16
10.3. JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameter 11.2.1. Registry Contents Additions Requested . . . . . . . 16
Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 11.3. JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameter
10.3.1. Registry Contents Additions Requested . . . . . . . 16 Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 11.3.1. Registry Contents Additions Requested . . . . . . . 17
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 12. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Appendix A. Example ES256 based PASSporT JWS Serialization and Appendix A. Example ES256 based PASSporT JWS Serialization and
Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
A.1. X.509 Private Key for ES256 Example** . . . . . . . . . . 20 A.1. X.509 Private Key for ES256 Example** . . . . . . . . . . 21
A.2. X.509 Public Key for ES256 Example** . . . . . . . . . . 20 A.2. X.509 Public Key for ES256 Example** . . . . . . . . . . 21
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
In today's IP-enabled telecommunications world, there is a growing In today's IP-enabled telecommunications world, there is a growing
concern about the ability to trust incoming invitations for concern about the ability to trust incoming invitations for
communications sessions, including video, voice and messaging communications sessions, including video, voice and messaging
[RFC7340]. As an example, modern telephone networks provide the [RFC7340]. As an example, modern telephone networks provide the
ability to spoof the calling party telephone number for many ability to spoof the calling party telephone number for many
legitimate purposes including providing network features and services legitimate purposes including providing network features and services
on the behalf of a legitimate telephone number. However, as we have on the behalf of a legitimate telephone number. However, as we have
seen, bad actors have taken advantage of this ability for seen, bad actors have taken advantage of this ability for
illegitimate and fraudulent purposes meant to trick telephone users illegitimate and fraudulent purposes meant to trick telephone users
to believe they are someone they are not. This problem can be to believe they are someone they are not. This problem can be
extended to many emerging forms of personal communications. extended to many emerging forms of personal communications.
This document defines a method for creating and validating a token This document defines a method for creating and validating a token
that cryptographically verifies an originating identity, or more that cryptographically verifies an originating identity, or more
generally a URI or telephone number representing the originator of generally a URI or telephone number representing the originator of
personal communications. Through extensions defined in this personal communications. Through extensions defined in this
document, in Section 7, other information relevant to the personal document, in Section 8, other information relevant to the personal
communications can also be added to the token. The goal of PASSporT communications can also be added to the token. The goal of PASSporT
is to provide a common framework for signing originating identity is to provide a common framework for signing originating identity
related information in an extensible way. Additionally, this related information in an extensible way. Additionally, this
functionality is independent of any specific personal communications functionality is independent of any specific personal communications
signaling call logic, so that the assertion of originating identity signaling call logic, so that the assertion of originating identity
related information can be implemented in a flexible way and can be related information can be implemented in a flexible way and can be
used in applications including end-to-end applications that require used in applications including end-to-end applications that require
different signaling protocols or gateways between different different signaling protocols or gateways between different
communications systems. It is anticipated that signaling protocol communications systems. It is anticipated that signaling protocol
specific guidance will be provided in other related documents and specific guidance will be provided in other related documents and
specifications to specify how to use and transport PASSporT tokens, specifications to specify how to use and transport PASSporT tokens,
however this is intentionally out of scope for this document. however this is intentionally out of scope for this document.
[I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] provides details of the use of PASSporT [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] provides details of the use of PASSporT
within SIP [RFC3261] signaling protocol for the signing and within SIP [RFC3261] signaling protocol for the signing and
verification of telephone numbers and SIP URIs. verification of telephone numbers and SIP URIs.
2. PASSporT Token Overview 2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
3. PASSporT Token Overview
JSON Web Token (JWT) [RFC7519] and JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515] JSON Web Token (JWT) [RFC7519] and JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515]
and related specifications define a standard token format that can be and related specifications define a standard token format that can be
used as a way of encapsulating claimed or asserted information with used as a way of encapsulating claimed or asserted information with
an associated digital signature using X.509 based certificates. JWT an associated digital signature using X.509 based certificates. JWT
provides a set of claims in JSON format that can conveniently provides a set of claims in JSON format that can conveniently
accommodate asserted originating identity information and is easily accommodate asserted originating identity information and is easily
extensible for extension mechanisms defined below. Additionally, JWS extensible for extension mechanisms defined below. Additionally, JWS
provides a path for updating methods and cryptographic algorithms provides a path for updating methods and cryptographic algorithms
used for the associated digital signatures. used for the associated digital signatures.
JWS defines the use of JSON data structures in a specified canonical JWS defines the use of JSON data structures in a specified canonical
format for signing data corresponding to JOSE header, JWS Payload, format for signing data corresponding to JOSE header, JWS Payload,
and JWS Signature. JWT defines a set of claims that are represented and JWS Signature. JWT defines a set of claims that are represented
by specified key value pairs which can be extended with custom keys by specified JSON objects which can be extended with custom keys for
for specific applications. The next sections define the header and specific applications. The next sections define the header and
claims that MUST be minimally used with JWT and JWS for PASSporT. claims that MUST be minimally used with JWT and JWS for PASSporT.
3. PASSporT Header PASSporT specifically uses this token format and defines claims that
convey the identity of the origination and destination of personal
communications. The originating identity, the primary value asserted
in a PASSporT object represents the identity of the calling party or
the initiator of a personal communications session. The signer of a
PASSporT object may or may not correspond to the origination
identity. For a given application's use or using protocol of
PASSporT the creation of the PASSporT object is performed by an
entity that is authoritative to assert the callers identity. This
authority is represented by the certificate credentials and the
signature and PASSporT object is created and initiated to the
destination(s) at the applications choice of authoritative point(s)
in the network. For example, the PASSporT object could be created at
a device that has authenticated with a user, or at a network entity
with an authenticated trust relationship with that device and it's
user. Destination identities represent the intended destination of
the personal communications, i.e. the identity(s) being called by the
caller. The destination point(s) determined by the application need
to have the capability to verify the PASSporT token and the digital
signature. The PASSporT associated certificate is used to validate
the authority of the originating signer, generally via a certificate
chain to the trust anchor for that application.
4. PASSporT Header
The JWS token header is a JOSE header, [RFC7515] Section 4, that The JWS token header is a JOSE header, [RFC7515] Section 4, that
defines the type and encryption algorithm used in the token. defines the type and encryption algorithm used in the token.
PASSporT header should include, at a minimum, the header parameters PASSporT header should include, at a minimum, the header parameters
defined in the next three subsections. defined in the next three subsections.
3.1. "typ" (Type) Header Parameter 4.1. "typ" (Type) Header Parameter
The "typ" (Type) Header Parameter is defined in JWS [RFC7515] The "typ" (Type) Header Parameter is defined in JWS [RFC7515]
Section 4.1.9. to declare the media type of the complete JWS. Section 4.1.9. to declare the media type of the complete JWS.
For PASSporT Token the "typ" header MUST be the string "passport". For PASSporT Token the "typ" header MUST be the string "passport".
This represents that the encoded token is a JWT of type passport. This represents that the encoded token is a JWT of type passport.
3.2. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter 4.2. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter
The "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter is defined in JWS [RFC7515] The "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter is defined in JWS [RFC7515]
Section 4.1.1. This definition includes the ability to specify the Section 4.1.1. This definition includes the ability to specify the
use of a cryptographic algorithm for the signature part of the JWS. use of a cryptographic algorithm for the signature part of the JWS.
It also refers to a list of defined "alg" values as part of a It also refers to a list of defined "alg" values as part of a
registry established by JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) [RFC7518] registry established by JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) [RFC7518]
Section 3.1. Section 3.1.
For the creation and verification of PASSporT tokens and their For the creation and verification of PASSporT tokens and their
digital signatures, implementations MUST support ES256 as defined in digital signatures, implementations MUST support ES256 as defined in
JWA [RFC7518] Section 3.4. Implementations MAY support other JWA [RFC7518] Section 3.4. Implementations MAY support other
algorithms registered in the JSON Web Signature and Encryption algorithms registered in the JSON Web Signature and Encryption
Algorithms registry created by [RFC7518]. The contents of that Algorithms registry created by [RFC7518]. The contents of that
registry may be updated in the future depending on cryptographic registry may be updated in the future depending on cryptographic
strength requirements guided by current security best practice. The strength requirements guided by current security best practice. The
mandatory-to-support algorithm for PASSporT tokens may likewise be mandatory-to-support algorithm for PASSporT tokens may likewise be
updated in future updates to this document. updated in future updates to this document.
3.3. "x5u" (X.509 URL) Header Parameter 4.3. "x5u" (X.509 URL) Header Parameter
As defined in JWS [RFC7515] Section 4.1.5., the "x5u" header As defined in JWS [RFC7515] Section 4.1.5., the "x5u" header
parameter defines a URI [RFC3986] referring to the resource for the parameter defines a URI [RFC3986] referring to the resource for the
X.509 public key certificate or certificate chain [RFC5280] X.509 public key certificate or certificate chain [RFC5280]
corresponding to the key used to digitally sign the JWS. Generally, corresponding to the key used to digitally sign the JWS. Generally,
as defined in JWS [RFC7515] section 4.1.5, this would correspond to as defined in JWS [RFC7515] section 4.1.5, this would correspond to
an HTTPS or DNSSEC resource using integrity protection. an HTTPS or DNSSEC resource using integrity protection.
3.4. Example PASSporT header 4.4. Example PASSporT header
An example of the header, would be the following, including the An example of the header, would be the following, including the
specified passport type, ES256 algorithm, and a URI referencing the specified passport type, ES256 algorithm, and a URI referencing the
network location of the certificate needed to validate the PASSporT network location of the certificate needed to validate the PASSporT
signature. signature.
{ {
"typ":"passport", "typ":"passport",
"alg":"ES256", "alg":"ES256",
"x5u":"https://cert.example.org/passport.cer" "x5u":"https://cert.example.org/passport.cer"
} }
4. PASSporT Payload 5. PASSporT Payload
The token claims consist of the information which needs to be The token claims consist of the information which needs to be
verified at the destination party. These claims follow the verified at the destination party. These claims follow the
definition of a JWT claim [RFC7519] Section 4 and are encoded as definition of a JWT claim [RFC7519] Section 4 and are encoded as
defined by the JWS Payload [RFC7515] Section 3. defined by the JWS Payload [RFC7515] Section 3.
PASSporT defines the use of a standard JWT defined claim as well as PASSporT defines the use of a standard JWT defined claim as well as
custom claims corresponding to the two parties associated with custom claims corresponding to the two parties associated with
personal communications, the originator and destination as detailed personal communications, the originator and destination as detailed
below. below.
Any claim key values outside the US-ASCII range should be encoded Any claim names or claim values outside the US-ASCII range should
using percent encoding as described in Section 2.1 of [RFC3986], case follow the default JSON serialization defined in [RFC7519] Section 7.
normalized as described in 6.2.2.1 of [RFC3986].
4.1. JWT defined claims 5.1. JWT defined claims
4.1.1. "iat" - Issued At claim 5.1.1. "iat" - Issued At claim
The JSON claim MUST include the "iat" [RFC7519] Section 4.1.6 defined The JSON claim MUST include the "iat" [RFC7519] Section 4.1.6 defined
claim Issued At. As defined the "iat" should be set to the date and claim Issued At. As defined the "iat" should be set to the date and
time of issuance of the JWT and MUST the origination of the personal time of issuance of the JWT and MUST the origination of the personal
communications. The time value should be of the format defined in communications. The time value should be of the format defined in
[RFC7519] Section 2 NumericDate. This is included for securing the [RFC7519] Section 2 NumericDate. This is included for securing the
token against replay and cut and paste attacks, as explained further token against replay and cut and paste attacks, as explained further
in the security considerations in Section 9. in the security considerations in Section 10.
4.2. PASSporT specific claims
4.2.1. Originating and Destination Identity Claims 5.2. PASSporT specific claims
PASSporT defines claims that convey the identity of the origination 5.2.1. Originating and Destination Identity Claims
and destination of personal communications. Origination in the
context of PASSporT and for a given application's use of PASSporT is
the point in the network that has the authority to assert the callers
identity. This authority is represented in PASSporT by the
certificate holder and is signed at the applications choice of
authoritative point(s) in the network, for example, at a device that
has authenticated with a user, or at a network entity with an
authenticated trust relationship with that device and it's user.
Destination represents the intended destination of the personal
communications, i.e. the identity(s) being called by the caller. The
destination point(s) determined by the application need to have the
capability to verify the PASSporT token and the digital signature.
The PASSporT associated certificate is used to validate the authority
of the originating signer, generally via a certificate chain to the
trust anchor for that application.
The origination and destination identities are represented by two The origination and destination identities are represented by two
claims that are required for PASSporT, the "orig" and "dest" claims. claims that are required for PASSporT, the "orig" and "dest" claims.
Both "orig" and "dest" MUST have claims where the key represents an Both "orig" and "dest" MUST contain claim values that are identity
identity type and the value is the identity string, both defined in claim JSON objects where the child claim name represents an identity
type and the claim value is the identity string, both defined in
subsequent subsections. Currently, these identities can be subsequent subsections. Currently, these identities can be
represented as either telephone numbers or Uniform Resource represented as either telephone numbers or Uniform Resource
Indicators (URIs). Indicators (URIs).
The "orig" JSON object MUST only have one key value pair representing The "orig" claim is a JSON object with the claim name of "orig" and a
the asserted identity of any type (currently either "tn" or "uri") of claim value which is a JSON object representing the asserted identity
the originator of the personal communications signaling. of any type (currently either "tn" or "uri") of the originator of the
personal communications signaling. There MUST be exactly one "orig"
claim with exactly one identity claim object in a PASSporT object.
The "dest" JSON object MUST have at least have one key value pair, Note, as explained in Section 3, the originating identity represents
but could have multiple identity types (i.e. "tn" and/or "uri") but the calling party and may or may not correspond to the authoritative
only one of each. If both "tn" and "uri" are included, the JSON signer of the token.
object should list the "tn" array first and the "uri" array second.
Within the "tn" and "uri" arrays, the identity strings should be put
in lexicographical order including the scheme-specific portion of the
URI characters. Additionally, in the case of "dest" only, the
identity type key value MUST be an array signaled by standard JSON
brackets, even when there is a single identity value in the identity
type key value.
4.2.1.1. "tn" - Telephone Number identity The "dest" is a JSON object with the claim name of "dest" and MUST
have at least have one identity claim object. The"dest" claim value
is an array containing one or more identity claim JSON objects
representing the destination identities of any type (currently "tn"
or "uri"). If the "dest" claim value array contains both "tn" and
"uri" claim names, the JSON object should list the "tn" array first
and the "uri" array second. Within the "tn" and "uri" arrays, the
identity strings should be put in lexicographical order including the
scheme-specific portion of the URI characters.
Note, as explained in Section 3, the destination identity represents
the called party and may or may not correspond to the authoritative
party verifying the token signature.
5.2.1.1. "tn" - Telephone Number identity
If the originating or destination identity is a telephone number, the If the originating or destination identity is a telephone number, the
key representing the identity MUST be "tn". claim name representing the identity MUST be "tn".
Telephone Number strings for "tn" MUST be canonicalized according to The claim value for the "tn" claim is the telephone number and MUST
the procedures specified in [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] Section 8.3. be canonicalized according to the procedures specified in
[I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] Section 8.3.
4.2.1.2. "uri" - URI identity 5.2.1.2. "uri" - URI identity
If any of the originating or destination identities is of the form If any of the originating or destination identities is of the form
URI, as defined in [RFC3986], the key representing the identity MUST URI, as defined in [RFC3986], the claim name representing the
be "uri" URI form of the identity. identity MUST be "uri" and the claim value is the URI form of the
identity.
4.2.1.3. Future identity forms 5.2.1.3. Future identity forms
We recognize that in the future there may be other standard We recognize that in the future there may be other standard
mechanisms for representing identities. The "orig" and "dest" claims mechanisms for representing identities. The "orig" and "dest" claims
currently support "tn" and "uri" but could be extended in the future currently support "tn" and "uri" but could be extended in the future
to allow for other identity types with new IANA registered unique to allow for other identity types with new IANA registered unique
types to represent these forms. types to represent these forms.
4.2.1.4. Examples 5.2.1.4. Examples
Single Originator, with telephone number identity +12155551212, to Single originator, with telephone number identity +12155551212, to
Single Destination, with URI identity 'sip:alice@example.com', single destination, with URI identity 'sip:alice@example.com',
example: example:
{ {
"dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]}, "dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]},
"iat":"1443208345", "iat":"1443208345",
"orig":{"tn":"12155551212"} "orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}
} }
Single Originator, with telephone number identity +12155551212, to Single originator, with telephone number identity +12155551212, to
Multiple Destination Identities, with telephone number identity multiple destination identities, with telephone number identity
+12125551212 and two URI identities, sip:alice@example.com and +12125551212 and two URI identities, sip:alice@example.com and
sip:bob@example.com, example: sip:bob@example.com, example:
{ {
"dest":{ "dest":{
"tn":["12125551212"], "tn":["12125551212"],
"uri":["sip:alice@example.com", "uri":["sip:alice@example.com",
"sip:bob@example.net"] "sip:bob@example.net"]
}, },
"iat":"1443208345", "iat":"1443208345",
"orig":{"tn":"12155551212"} "orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}
} }
4.2.2. "mky" - Media Key claim 5.2.2. "mky" - Media Key claim
Some protocols that use PASSporT may also want to protect media Some protocols that use PASSporT may also want to protect media
security keys delivered within their signaling in order to bind those security keys delivered within their signaling in order to bind those
keys to the identities established in the signaling layers. The keys to the identities established in the signaling layers. The
"mky" is an optional PASSporT claim defining the assertion of media "mky" is an optional PASSporT claim defining the assertion of media
key fingerprints carried in SDP [RFC4566] via the "a=fingerprint" key fingerprints carried in SDP [RFC4566] via the "a=fingerprint"
attribute [RFC4572] Section 5. This claim can support either a attribute [RFC4572] Section 5. This claim can support either a
single or multiple fingerprints appearing in a single SDP body single or multiple fingerprints appearing in a single SDP body
corresponding to one or more media streams offered. The "mky" claim corresponding to one or more media streams offered. The "mky" claim
MUST be formatted in a JSON form including the "alg" and "dig" keys MUST be formatted in a JSON form including the "alg" and "dig" claims
with the corresponding algorithm and hexadecimal values. If there is with the corresponding algorithm and hexadecimal values. If there is
more than one fingerprint value associated with different media more than one fingerprint value associated with different media
streams in SDP, the fingerprint values MUST be constructed as a JSON streams in SDP, the fingerprint values MUST be constructed as a JSON
array denoted by bracket characters. For the "dig" key value, the array denoted by bracket characters. For the "dig" claim, the claim
hash value MUST be the hexadecimal value without any colons. The value MUST be the hash hexadecimal value without any colons.
"mky" array MUST order the JSON objects containing both "alg" and
"dig" key values in lexicographic order of the "alg" string first The "mky" claim is a JSON object with a claim name of "mky" and a
followed by the corresponding lexicographic order of the "dig" string claim value of a JSON array. The "mky" claim value JSON array MUST
values. Within each of those objects the JSON keys MUST have "alg" contain JSON objects with exactly one of both corresponding "alg" and
first and "dig" second. "dig" claim objects. The order of the JSON array should be in
lexicographic order of the "alg" claims first followed by the
corresponding lexicographic order of the "dig" claim values when
there is repeated "alg" claims. Within each of the "mky" claim array
objects the claim objects MUST have "alg" first and "dig" second.
An example claim with "mky" claim is as follows: An example claim with "mky" claim is as follows:
For an SDP offer that includes the following fingerprint values, For an SDP offer that includes the following fingerprint values,
a=fingerprint:sha-256 4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E: a=fingerprint:sha-256 4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E:
5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB:3E:4B:65:2E:7D:46:3F:54:42:CD:54:F1 5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB:3E:4B:65:2E:7D:46:3F:54:42:CD:54:F1
a=fingerprint:sha-256 02:1A:CC:54:27:AB:EB:9C:53:3F:3E:4B:65 a=fingerprint:sha-256 02:1A:CC:54:27:AB:EB:9C:53:3F:3E:4B:65
:2E:7D:46:3F:54:42:CD:54:F1:7A:03:A2:7D:F9:B0:7F:46:19:B2 :2E:7D:46:3F:54:42:CD:54:F1:7A:03:A2:7D:F9:B0:7F:46:19:B2
skipping to change at page 9, line 23 skipping to change at page 9, line 46
}, },
{ {
"alg":"sha-256", "alg":"sha-256",
"dig":"4AADB9B13F82183B540212DF3E5D496B19E57C "dig":"4AADB9B13F82183B540212DF3E5D496B19E57C
AB3E4B652E7D463F5442CD54F1" AB3E4B652E7D463F5442CD54F1"
} }
], ],
"orig":{"tn":"12155551212"} "orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}
} }
5. PASSporT Signature 6. PASSporT Signature
The signature of the PASSporT is created as specified by JWS The signature of the PASSporT is created as specified by JWS
[RFC7515] Section 5.1 Steps 1 through 6. PASSporT MUST use the JWS [RFC7515] Section 5.1 Steps 1 through 6. PASSporT MUST use the JWS
Protected Header. For the JWS Payload and the JWS Protected Header, Protected Header. For the JWS Payload and the JWS Protected Header,
the lexicographic ordering and white space rules described above, and the lexicographic ordering and white space rules described in
JSON serialization rules in Section 8 of this document MUST be Section 4 and Section 5, and JSON serialization rules in Section 9 of
followed. this document MUST be followed.
Appendix A of this document has a detailed example of how to follow Appendix A of this document has a detailed example of how to follow
the steps to create the JWS Signature. the steps to create the JWS Signature.
JWS [RFC7515] Section 5.1 Step 7 JWS JSON serialization is not JWS [RFC7515] Section 5.1 Step 7 JWS JSON serialization is not
supported for PASSporT. supported for PASSporT.
JWS [RFC7515] Section 5.1 Step 8 describes the method to create the JWS [RFC7515] Section 5.1 Step 8 describes the method to create the
final JWS Compact Serialization form of the PASSporT Token. final JWS Compact Serialization form of the PASSporT Token.
6. Compact form of PASSporT 7. Compact form of PASSporT
For a using protocol of PASSporT, the PASSporT Claims as well as the For a using protocol of PASSporT, the PASSporT Claims as well as the
PASSporT Header may include redundant or default information that PASSporT Header may include redundant or default information that
could be reconstructed at the destination based on information could be reconstructed at the destination based on information
provided in the signaling protocol transporting the PASSporT object. provided in the signaling protocol transporting the PASSporT object.
In this case, it may be advantageous to have a more compact form of In this case, it may be advantageous to have a more compact form of
PASSporT to save the transmission of the bytes needed to represent PASSporT to save the transmission of the bytes needed to represent
the header and claims. the header and claims.
We define the compact form of the PASSporT token, in the spirit of This specification defines the compact form of the PASSporT token, in
form defined in [RFC7515] Appendix F, with the use of '..', two the spirit of form defined in [RFC7515] Appendix F, with the use of
periods to represent the header and claim objects being removed, '..', two periods to represent the header and claim objects being
followed by PASSporT signature as defined in Section 5, and the need removed, followed by PASSporT signature as defined in Section 6, and
for the destination to reconstruct the header and claim objects in the need for the destination to reconstruct the header and claim
order to verify the signature. objects in order to verify the signature.
In order to construct the Compact form of the PASSporT string, the In order to construct the Compact form of the PASSporT string, the
procedure described in Section 5 with the exception of Step 8 procedure described in Section 6 with the exception of Step 8
described in JWS [RFC7515] Section 5.1. This step would be replaced described in JWS [RFC7515] Section 5.1. This step would be replaced
by the following construction of the compact form of PASSporT, by the following construction of the compact form of PASSporT,
'..' || BASE64URL(JWS Signature). '..' || BASE64URL(JWS Signature).
The using protocol of the compact form of PASSporT MUST be The using protocol of the compact form of PASSporT MUST be
accompanied by a specification for how the header and claims objects accompanied by a specification for how the header and claims objects
can be reconstructed from information in the signaling protocol being can be reconstructed from information in the signaling protocol being
used. used.
6.1. Example Compact form PASSporT Token Note that the full form of the PASSporT token, containing the entire
header, payload, and signature, should also use the lexicographic
ordering and white space serialization rules, particularly in the
case where some using protocols or interworking between protocols may
require switching between full and compact forms and maintaining the
integrity of the signature.
7.1. Example Compact form PASSporT Token
The compact form of the following example token (with line breaks The compact form of the following example token (with line breaks
between period used for readability purposes only) between period used for readability purposes only)
eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6InBhc3Nwb3J0IiwieDV1IjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9j eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6InBhc3Nwb3J0IiwieDV1IjoiaHR0cHM6Ly9j
ZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUub3JnL3Bhc3Nwb3J0LmNlciJ9 ZXJ0LmV4YW1wbGUub3JnL3Bhc3Nwb3J0LmNlciJ9
. .
eyJkZXN0Ijp7InVyaSI6WyJzaXA6YWxpY2VAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iXX0sImlhdCI eyJkZXN0Ijp7InVyaSI6WyJzaXA6YWxpY2VAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iXX0sImlhdCI
6IjE0NDMyMDgzNDUiLCJvcmlnIjp7InRuIjoiMTIxNTU1NTEyMTIifX0 6IjE0NDMyMDgzNDUiLCJvcmlnIjp7InRuIjoiMTIxNTU1NTEyMTIifX0
. .
rq3pjT1hoRwakEGjHCnWSwUnshd0-zJ6F1VOgFWSjHBr8Qjpjlk-cpFYpFYsojN rq3pjT1hoRwakEGjHCnWSwUnshd0-zJ6F1VOgFWSjHBr8Qjpjlk-cpFYpFYsojN
CpTzO3QfPOlckGaS6hEck7w CpTzO3QfPOlckGaS6hEck7w
would be as follows (with line breaks between period used for would be as follows (with line breaks between period used for
readability purposes only) readability purposes only)
..rq3pjT1hoRwakEGjHCnWSwUnshd0-zJ6F1VOgFWSjHBr8Qjpjlk-cpFYpFYsojN ..rq3pjT1hoRwakEGjHCnWSwUnshd0-zJ6F1VOgFWSjHBr8Qjpjlk-cpFYpFYsojN
CpTzO3QfPOlckGaS6hEck7w CpTzO3QfPOlckGaS6hEck7w
7. Extending PASSporT 8. Extending PASSporT
PASSporT includes the bare minimum set of claims needed to securely PASSporT includes the bare minimum set of claims needed to securely
assert the originating identity and support the secure properties assert the originating identity and support the secure properties
discussed in various parts of this document. JWT supports a straight discussed in various parts of this document. JWT supports a straight
forward way to add additional claims by simply adding new claim key forward way to add additional asserted or signed information by
pairs. PASSporT can be extended beyond the defined base set of simply adding new claims. PASSporT can be extended beyond the
claims to represent other information requiring assertion or defined base set of claims to represent other information requiring
validation beyond the originating identity itself as needed. assertion or validation beyond the originating identity itself as
needed.
7.1. "ppt" (PASSporT) header parameter 8.1. "ppt" (PASSporT) header parameter
Any using protocol can extend the payload of PASSporT with additional Any using protocol can extend the payload of PASSporT with additional
JWT claims. JWT claims are managed by an existing IANA registry as JWT claims. JWT claims are managed by an existing IANA registry as
defined in [RFC7519] Section 10.1. Implementations of PASSporT MUST defined in [RFC7519] Section 10.1. Implementations of PASSporT MUST
support the baseline claims defined in Section 4.2, and MAY support support the baseline claims defined in Section 5.2, and MAY support
extended claims. If it is necessary for an extension to PASSporT to extended claims. If it is necessary for an extension to PASSporT to
require that a relying party support a particular extended claim or require that a relying party support a particular extended claim or
set of claims in the PASSporT object, it can do so by specifying a set of claims in the PASSporT object, it can do so by specifying a
"ppt" element for the PASSporT JOSE header. All values of "ppt" need "ppt" element for the PASSporT JOSE header. All values of "ppt" need
to be defined in a specification which associates the new value of to be defined in a specification which associates the new value of
the "ppt" element with the required claims and behaviors. Relying the "ppt" element with the required claims and behaviors. Relying
parties MUST fail to validate PASSporT objects containing an parties MUST fail to validate PASSporT objects containing an
unsupported "ppt". unsupported "ppt".
Using protocols MUST explicitly define the how each claim is carried
in the using protocol and the rules for how the header and payload
objects are constructed beyond the lexicographical and serialization
rules defined in this document.
Using protocols that carry the compact form of PASSporT, defined in Using protocols that carry the compact form of PASSporT, defined in
Section 6, instead of the full form MUST use only mandatory Section 7, instead of the full form MUST use only mandatory
extensions signaled with "ppt" - if a using protocol were to add extensions signaled with "ppt" - if a using protocol were to add
additional optional claims to a PASSporT object it carried in compact additional optional claims to a PASSporT object it carried in compact
form, relying parties would have no way to reconstruct the token. form, relying parties would have no way to reconstruct the token.
Moreover, using protocols that support the compact form of PASSporT Moreover, using protocols that support the compact form of PASSporT
MUST have some field to signal "ppt" to relying parties, as the MUST have some field to signal "ppt" to relying parties, as the
compact form of PASSporT omits the JOSE header. compact form of PASSporT omits the JOSE header.
7.2. Example extended PASSporT header 8.2. Example extended PASSporT header
An example header with a PASSporT extension type of "foo" is as An example header with a PASSporT extension type of "foo" is as
follows: follows:
{ {
"alg":"ES256", "alg":"ES256",
"ppt":"foo", "ppt":"foo",
"typ":"passport", "typ":"passport",
"x5u":"https://tel.example.org/passport.cer" "x5u":"https://tel.example.org/passport.cer"
} }
7.3. Extended PASSporT Claims 8.3. Extended PASSporT Claims
Specifications that define extensions to the PASSporT mechanism MUST Specifications that define extensions to the PASSporT mechanism MUST
explicitly specify what claims they include beyond the base set of explicitly specify what claims they include beyond the base set of
claims from this document, the order in which they will appear, and claims from this document, the order in which they will appear, and
any further information necessary to implement the extension. All any further information necessary to implement the extension. All
extensions MUST include the baseline PASSporT claim elements extensions MUST include the baseline PASSporT claim elements
specified in Section 4; claims may only be appended to the claims specified in Section 5; claims may only be appended to the claims
object specified; they can never be removed or re-ordered. object specified; they can never be removed or re-ordered.
Specifying new claims follows the baseline JWT procedures ([RFC7519] Specifying new claims follows the baseline JWT procedures ([RFC7519]
Section 10.1). Understanding an extension or new claims defined by Section 10.1). Understanding an extension or new claims defined by
the extension on the destination verification of the PASSporT token the extension on the destination verification of the PASSporT token
is optional. The creator of a PASSporT object cannot assume that is optional. The creator of a PASSporT object cannot assume that
destination systems will understand any given extension. destination systems will understand any given extension.
Verification of PASSporT tokens by destination systems that do Verification of PASSporT tokens by destination systems that do
support an extension may then trigger appropriate application-level support an extension may then trigger appropriate application-level
behavior in the presence of an extension; authors of extensions behavior in the presence of an extension; authors of extensions
should provide appropriate extension-specific guidance to application should provide appropriate extension-specific guidance to application
developers on this point. developers on this point.
An example set of extended claims, extending the first example in An example set of extended claims, extending the first example in
Section 4.2.1.4 using "bar" as the newly defined claim would be as Section 5.2.1.4 using "bar" as the newly defined claim would be as
follows: follows:
{ {
"bar":"beyond all recognition" "bar":"beyond all recognition"
"dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]}, "dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]},
"iat":"1443208345", "iat":"1443208345",
"orig":{"tn":"12155551212"} "orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}
} }
8. Deterministic JSON Serialization 9. Deterministic JSON Serialization
JSON, as a canonical format, can include spaces and line breaks, and JSON, as a canonical format, can include spaces and line breaks, and
key value pairs can occur in any order. It is therefore a non- key value pairs can occur in any order. It is therefore a non-
deterministic string format. In order to make the digital signature deterministic string format. In order to make the digital signature
verification work deterministically, the JSON representation of the verification work deterministically, the JSON representation of the
JWS Protected Header object and JWS Payload object MUST be computed JWS Protected Header object and JWS Payload object MUST be computed
as follows. as follows.
The JSON object MUST follow the rules for the construction of the The JSON object MUST follow the rules for the construction of the
thumbprint of a JSON Web Key (JWK) as defined in [RFC7638] Section 3 thumbprint of a JSON Web Key (JWK) as defined in [RFC7638] Section 3
Step 1 only. Step 2 should not be performed; as noted in JWK this is Step 1 only. Step 2 should not be performed; as noted in JWK this is
still a legal JWK object. still a legal JWK object.
The PASSporT header and claim direct members MUST follow the 9.1. Example PASSport deterministic JSON form
lexicographical ordering rules. Any top level JSON members that
contain JSON objects or arrays, such as "dest" or "mky" MUST follow
their own lexicographical ordering and whitespace and line break
rules for the sub-elements. This includes any header or claims
defined in future specifications using PASSporT.
8.1. Example PASSport deterministic JSON form
This section demonstrate the deterministic JSON serialization for the This section demonstrate the deterministic JSON serialization for the
example PASSporT Payload shown in Section 4.2.1.4. example PASSporT Payload shown in Section 5.2.1.4.
The initial JSON object is shown here: The initial JSON object is shown here:
{ {
"dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]}, "dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]},
"orig":{"tn":"12155551212"} "orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}
"iat":"1443208345", "iat":"1443208345",
"mky":[ "mky":[
{ {
"alg":"sha-256", "alg":"sha-256",
skipping to change at page 13, line 48 skipping to change at page 14, line 28
o "mky" o "mky"
o "orig" o "orig"
The final constructed deterministic JSON serialization The final constructed deterministic JSON serialization
representation, with whitespace and line breaks removed, (with line representation, with whitespace and line breaks removed, (with line
breaks used for display purposes only) is: breaks used for display purposes only) is:
{"dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"],"iat":1443208345,"mky": {"dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"],"iat":1443208345,"mky":
[{"alg":"sha-256","dig":"021ACC5427ABEB9C533F3E4B652E7D463F5442CD5 [{"alg":"sha-256","dig":"021ACC5427ABEB9C533F3E4B652E7D463F5442CD5
4F17A03A27DF9B07F4619B2"},{"alg":"sha-256","dig":"4AADB9B13F82183B5 4F17A03A27DF9B07F4619B2"},{"alg":"sha-256","dig":"4AADB9B13F82183B5
40212DF3E5D496B19E57CAB3E4B652E7D463F5442CD54F1"}], 40212DF3E5D496B19E57CAB3E4B652E7D463F5442CD54F1"}],
"orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}} "orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}}
9. Security Considerations 10. Security Considerations
9.1. Avoidance of replay and cut and paste attacks 10.1. Avoidance of replay and cut and paste attacks
There are a number of security considerations for use of the token There are a number of security considerations for use of the token
for avoidance of replay and cut and paste attacks. PASSporT tokens for avoidance of replay and cut and paste attacks. PASSporT tokens
SHOULD only be sent with application level protocol information (e.g. SHOULD only be sent with application level protocol information (e.g.
for SIP an INVITE as defined in [RFC3261]) corresponding to the for SIP an INVITE as defined in [RFC3261]) corresponding to the
required fields in the token. A uniqueness of the set of token required fields in the token. A uniqueness of the set of token
claims and token signature is constructed using the originating claims and token signature is constructed using the originating
identity being asserted with the 'orig' claim along with the the identity being asserted with the 'orig' claim along with the
following two claims: following two claims:
o 'iat' claim should correspond to a date/time the message was o 'iat' claim should correspond to a date/time the message was
originated. It should also be within a relative time that is originated. It should also be within a relative time that is
reasonable for clock drift and transmission time characteristics reasonable for clock drift and transmission time characteristics
associated with the application using the PASSporT token. associated with the application using the PASSporT token.
Therefore, validation of the token should consider date and time Therefore, validation of the token should consider date and time
correlation, which could be influenced by signaling protocol correlation, which could be influenced by signaling protocol
specific use and network time differences. specific use and network time differences.
o 'dest' claim is included to prevent the valid re-use of a o 'dest' claim is included to prevent the valid re-use of a
previously originated message to send to another destination previously originated message to send to another destination
party. party.
9.2. Solution Considerations 10.2. Solution Considerations
The use of PASSporT tokens based on the validation of the digital The use of PASSporT tokens based on the validation of the digital
signature and the associated certificate requires consideration of signature and the associated certificate requires consideration of
the authentication and authority or reputation of the signer to the authentication and authority or reputation of the signer to
attest to the identity being asserted. The following considerations attest to the identity being asserted. The following considerations
should be recognized when using PASSporT: * The use of this token should be recognized when using PASSporT:
should not, in it's own right, be considered a full solution for
absolute non-repudiation of the identity being asserted. * In many
applications, the end user the asserted identity represents and
signer may not be one in the same. For example, when a service
provider signs and validates the token on the behalf of the user
consuming the service, the provider MUST have an authenticated and
secure relationship with the end user or the device initiating and
terminating the communications signaling. * Applications that use
PASSporT should ensure the verification of the signature includes the
means of verifying the signer is authoritative through the use of an
application or service specific set of common trust anchors for the
application.
10. IANA Considerations o The use of this token should not, in it's own right, be considered
a full solution for absolute non-repudiation of the identity being
asserted.
10.1. Media Type Registration o In many applications, the end user represented by the asserted
identity represents and signer may not be one in the same. For
example, when a service provider signs and validates the token on
the behalf of the user consuming the service, the provider MUST
have an authenticated and secure relationship with the end user or
the device initiating and terminating the communications
signaling.
10.1.1. Media Type Registry Contents Additions Requested o Applications that use PASSporT should ensure the verification of
the signature includes the means of verifying the signer is
authoritative through the use of an application or service
specific set of common trust anchors for the application.
11. IANA Considerations
11.1. Media Type Registration
11.1.1. Media Type Registry Contents Additions Requested
This section registers the "application/passport" media type This section registers the "application/passport" media type
[RFC2046] in the "Media Types" registry in the manner described in [RFC2046] in the "Media Types" registry in the manner described in
[RFC6838], which can be used to indicate that the content is a [RFC6838], which can be used to indicate that the content is a
PASSporT defined JWT and JWS. PASSporT defined JWT and JWS.
o Type name: application o Type name: application
o Subtype name: passport o Subtype name: passport
skipping to change at page 16, line 4 skipping to change at page 16, line 32
Magic number(s): n/a File extension(s): n/a Macintosh file type Magic number(s): n/a File extension(s): n/a Macintosh file type
code(s): n/a code(s): n/a
o Person & email address to contact for further information: Chris o Person & email address to contact for further information: Chris
Wendt, chris-ietf@chriswendt.net Wendt, chris-ietf@chriswendt.net
o Intended usage: COMMON o Intended usage: COMMON
o Restrictions on usage: none o Restrictions on usage: none
o Author: Chris Wendt, chris-ietf@chriswendt.net o Author: Chris Wendt, chris-ietf@chriswendt.net
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Provisional registration? No o Provisional registration? No
10.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registration 11.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registration
10.2.1. Registry Contents Additions Requested 11.2.1. Registry Contents Additions Requested
o Claim Name: "orig" o Claim Name: "orig"
o Claim Description: Originating Identity String o Claim Description: Originating Identity String
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.2.1 of [RFCThis] o Specification Document(s): Section 5.2.1 of [RFCThis]
o Claim Name: "dest" o Claim Name: "dest"
o Claim Description: Destination Identity String o Claim Description: Destination Identity String
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.2.1 of [RFCThis] o Specification Document(s): Section 5.2.1 of [RFCThis]
o Claim Name: "mky" o Claim Name: "mky"
o Claim Description: Media Key Fingerprint String o Claim Description: Media Key Fingerprint String
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.2.2 of [RFCThis] o Specification Document(s): Section 5.2.2 of [RFCThis]
10.3. JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameter Registry 11.3. JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameter Registry
10.3.1. Registry Contents Additions Requested 11.3.1. Registry Contents Additions Requested
Header Parameter Name: "ppt" Header Parameter Name: "ppt"
o Header Parameter Description: PASSporT extension identifier o Header Parameter Description: PASSporT extension identifier
o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWS o Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWS
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 7.1 of [RFCThis] o Specification Document(s): Section 8.1 of [RFCThis]
11. Acknowledgements 12. Acknowledgements
Particular thanks to members of the ATIS and SIP Forum NNI Task Group Particular thanks to members of the ATIS and SIP Forum NNI Task Group
including Jim McEchern, Martin Dolly, Richard Shockey, John Barnhill, including Jim McEchern, Martin Dolly, Richard Shockey, John Barnhill,
Christer Holmberg, Victor Pascual Avila, Mary Barnes, Eric Burger for Christer Holmberg, Victor Pascual Avila, Mary Barnes, Eric Burger for
their review, ideas, and contributions also thanks to Henning their review, ideas, and contributions also thanks to Henning
Schulzrinne, Russ Housley, Alan Johnston, Richard Barnes, Mark Schulzrinne, Russ Housley, Alan Johnston, Richard Barnes, Mark
Miller, Ted Hardie, Dave Crocker, Robert Sparks for valuable feedback Miller, Ted Hardie, Dave Crocker, Robert Sparks for valuable feedback
on the technical and security aspects of the document. Additional on the technical and security aspects of the document. Additional
thanks to Harsha Bellur for assistance in coding the example tokens. thanks to Harsha Bellur for assistance in coding the example tokens.
12. References 13. References
12.1. Normative References 13.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis] [I-D.ietf-stir-rfc4474bis]
Peterson, J., Jennings, C., Rescorla, E., and C. Wendt, Peterson, J., Jennings, C., Rescorla, E., and C. Wendt,
"Authenticated Identity Management in the Session "Authenticated Identity Management in the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP)", draft-ietf-stir-rfc4474bis-12 Initiation Protocol (SIP)", draft-ietf-stir-rfc4474bis-13
(work in progress), September 2016. (work in progress), September 2016.
[RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail [RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046, Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996, DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2046>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2046>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform [RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005, RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[RFC4566] Handley, M., Jacobson, V., and C. Perkins, "SDP: Session [RFC4566] Handley, M., Jacobson, V., and C. Perkins, "SDP: Session
Description Protocol", RFC 4566, DOI 10.17487/RFC4566, Description Protocol", RFC 4566, DOI 10.17487/RFC4566,
July 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4566>. July 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4566>.
[RFC4572] Lennox, J., "Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the [RFC4572] Lennox, J., "Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the
skipping to change at page 18, line 21 skipping to change at page 19, line 5
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token [RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015, (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC7638] Jones, M. and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Key (JWK) [RFC7638] Jones, M. and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Key (JWK)
Thumbprint", RFC 7638, DOI 10.17487/RFC7638, September Thumbprint", RFC 7638, DOI 10.17487/RFC7638, September
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7638>. 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7638>.
12.2. Informative References 13.2. Informative References
[RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, [RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002, DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
skipping to change at page 19, line 21 skipping to change at page 19, line 52
{ {
"dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]} "dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]}
"iat":"1443208345", "iat":"1443208345",
"orig":{"tn":"12155551212"} "orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}
} }
This would be serialized to the form (with line break used for This would be serialized to the form (with line break used for
display purposes only): display purposes only):
{"dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]},"iat":"1443208345", {"dest":{"uri":["sip:alice@example.com"]},"iat":"1443208345",
"orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}} "orig":{"tn":"12155551212"}}
Step 2 Computes the BASE64URL(JWS Payload) producing this value (with Step 2 Computes the BASE64URL(JWS Payload) producing this value (with
line break used for display purposes only): line break used for display purposes only):
eyJkZXN0Ijp7InVyaSI6WyJzaXA6YWxpY2VAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iXX0sImlhdCI eyJkZXN0Ijp7InVyaSI6WyJzaXA6YWxpY2VAZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iXX0sImlhdCI
6IjE0NDMyMDgzNDUiLCJvcmlnIjp7InRuIjoiMTIxNTU1NTEyMTIifX0 6IjE0NDMyMDgzNDUiLCJvcmlnIjp7InRuIjoiMTIxNTU1NTEyMTIifX0
For Step 3, an example PASSporT Protected Header comprising the JOSE For Step 3, an example PASSporT Protected Header comprising the JOSE
Header is as follows: Header is as follows:
{ {
 End of changes. 80 change blocks. 
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