TCP Maintenance and Minor Extensions                             F. Gont
(tcpm)                                                           UTN/FRH                                            SI6 Networks / UTN-FRH
Internet-Draft                                               S. Bellovin
Obsoletes: 1948 (if approved)                        Columbia University
Updates: 793 (if approved)                                 June 28,                             December 16, 2011
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: December 30, 2011 June 18, 2012

               Defending Against Sequence Number Attacks


   This document specifies an algorithm for the generation of TCP
   Initial Sequence Numbers (ISNs), such that the chances of an off-path
   attacker guessing the sequence numbers in use by a target connection
   are reduced.  This document revises (and formally obsoletes) RFC
   1948, and takes the ISN generation algorithm originally proposed in
   that document to Standards Track. Track, formally updating RFC 793.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 30, 2011. June 18, 2012.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Generation of Initial Sequence Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   3.  Proposed Initial Sequence Number generation algorithm  . . . .  4
   4.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   5.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   6.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   7.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     7.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     7.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7  8
   Appendix A.  Address-based trust relationship exploitation
                attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     A.1.  Blind TCP connection-spoofing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   Appendix B.  Changes from RFC 1948 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   Appendix C.  Changes from previous versions of the document
                (this section should be removed by the RFC Editor
                before publication of this document as an RFC)  . . . 12
     C.1.  Changes from draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc1948bis-00 . . . . . . . . 12
     C.2.  Changes from draft-gont-tcpm-rfc1948bis-00 . . . . . . . . 12
     C.3.  Changes from RFC 1948  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

1.  Introduction

   For a long time, the Internet has experienced a number of off-path
   attacks against TCP connections.  These attacks have ranged from
   trust relationships exploitation to Denial of Service attacks
   [CPNI-TCP].  Discusion  Discussion of some of these attacks dates back to at
   least 1985, when Morris [Morris1985] described a form of attack based
   on guessing what sequence numbers TCP [RFC0793] will use for new
   connections between two known end-points.

   In 1996, RFC 1948 [RFC1948] proposed an algorithm for the selection
   of TCP ISNs, Initial Sequence Numbers (ISNs), such that the chances of an
   off-path attacker guessing valid sequence numbers are reduced.  With
   the aforementioned algorithm, such attacks would remain possible if
   and only if the attacker already has the ability to perform "man in
   the middle" attacks.

   This document revises (and formally obsoletes) RFC 1948, and takes
   the ISN generation algorithm originally proposed in that document to
   Standards Track.

   Section 2 provides a brief discussion of the requirements for a good
   ISN generation algorithm.  Section 3 specifies a good ISN selection
   algorithm.  Finally, Appendix A provides a discussion of the trust-
   relationship exploitation attacks that originally motivated the
   publication of RFC 1948 [RFC1948].

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

2.  Generation of Initial Sequence Numbers

   RFC 793 [RFC0793] suggests that the choice of the ISN of a connection
   is not arbitrary, but aims to reduce the chances of a stale segment
   from being accepted by a new incarnation of a previous connection.
   RFC 793 [RFC0793] suggests the use of a global 32-bit ISN generator
   that is incremented by 1 roughly every 4 microseconds.

   It is interesting to note that, as a matter of fact, protection
   against stale segments from a previous incarnation of the connection
   is enforced by preventing the creation of a new incarnation of a
   previous connection before 2*MSL have passed since a segment
   corresponding to the old incarnation was last seen.  This is
   accomplished by the TIME-WAIT state, and TCP's "quiet time" concept
   (see Appendix B of [RFC1323]).

   Based on the assumption that ISNs are monotonically-increasing across
   connections, many stacks (e.g., 4.2BSD-derived) use the ISN of an
   incoming SYN segment to perform "heuristics" that enable the creation
   of a new incarnation of a connection while the previous incarnation
   is still in the TIME-WAIT state (see pp. 945 of [Wright1994]).  This
   avoids an interoperability problem that may arise when a node
   establishes connections to a specific TCP end-point at a high rate

   Unfortunately, the ISN generator described in [RFC0793] makes it
   trivial for an off-path attacker to predict the ISN that a TCP will
   use for new connections, thus allowing a variety of attacks against
   TCP connections [CPNI-TCP].  One of the possible attacks that takes
   advantage of weak sequence numbers was first described in
   [Morris1985], and its exploitation was widely publicized about 10
   years later [Shimomura1995].  [CERT2001] and [USCERT2001] are
   advisories about the security implications of weak ISN generators.
   [Zalewski2001] and [Zalewski2002] contain a detailed analysis of ISN
   generators, and a survey of the algorithms in use by popular TCP

   Simple random selection of the TCP ISNs would mitigate those attacks
   that require an attacker to guess valid sequence numbers.  However,
   it would also break the 4.4BSD "heuristics" to accept a new incoming
   connection when there is a previous incarnation of that connection in
   the TIME-WAIT state [Silbersack2005].

   We can prevent sequence number guessing attacks by giving each
   connection -- that is, each 4-tuple of (localip, localport, remoteip,
   remoteport) -- a separate sequence number space.  Within each space,
   the ISN is incremented according to [RFC0793]; however, there is no
   obvious relationship between the numbering in different spaces.

   An obvious way to prevent sequence number guessing attacks while not
   breaking the 4.4BSD heuristics would be to maintain state for dead
   connections, and the easiest way to do that would be to change the
   TCP state transition diagram so that both end-points of all
   connections go to TIME-WAIT state.  That would work, but would
   consume system memory to store the additional state.  Instead, we
   propose an improvement to the TCP ISN generation algorithm, that does
   not require TCP to keep state for all recently-terminated

3.  Proposed Initial Sequence Number generation algorithm

   TCP SHOULD generate its Initial Sequence Numbers with the expression:

           ISN = M + F(localip, localport, remoteip, remoteport)

   where M is the 4 microsecond timer, and F F() is a pseudorandom
   function (PRF) of the connection-id.  It is vital that F not  F() MUST NOT be computable from
   the outside, or an attacker could still guess at sequence numbers
   from the ISN used for some other connection.  The PRF could be
   implemented as a cryptographic hash of the concatenation of the
   connection-id and some secret data; MD5 [RFC1321] would be a good
   choice for the hash function.

   The result of F() is no more secure than the the secret key.  If an
   attacker is aware of which cryptographic hash function is being used
   by the victim (which we should expect), and the attacker can obtain
   enough material (i.e., ISNs selected by the victim), the attacker may
   simply search the entire secret-key space to find matches.  To
   protect against this, the secret key should be of a reasonable
   length.  Key lengths of 128 bits should be adequate.  The secret key
   can either be a true random number [RFC4086], or some per-host
   secret.  A possible mechanism for protecting the secret key would be
   to change it on occasion.  For example, the secret key could be
   changed whenever one of the following events occur:

   o  The system is being bootstrapped (e.g., the secret key could be a
      combination of some secret and the boot time of the machine).

   o  Some predefined/random time has expired.

   o  The secret key has been used sufficiently often that it should be
      regarded as insecure now.

   Note that changing the secret would change the ISN space used for
   reincarnated connections, and thus could lead to the 4.4BSD
   heuristics to fail; to maintain safety, either dead connection state
   could be kept or a quiet time observed for two maximum segment
   lifetimes before such a change.

   It should be noted that while there have been concerns about the
   security properties of MD5 [RFC6151], the algorithm specified in this
   document simply aims at reducing the chances of an off-path attacker
   guessing the ISN of a new connection, and thus in our threat model it
   is not worth the effort for an attacker to try to learn the secret
   key.  Since MD5 is faster than other "stronger" alternatives, and is
   used in virtually all existing implementations of this algorithm, we
   consider that use of MD5 in the specified algorithm is acceptable.
   However, implementations should consider the trade-offs involved in
   using functions with stronger security properties, and employ them if
   it is deemed appropriate.

4.  Security Considerations

   Good sequence numbers are not a replacement for cryptographic
   authentication, such as that provided by IPsec [RFC4301] or TCP-AO
   [RFC5925].  At best, they are a palliative measure.

   If random numbers are used as the sole source of the secret, they
   MUST be chosen in accordance with the recommendations given in

   A security consideration that should be made about the algorithm
   proposed in this document is that it might allow an attacker to count
   the number of systems behind a Network Address Translator (NAT)
   [RFC3022].  Depending on the ISN generators implemented by each of
   the systems behind the NAT, an attacker might be able to count the
   number of systems behind a NAT by establishing a number of TCP
   connections (using the public address of the NAT) and indentifying identifying the
   number of different sequence number "spaces".
   [I-D.gont-behave-nat-security] discusses how this and other
   information leakages at NATs could be mitigated.

   An eavesdropper who can observe the initial messages for a connection
   can determine its sequence number state, and may still be able to
   launch sequence number guessing attacks by impersonating that
   connection.  However, such an eavesdropper can also hijack existing
   connections [Joncheray1995], so the incremental threat is not that
   high.  Still, since the offset between a fake connection and a given
   real connection will be more or less constant for the lifetime of the
   secret, it is important to ensure that attackers can never capture
   such packets.  Typical attacks that could disclose them include both
   eavesdropping and the variety of routing attacks discussed in

   Off-path attacks against TCP connections require the attacker to
   guess or know the four-tuple (localip, localport, remoteip,
   remoteport) that identifies the target connection.  TCP port number
   randomization [RFC6056] reduces the chances of an attacker of
   guessing such four-tuple by obfuscating the selection of TCP
   ephemeral ports, therefore contributing to the mitigation of such
   attacks.  [RFC6056] provides advice on the selection of TCP ephemeral
   ports, such that the overall protection of TCP connections against
   off-path attacks is improved.

   [CPNI-TCP] contains a discussion of all the currently-known attacks
   that require an attacker to know or be able to guess the TCP sequence
   numbers in use by the target connection.

5.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no actions for IANA.

6.  Acknowledgements

   Matt Blaze and Jim Ellis contributed some crucial ideas to RFC 1948,
   on which this document is based.  Frank Kastenholz contributed
   constructive comments to that memo.

   The authors of this document woul would like to thank (in chronological
   order) Alfred Hoenes, Lloyd Wood, Lars Eggert, Joe Touch, William
   Allen Simpson, Tim Shepard, Wesley Eddy, and Anantha Ramaiah, and Ben
   Campbell, for providing valuable comments on earlier versions of this

   Fernando Gont would like to thank the United Kingdom's Centre for the
   Protection of National Infrastructure (UK CPNI) for their continued

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC0793]  Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7,
              RFC 793, September 1981.

   [RFC1321]  Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC 1321,
              April 1992.

   [RFC1323]  Jacobson, V., Braden, B., and D. Borman, "TCP Extensions
              for High Performance", RFC 1323, May 1992.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC4086]  Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
              Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.

   [RFC6056]  Larsen, M. and F. Gont, "Recommendations for Transport-
              Protocol Port Randomization", BCP 156, RFC 6056,
              January 2011.

7.2.  Informative References

              Morris, R., "Security Problems in the TCP/IP Protocol
              Suite", Computer Communications Review, vol. 19, no. 2,
              pp. 32-48, 1989.

              CERT, "CERT Advisory CA-2001-09: Statistical Weaknesses in
              TCP/IP Initial Sequence Numbers",
     , 2001.

              CPNI, "Security Assessment of the Transmission Control
              Protocol (TCP)",
              tn-03-09-security-assessment-TCP.pdf, 2009.

              Gont, F. and P. Srisuresh, "Security implications of
              Network Address Translators (NATs)",
              draft-gont-behave-nat-security-03 (work in progress),
              October 2009.

              Joncheray, L., "A Simple Active Attack Against TCP", Proc.
              Fifth Usenix UNIX Security Symposium, 1995.

              Morris, R., "A Weakness in the 4.2BSD UNIX TCP/IP
              Software",  CSTR 117, AT&T Bell Laboratories, Murray Hill,
              NJ, 1985.

   [RFC0854]  Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "Telnet Protocol
              Specification", STD 8, RFC 854, May 1983.

   [RFC1034]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
              STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.

   [RFC1948]  Bellovin, S., "Defending Against Sequence Number Attacks",
              RFC 1948, May 1996.

   [RFC3022]  Srisuresh, P. and K. Egevang, "Traditional IP Network
              Address Translator (Traditional NAT)", RFC 3022,
              January 2001.

   [RFC4120]  Neuman, C., Yu, T., Hartman, S., and K. Raeburn, "The
              Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 4120,
              July 2005.

   [RFC4251]  Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, "The Secure Shell (SSH)
              Protocol Architecture", RFC 4251, January 2006.

   [RFC4301]  Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
              Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.

   [RFC4954]  Siemborski, R. and A. Melnikov, "SMTP Service Extension
              for Authentication", RFC 4954, July 2007.

   [RFC5321]  Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321,
              October 2008.

   [RFC5925]  Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP
              Authentication Option", RFC 5925, June 2010.

   [RFC5936]  Lewis, E. and A. Hoenes, "DNS Zone Transfer Protocol
              (AXFR)", RFC 5936, June 2010.

   [RFC6151]  Turner, S. and L. Chen, "Updated Security Considerations
              for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms",
              RFC 6151, March 2011.

              Shimomura, T., "Technical details of the attack described
              by Markoff in NYT",
              Message posted in USENET's newsgroup,
              Message-ID: <3g5gkl$, 1995.

              Silbersack, M., "Improving TCP/IP security through
              randomization without sacrificing interoperability.",
              EuroBSDCon 2005 Conference .

              US-CERT, "US-CERT Vulnerability Note VU#498440: Multiple
              TCP/IP implementations may use statistically predictable
              initial sequence numbers",
     , 2001.

              Wright, G. and W. Stevens, "TCP/IP Illustrated, Volume 2:
              The Implementation", Addison-Wesley, 1994.

              Zalewski, M., "Strange Attractors and TCP/IP Sequence
              Number Analysis",
     , 2001.

              Zalewski, M., "Strange Attractors and TCP/IP Sequence
              Number Analysis - One Year Later",
     , 2002.

Appendix A.  Address-based trust relationship exploitation attacks

   This section discusses the trust-relationship exploitation attack
   that originally motivated the publication of RFC 1948 [RFC1948].  It
   should be noted that while RFC 1948 focused its discussion of
   address-based trust relationship exploitation attacks on Telnet
   [RFC0854] and the various UNIX "r" commands, both Telnet and the
   various "r" commands have since been largely replaced by secure
   counter-parts (such as SSH [RFC4251]) for the purpose of remote login
   and remote command execution.  Nevertheless, address-based trust
   relationships are still employed nowadays in some scenarios.  For
   example, some SMTP [RFC5321] deployments still authenticate their
   users by means of their IP addresses, even when more appropriate
   authentication mechanisms are available [RFC4954].  Another example
   is the authentication of DNS secondary servers [RFC1034] by means of
   their IP addresses for allowing DNS zone transfers [RFC5936], or any
   other access control mechanism based on IP addresses.

   In 1985, Morris [Morris1985] described a form of attack based on
   guessing what sequence numbers TCP [RFC0793] will use for new
   connections.  Briefly, the attacker gags a host trusted by the
   target, impersonates the IP address of the trusted host when talking
   to the target, and completes the 3-way handshake based on its guess
   at the next ISN to be used.  An ordinary connection to the target is
   used to gather sequence number state information.  This entire
   sequence, coupled with address-based authentication, allows the
   attacker to execute commands on the target host.

   Clearly, the proper solution for these attacks is cryptographic
   authentication [RFC4301] [RFC4120] [RFC4251].

   The following subsection provides technical details for the trust
   relationship exploitation attack described by Morris [Morris1985].

A.1.  Blind TCP connection-spoofing

   In order to understand the particular case of sequence number
   guessing, one must look at the 3-way handshake used in the TCP open
   sequence [RFC0793].  Suppose client machine A wants to talk to rsh
   server B. It sends the following message:

                              A->B: SYN, ISNa

   That is, it sends a packet with the SYN ("synchronize sequence
   number") bit set and an initial sequence number ISNa.

   B replies with

                         B->A: SYN, ISNb, ACK(ISNa)

   In addition to sending its own ISN, it acknowledges A's.  Note that
   the actual numeric value ISNa must appear in the message.

   A concludes the handshake by sending

                              A->B: ACK(ISNb)

   RFC 793 [RFC0793] specifies that the 32-bit counter be incremented by
   1 in the low-order position about every 4 microseconds.  Instead,
   Berkeley-derived kernels traditionally incremented it by a constant
   every second, and by another constant for each new connection.  Thus,
   if you opened a connection to a machine, you knew to a very high
   degree of confidence what sequence number it would use for its next
   connection.  And therein lied the vulnerability.

   The attacker X first opens a real connection to its target B -- say,
   to the mail port or the TCP echo port.  This gives ISNb.  It then
   impersonates A and sends

                              Ax->B: SYN, ISNx

   where "Ax" denotes a packet sent by X pretending to be A.

   B's response to X's original SYN (so to speak)

                        B->A: SYN, ISNb', ACK(ISNx)

   goes to the legitimate A, about which more anon.  X never sees that
   message but can still send

                             Ax->B: ACK(ISNb')

   using the predicted value for ISNb'.  If the guess is right -- and
   usually it will be, if the sequence numbers are weak -- B's rsh
   server thinks it has a legitimate connection with A, when in fact X
   is sending the packets.  X can't see the output from this session,
   but it can execute commands as more or less any user -- and in that
   case, the game is over and X has won.

   There is a minor difficulty here.  If A sees B's message, it will
   realize that B is acknowledging something it never sent, and will
   send a RST packet in response to tear down the connection.  However,
   an attacker could send the TCP segments containing the commands to be
   executed back-to-back with the segments required to establish the TCP
   connection, and thus by the time the connection is reset, the
   attacker has already won.

      In the past, attackers exploited a common TCP implementation bug
      to prevent the connection from being reset (see subsection "A
      Common TCP Bug" in [RFC1948]).  However, all TCP implementations
      that used to implement this bug have been fixed for a long time.

Appendix B.  Changes from RFC 1948

   o  This document aims at Standards Track (rather than Informational).

   o  Formal requirements ([RFC2119]) are specified.

   o  The discussion of address-based trust relationship attacks has
      been updated and moved to an Appendix.

   o  The subsection entitled "A Common TCP Bug" (describing a common
      bug in the BSD TCP implementation) has been removed.

Appendix C.  Changes from previous versions of the document (this
             section should be removed by the RFC Editor before
             publication of this document as an RFC)

C.1.  Changes from draft-ietf-tcpm-rfc1948bis-00

   o  Addresses WGLC feedback (posted on-list) by Wesley Eddy, and some
      comments submitted by Anantha Ramaiah.

C.2.  Changes from draft-gont-tcpm-rfc1948bis-00

   o  The recommended hash algorithm has been changed back to MD5
      [RFC1321], with a note that the security implications of MD5 have
      been carefully considered.

   o  The subsection entitled "An old BSD bug" (describing a common bug
      in the BSD TCP implementation) has been removed.

   o  Minor editorial changes.

C.3.  Changes from RFC 1948

   o  New document aims at Standards Track (rather than Informational).

   o  The discussion of address-based trust relationship attacks was
      updated and moved to an Appendix.

   o  The recommended hash algorithm has been changed to SHA-256, in
      response to the security concerns for MD5 [RFC1321].

   o  Formal requirements ([RFC2119]) are specified.

Authors' Addresses

   Fernando Gont
   Universidad Tecnologica Nacional
   UTN-FRH / Facultad Regional Haedo SI6 Networks
   Evaristo Carriego 2644
   Haedo, Provincia de Buenos Aires  1706

   Phone: +54 11 4650 8472

   Steven M. Bellovin
   Columbia University
   1214 Amsterdam Avenue
   MC 0401
   New York, NY  10027

   Phone: +1 212 939 7149