draft-ietf-tls-cached-info-01.txt		draft-ietf-tls-cached-info-02.txt
	INTERNET-DRAFT S. Santesson (3xA Security)		INTERNET-DRAFT S. Santesson (3xA Security)
	Intended Status: Proposed Standard Q. Dang (NIST)		Intended Status: Proposed Standard
			Expires: March 19, 2010 September 15, 2009
	Transport Layer Security (TLS) Cached Information Extension		Transport Layer Security (TLS) Cached Information Extension
	<draft-ietf-tls-cached-info-01.txt>		<draft-ietf-tls-cached-info-02.txt>
	Status of this Memo		Status of this Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the		This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
	provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.		provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that		Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
	other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-		other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
	Drafts.		Drafts.
	skipping to change at page 1, line 29		skipping to change at page 1, line 31
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at		The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
	http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html		http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html
	The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at		The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
	http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html		http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html
			Copyright Notice
			Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
			document authors. All rights reserved.
			This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
			Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of
			publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
			Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
			and restrictions with respect to this document.
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document defines a Transport Layer Security (TLS) extension for		This document defines a Transport Layer Security (TLS) extension for
	cached information. This extension allows the TLS client to inform a		cached information. This extension allows the TLS client to inform a
	server of cached information from previous TLS sessions, allowing the		server of cached information from previous TLS sessions, allowing the
	server to omit sending cached static information to the client during		server to omit sending cached static information to the client during
	the TLS handshake protocol exchange.		the TLS handshake protocol exchange.
			Table of Contents
			1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
			2 Cached Information Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
			4 Message flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
			5 Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
			6 IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
			7 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
			Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	1 Introduction		1 Introduction
	TLS handshakes often include fairly static information such as server		TLS handshakes often include fairly static information such as server
	certificate and a list of trusted Certification Authorities (CAs).		certificate and a list of trusted Certification Authorities (CAs).
	Static information such as a server certificate can be of		Static information such as a server certificate can be of
	considerable size. This is the case in particular if the server		considerable size. This is the case in particular if the server
	certificate is bundled with a complete certificate path, including		certificate is bundled with a complete certificate path, including
	all intermediary certificates up to the trust anchor public key.		all intermediary certificates up to the trust anchor public key.
	Significant benefits can be achieved in low bandwidth and high		Significant benefits can be achieved in low bandwidth and high
	skipping to change at page 3, line 49		skipping to change at page 4, line 33
	caching of information objects by including an extension of type		caching of information objects by including an extension of type
	"cached_information" with an empty extension_data field in their		"cached_information" with an empty extension_data field in their
	(extended) server hello.		(extended) server hello.
	Following a successful exchange of "cached_information" extensions,		Following a successful exchange of "cached_information" extensions,
	the server may replace data objects identified through the client		the server may replace data objects identified through the client
	extension with any of the CachedInformationHash values received from		extension with any of the CachedInformationHash values received from
	the client, which matches the replaced object.		the client, which matches the replaced object.
	The handshake protocol will proceed using the cached data as if it		The handshake protocol will proceed using the cached data as if it
	was provided in the handshake protocol. The finished message will		was provided in the handshake protocol. The Finished message will
	however be calculated over the actual data exchanged in the handshake		however be calculated over the actual data exchanged in the handshake
	protocol. That is, the finished message will be calculated over the		protocol. That is, the Finished message will be calculated over the
	hash values of cached information objects and not over the cached		hash values of cached information objects and not over the cached
	objects that were omitted from transmission.		objects that were omitted from transmission.
	5 Security Considerations		5 Security Considerations
	Hash algorithms used in this specification are required to have		Hash algorithms used in this specification are required to have
	reasonable random properties in order to provide reasonably unique		reasonable random properties in order to provide reasonably unique
	identifiers. Failure of a provided hash to correctly and uniquely		identifiers. Failure of a provided hash to correctly and uniquely
	identify the correct set of hashed parameters may at most lead to a		identify the correct set of hashed parameters may at most lead to a
	failed TLS handshake followed by a new attempt without the cached		failed TLS handshake followed by a new attempt without the cached
	skipping to change at page 5, line 8		skipping to change at page 5, line 22
	trusted_cas(2). TLS CachedInformationType values in the inclusive		trusted_cas(2). TLS CachedInformationType values in the inclusive
	range 0-63 (decimal) are assigned via RFC 5226 [RFC5226] Standards		range 0-63 (decimal) are assigned via RFC 5226 [RFC5226] Standards
	Action. Values from the inclusive range 64-223 (decimal) are		Action. Values from the inclusive range 64-223 (decimal) are
	assigned via RFC 5226 Specification Required. Values from the		assigned via RFC 5226 Specification Required. Values from the
	inclusive range 224-255 (decimal) are reserved for RFC 5226		inclusive range 224-255 (decimal) are reserved for RFC 5226
	Private Use.		Private Use.
	7 Normative References		7 Normative References
	[RFC2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	[RFC5226] T. Narten, H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an		[RFC5226] T. Narten, H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA
	IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226,
	[RFC5246] T. Dierks, E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security		[RFC5246] T. Dierks, E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
	(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008		(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008
	[RFC4366] S. Blake-Wilson, M. Nystrom, D. Hopwood, J. Mikkelsen,		[RFC4366] S. Blake-Wilson, M. Nystrom, D. Hopwood, J. Mikkelsen, T.
	T. Wright, "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions",		Wright, "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions", RFC
			NOTE: RFC 4366 will be updated by RFC4366bis, currently in IESG
			process.
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Stefan Santesson		Stefan Santesson
	3xA Security AB		3xA Security AB
	Bjornstorp 744		Bjornstorp 744
	247 98 Genarp		247 98 Genarp
	Sweden		Sweden
	EMail: sts@aaa-sec.com		EMail: sts@aaa-sec.com
	Quynh Dang
	NIST
	100 Bureau Drive, Stop 8930
	Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930
	USA
	Email: quynh.dang@nist.gov
	Full Copyright Statement
	Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of
	publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/licenseinfo).
	Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
	and restrictions with respect to this document.
	All IETF Documents and the information contained therein are provided
	on an "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE
	REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE
	IETF TRUST AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL
	WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY
	WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION THEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE
	ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS
	FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
	Expires December 2009
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