--- 1/draft-ietf-tls-ctr-00.txt 2006-06-16 22:12:53.000000000 +0200 +++ 2/draft-ietf-tls-ctr-01.txt 2006-06-16 22:12:53.000000000 +0200 @@ -1,19 +1,19 @@ Network Working Group N. Modadugu Internet-Draft Stanford University -Expires: August 30, 2006 E. Rescorla +Expires: December 15, 2006 E. Rescorla Network Resonance - February 26, 2006 + June 13, 2006 AES Counter Mode Cipher Suites for TLS and DTLS - draft-ietf-tls-ctr-00.txt + draft-ietf-tls-ctr-01.txt Status of this Memo By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that @@ -24,50 +24,52 @@ and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. - This Internet-Draft will expire on August 30, 2006. + This Internet-Draft will expire on December 15, 2006. Copyright Notice Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006). Abstract This document describes the use of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Counter Mode for use as a Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) confidentiality mechanism. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 - 1.1. Conventions Used In This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 - 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 + 1.1. Conventions Used In This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 + 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Encrypting Records with AES Counter Mode . . . . . . . . . . . 4 - 3.1. TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 - 3.1.1. AES Counter Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 3.1. TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 3.1.1. Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 3.1.2. Decryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 3.1.3. Counter Block Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2. DTLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 - 3.3. Padding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 - 3.4. Session Resumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 - 4. Design Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 - 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 - 5.1. Maximum Key Lifetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 - 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 - 7. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 - Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 - Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 9 + 3.3. Padding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 3.4. Session Resumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 4. Design Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 5.1. Maximum Key Lifetime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 + 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 + 7. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 + Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 10 1. Introduction Transport Layer Security [3] provides channel-oriented security for application layer protocols. In TLS, cryptographic algorithms are specified in "Cipher Suites, which consist of a group of algorithms to be used together." Cipher suites supported by TLS are divided into stream and block ciphers. Counter mode ciphers behave like stream ciphers, but are @@ -83,186 +85,226 @@ compared to AES-CBC as used in TLS 1.1 and DTLS. 16 bytes are saved from not having to transmit an explicit IV, and another 1-16 bytes are saved from the absence of the padding block. Random Access: AES-CTR is capable of random access within the key stream. For DTLS, this implies that records can be processed out of order without dependency on packet arrival order, and also without keystream buffering. Parallelizable: As a consequence of AES-CTR supporting random access - within the key stream, the cipher can be easily parallelized. + within the key stream, making the cipher amenable to parallelizing + and pipelining in hardware. Multiple mode support: AES-CTR support in TLS/DTLS allows for implementator to support both a stream (CTR) and block (CBC) - cipher through the implemention of a single symmetric algorithm. + cipher through the implementation of a single symmetric algorithm. 1.1. Conventions Used In This Document The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [1]. 2. Terminology This document reuses some terminology introduced in [2] and [3]. The - term 'counter block' has the same meaning as used in RFC3686, - however, the term 'IV', in this document, holds the meaning defined - in [3]. + term 'counter block' has the same meaning as used in [2]. However, + the term 'IV' in this document, holds the meaning defined in [3]. 3. Encrypting Records with AES Counter Mode - The use of AES-CTR in TLS/DTLS turns out to be fairly - straightforward, with the additional benefit that the method of - operation in TLS/DTLS mimics, to a large extent, that in IPsec. The - primary constraint on the use of counter mode ciphers is that for a - given key, a counter block value MUST never be used more than once - (see Section 7 of [2] for a detailed explanation.) In TLS/DTLS - ensuring that counter block values never repeat during a given - session is straightforward as explained in the following sections. - - SSL/TLS records encrypted with AES-CTR mode use a - CipherSpec.cipher_type of GenericStreamCipher (Section 6.2.3 of [3]). + AES-CTR is functionally equivalent to a stream cipher; it generates a + pseudo-random cipher stream that is XORed into the plaintext to form + ciphertext. -3.1. TLS + The cipher stream is generated by applying the AES encrypt operation + on a sequence of 128-bit counter blocks. Counter blocks, in turn, + are generated based on record sequence numbers (in the case of TLS), + or a combination of record sequence and epoch numbers (in the case of + DTLS.) - The cipher stream generated by AES-CTR is much like the cipher stream - generated by stream ciphers like RC4. For reasons described in - Section 7 of [2], a counter block value MUST never be used more than - once with a given key. This is achieved by having part of the per- - record IV determined by the record sequence number. Although the - client and server use the same sequence number space, they use - different keys and IVs. + It should be noted that although the client and server use the same + sequence number space, they use different write keys and counter + blocks. -3.1.1. AES Counter Mode + There is one important constraint on the use of counter mode ciphers: + for a given key, a counter block value MUST never be used more than + once. - AES counter mode requires the encryptor and decryptor to share a per- - record unique counter block. A given counter block MUST never be - used more than once with the same key. For a more in-depth - discussion of AES-CTR operation, refer to Section 2.1 of [2]. The - following description of AES-CTR mode has been adapted from [2]. + This constraint is required because a given key and counter block + value completely specify a portion of the cipher stream. Hence, a + particular counter block value when used (with a given key) to + generate more than one ciphertext leaks information about the + corresponding plaintexts. For a detailed explanation, see Section 7 + of [2]. - To encrypt a payload with AES-CTR, the encryptor partitions the - plaintext, PT, into 128-bit blocks. The final block MAY be less than - 128 bits. + Given this constraint, the challenge then is in the design of the + counter block. We describe the construction of the counter block in + the following sections. - PT = PT[1] PT[2] ... PT[n] + TLS/DTLS records encrypted with AES-CTR mode use a + CipherSpec.cipher_type of GenericStreamCipher (Section 6.2.3 of [3]). - Each PT block is XORed with a block of the key stream to generate the - ciphertext, CT. The AES encryption of each counter block results in - 128 bits of key stream. +3.1. TLS - To construct the counter block, the most significant 48 bits of the - counter block are set to the 48 low order bits of the client_write_IV - (for the half-duplex stream originated by the client) or the 48 low - order bits of the server_write_IV (for the half-duplex stream - originated by the server.) The following 64 bits of the counter - block are set to record sequence number, and the remaining 16 bits - function as the block counter. The least significant bit of the - counter block is initially set to one. This counter value is - incremented by one to generate subsequent counter blocks, each - resulting in another 128 bits of key stream. + AES counter mode requires the encryptor and decryptor to share a per- + record unique counter block. As previously stated, a given counter + block MUST never be used more than once with the same key. The + following description of AES-CTR mode has been adapted from [2]. - struct { - case client: - uint48 client_write_IV; // low order 48-bits - case server: - uint48 server_write_IV; // low order 48-bits - uint64 seq_num; - uint16 blk_ctr; - } CtrBlk; +3.1.1. Encryption - The seq_num and blk_ctr fields of the counter block are initialized - for each record processed, while the IV is initialized immediately - after a key calculation is made (key calculations are made whenver a - TLS/DTLS handshake, either full or abbreviated, is executed.) seq_num - is set to the sequence number of the record, and blk_ctr is - initialized to 1. + To encrypt a payload with AES-CTR, the encryptor sequentially + partitions the plaintext (PT) into 128-bit blocks. The final PT + block MAY be less than 128-bits. This partitioning is denoted as: - Note that the block counter does not overflow since the maximum TLS/ - DTLS record size is 14 KB and 16 bits of blk_ctr allow the generation - of 1MB of keying material per record. + PT = PT[1] PT[2] ... PT[n] + In order to encrypt, each PT block is XORed with a block of the key + stream to generate the ciphertext (CT.) The keystream is generated + via the AES encryption of each counter block value, with each + encryption operation producing 128-bits of key stream. - The encryption of n plaintext blocks can be summarized as: + The encryption operation is performed as follows: FOR i := 1 to n-1 DO CT[i] := PT[i] XOR AES(CtrBlk) CtrBlk := CtrBlk + 1 END CT[n] := PT[n] XOR TRUNC(AES(CtrBlk)) The AES() function performs AES encryption with the fresh key. The TRUNC() function truncates the output of the AES encrypt operation to the same length as the final plaintext block, returning - the most significant bits. + the leftmost bits. - Decryption is similar. The decryption of n ciphertext blocks can be - summarized as: +3.1.2. Decryption + + Decryption is similar to encryption. The decryption of n ciphertext + blocks is performed as follows: FOR i := 1 to n-1 DO PT[i] := CT[i] XOR AES(CtrBlk) CtrBlk := CtrBlk + 1 END PT[n] := CT[n] XOR TRUNC(AES(CtrBlk)) - For TLS, no part of the counter block need be transmitted, since the - client_write_IV and server_write_IV are derived during the key - calculation phase, and the record sequence number is implicit. + + The AES() and TRUNC() operate identically as in the case of + encryption. + +3.1.3. Counter Block Construction + + To construct the counter block, the leftmost 48-bits of the counter + block are set to the rightmost 48-bits of the client_write_IV (for + the half-duplex stream originated by the client) or the rightmost 48- + bits of the server_write_IV (for the half-duplex stream originated by + the server.) The following 64-bits of the counter block are set to + record sequence number, and the remaining 16-bits function as the + block counter. The block counter is a 16-bit unsigned integer in + network byte order (i.e. big-endien). The block counter is initially + set to one, and is incremented by one to generate subsequent counter + blocks, each resulting in another 128-bits of key stream. + + The structure of the counter block is depicted below: + + struct { + case client: + uint48 client_write_IV; // low order 48-bits + case server: + uint48 server_write_IV; // low order 48-bits + uint64 seq_num; + uint16 blk_ctr; + } CtrBlk; + + The seq_num and blk_ctr fields of the counter block are initialized + for each record processed, while the IV is initialized immediately + after a key calculation is made (key calculations are made whenever a + TLS/DTLS handshake, either full or abbreviated, is executed.) seq_num + is set to the sequence number of the record, and blk_ctr is + initialized to 1. + + Note that the block counter does not overflow since the maximum size + of input to the record payload protection layer in TLS or DTLS + (TLSCompressed.length) is 2^14 + 1024 octets, and 16 bits of blk_ctr + allow the generation of 2^20 octets (2^16 AES blocks) of keying + material per record. + + Note that for TLS, no part of the counter block need be transmitted, + since the client_write_IV and server_write_IV are derived during the + key calculation phase, and the record sequence number is implicit. 3.2. DTLS The operation of AES-CTR in DTLS is the same as in TLS, with the only difference being the inclusion of the epoch in the counter block. The counter block is constructed as follows for DTLS: struct { case client: uint48 client_write_IV; // low order 48-bits case server: uint48 server_write_IV; // low order 48-bits uint16 epoch; uint48 seq_num; uint16 blk_ctr; } CtrBlk; - The epoch and record sequence number used for generating the counter - block are extracted from the received record. + For decryption, the epoch and seq_num fields are initialized based on + the corresponding values in a received record. 3.3. Padding Stream ciphers in TLS and DTLS do not require plaintext padding. 3.4. Session Resumption TLS supports session resumption via caching of session ID's and connection parameters on both client and server. While resumed sessions use the same master secret that was originally negotiated, a resumed session uses new keys that are derived, in part, using fresh client_random and server_random parameters. As a result resumed - sessions do not use the same encryption keys or IVs as the original + sessions do not use the same encryption keys or IV's as the original session. 4. Design Rationale An alternate design for the construction of the counter block would be the use of an explicit 'record tag' (as a substitute for the implicit record sequence number) that could potentially be generated - via an LFSR. Such a design, however, suffers two major drawbacks - when used in the TLS or DTLS protocol, without offering any - significant benefit: (1) in both TLS and DTLS inclusion of such a tag - would incur a bandwidth cost, (2) all TLS and DTLS associations have - per-record sequence numbers which can be used to ensure counter - uniqueness. + via an LFSR. Such a design, however, suffers a major drawback when + used in the TLS or DTLS protocol, without offering any significant + benefit: in both TLS and DTLS inclusion of such a tag would incur a + bandwidth cost. 5. Security Considerations - See Section 7. of [2]. + The security considerations for the use of AES-CTR in TLS/DTLS are + specified below. The below text is based heavily on that for AES-CTR + in IPsec [2]. + + o Counter blocks must not be used more than once with a given key. + Doing so allows a passive attacker to determine the XOR of the + affected plain text blocks. Extracting two plaintexts from their + XOR is a relatively straightforward operation. Because the + counter block is derived from the per-record sequence, this means + that sequence numbers MUST never be re-used with different data. + Note, however, that retransmitting the same record in DTLS is + safe. + o AES-CTR can be used in pre-shared key mode, since session keys and + not pre-shared keys are used for ciphering. Also, since separate + read and write keys are generated, counter blocks generated by + client and server can safely overlap. + o As with other stream ciphers, data forgery is trivial if no + message integrity mechanism is employed. This threat is of no + concern in TLS/DTLS since all ciphersuites that support encryption + also employ message integrity. 5.1. Maximum Key Lifetime TLS/DTLS sessions employing AES-CTR MUST be renegotiated before sequence numbers repeat. In the case of TLS, this implies a maximum of 2^64 records per session, while for DTLS the maximum is 2^48 (with the remaining bits reserved for epoch.) 6. IANA Considerations @@ -284,22 +326,22 @@ 7. Normative References [1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. [2] Housley, R., "Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Counter Mode With IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC 3686, January 2004. - [3] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.1", - draft-ietf-tls-rfc2246-bis-13 (work in progress), June 2005. + [3] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) + Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346, April 2006. Authors' Addresses Nagendra Modadugu Stanford University 353 Serra Mall Stanford, CA 94305 USA Email: nagendra@cs.stanford.edu