draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-02.txt   draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-03.txt 
Network Working Group J. Mattsson Network Working Group J. Mattsson
Internet-Draft D. Migault Internet-Draft D. Migault
Intended status: Standards Track Ericsson Intended status: Standards Track Ericsson
Expires: October 12, 2017 April 10, 2017 Expires: November 4, 2017 May 3, 2017
ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport Layer ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport Layer
Security (TLS) Security (TLS)
draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-02 draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-03
Abstract Abstract
This document defines several new cipher suites for the Transport This document defines several new cipher suites for the Transport
Layer Security (TLS) protocol. The cipher suites are all based on Layer Security (TLS) protocol. The cipher suites are all based on
the Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman with Pre-Shared Key the Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman with Pre-Shared Key
(ECDHE_PSK) key exchange together with the Authenticated Encryption (ECDHE_PSK) key exchange together with the Authenticated Encryption
with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithms AES-GCM and AES-CCM. PSK with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithms AES-GCM and AES-CCM. PSK
provides light and efficient authentication, ECDHE provides perfect provides light and efficient authentication, ECDHE provides perfect
forward secrecy, and AES-GCM and AES-CCM provides encryption and forward secrecy, and AES-GCM and AES-CCM provides encryption and
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 12, 2017. This Internet-Draft will expire on November 4, 2017.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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This document defines the following new cipher suites, whose values This document defines the following new cipher suites, whose values
have been assigned in the TLS Cipher Suite Registry defined by have been assigned in the TLS Cipher Suite Registry defined by
[RFC5246]. [RFC5246].
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xTBD; 0xTBD} {0xD0,0x01}; TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xTBD; 0xTBD} {0xD0,0x01};
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xTBD; 0xTBD} {0xD0,0x02}; TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xTBD; 0xTBD} {0xD0,0x02};
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 = {0xTBD; 0xTBD} {0xD0,0x03}; TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 = {0xTBD; 0xTBD} {0xD0,0x03};
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 = {0xTBD; 0xTBD} {0xD0,0x05}; TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 = {0xTBD; 0xTBD} {0xD0,0x05};
The cipher suite numbers listed in the second column are numbers used The cipher suite numbers listed in the last column are numbers used
for cipher suite interoperability testing and it's suggested that for cipher suite interoperability testing and it's suggested that
IANA use these values for assignment. IANA use these values for assignment.
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
The security considerations in TLS 1.2 [RFC5246], DTLS 1.2 [RFC6347], The security considerations in TLS 1.2 [RFC5246], DTLS 1.2 [RFC6347],
TLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13], ECDHE_PSK [RFC5489], AES-GCM [RFC5288], TLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13], ECDHE_PSK [RFC5489], AES-GCM [RFC5288],
and AES-CCM [RFC6655] apply to this document as well. and AES-CCM [RFC6655] apply to this document as well.
All the cipher suites defined in this document provide All the cipher suites defined in this document provide
confidentiality, mutual authentication, and perfect forward secrecy. confidentiality, mutual authentication, and perfect forward secrecy.
The AES-128 cipher suites provide 128-bit security and the AES-256 The AES-128 cipher suites provide 128-bit security and the AES-256
cipher suites provide at least 192-bit security. However, cipher suites provide at least 192-bit security. However,
AES_128_CCM_8 only provides 64-bit security against message forgery. AES_128_CCM_8 only provides 64-bit security against message forgery.
Use of Pre-Shared Keys of limited entropy may allow an active Use of Pre-Shared Keys of limited entropy may allow an active
attacker attempts to connect to the server and tries different keys. attacker attempts to connect to the server and try different keys.
For example, limited entropy may be provided by using short PSK in For example, limited entropy may be provided by using short PSK in
which case an attacker may perform a brute-force attack. Other which case an attacker may perform a brute-force attack. Another
example includes the use of a PSK chosen by a human and thus may be example includes the use of a PSK chosen by a human and thus may be
exposed to dictionary attacks. exposed to dictionary attacks.
The Pre-Shared Keys used for authentication MUST have a security The Pre-Shared Keys used for authentication MUST have a security
level equal or higher than the cipher suite used, i.e. at least level equal or higher than the cipher suite used, i.e. at least
128-bit for the AES-128 cipher suites and at least 192-bit for the 128-bit for the AES-128 cipher suites and at least 192-bit for the
AES-256 cipher suites. AES-256 cipher suites.
7. Acknowledgements 7. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Ilari Liusvaara, Eric Rescorla, Dan The authors would like to thank Ilari Liusvaara, Eric Rescorla, Dan
Harkins, Russ Housley, Dan Harkins, Martin Thomson, Nikos Harkins, Russ Housley, Dan Harkins, Martin Thomson, Nikos
Mavrogiannopoulos, Peter Dettman, Xiaoyin Liu and Sean Turner for Mavrogiannopoulos, Peter Dettman, Xiaoyin Liu, Joseph Salowey, Sean
their valuable comments and feedback. Turner and Kathleen Moriarty for their valuable comments and
feedback.
8. References 8. References
8.1. Normative References 8.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4492bis] [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4492bis]
Nir, Y., Josefsson, S., and M. Pegourie-Gonnard, "Elliptic Nir, Y., Josefsson, S., and M. Pegourie-Gonnard, "Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer
Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier", draft-ietf-tls- Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier", draft-ietf-tls-
rfc4492bis-16 (work in progress), March 2017. rfc4492bis-16 (work in progress), March 2017.
[I-D.ietf-tls-tls13] [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]
Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", draft-ietf-tls-tls13-19 (work in progress), Version 1.3", draft-ietf-tls-tls13-20 (work in progress),
March 2017. April 2017.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4279] Eronen, P., Ed. and H. Tschofenig, Ed., "Pre-Shared Key [RFC4279] Eronen, P., Ed. and H. Tschofenig, Ed., "Pre-Shared Key
Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 4279, DOI 10.17487/RFC4279, December 2005, RFC 4279, DOI 10.17487/RFC4279, December 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4279>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4279>.
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