draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-05.txt   rfc8442.txt 
Network Working Group J. Mattsson Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) J. Mattsson
Internet-Draft D. Migault Request for Comments: 8442 D. Migault
Intended status: Standards Track Ericsson Category: Standards Track Ericsson
Expires: November 25, 2017 May 24, 2017 ISSN: 2070-1721 September 2018
ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport Layer ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites
Security (TLS) Protocol version 1.2 for TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2
draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-psk-aead-05
Abstract Abstract
This document defines several new cipher suites for the Transport This document defines several new cipher suites for version 1.2 of
Layer Security (TLS) protocol version 1.2. The cipher suites are all the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol and version 1.2 of the
based on the Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman with Pre-Shared Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol. These cipher
Key (ECDHE_PSK) key exchange together with the Authenticated suites are based on the Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman with
Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithms AES-GCM and AES- Pre-Shared Key (ECDHE_PSK) key exchange together with the
CCM. PSK provides light and efficient authentication, ECDHE provides Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithms
forward secrecy, and AES-GCM and AES-CCM provides encryption and AES-GCM and AES-CCM. PSK provides light and efficient
integrity protection. authentication, ECDHE provides forward secrecy, and AES-GCM and
AES-CCM provide encryption and integrity protection.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This is an Internet Standards Track document.
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference received public review and has been approved for publication by the
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 25, 2017. Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8442.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction ....................................................2
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Requirements Notation ...........................................3
3. ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites . . . . . . 3 3. ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites ................3
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. IANA Considerations .............................................4
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5. Security Considerations .........................................4
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6. References ......................................................5
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6.1. Normative References .......................................5
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6.2. Informative References .....................................6
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Acknowledgements ...................................................7
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Authors' Addresses .................................................7
1. Requirements notation
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document defines new cipher suites that provide Pre-Shared Key This document defines new cipher suites that provide Pre-Shared Key
(PSK) authentication, Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS), and (PSK) authentication, Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS), and
Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD). The cipher Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD). The cipher
suites are defined for version 1.2 of the Transport Layer Security suites are defined for version 1.2 of the Transport Layer Security
(TLS) [RFC5246] protocol and version 1.2 of the Datagram Transport (TLS) protocol [RFC5246] and version 1.2 of the Datagram Transport
Layer Security (DTLS) protocol [RFC6347]. Layer Security (DTLS) protocol [RFC6347].
Pre-Shared Key (PSK) Authentication is widely used in many scenarios. PSK authentication is widely used in many scenarios. One deployment
One deployment is 3GPP networks where pre-shared keys are used to is 3GPP networks where pre-shared keys are used to authenticate both
authenticate both subscriber and network. Another deployment is subscriber and network. Another deployment is Internet of Things
Internet of Things where PSK authentication is often preferred for where PSK authentication is often preferred for performance and
performance and energy efficiency reasons. In both scenarios the energy efficiency reasons. In both scenarios, the endpoints are
endpoints are owned/controlled by a party that provisions the pre- owned and/or controlled by a party that provisions the pre-shared
shared keys and makes sure that they provide a high level of entropy. keys and makes sure that they provide a high level of entropy.
Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) is a strongly recommended feature in Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) is a strongly recommended feature in
security protocol design and can be accomplished by using an security protocol design and can be accomplished by using an
ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange method. Ephemeral Elliptic ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange method. Ephemeral Elliptic
Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE) provides PFS with excellent performance Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE) provides PFS with excellent performance
and small key sizes. ECDHE is mandatory to implement in both HTTP/2 and small key sizes. ECDHE is mandatory to implement in both HTTP/2
[RFC7540] and CoAP [RFC7252]. [RFC7540] and the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252].
AEAD algorithms that combine encryption and integrity protection are AEAD algorithms that combine encryption and integrity protection are
strongly recommended for (D)TLS [RFC7525] and non-AEAD algorithms are strongly recommended for (D)TLS [RFC7525], and TLS 1.3 [RFC8446]
forbidden to use in TLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]. The AEAD forbids the use of non-AEAD algorithms. The AEAD algorithms
algorithms considered in this document are AES-GCM and AES-CCM. The considered in this document are AES-GCM and AES-CCM. The use of
use of AES-GCM in TLS is defined in [RFC5288] and the use of AES-CCM AES-GCM in TLS is defined in [RFC5288], and the use of AES-CCM is
is defined in [RFC6655]. defined in [RFC6655].
[RFC4279] defines Pre-Shared Key (PSK) cipher suites for TLS but does [RFC4279] defines PSK cipher suites for TLS but does not consider
not consider Elliptic Curve Cryptography. [RFC4492] introduces elliptic curve cryptography. [RFC8422] introduces elliptic curve
Elliptic Curve Cryptography for TLS but does not consider PSK cryptography for TLS but does not consider PSK authentication.
authentication. [RFC5487] describes the use of AES-GCM in [RFC5487] describes the use of AES-GCM in combination with PSK
combination with PSK authentication, but does not consider ECDHE. authentication but does not consider ECDHE. [RFC5489] describes the
[RFC5489] describes the use of PSK in combination with ECDHE but does use of PSK in combination with ECDHE but does not consider AES-GCM or
not consider AES-GCM or AES-CCM. AES-CCM.
2. Requirements Notation
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites 3. ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites
The cipher suites defined in this document are based on the AES-GCM The cipher suites defined in this document are based on the following
and AES-CCM Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) AES-GCM and AES-CCM AEAD algorithms: AEAD_AES_128_GCM [RFC5116],
algorithms AEAD_AES_128_GCM, AEAD_AES_256_GCM, AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8 AEAD_AES_256_GCM [RFC5116], AEAD_AES_128_CCM [RFC5116], and
defined in [RFC6655] and AEAD_AES_128_CCM defined in [RFC5116]. AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8 [RFC6655].
Messages and premaster secret construction in this document are Messages and premaster secret construction in this document are
defined in [RFC5489]. The ServerKeyExchange and ClientKeyExchange defined in [RFC5489]. The ServerKeyExchange and ClientKeyExchange
messages are used and the premaster secret is computed as for the messages are used, and the premaster secret is computed as for the
ECDHE_PSK key exchange. The elliptic curve parameters used in in the ECDHE_PSK key exchange. The elliptic curve parameters used in the
Diffie-Hellman parameters are negotiated using extensions defined in Diffie-Hellman parameters are negotiated using extensions defined in
[I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4492bis]. [RFC8422].
For TLS 1.2, the following cipher suites are defined:
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xTBD,0xTBD}; For TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2, the following cipher suites are defined:
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xTBD,0xTBD};
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 = {0xTBD,0xTBD};
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 = {0xTBD,0xTBD};
The assigned code points can only be used for TLS 1.2. TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xD0,0x01}
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xD0,0x02}
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 = {0xD0,0x03}
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 = {0xD0,0x05}
The assigned code points can only be used for TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2.
The cipher suites defined in this document MUST NOT be negotiated for The cipher suites defined in this document MUST NOT be negotiated for
any version of (D)TLS other than TLS 1.2. Servers MUST NOT select any version of (D)TLS other than version 1.2. Servers MUST NOT
one of these cipher suites when selecting TLS version other than TLS select one of these cipher suites when selecting a (D)TLS version
1.2. A client MUST treat the selection of these cipher suites in other than version 1.2. A client MUST treat the selection of these
combination with a different version of TLS as an error and generate cipher suites in combination with a different version of (D)TLS as an
a fatal 'illegal_parameter' TLS alert. error and generate a fatal 'illegal_parameter' TLS alert.
Cipher suites TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, Cipher suites TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 and TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 are used to TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256, and TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 are used to
support equivalent functionality in TLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]. support equivalent functionality in TLS 1.3 [RFC8446].
4. IANA Considerations 4. IANA Considerations
This document defines the following new cipher suites, whose values This document defines the following new cipher suites for TLS 1.2 and
have been assigned in the TLS Cipher Suite Registry defined by DTLS 1.2. The values have been assigned in the "TLS Cipher Suites"
[RFC5246]. registry defined by [RFC8446] and [RFC8447].
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {0xTBD; 0xTBD} {0xD0,0x01};
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {0xTBD; 0xTBD} {0xD0,0x02};
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 = {0xTBD; 0xTBD} {0xD0,0x03};
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 = {0xTBD; 0xTBD} {0xD0,0x05};
NOTE TO THE RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THIS PARAGRAPH. The cipher Value Description DTLS-OK Recommended
suite numbers listed in the last column are numbers used for cipher ----- ----------- ------- -----------
suite interoperability testing and it's suggested that IANA use these {0xD0,0x01} TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 Y Y
values for assignment. {0xD0,0x02} TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 Y Y
{0xD0,0x03} TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 Y N
{0xD0,0x05} TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 Y Y
5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
The security considerations in TLS 1.2 [RFC5246], DTLS 1.2 [RFC6347], The security considerations in TLS 1.2 [RFC5246], DTLS 1.2 [RFC6347],
PSK Ciphersuites for TLS [RFC4279], ECDHE_PSK [RFC5489], AES-GCM PSK Ciphersuites for TLS [RFC4279], ECDHE_PSK [RFC5489], AES-GCM
[RFC5288], and AES-CCM [RFC6655] apply to this document as well. [RFC5288], and AES-CCM [RFC6655] apply to this document as well.
All the cipher suites defined in this document provide All the cipher suites defined in this document provide
confidentiality, mutual authentication, and forward secrecy. The confidentiality, mutual authentication, and forward secrecy. The
AES-128 cipher suites provide 128-bit security and the AES-256 cipher AES-128 cipher suites provide 128-bit security, and the AES-256
suites provide at least 192-bit security. However, AES_128_CCM_8 cipher suites provide at least 192-bit security. However,
only provides 64-bit security against message forgery. AES_128_CCM_8 only provides 64-bit security against message forgery.
The Pre-Shared Keys used for authentication MUST have a security
level equal or higher than the cipher suite used, i.e., at least
128-bit for the AES-128 cipher suites and at least 192-bit for the
AES-256 cipher suites.
GCM or CCM encryption - even of different clear text - re-using a
nonce with a same key undermines the security of GCM and CCM. As a
result, GCM and CCM MUST only be used with a system guaranteeing
nonce uniqueness [RFC5116].
6. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Ilari Liusvaara, Eric Rescorla, Dan
Harkins, Russ Housley, Dan Harkins, Martin Thomson, Nikos
Mavrogiannopoulos, Peter Dettman, Xiaoyin Liu, Joseph Salowey, Sean
Turner Dave Garrett, Martin Rex and Kathleen Moriarty for their
valuable comments and feedback.
7. References The pre-shared keys used for authentication MUST have a security
level equal to or higher than the cipher suite used, i.e., at least
128-bit security for the AES-128 cipher suites and at least 192-bit
security for the AES-256 cipher suites.
7.1. Normative References GCM or CCM encryption that reuses a nonce with a same key undermines
the security of GCM and CCM. As a result, GCM and CCM MUST only be
used with a system guaranteeing nonce uniqueness [RFC5116].
[I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4492bis] 6. References
Nir, Y., Josefsson, S., and M. Pegourie-Gonnard, "Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer
Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier", draft-ietf-tls-
rfc4492bis-17 (work in progress), May 2017.
[I-D.ietf-tls-tls13] 6.1. Normative References
Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", draft-ietf-tls-tls13-20 (work in progress),
April 2017.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4279] Eronen, P., Ed. and H. Tschofenig, Ed., "Pre-Shared Key [RFC4279] Eronen, P., Ed. and H. Tschofenig, Ed., "Pre-Shared Key
Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 4279, DOI 10.17487/RFC4279, December 2005, RFC 4279, DOI 10.17487/RFC4279, December 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4279>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4279>.
[RFC5116] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated [RFC5116] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
Encryption", RFC 5116, DOI 10.17487/RFC5116, January 2008, Encryption", RFC 5116, DOI 10.17487/RFC5116, January 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5116>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5116>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008, DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC5288] Salowey, J., Choudhury, A., and D. McGrew, "AES Galois [RFC5288] Salowey, J., Choudhury, A., and D. McGrew, "AES Galois
Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS", RFC 5288, Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS", RFC 5288,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5288, August 2008, DOI 10.17487/RFC5288, August 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5288>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5288>.
[RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer [RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347, Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
January 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>. January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.
[RFC6655] McGrew, D. and D. Bailey, "AES-CCM Cipher Suites for [RFC6655] McGrew, D. and D. Bailey, "AES-CCM Cipher Suites for
Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 6655, Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 6655,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6655, July 2012, DOI 10.17487/RFC6655, July 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6655>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6655>.
7.2. Informative References [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC4492] Blake-Wilson, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C., and B. [RFC8422] Nir, Y., Josefsson, S., and M. Pegourie-Gonnard, "Elliptic
Moeller, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4492, Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier", RFC 8422,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4492, May 2006, DOI 10.17487/RFC8422, August 2018,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4492>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8422>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
6.2. Informative References
[RFC5487] Badra, M., "Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for TLS with SHA- [RFC5487] Badra, M., "Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for TLS with SHA-
256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode", RFC 5487, 256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode", RFC 5487,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5487, March 2009, DOI 10.17487/RFC5487, March 2009,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5487>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5487>.
[RFC5489] Badra, M. and I. Hajjeh, "ECDHE_PSK Cipher Suites for [RFC5489] Badra, M. and I. Hajjeh, "ECDHE_PSK Cipher Suites for
Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5489, Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5489,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5489, March 2009, DOI 10.17487/RFC5489, March 2009,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5489>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5489>.
[RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained [RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252, Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014, DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.
[RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, [RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>. 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.
[RFC7540] Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext [RFC7540] Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", RFC 7540, Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", RFC 7540,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015, DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7540>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7540>.
[RFC8447] Salowey, J. and S. Turner, "IANA Registry Updates for TLS
and DTLS", RFC 8447, DOI 10.17487/RFC8447, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8447>.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Ilari Liusvaara, Eric Rescorla, Dan
Harkins, Russ Housley, Dan Harkins, Martin Thomson, Nikos
Mavrogiannopoulos, Peter Dettman, Xiaoyin Liu, Joseph Salowey, Sean
Turner, Dave Garrett, Martin Rex, and Kathleen Moriarty for their
valuable comments and feedback.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
John Mattsson John Mattsson
Ericsson AB Ericsson AB
SE-164 80 Stockholm SE-164 80 Stockholm
Sweden Sweden
Phone: +46 76 115 35 01 Phone: +46 76 115 35 01
Email: john.mattsson@ericsson.com Email: john.mattsson@ericsson.com
skipping to change at page 7, line 4 skipping to change at page 7, line 22
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
John Mattsson John Mattsson
Ericsson AB Ericsson AB
SE-164 80 Stockholm SE-164 80 Stockholm
Sweden Sweden
Phone: +46 76 115 35 01 Phone: +46 76 115 35 01
Email: john.mattsson@ericsson.com Email: john.mattsson@ericsson.com
Daniel Migault Daniel Migault
Ericsson Ericsson
8400 boulevard Decarie 8400 Boulevard Decarie
Montreal, QC H4P 2N2 Montreal, QC H4P 2N2
Canada Canada
Phone: +1 514-452-2160 Phone: +1 514-452-2160
Email: daniel.migault@ericsson.com Email: daniel.migault@ericsson.com
 End of changes. 45 change blocks. 
152 lines changed or deleted 148 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.47. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/