draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-00.txt   draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-01.txt 
Internet Engineering Task Force K. Moriarty Internet Engineering Task Force K. Moriarty
Internet-Draft Dell EMC Internet-Draft Dell EMC
Updates: [[List TBD]] (if approved) S. Farrell Updates: 8465 8422 7568 7562 7507 7465 S. Farrell
Intended status: Standards Track Trinity College Dublin 7255 7030 6750 6749 6739 6367 Trinity College Dublin
Expires: March 18, 2019 September 14, 2018 6176 6042 5878 5734 5469 5422 November 8, 2018
5364 5281 5263 5238 5216 5158
5091 5054 5049 5024 5023 5019
5018 4992 4976 4975 4964 4851
4823 4791 4785 4744 4743 4732
4712 4681 4680 4642 4616 4582
4540 4531 4513 4497 4279 4261
4235 4217 4168 4162 4111 4097
3983 3943 3903 3887 3871 3856
3767 3749 3656 3568 3552 3501
3470 3436 3329 3261 (if
approved)
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: May 12, 2019
Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1 Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1
draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-00 draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-01
Abstract Abstract
This document [if approved] formally deprecates Transport Layer This document, if approved, formally deprecates Transport Layer
Security (TLS) versions 1.0 [RFC2246] and 1.1 [RFC4346] and moves Security (TLS) versions 1.0 [RFC2246] and 1.1 [RFC4346] and moves
these documents to the historic state. These versions lack support these documents to the historic state. These versions lack support
for current and recommended cipher suites, and various government and for current and recommended cipher suites, and various government and
industry profiles of applications using TLS now mandate avoiding industry profiles of applications using TLS now mandate avoiding
these old TLS versions. TLSv1.2 has been the recommended version for these old TLS versions. TLSv1.2 has been the recommended version for
IETF protocols since 2008, providing sufficient time to transition IETF protocols since 2008, providing sufficient time to transition
away from older versions. Products having to support older versions away from older versions. Products having to support older versions
increase the attack surface unnecessarily and increase opportunities increase the attack surface unnecessarily and increase opportunities
for misconfigurations. Supporting these older versions also requires for misconfigurations. Supporting these older versions also requires
additional effort for library and product maintenance. additional effort for library and product maintenance.
This document updates the backward compatibility sections of TLS RFCs This document updates many RFCs that normatively refer to TLS1.0 or
[[list TBD]] to prohibit fallback to TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1. This TLS1.1 as described herein. This document also updates RFC 7525 and
document also updates RFC 7525. hence is part of BCP195.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
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This Internet-Draft will expire on March 18, 2019. This Internet-Draft will expire on May 12, 2019.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Updates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Support for Deprecation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Support for Deprecation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Removing Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. SHA-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. Do Not Use TLSv1.0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. Web . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. Do Not Use TLSv1.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. Mail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6. Updates to RFC7525 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3. Operating Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.4. Enterprise Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. SHA-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Do Not Use TLSv1.0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Do Not Use TLSv1.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. Do Not Use SHA-1 in TLSv1.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
9. Updates to RFC7525 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
[[Text in double-square brackets is intended to be fixed as the draft
evolves. You've seen that we need to figure out the list of RFCs
that this'd update in the abstract. There is a repo for this at:
https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate - PRs (on the xml
file) are welcome there.]]
Transport Layer Security (TLS) versions 1.0 [RFC2246] and 1.1 Transport Layer Security (TLS) versions 1.0 [RFC2246] and 1.1
[RFC4346] were superceded by TLSv1.2 [RFC5246] in 2008, which has now [RFC4346] were superceded by TLSv1.2 [RFC5246] in 2008, which has now
itself been superceded by TLSv1.3 [RFC8446]. It is therefore timely itself been superceded by TLSv1.3 [RFC8446]. It is therefore timely
to further deprecate these old versions. The expectation is that to further deprecate these old versions. The expectation is that
TLSv1.2 will continue to be used for many years alongside TLSv1.3. TLSv1.2 will continue to be used for many years alongside TLSv1.3.
TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.0 are also actively being deprecated in accordance TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.0 are also actively being deprecated in accordance
with guidance from government agencies (e.g. NIST SP 80052r2 with guidance from government agencies (e.g. NIST SP 80052r2
[NIST800-52r2]) and industry consortia such as the Payment Card [NIST800-52r2]) and industry consortia such as the Payment Card
Industry Association (PCI) [PCI-TLS1]. Industry Association (PCI) [PCI-TLS1].
skipping to change at page 3, line 41 skipping to change at page 3, line 44
libraries would need to use older versions of the libraries to libraries would need to use older versions of the libraries to
support TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1, which is clearly undesirable support TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1, which is clearly undesirable
Deprecation of these versions is intended to assist developers as Deprecation of these versions is intended to assist developers as
additional justification to no longer support older TLS versions and additional justification to no longer support older TLS versions and
to migrate to a minimum of TLSv1.2. Deprecation also assists product to migrate to a minimum of TLSv1.2. Deprecation also assists product
teams with phasing out support for the older versions to reduce the teams with phasing out support for the older versions to reduce the
attack surface and the scope of maintenance for protocols in their attack surface and the scope of maintenance for protocols in their
offerings. offerings.
[[This draft is being written now so that the TLS WG chairs can just 1.1. Updates
hit the "publication requested" button as soon as there is WG
consensus to deprecate these ancient versions of TLS. The authors
however think that deprecation now is timely.]]
1.1. Terminology This document updates these RFCs that normatively reference TLS1.0 or
TLS1.1 and have not been obsoleted: [RFC8465] [RFC8422] [RFC7568]
[RFC7562] [RFC7507] [RFC7465] [RFC7255] [RFC7030] [RFC6750] [RFC6749]
[RFC6739] [RFC6367] [RFC6176] [RFC6042] [RFC5878] [RFC5734] [RFC5469]
[RFC5422] [RFC5364] [RFC5281] [RFC5263] [RFC5238] [RFC5216] [RFC5158]
[RFC5091] [RFC5054] [RFC5049] [RFC5024] [RFC5023] [RFC5019] [RFC5018]
[RFC4992] [RFC4976] [RFC4975] [RFC4964] [RFC4851] [RFC4823] [RFC4791]
[RFC4785] [RFC4744] [RFC4743] [RFC4732] [RFC4712] [RFC4681] [RFC4680]
[RFC4642] [RFC4616] [RFC4582] [RFC4540] [RFC4531] [RFC4513] [RFC4497]
[RFC4279] [RFC4261] [RFC4235] [RFC4217] [RFC4168] [RFC4162] [RFC4111]
[RFC4097] [RFC3983] [RFC3943] [RFC3903] [RFC3887] [RFC3871] [RFC3856]
[RFC3767] [RFC3749] [RFC3656] [RFC3568] [RFC3552] [RFC3501] [RFC3470]
[RFC3436] [RFC3329] [RFC3261]
In addition these RFCs normatively refer to TLS1.0 or TLS1.1 and have
been obsoleted, or informatively refer to TLS1.0 or TLS1.1: [RFC5101]
[RFC5081] [RFC5077] [RFC4934] [RFC4572] [RFC4507] [RFC4492] [RFC4366]
[RFC4347] [RFC4244] [RFC4132] [RFC3920] [RFC3734] [RFC3588] [RFC3546]
[RFC3489] [RFC3316]
1.2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
2. Support for Deprecation 2. Support for Deprecation
Industry has actively followed guidance provided by NIST and the PCI Industry has actively followed guidance provided by NIST and the PCI
Council to deprecate TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1 by June 30, 2018. TLSv1.2 Council to deprecate TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1 by June 30, 2018. TLSv1.2
should remain a minimum baseline for TLS support at this time. should remain a minimum baseline for TLS support at this time.
Specific details on attacks against TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1 as well as Specific details on attacks against TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1 as well as
their mitigations are provided in NIST SP800-52r2 [NIST800-52r2], RFC their mitigations are provided in NIST SP800-52r2 [NIST800-52r2], RFC
7457 [RFC7457] and other referenced RFCs. Although the attacks have 7457 [RFC7457] and other referenced RFCs. Although the attacks have
been mitigated, if support is dropped for future library releases for been mitigated, if support is dropped for future library releases for
these versions, it is unlikely attacks found going forward will be these versions, it is unlikely attacks found going forward will be
mitigated in older library releases. mitigated in older library releases.
NIST for example have provided the following rationale, copied with NIST for example have provided the following rationale, copied with
permission from NIST SP800-52r2 [NIST800-52r2], section 1.2 "History permission from NIST SP800-52r2 [NIST800-52r2], section 1.2 "History
of TLS" (with references changed for RFC formatting). of TLS" (with references changed for RFC formatting).
TLS 1.1, specified in [RFC4346], was developed to address TLS 1.1, specified in [RFC4346], was developed to address
weaknesses discovered in TLS 1.0, primarily in the areas of weaknesses discovered in TLS 1.0, primarily in the areas of
skipping to change at page 5, line 8 skipping to change at page 5, line 26
TLS 1.3, specified in TLSv1.3 [RFC8446], represents a significant TLS 1.3, specified in TLSv1.3 [RFC8446], represents a significant
change to TLS that aims to address threats that have arisen over change to TLS that aims to address threats that have arisen over
the years. Among the changes are a new handshake protocol, a new the years. Among the changes are a new handshake protocol, a new
key derivation process that uses the HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand key derivation process that uses the HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
Key Derivation Function (HKDF), and the removal of cipher suites Key Derivation Function (HKDF), and the removal of cipher suites
that use static RSA or DH key exchanges, the CBC mode of that use static RSA or DH key exchanges, the CBC mode of
operation, or SHA-1. The list of extensions that can be used with operation, or SHA-1. The list of extensions that can be used with
TLS 1.3 has been reduced considerably. TLS 1.3 has been reduced considerably.
The Canadian government treasury board have mandated that these old The Canadian government treasury board have also mandated that these
versions of TLS not be used. [Canada] old versions of TLS not be used. [Canada]
3. Removing Support
[[This section can be removed upon publication - or maybe keep it?]]
Support for TLSv1.0 has been removed by the July 2018 PCI deadline
from the following standards, products, and services:
o 3GPP 5G
o Amazon Elastic Load Balancing [Amazon]
o CloudFlare [CloudFlare]
o Digicert [Digicert]
o GitHub [GIT]
o KeyCDN [KeyCDN]
o PayPal [paypal]
o Stripe [stripe]
o [[Numerous web sites...]]
Many web sites have taken the action of including the deprecation of
TLSv1.1 into their plans for deprecating TLSv1.0 for the PCI council
deadline. Support for TLSv1.1 has been removed by the July 2018 PCI
deadline from the following standards, products, and services:
o 3GPP 5G Release 16
o Amazon Elastic Load Balancing [Amazon]
o CloudFlare [CloudFlare]
o GitHub [GIT]
o PayPal [paypal]
o Stripe [stripe]
o [[Numerous web sites...]]
4. Usage
[[This section can be removed upon publication - or maybe keep it?]]
4.1. Web
Usage statistics for TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1 on the public web vary, but
have been in general very low and declined further with the impending
PCI deadline to migrate off of TLSv1.0 by June 30, 2018. As of
January 2018, [StackExchange] quoted 4 percent of browsers using
TLSv1.0.
The number of websites supporting TLS 1.2 is still growing (+0.4%),
and has reached 92% according to sslpulse as of June 19, 2018.
[SSLpulse] Deprecating TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 will thus not have a major
impact on browser or web server implementations.
Figure 1 presents statistics for use of TLS versions in the web.
+----------------+----------+------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
| Name/Ref | Date | SSLv3|TLSv1.0|TLSv1.1|TLSv1.2|TLSv1.3|
+----------------+----------+------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
! Alexa [1] | 20180226 | - | 2.0 | <0.1 | 97.9 | - |
| Cloudflare [2] | 20180518 | 0.0 | 9.3 | 0.2 | 84.9 | 5.5 |
| Firefox [3] | 20180709 | - | 1.0 | - | 94.0 | 5.0 |
| Chrome [4] | 20180711 | - | 0.4 | <0.1 | - | - |
+----------------+----------+------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
[1] https://scotthelme.co.uk/alexa-top-1-million-analysis-february-2018/
[2] https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg26578.html
[3] https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg26575.html
[4] https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg26620.html
Figure 1: Web Statistics
4.2. Mail
E-Mail uses TLS for SMTP, submission (port 587), POP/POP3 and IMAP.
Typically email deployments lag public web deployments in terms of
the rate of adoption of new TLS versions. Figure 2 presents
statistics for use of TLS versions in the email applications.
+----------------+----------+------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
| Name/Ref | Date | SSLv3|TLSv1.0|TLSv1.1|TLSv1.2|TLSv1.3|
+----------------+----------+------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
| Clusters [1] | 20180316 | <0.1 | 10.6 | <0.1 | 89.3 | - |
| TLSA [2] | 20180710 | - | 1.4 | 0.1 | 98.5 | - |
| UK-ESP [3] | 20180710 | - | 19.9 | <0.1 | - | - |
+----------------+----------+------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
[1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/299
[2] https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg26603.html
[3] https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg26603.html
Figure 2: Mail Statistics
4.3. Operating Systems
Figure 3 presents statistics for use of TLS versions in operating
systems.
+----------------+----------+------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
| Name/Ref | Date | SSLv3|TLSv1.0|TLSv1.1|TLSv1.2|TLSv1.3|
+----------------+----------+------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
| Windows cli [1]| 20180709 | - | >10.0 | ~0.3 | - | - |
| Windows svr [1]| 20180709 | - | ~1.5 | ~0.0 | - | - |
| Apple [2] | 20180709 | - | 0.4 | - | 99.6 | - |
+----------------+----------+------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
[1] https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg26577.html
[2] https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg26634.html
Figure 3: Operating System Statistics
4.4. Enterprise Networks
Figure 4 presents statistics for use of TLS versions in the
enterprise networks. The tcd.ie numbers below were the result of a
student project and need further validation.
+----------------+----------+------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
| Name/Ref | Date | SSLv3|TLSv1.0|TLSv1.1|TLSv1.2|TLSv1.3|
+----------------+----------+------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
| tcd.ie [1] | 20180713 | 18.0 | 35.0 | 0 | 45.0 | 0 |
+----------------+----------+------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
[1] https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg26633.html
Figure 4: Enterprise Network Statistics Various companies and web sites have announced plans to deprecate
these old versions of TLS.
5. SHA-1 3. SHA-1
The integrity of both TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1 depends on a running SHA-1 The integrity of both TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1 depends on a running SHA-1
hash of the exchanged messages. This makes it possible to perform a hash of the exchanged messages. This makes it possible to perform a
downgrade attack on the handshake by an attacker able to perform 2^77 downgrade attack on the handshake by an attacker able to perform 2^77
operations, well below the acceptable modern security margin. operations, well below the acceptable modern security margin.
Similarly, the authentication of the handshake depends on signatures Similarly, the authentication of the handshake depends on signatures
made using SHA-1 hash or a not stronger concatenation of MD-5 and made using SHA-1 hash or a not stronger concatenation of MD-5 and
SHA-1 hashes, allowing the attacker to impersonate a server when it SHA-1 hashes, allowing the attacker to impersonate a server when it
is able to break the severely weakened SHA-1 hash. is able to break the severely weakened SHA-1 hash.
Neither TLSv1.0 nor TLSv1.1 allow the peers to select a stronger hash Neither TLSv1.0 nor TLSv1.1 allow the peers to select a stronger hash
for signatures in the ServerKeyExchange or CertificateVerify for signatures in the ServerKeyExchange or CertificateVerify
messages, making the only upgrade path the use of a newer protocol messages, making the only upgrade path the use of a newer protocol
version. version.
See [Bhargavan2016] for additional detail. See [Bhargavan2016] for additional detail.
6. Do Not Use TLSv1.0 4. Do Not Use TLSv1.0
TLSv1.0 MUST NOT be used. Negotiation of TLSv1.0 from any version of TLSv1.0 MUST NOT be used. Negotiation of TLSv1.0 from any version of
TLS MUST NOT be permitted. TLS MUST NOT be permitted.
Any other version of TLS is more secure then TLSv1.0. TLSv1.0 can be Any other version of TLS is more secure than TLSv1.0. TLSv1.0 can be
configured to prevent interception, though using the highest version configured to prevent interception, though using the highest version
available is preferable. available is preferable.
Pragmatically, clients MUST NOT send a ClientHello with Pragmatically, clients MUST NOT send a ClientHello with
ClientHello.client_version set to {03,01}. Similarly, servers MUST ClientHello.client_version set to {03,01}. Similarly, servers MUST
NOT send a ServerHello with ServerHello.server_version set to NOT send a ServerHello with ServerHello.server_version set to
{03,01}. Any party receiving a Hello message with the protocol {03,01}. Any party receiving a Hello message with the protocol
version set to {03,01} MUST respond with a "protocol_version" alert version set to {03,01} MUST respond with a "protocol_version" alert
message and close the connection. message and close the connection.
Historically, TLS specifications were not clear on what the record Historically, TLS specifications were not clear on what the record
layer version number (TLSPlaintext.version) could contain when layer version number (TLSPlaintext.version) could contain when
sending ClientHello. Appendix E of [RFC5246] notes that sending ClientHello. Appendix E of [RFC5246] notes that
TLSPlaintext.version could be selected to maximize interoperability, TLSPlaintext.version could be selected to maximize interoperability,
though no definitive value is identified as ideal. That guidance is though no definitive value is identified as ideal. That guidance is
still applicable; therefore, TLS servers MUST accept any value still applicable; therefore, TLS servers MUST accept any value
{03,XX} (including {03,00}) as the record layer version number for {03,XX} (including {03,00}) as the record layer version number for
ClientHello, but they MUST NOT negotiate TLSv1.0. ClientHello, but they MUST NOT negotiate TLSv1.0.
[[Text here is derived (or stolen:-) from [RFC7568]]] 5. Do Not Use TLSv1.1
7. Do Not Use TLSv1.1
TLSv1.1 MUST NOT be used. Negotiation of TLSv1.1 from any version of TLSv1.1 MUST NOT be used. Negotiation of TLSv1.1 from any version of
TLS MUST NOT be permitted. TLS MUST NOT be permitted.
Pragmatically, clients MUST NOT send a ClientHello with Pragmatically, clients MUST NOT send a ClientHello with
ClientHello.client_version set to {03,02}. Similarly, servers MUST ClientHello.client_version set to {03,02}. Similarly, servers MUST
NOT send a ServerHello with ServerHello.server_version set to NOT send a ServerHello with ServerHello.server_version set to
{03,02}. Any party receiving a Hello message with the protocol {03,02}. Any party receiving a Hello message with the protocol
version set to {03,02} MUST respond with a "protocol_version" alert version set to {03,02} MUST respond with a "protocol_version" alert
message and close the connection. message and close the connection.
Any newer version of TLS is more secure then TLSv1.1. TLSv1.1 can be Any newer version of TLS is more secure than TLSv1.1. TLSv1.1 can be
configured to prevent interception, though using the highest version configured to prevent interception, though using the highest version
available is preferable. Support for TLSv1.1 is dwindling in available is preferable. Support for TLSv1.1 is dwindling in
libraries and will impact security going forward if mitigations for libraries and will impact security going forward if mitigations for
attacks cannot be easily addressed and supported in older libraries. attacks cannot be easily addressed and supported in older libraries.
Historically, TLS specifications were not clear on what the record Historically, TLS specifications were not clear on what the record
layer version number (TLSPlaintext.version) could contain when layer version number (TLSPlaintext.version) could contain when
sending ClientHello. Appendix E of [RFC5246] notes that sending ClientHello. Appendix E of [RFC5246] notes that
TLSPlaintext.version could be selected to maximize interoperability, TLSPlaintext.version could be selected to maximize interoperability,
though no definitive value is identified as ideal. That guidance is though no definitive value is identified as ideal. That guidance is
still applicable; therefore, TLS servers MUST accept any value still applicable; therefore, TLS servers MUST accept any value
{03,XX} (including {03,00}) as the record layer version number for {03,XX} (including {03,00}) as the record layer version number for
ClientHello, but they MUST NOT negotiate TLSv1.1. ClientHello, but they MUST NOT negotiate TLSv1.1.
8. Do Not Use SHA-1 in TLSv1.2 6. Updates to RFC7525
[[This section was suggested in PR#2 for the pre-WG draft repo by
Hubert Kario. We're not clear if the WG would like this draft to
include this or not, so will ask the TLS WG at the appropriate
time.]]
SHA-1 as a signature hash MUST NOT be used. That means that clients
MUST send signature_algorithms extension and that extension MUST NOT
include pairs that include SHA-1 hash. In particular, values {2, 1},
{2, 2} and {2, 3} MUST NOT be present in the extension.
Note: this does not affect cipher suites that use SHA-1 HMAC for data
integrity as the HMAC construction is still considered secure and
when they are used in TLSv1.2 SHA-256 is used for handshake
integrity.
9. Updates to RFC7525
[[Since RFC7525 is BCP195, there'll probably be some process-fun to
do an update of that. Formally, it may be that this document becomes
a new part of BCP195 I guess, but we can figure that out with chairs
and ADs.]]
This documents updates [RFC7525] Section 3.1.1 changing SHOULD NOT to This documents updates [RFC7525] Section 3.1.1 changing SHOULD NOT to
MUST NOT as follows: MUST NOT as follows:
o Implementations MUST NOT negotiate TLS version 1.0 [RFC2246]. o Implementations MUST NOT negotiate TLS version 1.0 [RFC2246].
Rationale: TLS 1.0 (published in 1999) does not support many Rationale: TLS 1.0 (published in 1999) does not support many
modern, strong cipher suites. In addition, TLS 1.0 lacks a per- modern, strong cipher suites. In addition, TLS 1.0 lacks a per-
record Initialization Vector (IV) for CBC-based cipher suites and record Initialization Vector (IV) for CBC-based cipher suites and
does not warn against common padding errors. does not warn against common padding errors.
skipping to change at page 10, line 9 skipping to change at page 7, line 33
over TLS 1.0 but still does not support certain stronger cipher over TLS 1.0 but still does not support certain stronger cipher
suites. suites.
This documents updates [RFC7525] Section 3.1.2 changing SHOULD NOT to This documents updates [RFC7525] Section 3.1.2 changing SHOULD NOT to
MUST NOT as follows: MUST NOT as follows:
o Implementations MUST NOT negotiate DTLS version 1.0 [RFC4347]. o Implementations MUST NOT negotiate DTLS version 1.0 [RFC4347].
Version 1.0 of DTLS correlates to version 1.1 of TLS (see above). Version 1.0 of DTLS correlates to version 1.1 of TLS (see above).
10. Security Considerations 7. Security Considerations
This document deprecates two older protocol versions for security This document deprecates two older protocol versions for security
reasons already described. The attack surface is reduced when there reasons already described. The attack surface is reduced when there
are a smaller number of supported protocols and fallback options are are a smaller number of supported protocols and fallback options are
removed. removed.
11. Acknowledgements 8. Acknowledgements
Thanks to those that provided usage data, reviewed and/or improved Thanks to those that provided usage data, reviewed and/or improved
this document, including: David Benjamin, David Black, Viktor this document, including: David Benjamin, David Black, Viktor
Dukhovni, Alessandro Ghedini, Jeremy Harris, Russ Housley, Hubert Dukhovni, Alessandro Ghedini, Jeremy Harris, Russ Housley, Hubert
Kario, Loganaden Velvindron, Eric Mill, Yoav Nir, Andrei Popov, Eric Kario, Loganaden Velvindron, Eric Mill, Yoav Nir, Andrei Popov, Eric
Rescorla, Yaron Sheffer, and Jakub Wilk. Rescorla, Yaron Sheffer, https://github.com/yaleman, and Jakub Wilk.
12. IANA Considerations 9. IANA Considerations
[[This memo includes no request to IANA.]] [[This memo includes no request to IANA.]]
13. References 10. References
13.1. Normative References 10.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2246] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", [RFC2246] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",
RFC 2246, DOI 10.17487/RFC2246, January 1999, RFC 2246, DOI 10.17487/RFC2246, January 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2246>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2246>.
[RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261>.
[RFC3329] Arkko, J., Torvinen, V., Camarillo, G., Niemi, A., and T.
Haukka, "Security Mechanism Agreement for the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 3329,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3329, January 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3329>.
[RFC3436] Jungmaier, A., Rescorla, E., and M. Tuexen, "Transport
Layer Security over Stream Control Transmission Protocol",
RFC 3436, DOI 10.17487/RFC3436, December 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3436>.
[RFC3470] Hollenbeck, S., Rose, M., and L. Masinter, "Guidelines for
the Use of Extensible Markup Language (XML) within IETF
Protocols", BCP 70, RFC 3470, DOI 10.17487/RFC3470,
January 2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3470>.
[RFC3501] Crispin, M., "INTERNET MESSAGE ACCESS PROTOCOL - VERSION
4rev1", RFC 3501, DOI 10.17487/RFC3501, March 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3501>.
[RFC3552] Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3552, July 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3552>.
[RFC3568] Barbir, A., Cain, B., Nair, R., and O. Spatscheck, "Known
Content Network (CN) Request-Routing Mechanisms",
RFC 3568, DOI 10.17487/RFC3568, July 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3568>.
[RFC3656] Siemborski, R., "The Mailbox Update (MUPDATE) Distributed
Mailbox Database Protocol", RFC 3656,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3656, December 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3656>.
[RFC3749] Hollenbeck, S., "Transport Layer Security Protocol
Compression Methods", RFC 3749, DOI 10.17487/RFC3749, May
2004, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3749>.
[RFC3767] Farrell, S., Ed., "Securely Available Credentials
Protocol", RFC 3767, DOI 10.17487/RFC3767, June 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3767>.
[RFC3856] Rosenberg, J., "A Presence Event Package for the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 3856,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3856, August 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3856>.
[RFC3871] Jones, G., Ed., "Operational Security Requirements for
Large Internet Service Provider (ISP) IP Network
Infrastructure", RFC 3871, DOI 10.17487/RFC3871, September
2004, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3871>.
[RFC3887] Hansen, T., "Message Tracking Query Protocol", RFC 3887,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3887, September 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3887>.
[RFC3903] Niemi, A., Ed., "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
Extension for Event State Publication", RFC 3903,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3903, October 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3903>.
[RFC3943] Friend, R., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Compression Using Lempel-Ziv-Stac (LZS)", RFC 3943,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3943, November 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3943>.
[RFC3983] Newton, A. and M. Sanz, "Using the Internet Registry
Information Service (IRIS) over the Blocks Extensible
Exchange Protocol (BEEP)", RFC 3983, DOI 10.17487/RFC3983,
January 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3983>.
[RFC4097] Barnes, M., Ed., "Middlebox Communications (MIDCOM)
Protocol Evaluation", RFC 4097, DOI 10.17487/RFC4097, June
2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4097>.
[RFC4111] Fang, L., Ed., "Security Framework for Provider-
Provisioned Virtual Private Networks (PPVPNs)", RFC 4111,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4111, July 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4111>.
[RFC4162] Lee, H., Yoon, J., and J. Lee, "Addition of SEED Cipher
Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4162,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4162, August 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4162>.
[RFC4168] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., and G. Camarillo, "The
Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) as a Transport
for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 4168,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4168, October 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4168>.
[RFC4217] Ford-Hutchinson, P., "Securing FTP with TLS", RFC 4217,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4217, October 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4217>.
[RFC4235] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., and R. Mahy, Ed., "An
INVITE-Initiated Dialog Event Package for the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 4235,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4235, November 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4235>.
[RFC4261] Walker, J. and A. Kulkarni, Ed., "Common Open Policy
Service (COPS) Over Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 4261, DOI 10.17487/RFC4261, December 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4261>.
[RFC4279] Eronen, P., Ed. and H. Tschofenig, Ed., "Pre-Shared Key
Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 4279, DOI 10.17487/RFC4279, December 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4279>.
[RFC4346] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security [RFC4346] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346, (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4346, April 2006, DOI 10.17487/RFC4346, April 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4346>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4346>.
[RFC4497] Elwell, J., Derks, F., Mourot, P., and O. Rousseau,
"Interworking between the Session Initiation Protocol
(SIP) and QSIG", BCP 117, RFC 4497, DOI 10.17487/RFC4497,
May 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4497>.
[RFC4513] Harrison, R., Ed., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(LDAP): Authentication Methods and Security Mechanisms",
RFC 4513, DOI 10.17487/RFC4513, June 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4513>.
[RFC4531] Zeilenga, K., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(LDAP) Turn Operation", RFC 4531, DOI 10.17487/RFC4531,
June 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4531>.
[RFC4540] Stiemerling, M., Quittek, J., and C. Cadar, "NEC's Simple
Middlebox Configuration (SIMCO) Protocol Version 3.0",
RFC 4540, DOI 10.17487/RFC4540, May 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4540>.
[RFC4582] Camarillo, G., Ott, J., and K. Drage, "The Binary Floor
Control Protocol (BFCP)", RFC 4582, DOI 10.17487/RFC4582,
November 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4582>.
[RFC4616] Zeilenga, K., Ed., "The PLAIN Simple Authentication and
Security Layer (SASL) Mechanism", RFC 4616,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4616, August 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4616>.
[RFC4642] Murchison, K., Vinocur, J., and C. Newman, "Using
Transport Layer Security (TLS) with Network News Transfer
Protocol (NNTP)", RFC 4642, DOI 10.17487/RFC4642, October
2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4642>.
[RFC4680] Santesson, S., "TLS Handshake Message for Supplemental
Data", RFC 4680, DOI 10.17487/RFC4680, October 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4680>.
[RFC4681] Santesson, S., Medvinsky, A., and J. Ball, "TLS User
Mapping Extension", RFC 4681, DOI 10.17487/RFC4681,
October 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4681>.
[RFC4712] Siddiqui, A., Romascanu, D., Golovinsky, E., Rahman, M.,
and Y. Kim, "Transport Mappings for Real-time Application
Quality-of-Service Monitoring (RAQMON) Protocol Data Unit
(PDU)", RFC 4712, DOI 10.17487/RFC4712, October 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4712>.
[RFC4732] Handley, M., Ed., Rescorla, E., Ed., and IAB, "Internet
Denial-of-Service Considerations", RFC 4732,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4732, December 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4732>.
[RFC4743] Goddard, T., "Using NETCONF over the Simple Object Access
Protocol (SOAP)", RFC 4743, DOI 10.17487/RFC4743, December
2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4743>.
[RFC4744] Lear, E. and K. Crozier, "Using the NETCONF Protocol over
the Blocks Extensible Exchange Protocol (BEEP)", RFC 4744,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4744, December 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4744>.
[RFC4785] Blumenthal, U. and P. Goel, "Pre-Shared Key (PSK)
Ciphersuites with NULL Encryption for Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 4785, DOI 10.17487/RFC4785, January
2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4785>.
[RFC4791] Daboo, C., Desruisseaux, B., and L. Dusseault,
"Calendaring Extensions to WebDAV (CalDAV)", RFC 4791,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4791, March 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4791>.
[RFC4823] Harding, T. and R. Scott, "FTP Transport for Secure Peer-
to-Peer Business Data Interchange over the Internet",
RFC 4823, DOI 10.17487/RFC4823, April 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4823>.
[RFC4851] Cam-Winget, N., McGrew, D., Salowey, J., and H. Zhou, "The
Flexible Authentication via Secure Tunneling Extensible
Authentication Protocol Method (EAP-FAST)", RFC 4851,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4851, May 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4851>.
[RFC4964] Allen, A., Ed., Holm, J., and T. Hallin, "The P-Answer-
State Header Extension to the Session Initiation Protocol
for the Open Mobile Alliance Push to Talk over Cellular",
RFC 4964, DOI 10.17487/RFC4964, September 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4964>.
[RFC4975] Campbell, B., Ed., Mahy, R., Ed., and C. Jennings, Ed.,
"The Message Session Relay Protocol (MSRP)", RFC 4975,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4975, September 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4975>.
[RFC4976] Jennings, C., Mahy, R., and A. Roach, "Relay Extensions
for the Message Sessions Relay Protocol (MSRP)", RFC 4976,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4976, September 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4976>.
[RFC4992] Newton, A., "XML Pipelining with Chunks for the Internet
Registry Information Service", RFC 4992,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4992, August 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4992>.
[RFC5018] Camarillo, G., "Connection Establishment in the Binary
Floor Control Protocol (BFCP)", RFC 5018,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5018, September 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5018>.
[RFC5019] Deacon, A. and R. Hurst, "The Lightweight Online
Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Profile for High-Volume
Environments", RFC 5019, DOI 10.17487/RFC5019, September
2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5019>.
[RFC5023] Gregorio, J., Ed. and B. de hOra, Ed., "The Atom
Publishing Protocol", RFC 5023, DOI 10.17487/RFC5023,
October 2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5023>.
[RFC5024] Friend, I., "ODETTE File Transfer Protocol 2.0", RFC 5024,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5024, November 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5024>.
[RFC5049] Bormann, C., Liu, Z., Price, R., and G. Camarillo, Ed.,
"Applying Signaling Compression (SigComp) to the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 5049,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5049, December 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5049>.
[RFC5054] Taylor, D., Wu, T., Mavrogiannopoulos, N., and T. Perrin,
"Using the Secure Remote Password (SRP) Protocol for TLS
Authentication", RFC 5054, DOI 10.17487/RFC5054, November
2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5054>.
[RFC5091] Boyen, X. and L. Martin, "Identity-Based Cryptography
Standard (IBCS) #1: Supersingular Curve Implementations of
the BF and BB1 Cryptosystems", RFC 5091,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5091, December 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5091>.
[RFC5158] Huston, G., "6to4 Reverse DNS Delegation Specification",
RFC 5158, DOI 10.17487/RFC5158, March 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5158>.
[RFC5216] Simon, D., Aboba, B., and R. Hurst, "The EAP-TLS
Authentication Protocol", RFC 5216, DOI 10.17487/RFC5216,
March 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5216>.
[RFC5238] Phelan, T., "Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) over
the Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP)",
RFC 5238, DOI 10.17487/RFC5238, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5238>.
[RFC5263] Lonnfors, M., Costa-Requena, J., Leppanen, E., and H.
Khartabil, "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Extension
for Partial Notification of Presence Information",
RFC 5263, DOI 10.17487/RFC5263, September 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5263>.
[RFC5281] Funk, P. and S. Blake-Wilson, "Extensible Authentication
Protocol Tunneled Transport Layer Security Authenticated
Protocol Version 0 (EAP-TTLSv0)", RFC 5281,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5281, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5281>.
[RFC5364] Garcia-Martin, M. and G. Camarillo, "Extensible Markup
Language (XML) Format Extension for Representing Copy
Control Attributes in Resource Lists", RFC 5364,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5364, October 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5364>.
[RFC5422] Cam-Winget, N., McGrew, D., Salowey, J., and H. Zhou,
"Dynamic Provisioning Using Flexible Authentication via
Secure Tunneling Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP-
FAST)", RFC 5422, DOI 10.17487/RFC5422, March 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5422>.
[RFC5469] Eronen, P., Ed., "DES and IDEA Cipher Suites for Transport
Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5469, DOI 10.17487/RFC5469,
February 2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5469>.
[RFC5734] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
Transport over TCP", STD 69, RFC 5734,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5734, August 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5734>.
[RFC5878] Brown, M. and R. Housley, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Authorization Extensions", RFC 5878, DOI 10.17487/RFC5878,
May 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5878>.
[RFC6042] Keromytis, A., "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Authorization Using KeyNote", RFC 6042,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6042, October 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6042>.
[RFC6176] Turner, S. and T. Polk, "Prohibiting Secure Sockets Layer
(SSL) Version 2.0", RFC 6176, DOI 10.17487/RFC6176, March
2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6176>.
[RFC6367] Kanno, S. and M. Kanda, "Addition of the Camellia Cipher
Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 6367,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6367, September 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6367>.
[RFC6739] Schulzrinne, H. and H. Tschofenig, "Synchronizing Service
Boundaries and <mapping> Elements Based on the Location-
to-Service Translation (LoST) Protocol", RFC 6739,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6739, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6739>.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
[RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6750>.
[RFC7030] Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,
"Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7030>.
[RFC7255] Allen, A., Ed., "Using the International Mobile station
Equipment Identity (IMEI) Uniform Resource Name (URN) as
an Instance ID", RFC 7255, DOI 10.17487/RFC7255, May 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7255>.
[RFC7465] Popov, A., "Prohibiting RC4 Cipher Suites", RFC 7465,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7465, February 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7465>.
[RFC7507] Moeller, B. and A. Langley, "TLS Fallback Signaling Cipher
Suite Value (SCSV) for Preventing Protocol Downgrade
Attacks", RFC 7507, DOI 10.17487/RFC7507, April 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7507>.
[RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, [RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>. 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.
[RFC7562] Thakore, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Authorization
Using Digital Transmission Content Protection (DTCP)
Certificates", RFC 7562, DOI 10.17487/RFC7562, July 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7562>.
[RFC7568] Barnes, R., Thomson, M., Pironti, A., and A. Langley,
"Deprecating Secure Sockets Layer Version 3.0", RFC 7568,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7568, June 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7568>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
13.2. Informative References [RFC8422] Nir, Y., Josefsson, S., and M. Pegourie-Gonnard, "Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer
Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier", RFC 8422,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8422, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8422>.
[Amazon] Amazon, "Amazon Elastic Load Balancing Support Deprecated [RFC8465] Atarius, R., Ed., "Using the Mobile Equipment Identity
TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1 https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/ (MEID) URN as an Instance ID", RFC 8465,
whats-new/2017/02/elastic-load-balancing-support-for-tls- DOI 10.17487/RFC8465, September 2018,
1-1-and-tls-1-2-pre-defined-security-policies/", 2017. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8465>.
10.2. Informative References
[Bhargavan2016] [Bhargavan2016]
Bhargavan, K. and G. Leuren, "Transcript Collision Bhargavan, K. and G. Leuren, "Transcript Collision
Attacks: Breaking Authentication in TLS, IKE, and SSH Attacks: Breaking Authentication in TLS, IKE, and SSH
https://www.mitls.org/downloads/ https://www.mitls.org/downloads/
transcript-collisions.pdf", 2016. transcript-collisions.pdf", 2016.
[Canada] Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, "Implementing HTTPS [Canada] Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, "Implementing HTTPS
for Secure Web Connections: Information Technology Policy for Secure Web Connections: Information Technology Policy
Implementation Notice (ITPIN)", June 2018, Implementation Notice (ITPIN)", June 2018,
<https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board- <https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-
secretariat/services/information-technology/ secretariat/services/information-technology/
policy-implementation-notices/ policy-implementation-notices/
implementing-https-secure-web-connections-itpin.html>. implementing-https-secure-web-connections-itpin.html>.
[CloudFlare]
CloudFlare, "CloudFlare Deprecated TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1
https://blog.cloudflare.com/deprecating-old-tls-versions-
on-cloudflare-dashboard-and-api/", 2018.
[Digicert]
Digicert, "Deprecating TLS 1.0 and 1.1
https://www.digicert.com/blog/
depreciating-tls-1-0-and-1-1/", 2018.
[GIT] GitHub, "GitHub Deprecates TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1
https://githubengineering.com/crypto-removal-notice/",
2018.
[KeyCDN] KeyCDN, "Deprecating TLS 1.0 and 1.1 Enhancing Security
for Everyone
https://www.keycdn.com/blog/deprecating-tls-1-0-and-1-1/",
2018.
[NIST800-52r2] [NIST800-52r2]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology, "NIST
SP800-52r2 https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Publications/ SP800-52r2 https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Publications/
sp/800-52/rev-2/draft/documents/sp800-52r2-draft.pdf", sp/800-52/rev-2/draft/documents/sp800-52r2-draft.pdf",
2018. 2018.
[paypal] Paypal, ""TLS1.2 and HTTP/1.1 Upgrade" https://www.paypal-
notice.com/en/TLS-1.2-and-HTTP1.1-Upgrade/", 2018.
[PCI-TLS1] [PCI-TLS1]
PCI Security Standards Council, "Migrating from SSL and PCI Security Standards Council, "Migrating from SSL and
Early TLS https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/ Early TLS https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/
Migrating-from-SSL-Early-TLS-Info-Supp-v1_1.pdf", 2016. Migrating-from-SSL-Early-TLS-Info-Supp-v1_1.pdf", 2016.
[RFC3316] Arkko, J., Kuijpers, G., Soliman, H., Loughney, J., and J.
Wiljakka, "Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) for Some
Second and Third Generation Cellular Hosts", RFC 3316,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3316, April 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3316>.
[RFC3489] Rosenberg, J., Weinberger, J., Huitema, C., and R. Mahy,
"STUN - Simple Traversal of User Datagram Protocol (UDP)
Through Network Address Translators (NATs)", RFC 3489,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3489, March 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3489>.
[RFC3546] Blake-Wilson, S., Nystrom, M., Hopwood, D., Mikkelsen, J.,
and T. Wright, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Extensions", RFC 3546, DOI 10.17487/RFC3546, June 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3546>.
[RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J.
Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3588, September 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3588>.
[RFC3734] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
Transport Over TCP", RFC 3734, DOI 10.17487/RFC3734, March
2004, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3734>.
[RFC3920] Saint-Andre, P., Ed., "Extensible Messaging and Presence
Protocol (XMPP): Core", RFC 3920, DOI 10.17487/RFC3920,
October 2004, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3920>.
[RFC4132] Moriai, S., Kato, A., and M. Kanda, "Addition of Camellia
Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
RFC 4132, DOI 10.17487/RFC4132, July 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4132>.
[RFC4244] Barnes, M., Ed., "An Extension to the Session Initiation
Protocol (SIP) for Request History Information", RFC 4244,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4244, November 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4244>.
[RFC4347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer [RFC4347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security", RFC 4347, DOI 10.17487/RFC4347, April 2006, Security", RFC 4347, DOI 10.17487/RFC4347, April 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4347>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4347>.
[RFC4366] Blake-Wilson, S., Nystrom, M., Hopwood, D., Mikkelsen, J.,
and T. Wright, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Extensions", RFC 4366, DOI 10.17487/RFC4366, April 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4366>.
[RFC4492] Blake-Wilson, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C., and B.
Moeller, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4492,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4492, May 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4492>.
[RFC4507] Salowey, J., Zhou, H., Eronen, P., and H. Tschofenig,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without
Server-Side State", RFC 4507, DOI 10.17487/RFC4507, May
2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4507>.
[RFC4572] Lennox, J., "Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the
Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session
Description Protocol (SDP)", RFC 4572,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4572, July 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4572>.
[RFC4934] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
Transport Over TCP", RFC 4934, DOI 10.17487/RFC4934, May
2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4934>.
[RFC5077] Salowey, J., Zhou, H., Eronen, P., and H. Tschofenig,
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without
Server-Side State", RFC 5077, DOI 10.17487/RFC5077,
January 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5077>.
[RFC5081] Mavrogiannopoulos, N., "Using OpenPGP Keys for Transport
Layer Security (TLS) Authentication", RFC 5081,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5081, November 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5081>.
[RFC5101] Claise, B., Ed., "Specification of the IP Flow Information
Export (IPFIX) Protocol for the Exchange of IP Traffic
Flow Information", RFC 5101, DOI 10.17487/RFC5101, January
2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5101>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008, DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC7457] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, "Summarizing [RFC7457] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, "Summarizing
Known Attacks on Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Known Attacks on Transport Layer Security (TLS) and
Datagram TLS (DTLS)", RFC 7457, DOI 10.17487/RFC7457, Datagram TLS (DTLS)", RFC 7457, DOI 10.17487/RFC7457,
February 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7457>. February 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7457>.
[RFC7568] Barnes, R., Thomson, M., Pironti, A., and A. Langley,
"Deprecating Secure Sockets Layer Version 3.0", RFC 7568,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7568, June 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7568>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
[RFC8447] Salowey, J. and S. Turner, "IANA Registry Updates for TLS [RFC8447] Salowey, J. and S. Turner, "IANA Registry Updates for TLS
and DTLS", RFC 8447, DOI 10.17487/RFC8447, August 2018, and DTLS", RFC 8447, DOI 10.17487/RFC8447, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8447>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8447>.
[SSLpulse] Appendix A. Change Log
SSLpulse - will be deleted before publication, "SSLpulse
https://www.ssllabs.com/ssl-pulse/", 2018.
[StackExchange] [[RFC editor: please remove this before publication.]]
StackExchange - will be deleted before publication,
"Stackexchange
https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/177182/is-
there-a-list-of-old-browsers-that-only-support-tls-1-0",
2018.
[stripe] Stripe, ""Upgrading to SHA-2 and TLS 1.2" From draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-00 to draft-ietf-tls-
https://stripe.com/blog/upgrading-tls", 2018. oldversions-deprecate-01:
Appendix A. Change Log o PRs with typos and similar: so far just #1
o PR#2 noting msft browser announced deprecation (but this was OBE
as per...)
o Implemented actions as per IETF-103 meeting:
[[RFC editor: please remove this before publication.]] * Details about which RFC's, BCP's are affected were generated
using a script in the git repo: https://github.com/tlswg/
oldversions-deprecate/blob/master/nonobsnorms.sh
* Removed the 'measurements' part
* Removed SHA-1 deprecation (section 8 of -00)
From draft-moriarty-tls-oldversions-diediedie-01 to draft-ietf-tls- From draft-moriarty-tls-oldversions-diediedie-01 to draft-ietf-tls-
oldversions-deprecate-00: oldversions-deprecate-00:
o I-Ds became RFCs 8446/8447 (old-repo PR#4, for TLS1.3) o I-Ds became RFCs 8446/8447 (old-repo PR#4, for TLS1.3)
o Accepted old-repo PR#5 fixing typos o Accepted old-repo PR#5 fixing typos
From draft-moriarty-tls-oldversions-diediedie-00 to draft-moriarty- From draft-moriarty-tls-oldversions-diediedie-00 to draft-moriarty-
tls-oldversions-diediedie-01: tls-oldversions-diediedie-01:
 End of changes. 40 change blocks. 
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