draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-00.txt		draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-01.txt
	Internet Engineering Task Force K. Moriarty		Internet Engineering Task Force K. Moriarty
	Internet-Draft Dell EMC		Internet-Draft Dell EMC
	Updates: [[List TBD]] (if approved) S. Farrell		Updates: 8465 8422 7568 7562 7507 7465 S. Farrell
	Intended status: Standards Track Trinity College Dublin		7255 7030 6750 6749 6739 6367 Trinity College Dublin
	Expires: March 18, 2019 September 14, 2018		6176 6042 5878 5734 5469 5422 November 8, 2018
			5364 5281 5263 5238 5216 5158
			5091 5054 5049 5024 5023 5019
			5018 4992 4976 4975 4964 4851
			4823 4791 4785 4744 4743 4732
			4712 4681 4680 4642 4616 4582
			4540 4531 4513 4497 4279 4261
			4235 4217 4168 4162 4111 4097
			3983 3943 3903 3887 3871 3856
			3767 3749 3656 3568 3552 3501
			3470 3436 3329 3261 (if
			approved)
			Intended status: Standards Track
			Expires: May 12, 2019
	Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1		Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1
	draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-00		draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-01
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document [if approved] formally deprecates Transport Layer		This document, if approved, formally deprecates Transport Layer
	Security (TLS) versions 1.0 [RFC2246] and 1.1 [RFC4346] and moves		Security (TLS) versions 1.0 [RFC2246] and 1.1 [RFC4346] and moves
	these documents to the historic state. These versions lack support		these documents to the historic state. These versions lack support
	for current and recommended cipher suites, and various government and		for current and recommended cipher suites, and various government and
	industry profiles of applications using TLS now mandate avoiding		industry profiles of applications using TLS now mandate avoiding
	these old TLS versions. TLSv1.2 has been the recommended version for		these old TLS versions. TLSv1.2 has been the recommended version for
	IETF protocols since 2008, providing sufficient time to transition		IETF protocols since 2008, providing sufficient time to transition
	away from older versions. Products having to support older versions		away from older versions. Products having to support older versions
	increase the attack surface unnecessarily and increase opportunities		increase the attack surface unnecessarily and increase opportunities
	for misconfigurations. Supporting these older versions also requires		for misconfigurations. Supporting these older versions also requires
	additional effort for library and product maintenance.		additional effort for library and product maintenance.
	This document updates the backward compatibility sections of TLS RFCs		This document updates many RFCs that normatively refer to TLS1.0 or
	[[list TBD]] to prohibit fallback to TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1. This		TLS1.1 as described herein. This document also updates RFC 7525 and
	document also updates RFC 7525.		hence is part of BCP195.
	Status of This Memo		Status of This Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the		This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
	provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.		provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on March 18, 2019.		This Internet-Draft will expire on May 12, 2019.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1.1. Updates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
			1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	2. Support for Deprecation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		2. Support for Deprecation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	3. Removing Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		3. SHA-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	4. Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		4. Do Not Use TLSv1.0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	4.1. Web . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		5. Do Not Use TLSv1.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	4.2. Mail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		6. Updates to RFC7525 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	4.3. Operating Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	4.4. Enterprise Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	5. SHA-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	6. Do Not Use TLSv1.0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	7. Do Not Use TLSv1.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	8. Do Not Use SHA-1 in TLSv1.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	9. Updates to RFC7525 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
	10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
	11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	[[Text in double-square brackets is intended to be fixed as the draft
	evolves. You've seen that we need to figure out the list of RFCs
	that this'd update in the abstract. There is a repo for this at:
	https://github.com/tlswg/oldversions-deprecate - PRs (on the xml
	file) are welcome there.]]
	Transport Layer Security (TLS) versions 1.0 [RFC2246] and 1.1		Transport Layer Security (TLS) versions 1.0 [RFC2246] and 1.1
	[RFC4346] were superceded by TLSv1.2 [RFC5246] in 2008, which has now		[RFC4346] were superceded by TLSv1.2 [RFC5246] in 2008, which has now
	itself been superceded by TLSv1.3 [RFC8446]. It is therefore timely		itself been superceded by TLSv1.3 [RFC8446]. It is therefore timely
	to further deprecate these old versions. The expectation is that		to further deprecate these old versions. The expectation is that
	TLSv1.2 will continue to be used for many years alongside TLSv1.3.		TLSv1.2 will continue to be used for many years alongside TLSv1.3.
	TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.0 are also actively being deprecated in accordance		TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.0 are also actively being deprecated in accordance
	with guidance from government agencies (e.g. NIST SP 80052r2		with guidance from government agencies (e.g. NIST SP 80052r2
	[NIST800-52r2]) and industry consortia such as the Payment Card		[NIST800-52r2]) and industry consortia such as the Payment Card
	Industry Association (PCI) [PCI-TLS1].		Industry Association (PCI) [PCI-TLS1].
	skipping to change at page 3, line 41 ¶		skipping to change at page 3, line 44 ¶
	libraries would need to use older versions of the libraries to		libraries would need to use older versions of the libraries to
	support TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1, which is clearly undesirable		support TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1, which is clearly undesirable
	Deprecation of these versions is intended to assist developers as		Deprecation of these versions is intended to assist developers as
	additional justification to no longer support older TLS versions and		additional justification to no longer support older TLS versions and
	to migrate to a minimum of TLSv1.2. Deprecation also assists product		to migrate to a minimum of TLSv1.2. Deprecation also assists product
	teams with phasing out support for the older versions to reduce the		teams with phasing out support for the older versions to reduce the
	attack surface and the scope of maintenance for protocols in their		attack surface and the scope of maintenance for protocols in their
	offerings.		offerings.
	[[This draft is being written now so that the TLS WG chairs can just		1.1. Updates
	hit the "publication requested" button as soon as there is WG
	consensus to deprecate these ancient versions of TLS. The authors
	however think that deprecation now is timely.]]
	1.1. Terminology		This document updates these RFCs that normatively reference TLS1.0 or
			TLS1.1 and have not been obsoleted: [RFC8465] [RFC8422] [RFC7568]
			[RFC7562] [RFC7507] [RFC7465] [RFC7255] [RFC7030] [RFC6750] [RFC6749]
			[RFC6739] [RFC6367] [RFC6176] [RFC6042] [RFC5878] [RFC5734] [RFC5469]
			[RFC5422] [RFC5364] [RFC5281] [RFC5263] [RFC5238] [RFC5216] [RFC5158]
			[RFC5091] [RFC5054] [RFC5049] [RFC5024] [RFC5023] [RFC5019] [RFC5018]
			[RFC4992] [RFC4976] [RFC4975] [RFC4964] [RFC4851] [RFC4823] [RFC4791]
			[RFC4785] [RFC4744] [RFC4743] [RFC4732] [RFC4712] [RFC4681] [RFC4680]
			[RFC4642] [RFC4616] [RFC4582] [RFC4540] [RFC4531] [RFC4513] [RFC4497]
			[RFC4279] [RFC4261] [RFC4235] [RFC4217] [RFC4168] [RFC4162] [RFC4111]
			[RFC4097] [RFC3983] [RFC3943] [RFC3903] [RFC3887] [RFC3871] [RFC3856]
			[RFC3767] [RFC3749] [RFC3656] [RFC3568] [RFC3552] [RFC3501] [RFC3470]
			[RFC3436] [RFC3329] [RFC3261]
			In addition these RFCs normatively refer to TLS1.0 or TLS1.1 and have
			been obsoleted, or informatively refer to TLS1.0 or TLS1.1: [RFC5101]
			[RFC5081] [RFC5077] [RFC4934] [RFC4572] [RFC4507] [RFC4492] [RFC4366]
			[RFC4347] [RFC4244] [RFC4132] [RFC3920] [RFC3734] [RFC3588] [RFC3546]
			[RFC3489] [RFC3316]
			1.2. Terminology
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
	"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP		"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
	14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all		14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
	capitals, as shown here.		capitals, as shown here.
	2. Support for Deprecation		2. Support for Deprecation
	Industry has actively followed guidance provided by NIST and the PCI		Industry has actively followed guidance provided by NIST and the PCI
	Council to deprecate TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1 by June 30, 2018. TLSv1.2		Council to deprecate TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1 by June 30, 2018. TLSv1.2
	should remain a minimum baseline for TLS support at this time.		should remain a minimum baseline for TLS support at this time.
	Specific details on attacks against TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1 as well as		Specific details on attacks against TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1 as well as
	their mitigations are provided in NIST SP800-52r2 [NIST800-52r2], RFC		their mitigations are provided in NIST SP800-52r2 [NIST800-52r2], RFC
	7457 [RFC7457] and other referenced RFCs. Although the attacks have		7457 [RFC7457] and other referenced RFCs. Although the attacks have
	been mitigated, if support is dropped for future library releases for		been mitigated, if support is dropped for future library releases for
	these versions, it is unlikely attacks found going forward will be		these versions, it is unlikely attacks found going forward will be
	mitigated in older library releases.		mitigated in older library releases.
	NIST for example have provided the following rationale, copied with		NIST for example have provided the following rationale, copied with
	permission from NIST SP800-52r2 [NIST800-52r2], section 1.2 "History		permission from NIST SP800-52r2 [NIST800-52r2], section 1.2 "History
	of TLS" (with references changed for RFC formatting).		of TLS" (with references changed for RFC formatting).
	TLS 1.1, specified in [RFC4346], was developed to address		TLS 1.1, specified in [RFC4346], was developed to address
	weaknesses discovered in TLS 1.0, primarily in the areas of		weaknesses discovered in TLS 1.0, primarily in the areas of
	skipping to change at page 5, line 8 ¶		skipping to change at page 5, line 26 ¶
	TLS 1.3, specified in TLSv1.3 [RFC8446], represents a significant		TLS 1.3, specified in TLSv1.3 [RFC8446], represents a significant
	change to TLS that aims to address threats that have arisen over		change to TLS that aims to address threats that have arisen over
	the years. Among the changes are a new handshake protocol, a new		the years. Among the changes are a new handshake protocol, a new
	key derivation process that uses the HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand		key derivation process that uses the HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
	Key Derivation Function (HKDF), and the removal of cipher suites		Key Derivation Function (HKDF), and the removal of cipher suites
	that use static RSA or DH key exchanges, the CBC mode of		that use static RSA or DH key exchanges, the CBC mode of
	operation, or SHA-1. The list of extensions that can be used with		operation, or SHA-1. The list of extensions that can be used with
	TLS 1.3 has been reduced considerably.		TLS 1.3 has been reduced considerably.
	The Canadian government treasury board have mandated that these old		The Canadian government treasury board have also mandated that these
	versions of TLS not be used. [Canada]		old versions of TLS not be used. [Canada]
	3. Removing Support
	[[This section can be removed upon publication - or maybe keep it?]]
	Support for TLSv1.0 has been removed by the July 2018 PCI deadline
	from the following standards, products, and services:
	o 3GPP 5G
	o Amazon Elastic Load Balancing [Amazon]
	o CloudFlare [CloudFlare]
	o Digicert [Digicert]
	o GitHub [GIT]
	o KeyCDN [KeyCDN]
	o PayPal [paypal]
	o Stripe [stripe]
	o [[Numerous web sites...]]
	Many web sites have taken the action of including the deprecation of
	TLSv1.1 into their plans for deprecating TLSv1.0 for the PCI council
	deadline. Support for TLSv1.1 has been removed by the July 2018 PCI
	deadline from the following standards, products, and services:
	o 3GPP 5G Release 16
	o Amazon Elastic Load Balancing [Amazon]
	o CloudFlare [CloudFlare]
	o GitHub [GIT]
	o PayPal [paypal]
	o Stripe [stripe]
	o [[Numerous web sites...]]
	4. Usage
	[[This section can be removed upon publication - or maybe keep it?]]
	4.1. Web
	Usage statistics for TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1 on the public web vary, but
	have been in general very low and declined further with the impending
	PCI deadline to migrate off of TLSv1.0 by June 30, 2018. As of
	January 2018, [StackExchange] quoted 4 percent of browsers using
	TLSv1.0.
	The number of websites supporting TLS 1.2 is still growing (+0.4%),
	and has reached 92% according to sslpulse as of June 19, 2018.
	[SSLpulse] Deprecating TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 will thus not have a major
	impact on browser or web server implementations.
	Figure 1 presents statistics for use of TLS versions in the web.
	+----------------+----------+------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
	| Name/Ref | Date | SSLv3|TLSv1.0|TLSv1.1|TLSv1.2|TLSv1.3|
	+----------------+----------+------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
	! Alexa [1] | 20180226 | - | 2.0 | <0.1 | 97.9 | - |
	| Cloudflare [2] | 20180518 | 0.0 | 9.3 | 0.2 | 84.9 | 5.5 |
	| Firefox [3] | 20180709 | - | 1.0 | - | 94.0 | 5.0 |
	| Chrome [4] | 20180711 | - | 0.4 | <0.1 | - | - |
	+----------------+----------+------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
	[1] https://scotthelme.co.uk/alexa-top-1-million-analysis-february-2018/
	[2] https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg26578.html
	[3] https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg26575.html
	[4] https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg26620.html
	Figure 1: Web Statistics
	4.2. Mail
	E-Mail uses TLS for SMTP, submission (port 587), POP/POP3 and IMAP.
	Typically email deployments lag public web deployments in terms of
	the rate of adoption of new TLS versions. Figure 2 presents
	statistics for use of TLS versions in the email applications.
	+----------------+----------+------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
	| Name/Ref | Date | SSLv3|TLSv1.0|TLSv1.1|TLSv1.2|TLSv1.3|
	+----------------+----------+------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
	| Clusters [1] | 20180316 | <0.1 | 10.6 | <0.1 | 89.3 | - |
	| TLSA [2] | 20180710 | - | 1.4 | 0.1 | 98.5 | - |
	| UK-ESP [3] | 20180710 | - | 19.9 | <0.1 | - | - |
	+----------------+----------+------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
	[1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/299
	[2] https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg26603.html
	[3] https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg26603.html
	Figure 2: Mail Statistics
	4.3. Operating Systems
	Figure 3 presents statistics for use of TLS versions in operating
	systems.
	+----------------+----------+------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
	| Name/Ref | Date | SSLv3|TLSv1.0|TLSv1.1|TLSv1.2|TLSv1.3|
	+----------------+----------+------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
	| Windows cli [1]| 20180709 | - | >10.0 | ~0.3 | - | - |
	| Windows svr [1]| 20180709 | - | ~1.5 | ~0.0 | - | - |
	| Apple [2] | 20180709 | - | 0.4 | - | 99.6 | - |
	+----------------+----------+------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
	[1] https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg26577.html
	[2] https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg26634.html
	Figure 3: Operating System Statistics
	4.4. Enterprise Networks
	Figure 4 presents statistics for use of TLS versions in the
	enterprise networks. The tcd.ie numbers below were the result of a
	student project and need further validation.
	+----------------+----------+------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
	| Name/Ref | Date | SSLv3|TLSv1.0|TLSv1.1|TLSv1.2|TLSv1.3|
	+----------------+----------+------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
	| tcd.ie [1] | 20180713 | 18.0 | 35.0 | 0 | 45.0 | 0 |
	+----------------+----------+------+-------+-------+-------+-------+
	[1] https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg26633.html
	Figure 4: Enterprise Network Statistics		Various companies and web sites have announced plans to deprecate
			these old versions of TLS.
	5. SHA-1		3. SHA-1
	The integrity of both TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1 depends on a running SHA-1		The integrity of both TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1 depends on a running SHA-1
	hash of the exchanged messages. This makes it possible to perform a		hash of the exchanged messages. This makes it possible to perform a
	downgrade attack on the handshake by an attacker able to perform 2^77		downgrade attack on the handshake by an attacker able to perform 2^77
	operations, well below the acceptable modern security margin.		operations, well below the acceptable modern security margin.
	Similarly, the authentication of the handshake depends on signatures		Similarly, the authentication of the handshake depends on signatures
	made using SHA-1 hash or a not stronger concatenation of MD-5 and		made using SHA-1 hash or a not stronger concatenation of MD-5 and
	SHA-1 hashes, allowing the attacker to impersonate a server when it		SHA-1 hashes, allowing the attacker to impersonate a server when it
	is able to break the severely weakened SHA-1 hash.		is able to break the severely weakened SHA-1 hash.
	Neither TLSv1.0 nor TLSv1.1 allow the peers to select a stronger hash		Neither TLSv1.0 nor TLSv1.1 allow the peers to select a stronger hash
	for signatures in the ServerKeyExchange or CertificateVerify		for signatures in the ServerKeyExchange or CertificateVerify
	messages, making the only upgrade path the use of a newer protocol		messages, making the only upgrade path the use of a newer protocol
	version.		version.
	See [Bhargavan2016] for additional detail.		See [Bhargavan2016] for additional detail.
	6. Do Not Use TLSv1.0		4. Do Not Use TLSv1.0
	TLSv1.0 MUST NOT be used. Negotiation of TLSv1.0 from any version of		TLSv1.0 MUST NOT be used. Negotiation of TLSv1.0 from any version of
	TLS MUST NOT be permitted.		TLS MUST NOT be permitted.
	Any other version of TLS is more secure then TLSv1.0. TLSv1.0 can be		Any other version of TLS is more secure than TLSv1.0. TLSv1.0 can be
	configured to prevent interception, though using the highest version		configured to prevent interception, though using the highest version
	available is preferable.		available is preferable.
	Pragmatically, clients MUST NOT send a ClientHello with		Pragmatically, clients MUST NOT send a ClientHello with
	ClientHello.client_version set to {03,01}. Similarly, servers MUST		ClientHello.client_version set to {03,01}. Similarly, servers MUST
	NOT send a ServerHello with ServerHello.server_version set to		NOT send a ServerHello with ServerHello.server_version set to
	{03,01}. Any party receiving a Hello message with the protocol		{03,01}. Any party receiving a Hello message with the protocol
	version set to {03,01} MUST respond with a "protocol_version" alert		version set to {03,01} MUST respond with a "protocol_version" alert
	message and close the connection.		message and close the connection.
	Historically, TLS specifications were not clear on what the record		Historically, TLS specifications were not clear on what the record
	layer version number (TLSPlaintext.version) could contain when		layer version number (TLSPlaintext.version) could contain when
	sending ClientHello. Appendix E of [RFC5246] notes that		sending ClientHello. Appendix E of [RFC5246] notes that
	TLSPlaintext.version could be selected to maximize interoperability,		TLSPlaintext.version could be selected to maximize interoperability,
	though no definitive value is identified as ideal. That guidance is		though no definitive value is identified as ideal. That guidance is
	still applicable; therefore, TLS servers MUST accept any value		still applicable; therefore, TLS servers MUST accept any value
	{03,XX} (including {03,00}) as the record layer version number for		{03,XX} (including {03,00}) as the record layer version number for
	ClientHello, but they MUST NOT negotiate TLSv1.0.		ClientHello, but they MUST NOT negotiate TLSv1.0.
	[[Text here is derived (or stolen:-) from [RFC7568]]]		5. Do Not Use TLSv1.1
	7. Do Not Use TLSv1.1
	TLSv1.1 MUST NOT be used. Negotiation of TLSv1.1 from any version of		TLSv1.1 MUST NOT be used. Negotiation of TLSv1.1 from any version of
	TLS MUST NOT be permitted.		TLS MUST NOT be permitted.
	Pragmatically, clients MUST NOT send a ClientHello with		Pragmatically, clients MUST NOT send a ClientHello with
	ClientHello.client_version set to {03,02}. Similarly, servers MUST		ClientHello.client_version set to {03,02}. Similarly, servers MUST
	NOT send a ServerHello with ServerHello.server_version set to		NOT send a ServerHello with ServerHello.server_version set to
	{03,02}. Any party receiving a Hello message with the protocol		{03,02}. Any party receiving a Hello message with the protocol
	version set to {03,02} MUST respond with a "protocol_version" alert		version set to {03,02} MUST respond with a "protocol_version" alert
	message and close the connection.		message and close the connection.
	Any newer version of TLS is more secure then TLSv1.1. TLSv1.1 can be		Any newer version of TLS is more secure than TLSv1.1. TLSv1.1 can be
	configured to prevent interception, though using the highest version		configured to prevent interception, though using the highest version
	available is preferable. Support for TLSv1.1 is dwindling in		available is preferable. Support for TLSv1.1 is dwindling in
	libraries and will impact security going forward if mitigations for		libraries and will impact security going forward if mitigations for
	attacks cannot be easily addressed and supported in older libraries.		attacks cannot be easily addressed and supported in older libraries.
	Historically, TLS specifications were not clear on what the record		Historically, TLS specifications were not clear on what the record
	layer version number (TLSPlaintext.version) could contain when		layer version number (TLSPlaintext.version) could contain when
	sending ClientHello. Appendix E of [RFC5246] notes that		sending ClientHello. Appendix E of [RFC5246] notes that
	TLSPlaintext.version could be selected to maximize interoperability,		TLSPlaintext.version could be selected to maximize interoperability,
	though no definitive value is identified as ideal. That guidance is		though no definitive value is identified as ideal. That guidance is
	still applicable; therefore, TLS servers MUST accept any value		still applicable; therefore, TLS servers MUST accept any value
	{03,XX} (including {03,00}) as the record layer version number for		{03,XX} (including {03,00}) as the record layer version number for
	ClientHello, but they MUST NOT negotiate TLSv1.1.		ClientHello, but they MUST NOT negotiate TLSv1.1.
	8. Do Not Use SHA-1 in TLSv1.2		6. Updates to RFC7525
	[[This section was suggested in PR#2 for the pre-WG draft repo by
	Hubert Kario. We're not clear if the WG would like this draft to
	include this or not, so will ask the TLS WG at the appropriate
	time.]]
	SHA-1 as a signature hash MUST NOT be used. That means that clients
	MUST send signature_algorithms extension and that extension MUST NOT
	include pairs that include SHA-1 hash. In particular, values {2, 1},
	{2, 2} and {2, 3} MUST NOT be present in the extension.
	Note: this does not affect cipher suites that use SHA-1 HMAC for data
	integrity as the HMAC construction is still considered secure and
	when they are used in TLSv1.2 SHA-256 is used for handshake
	integrity.
	9. Updates to RFC7525
	[[Since RFC7525 is BCP195, there'll probably be some process-fun to
	do an update of that. Formally, it may be that this document becomes
	a new part of BCP195 I guess, but we can figure that out with chairs
	and ADs.]]
	This documents updates [RFC7525] Section 3.1.1 changing SHOULD NOT to		This documents updates [RFC7525] Section 3.1.1 changing SHOULD NOT to
	MUST NOT as follows:		MUST NOT as follows:
	o Implementations MUST NOT negotiate TLS version 1.0 [RFC2246].		o Implementations MUST NOT negotiate TLS version 1.0 [RFC2246].
	Rationale: TLS 1.0 (published in 1999) does not support many		Rationale: TLS 1.0 (published in 1999) does not support many
	modern, strong cipher suites. In addition, TLS 1.0 lacks a per-		modern, strong cipher suites. In addition, TLS 1.0 lacks a per-
	record Initialization Vector (IV) for CBC-based cipher suites and		record Initialization Vector (IV) for CBC-based cipher suites and
	does not warn against common padding errors.		does not warn against common padding errors.
	skipping to change at page 10, line 9 ¶		skipping to change at page 7, line 33 ¶
	over TLS 1.0 but still does not support certain stronger cipher		over TLS 1.0 but still does not support certain stronger cipher
	suites.		suites.
	This documents updates [RFC7525] Section 3.1.2 changing SHOULD NOT to		This documents updates [RFC7525] Section 3.1.2 changing SHOULD NOT to
	MUST NOT as follows:		MUST NOT as follows:
	o Implementations MUST NOT negotiate DTLS version 1.0 [RFC4347].		o Implementations MUST NOT negotiate DTLS version 1.0 [RFC4347].
	Version 1.0 of DTLS correlates to version 1.1 of TLS (see above).		Version 1.0 of DTLS correlates to version 1.1 of TLS (see above).
	10. Security Considerations		7. Security Considerations
	This document deprecates two older protocol versions for security		This document deprecates two older protocol versions for security
	reasons already described. The attack surface is reduced when there		reasons already described. The attack surface is reduced when there
	are a smaller number of supported protocols and fallback options are		are a smaller number of supported protocols and fallback options are
	removed.		removed.
	11. Acknowledgements		8. Acknowledgements
	Thanks to those that provided usage data, reviewed and/or improved		Thanks to those that provided usage data, reviewed and/or improved
	this document, including: David Benjamin, David Black, Viktor		this document, including: David Benjamin, David Black, Viktor
	Dukhovni, Alessandro Ghedini, Jeremy Harris, Russ Housley, Hubert		Dukhovni, Alessandro Ghedini, Jeremy Harris, Russ Housley, Hubert
	Kario, Loganaden Velvindron, Eric Mill, Yoav Nir, Andrei Popov, Eric		Kario, Loganaden Velvindron, Eric Mill, Yoav Nir, Andrei Popov, Eric
	Rescorla, Yaron Sheffer, and Jakub Wilk.		Rescorla, Yaron Sheffer, https://github.com/yaleman, and Jakub Wilk.
	12. IANA Considerations		9. IANA Considerations
	[[This memo includes no request to IANA.]]		[[This memo includes no request to IANA.]]
	13. References		10. References
	13.1. Normative References		10.1. Normative References
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,		DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
	[RFC2246] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",		[RFC2246] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",
	RFC 2246, DOI 10.17487/RFC2246, January 1999,		RFC 2246, DOI 10.17487/RFC2246, January 1999,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2246>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2246>.
			[RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
			A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
			Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261>.
			[RFC3329] Arkko, J., Torvinen, V., Camarillo, G., Niemi, A., and T.
			Haukka, "Security Mechanism Agreement for the Session
			Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 3329,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC3329, January 2003,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3329>.
			[RFC3436] Jungmaier, A., Rescorla, E., and M. Tuexen, "Transport
			Layer Security over Stream Control Transmission Protocol",
			RFC 3436, DOI 10.17487/RFC3436, December 2002,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3436>.
			[RFC3470] Hollenbeck, S., Rose, M., and L. Masinter, "Guidelines for
			the Use of Extensible Markup Language (XML) within IETF
			Protocols", BCP 70, RFC 3470, DOI 10.17487/RFC3470,
			January 2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3470>.
			[RFC3501] Crispin, M., "INTERNET MESSAGE ACCESS PROTOCOL - VERSION
			4rev1", RFC 3501, DOI 10.17487/RFC3501, March 2003,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3501>.
			[RFC3552] Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
			Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC3552, July 2003,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3552>.
			[RFC3568] Barbir, A., Cain, B., Nair, R., and O. Spatscheck, "Known
			Content Network (CN) Request-Routing Mechanisms",
			RFC 3568, DOI 10.17487/RFC3568, July 2003,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3568>.
			[RFC3656] Siemborski, R., "The Mailbox Update (MUPDATE) Distributed
			Mailbox Database Protocol", RFC 3656,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC3656, December 2003,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3656>.
			[RFC3749] Hollenbeck, S., "Transport Layer Security Protocol
			Compression Methods", RFC 3749, DOI 10.17487/RFC3749, May
			2004, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3749>.
			[RFC3767] Farrell, S., Ed., "Securely Available Credentials
			Protocol", RFC 3767, DOI 10.17487/RFC3767, June 2004,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3767>.
			[RFC3856] Rosenberg, J., "A Presence Event Package for the Session
			Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 3856,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC3856, August 2004,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3856>.
			[RFC3871] Jones, G., Ed., "Operational Security Requirements for
			Large Internet Service Provider (ISP) IP Network
			Infrastructure", RFC 3871, DOI 10.17487/RFC3871, September
			2004, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3871>.
			[RFC3887] Hansen, T., "Message Tracking Query Protocol", RFC 3887,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC3887, September 2004,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3887>.
			[RFC3903] Niemi, A., Ed., "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
			Extension for Event State Publication", RFC 3903,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC3903, October 2004,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3903>.
			[RFC3943] Friend, R., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
			Compression Using Lempel-Ziv-Stac (LZS)", RFC 3943,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC3943, November 2004,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3943>.
			[RFC3983] Newton, A. and M. Sanz, "Using the Internet Registry
			Information Service (IRIS) over the Blocks Extensible
			Exchange Protocol (BEEP)", RFC 3983, DOI 10.17487/RFC3983,
			January 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3983>.
			[RFC4097] Barnes, M., Ed., "Middlebox Communications (MIDCOM)
			Protocol Evaluation", RFC 4097, DOI 10.17487/RFC4097, June
			2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4097>.
			[RFC4111] Fang, L., Ed., "Security Framework for Provider-
			Provisioned Virtual Private Networks (PPVPNs)", RFC 4111,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC4111, July 2005,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4111>.
			[RFC4162] Lee, H., Yoon, J., and J. Lee, "Addition of SEED Cipher
			Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4162,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC4162, August 2005,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4162>.
			[RFC4168] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., and G. Camarillo, "The
			Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) as a Transport
			for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 4168,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC4168, October 2005,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4168>.
			[RFC4217] Ford-Hutchinson, P., "Securing FTP with TLS", RFC 4217,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC4217, October 2005,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4217>.
			[RFC4235] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., and R. Mahy, Ed., "An
			INVITE-Initiated Dialog Event Package for the Session
			Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 4235,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC4235, November 2005,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4235>.
			[RFC4261] Walker, J. and A. Kulkarni, Ed., "Common Open Policy
			Service (COPS) Over Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
			RFC 4261, DOI 10.17487/RFC4261, December 2005,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4261>.
			[RFC4279] Eronen, P., Ed. and H. Tschofenig, Ed., "Pre-Shared Key
			Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
			RFC 4279, DOI 10.17487/RFC4279, December 2005,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4279>.
	[RFC4346] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security		[RFC4346] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
	(TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346,		(TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC4346, April 2006,		DOI 10.17487/RFC4346, April 2006,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4346>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4346>.
			[RFC4497] Elwell, J., Derks, F., Mourot, P., and O. Rousseau,
			"Interworking between the Session Initiation Protocol
			(SIP) and QSIG", BCP 117, RFC 4497, DOI 10.17487/RFC4497,
			May 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4497>.
			[RFC4513] Harrison, R., Ed., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
			(LDAP): Authentication Methods and Security Mechanisms",
			RFC 4513, DOI 10.17487/RFC4513, June 2006,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4513>.
			[RFC4531] Zeilenga, K., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
			(LDAP) Turn Operation", RFC 4531, DOI 10.17487/RFC4531,
			June 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4531>.
			[RFC4540] Stiemerling, M., Quittek, J., and C. Cadar, "NEC's Simple
			Middlebox Configuration (SIMCO) Protocol Version 3.0",
			RFC 4540, DOI 10.17487/RFC4540, May 2006,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4540>.
			[RFC4582] Camarillo, G., Ott, J., and K. Drage, "The Binary Floor
			Control Protocol (BFCP)", RFC 4582, DOI 10.17487/RFC4582,
			November 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4582>.
			[RFC4616] Zeilenga, K., Ed., "The PLAIN Simple Authentication and
			Security Layer (SASL) Mechanism", RFC 4616,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC4616, August 2006,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4616>.
			[RFC4642] Murchison, K., Vinocur, J., and C. Newman, "Using
			Transport Layer Security (TLS) with Network News Transfer
			Protocol (NNTP)", RFC 4642, DOI 10.17487/RFC4642, October
			2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4642>.
			[RFC4680] Santesson, S., "TLS Handshake Message for Supplemental
			Data", RFC 4680, DOI 10.17487/RFC4680, October 2006,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4680>.
			[RFC4681] Santesson, S., Medvinsky, A., and J. Ball, "TLS User
			Mapping Extension", RFC 4681, DOI 10.17487/RFC4681,
			October 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4681>.
			[RFC4712] Siddiqui, A., Romascanu, D., Golovinsky, E., Rahman, M.,
			and Y. Kim, "Transport Mappings for Real-time Application
			Quality-of-Service Monitoring (RAQMON) Protocol Data Unit
			(PDU)", RFC 4712, DOI 10.17487/RFC4712, October 2006,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4712>.
			[RFC4732] Handley, M., Ed., Rescorla, E., Ed., and IAB, "Internet
			Denial-of-Service Considerations", RFC 4732,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC4732, December 2006,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4732>.
			[RFC4743] Goddard, T., "Using NETCONF over the Simple Object Access
			Protocol (SOAP)", RFC 4743, DOI 10.17487/RFC4743, December
			2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4743>.
			[RFC4744] Lear, E. and K. Crozier, "Using the NETCONF Protocol over
			the Blocks Extensible Exchange Protocol (BEEP)", RFC 4744,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC4744, December 2006,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4744>.
			[RFC4785] Blumenthal, U. and P. Goel, "Pre-Shared Key (PSK)
			Ciphersuites with NULL Encryption for Transport Layer
			Security (TLS)", RFC 4785, DOI 10.17487/RFC4785, January
			2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4785>.
			[RFC4791] Daboo, C., Desruisseaux, B., and L. Dusseault,
			"Calendaring Extensions to WebDAV (CalDAV)", RFC 4791,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC4791, March 2007,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4791>.
			[RFC4823] Harding, T. and R. Scott, "FTP Transport for Secure Peer-
			to-Peer Business Data Interchange over the Internet",
			RFC 4823, DOI 10.17487/RFC4823, April 2007,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4823>.
			[RFC4851] Cam-Winget, N., McGrew, D., Salowey, J., and H. Zhou, "The
			Flexible Authentication via Secure Tunneling Extensible
			Authentication Protocol Method (EAP-FAST)", RFC 4851,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC4851, May 2007,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4851>.
			[RFC4964] Allen, A., Ed., Holm, J., and T. Hallin, "The P-Answer-
			State Header Extension to the Session Initiation Protocol
			for the Open Mobile Alliance Push to Talk over Cellular",
			RFC 4964, DOI 10.17487/RFC4964, September 2007,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4964>.
			[RFC4975] Campbell, B., Ed., Mahy, R., Ed., and C. Jennings, Ed.,
			"The Message Session Relay Protocol (MSRP)", RFC 4975,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC4975, September 2007,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4975>.
			[RFC4976] Jennings, C., Mahy, R., and A. Roach, "Relay Extensions
			for the Message Sessions Relay Protocol (MSRP)", RFC 4976,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC4976, September 2007,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4976>.
			[RFC4992] Newton, A., "XML Pipelining with Chunks for the Internet
			Registry Information Service", RFC 4992,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC4992, August 2007,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4992>.
			[RFC5018] Camarillo, G., "Connection Establishment in the Binary
			Floor Control Protocol (BFCP)", RFC 5018,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC5018, September 2007,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5018>.
			[RFC5019] Deacon, A. and R. Hurst, "The Lightweight Online
			Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Profile for High-Volume
			Environments", RFC 5019, DOI 10.17487/RFC5019, September
			2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5019>.
			[RFC5023] Gregorio, J., Ed. and B. de hOra, Ed., "The Atom
			Publishing Protocol", RFC 5023, DOI 10.17487/RFC5023,
			October 2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5023>.
			[RFC5024] Friend, I., "ODETTE File Transfer Protocol 2.0", RFC 5024,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC5024, November 2007,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5024>.
			[RFC5049] Bormann, C., Liu, Z., Price, R., and G. Camarillo, Ed.,
			"Applying Signaling Compression (SigComp) to the Session
			Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 5049,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC5049, December 2007,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5049>.
			[RFC5054] Taylor, D., Wu, T., Mavrogiannopoulos, N., and T. Perrin,
			"Using the Secure Remote Password (SRP) Protocol for TLS
			Authentication", RFC 5054, DOI 10.17487/RFC5054, November
			2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5054>.
			[RFC5091] Boyen, X. and L. Martin, "Identity-Based Cryptography
			Standard (IBCS) #1: Supersingular Curve Implementations of
			the BF and BB1 Cryptosystems", RFC 5091,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC5091, December 2007,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5091>.
			[RFC5158] Huston, G., "6to4 Reverse DNS Delegation Specification",
			RFC 5158, DOI 10.17487/RFC5158, March 2008,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5158>.
			[RFC5216] Simon, D., Aboba, B., and R. Hurst, "The EAP-TLS
			Authentication Protocol", RFC 5216, DOI 10.17487/RFC5216,
			March 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5216>.
			[RFC5238] Phelan, T., "Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) over
			the Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP)",
			RFC 5238, DOI 10.17487/RFC5238, May 2008,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5238>.
			[RFC5263] Lonnfors, M., Costa-Requena, J., Leppanen, E., and H.
			Khartabil, "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Extension
			for Partial Notification of Presence Information",
			RFC 5263, DOI 10.17487/RFC5263, September 2008,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5263>.
			[RFC5281] Funk, P. and S. Blake-Wilson, "Extensible Authentication
			Protocol Tunneled Transport Layer Security Authenticated
			Protocol Version 0 (EAP-TTLSv0)", RFC 5281,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC5281, August 2008,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5281>.
			[RFC5364] Garcia-Martin, M. and G. Camarillo, "Extensible Markup
			Language (XML) Format Extension for Representing Copy
			Control Attributes in Resource Lists", RFC 5364,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC5364, October 2008,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5364>.
			[RFC5422] Cam-Winget, N., McGrew, D., Salowey, J., and H. Zhou,
			"Dynamic Provisioning Using Flexible Authentication via
			Secure Tunneling Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP-
			FAST)", RFC 5422, DOI 10.17487/RFC5422, March 2009,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5422>.
			[RFC5469] Eronen, P., Ed., "DES and IDEA Cipher Suites for Transport
			Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5469, DOI 10.17487/RFC5469,
			February 2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5469>.
			[RFC5734] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
			Transport over TCP", STD 69, RFC 5734,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC5734, August 2009,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5734>.
			[RFC5878] Brown, M. and R. Housley, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
			Authorization Extensions", RFC 5878, DOI 10.17487/RFC5878,
			May 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5878>.
			[RFC6042] Keromytis, A., "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
			Authorization Using KeyNote", RFC 6042,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC6042, October 2010,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6042>.
			[RFC6176] Turner, S. and T. Polk, "Prohibiting Secure Sockets Layer
			(SSL) Version 2.0", RFC 6176, DOI 10.17487/RFC6176, March
			2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6176>.
			[RFC6367] Kanno, S. and M. Kanda, "Addition of the Camellia Cipher
			Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 6367,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC6367, September 2011,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6367>.
			[RFC6739] Schulzrinne, H. and H. Tschofenig, "Synchronizing Service
			Boundaries and <mapping> Elements Based on the Location-
			to-Service Translation (LoST) Protocol", RFC 6739,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC6739, October 2012,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6739>.
			[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
			RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
			[RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
			Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, October 2012,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6750>.
			[RFC7030] Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,
			"Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7030>.
			[RFC7255] Allen, A., Ed., "Using the International Mobile station
			Equipment Identity (IMEI) Uniform Resource Name (URN) as
			an Instance ID", RFC 7255, DOI 10.17487/RFC7255, May 2014,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7255>.
			[RFC7465] Popov, A., "Prohibiting RC4 Cipher Suites", RFC 7465,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC7465, February 2015,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7465>.
			[RFC7507] Moeller, B. and A. Langley, "TLS Fallback Signaling Cipher
			Suite Value (SCSV) for Preventing Protocol Downgrade
			Attacks", RFC 7507, DOI 10.17487/RFC7507, April 2015,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7507>.
	[RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,		[RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
	"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer		"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
	Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security		Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
	(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May		(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
	2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.		2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.
			[RFC7562] Thakore, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Authorization
			Using Digital Transmission Content Protection (DTCP)
			Certificates", RFC 7562, DOI 10.17487/RFC7562, July 2015,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7562>.
			[RFC7568] Barnes, R., Thomson, M., Pironti, A., and A. Langley,
			"Deprecating Secure Sockets Layer Version 3.0", RFC 7568,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC7568, June 2015,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7568>.
	[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC		[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
	2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,		2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
	May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.		May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
	13.2. Informative References		[RFC8422] Nir, Y., Josefsson, S., and M. Pegourie-Gonnard, "Elliptic
			Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer
			Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier", RFC 8422,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC8422, August 2018,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8422>.
	[Amazon] Amazon, "Amazon Elastic Load Balancing Support Deprecated		[RFC8465] Atarius, R., Ed., "Using the Mobile Equipment Identity
	TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1 https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/		(MEID) URN as an Instance ID", RFC 8465,
	whats-new/2017/02/elastic-load-balancing-support-for-tls-		DOI 10.17487/RFC8465, September 2018,
	1-1-and-tls-1-2-pre-defined-security-policies/", 2017.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8465>.
			10.2. Informative References
	[Bhargavan2016]		[Bhargavan2016]
	Bhargavan, K. and G. Leuren, "Transcript Collision		Bhargavan, K. and G. Leuren, "Transcript Collision
	Attacks: Breaking Authentication in TLS, IKE, and SSH		Attacks: Breaking Authentication in TLS, IKE, and SSH
	https://www.mitls.org/downloads/		https://www.mitls.org/downloads/
	transcript-collisions.pdf", 2016.		transcript-collisions.pdf", 2016.
	[Canada] Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, "Implementing HTTPS		[Canada] Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, "Implementing HTTPS
	for Secure Web Connections: Information Technology Policy		for Secure Web Connections: Information Technology Policy
	Implementation Notice (ITPIN)", June 2018,		Implementation Notice (ITPIN)", June 2018,
	<https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-		<https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-
	secretariat/services/information-technology/		secretariat/services/information-technology/
	policy-implementation-notices/		policy-implementation-notices/
	implementing-https-secure-web-connections-itpin.html>.		implementing-https-secure-web-connections-itpin.html>.
	[CloudFlare]
	CloudFlare, "CloudFlare Deprecated TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1
	https://blog.cloudflare.com/deprecating-old-tls-versions-
	on-cloudflare-dashboard-and-api/", 2018.
	[Digicert]
	Digicert, "Deprecating TLS 1.0 and 1.1
	https://www.digicert.com/blog/
	depreciating-tls-1-0-and-1-1/", 2018.
	[GIT] GitHub, "GitHub Deprecates TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1
	https://githubengineering.com/crypto-removal-notice/",
	2018.
	[KeyCDN] KeyCDN, "Deprecating TLS 1.0 and 1.1 Enhancing Security
	for Everyone
	https://www.keycdn.com/blog/deprecating-tls-1-0-and-1-1/",
	2018.
	[NIST800-52r2]		[NIST800-52r2]
	National Institute of Standards and Technology, "NIST		National Institute of Standards and Technology, "NIST
	SP800-52r2 https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Publications/		SP800-52r2 https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Publications/
	sp/800-52/rev-2/draft/documents/sp800-52r2-draft.pdf",		sp/800-52/rev-2/draft/documents/sp800-52r2-draft.pdf",
	2018.		2018.
	[paypal] Paypal, ""TLS1.2 and HTTP/1.1 Upgrade" https://www.paypal-
	notice.com/en/TLS-1.2-and-HTTP1.1-Upgrade/", 2018.
	[PCI-TLS1]		[PCI-TLS1]
	PCI Security Standards Council, "Migrating from SSL and		PCI Security Standards Council, "Migrating from SSL and
	Early TLS https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/		Early TLS https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/
	Migrating-from-SSL-Early-TLS-Info-Supp-v1_1.pdf", 2016.		Migrating-from-SSL-Early-TLS-Info-Supp-v1_1.pdf", 2016.
			[RFC3316] Arkko, J., Kuijpers, G., Soliman, H., Loughney, J., and J.
			Wiljakka, "Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) for Some
			Second and Third Generation Cellular Hosts", RFC 3316,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC3316, April 2003,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3316>.
			[RFC3489] Rosenberg, J., Weinberger, J., Huitema, C., and R. Mahy,
			"STUN - Simple Traversal of User Datagram Protocol (UDP)
			Through Network Address Translators (NATs)", RFC 3489,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC3489, March 2003,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3489>.
			[RFC3546] Blake-Wilson, S., Nystrom, M., Hopwood, D., Mikkelsen, J.,
			and T. Wright, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
			Extensions", RFC 3546, DOI 10.17487/RFC3546, June 2003,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3546>.
			[RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J.
			Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC3588, September 2003,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3588>.
			[RFC3734] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
			Transport Over TCP", RFC 3734, DOI 10.17487/RFC3734, March
			2004, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3734>.
			[RFC3920] Saint-Andre, P., Ed., "Extensible Messaging and Presence
			Protocol (XMPP): Core", RFC 3920, DOI 10.17487/RFC3920,
			October 2004, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3920>.
			[RFC4132] Moriai, S., Kato, A., and M. Kanda, "Addition of Camellia
			Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
			RFC 4132, DOI 10.17487/RFC4132, July 2005,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4132>.
			[RFC4244] Barnes, M., Ed., "An Extension to the Session Initiation
			Protocol (SIP) for Request History Information", RFC 4244,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC4244, November 2005,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4244>.
	[RFC4347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer		[RFC4347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
	Security", RFC 4347, DOI 10.17487/RFC4347, April 2006,		Security", RFC 4347, DOI 10.17487/RFC4347, April 2006,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4347>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4347>.
			[RFC4366] Blake-Wilson, S., Nystrom, M., Hopwood, D., Mikkelsen, J.,
			and T. Wright, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
			Extensions", RFC 4366, DOI 10.17487/RFC4366, April 2006,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4366>.
			[RFC4492] Blake-Wilson, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C., and B.
			Moeller, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
			for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4492,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC4492, May 2006,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4492>.
			[RFC4507] Salowey, J., Zhou, H., Eronen, P., and H. Tschofenig,
			"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without
			Server-Side State", RFC 4507, DOI 10.17487/RFC4507, May
			2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4507>.
			[RFC4572] Lennox, J., "Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the
			Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session
			Description Protocol (SDP)", RFC 4572,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC4572, July 2006,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4572>.
			[RFC4934] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
			Transport Over TCP", RFC 4934, DOI 10.17487/RFC4934, May
			2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4934>.
			[RFC5077] Salowey, J., Zhou, H., Eronen, P., and H. Tschofenig,
			"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without
			Server-Side State", RFC 5077, DOI 10.17487/RFC5077,
			January 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5077>.
			[RFC5081] Mavrogiannopoulos, N., "Using OpenPGP Keys for Transport
			Layer Security (TLS) Authentication", RFC 5081,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC5081, November 2007,
			<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5081>.
			[RFC5101] Claise, B., Ed., "Specification of the IP Flow Information
			Export (IPFIX) Protocol for the Exchange of IP Traffic
			Flow Information", RFC 5101, DOI 10.17487/RFC5101, January
			2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5101>.
	[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security		[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
	(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,		(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,		DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
	[RFC7457] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, "Summarizing		[RFC7457] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, "Summarizing
	Known Attacks on Transport Layer Security (TLS) and		Known Attacks on Transport Layer Security (TLS) and
	Datagram TLS (DTLS)", RFC 7457, DOI 10.17487/RFC7457,		Datagram TLS (DTLS)", RFC 7457, DOI 10.17487/RFC7457,
	February 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7457>.		February 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7457>.
	[RFC7568] Barnes, R., Thomson, M., Pironti, A., and A. Langley,
	"Deprecating Secure Sockets Layer Version 3.0", RFC 7568,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC7568, June 2015,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7568>.
	[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol		[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
	Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,		Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
	[RFC8447] Salowey, J. and S. Turner, "IANA Registry Updates for TLS		[RFC8447] Salowey, J. and S. Turner, "IANA Registry Updates for TLS
	and DTLS", RFC 8447, DOI 10.17487/RFC8447, August 2018,		and DTLS", RFC 8447, DOI 10.17487/RFC8447, August 2018,
	<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8447>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8447>.
	[SSLpulse]		Appendix A. Change Log
	SSLpulse - will be deleted before publication, "SSLpulse
	https://www.ssllabs.com/ssl-pulse/", 2018.
	[StackExchange]		[[RFC editor: please remove this before publication.]]
	StackExchange - will be deleted before publication,
	"Stackexchange
	https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/177182/is-
	there-a-list-of-old-browsers-that-only-support-tls-1-0",
	2018.
	[stripe] Stripe, ""Upgrading to SHA-2 and TLS 1.2"		From draft-ietf-tls-oldversions-deprecate-00 to draft-ietf-tls-
	https://stripe.com/blog/upgrading-tls", 2018.		oldversions-deprecate-01:
	Appendix A. Change Log		o PRs with typos and similar: so far just #1
			o PR#2 noting msft browser announced deprecation (but this was OBE
			as per...)
			o Implemented actions as per IETF-103 meeting:
	[[RFC editor: please remove this before publication.]]		* Details about which RFC's, BCP's are affected were generated
			using a script in the git repo: https://github.com/tlswg/
			oldversions-deprecate/blob/master/nonobsnorms.sh
			* Removed the 'measurements' part
			* Removed SHA-1 deprecation (section 8 of -00)
	From draft-moriarty-tls-oldversions-diediedie-01 to draft-ietf-tls-		From draft-moriarty-tls-oldversions-diediedie-01 to draft-ietf-tls-
	oldversions-deprecate-00:		oldversions-deprecate-00:
	o I-Ds became RFCs 8446/8447 (old-repo PR#4, for TLS1.3)		o I-Ds became RFCs 8446/8447 (old-repo PR#4, for TLS1.3)
	o Accepted old-repo PR#5 fixing typos		o Accepted old-repo PR#5 fixing typos
	From draft-moriarty-tls-oldversions-diediedie-00 to draft-moriarty-		From draft-moriarty-tls-oldversions-diediedie-00 to draft-moriarty-
	tls-oldversions-diediedie-01:		tls-oldversions-diediedie-01:
End of changes. 40 change blocks.
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