draft-ietf-tls-rsa-aes-gcm-01.txt   draft-ietf-tls-rsa-aes-gcm-02.txt 
TLS Working Group J. Salowey TLS Working Group J. Salowey
Internet-Draft A. Choudhury Internet-Draft A. Choudhury
Intended status: Standards Track D. McGrew Intended status: Standards Track D. McGrew
Expires: July 16, 2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. Expires: August 10, 2008 Cisco Systems, Inc.
January 13, 2008 February 7, 2008
RSA based AES-GCM Cipher Suites for TLS AES-GCM Cipher Suites for TLS
draft-ietf-tls-rsa-aes-gcm-01 draft-ietf-tls-rsa-aes-gcm-02
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on July 16, 2008. This Internet-Draft will expire on August 10, 2008.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008). Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
Abstract Abstract
This memo describes the use of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) This memo describes the use of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
in Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) as a Transport Layer Security (TLS) in Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) as a Transport Layer Security (TLS)
authenticated encryption operation. GCM provides both authenticated encryption operation. GCM provides both
confidentiality and data origin authentication, can be efficiently confidentiality and data origin authentication, can be efficiently
implemented in hardware for speeds of 10 gigabits per second and implemented in hardware for speeds of 10 gigabits per second and
above, and is also well-suited to software implementations. This above, and is also well-suited to software implementations. This
memo defines TLS ciphersuites that use AES-GCM with RSA. memo defines TLS ciphersuites that use AES-GCM with RSA, DSS and
Diffie-Hellman based key exchange mechanisms.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions Used In This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Conventions Used In This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. RSA Based AES-GCM Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. AES-GCM Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Recommendations for Multiple Cryptographic Processors . . . 4
4. TLS Versions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. TLS Versions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6.1. Perfect Forward Secrecy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6.1. Counter Reuse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6.2. Counter Reuse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6.2. Recommendations for Multiple Encryption Processors . . . . 5
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 9 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document describes the use of AES [AES]in Galois Counter Mode This document describes the use of AES [AES]in Galois Counter Mode
(GCM) [GCM] (AES-GCM) with RSA based key exchange as a ciphersuite (GCM) [GCM] (AES-GCM) with various key exchange mechanisms as a
for TLS. This mechanism is not only efficient and secure, hardware ciphersuite for TLS. AES-GCM is not only efficient and secure, but
implementations can achieve high speeds with low cost and low hardware implementations can achieve high speeds with low cost and
latency, because the mode can be pipelined. Applications like low latency, because the mode can be pipelined. Applications like
CAPWAP, which uses DTLS, can benefit from the high-speed CAPWAP, which uses DTLS, can benefit from the high-speed
implementations when wireless termination points (WTPs) and implementations when wireless termination points (WTPs) and
controllers (ACs) have to meet requirements to support higher controllers (ACs) have to meet requirements to support higher
throughputs in the future. AES-GCM has been specified as a mode that throughputs in the future. AES-GCM has been specified as a mode that
can be used with IPsec ESP [RFC4106] and 802.1AE MAC Security can be used with IPsec ESP [RFC4106] and 802.1AE MAC Security
[IEEE8021AE]. It also is part of the NSA suite B ciphersuites for [IEEE8021AE]. This document defines ciphersutes based on RSA, DSS
TLS [I-D.rescorla-tls-suiteb]; however in order to meet Suite B and Diffie-Hellman key exchanges; ECC based ciphersuites are defined
requirements these ciphersuites require ECC base key exchange and TLS in a separate document [I-D.ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac]. AES-GCM is an
1.2. The ciphersuites defined in this document are based on RSA authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) cipher, as
which allows the use of AES-GCM in environments that have not defined in TLS 1.2 [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis]. The ciphersuites
deployed ECC algorithms and do not need to meet NSA Suite B defined in this draft may be used with Datagram TLS defined in
requirements. AES-GCM is an authenticated encryption with associated [RFC4347]. This memo uses GCM in a way similar to
data (AEAD) cipher, as defined in TLS 1.2[I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis].
The ciphersuites defined in this draft may be used with Datagram TLS
defined in [RFC4347]. This memo uses GCM in a way similar to
[I-D.ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac]. [I-D.ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac].
2. Conventions Used In This Document 2. Conventions Used In This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]
3. RSA Based AES-GCM Cipher Suites 3. AES-GCM Cipher Suites
The following ciphersuites use the new authenticated encryption modes The following ciphersuites use the new authenticated encryption modes
defined in TLS 1.2 with AES in Galois Counter Mode (GCM) [GCM]: defined in TLS 1.2 with AES in Galois Counter Mode (GCM) [GCM]:
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD1,TBD1} CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD2,TBD2} CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_DHE_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD3,TBD3} CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_DHE_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD4,TBD4} CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}
CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}
CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}
CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}
CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}
CipherSuite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}
CipherSuite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}
These ciphersuites use the AES-GCM authenticated encryption with These ciphersuites use the AES-GCM authenticated encryption with
associated data (AEAD) algorithms AEAD_AES_128_GCM and associated data (AEAD) algorithms AEAD_AES_128_GCM and
AEAD_AES_256_GCM described in [I-D.mcgrew-auth-enc]. Note that this AEAD_AES_256_GCM described in [RFC5116]. Note that each of these
specification uses a 128-bit authentication tag with GCM. The AEAD algorithms uses a 128-bit authentication tag with GCM. The
"nonce" SHALL be 12 bytes long and it is "partially implicit" (see "nonce" SHALL be 12 bytes long and it is "partially implicit" (see
section 3.2.1 in [I-D.mcgrew-auth-enc]). Part of the nonce is section 3.2.1 in [RFC5116]). Part of the nonce is generated as part
generated as part of the handshake process and is static for the of the handshake process and is static for the entire session and the
entire session and part is carried in each packet. other part is carried in each packet.
Struct{ Struct{
opaque salt[4]; opaque salt[4];
opaque explicit_nonce_part[8]; opaque explicit_nonce_part[8];
} GCMNonce } GCMNonce
The salt is the "implicit" part of the nonce and is not sent in the The salt is the "implicit" part of the nonce and is not sent in the
packet. It is either the client_write_IV if the client is sending or packet. It is either the client_write_IV if the client is sending or
the server_write_IV if the server is sending. These IVs SHALL be 4 the server_write_IV if the server is sending. These IVs SHALL be 4
bytes long. bytes long, therefore, for all the algorithms defined in this
section, SecurityParameters.fixed_iv_length=4.
The explicit_nonce_part is chosen by the sender and included in the The explicit_nonce_part is chosen by the sender and included in the
packet. Each value of the explicit_nonce_part MUST be distinct for packet. Each value of the explicit_nonce_part MUST be distinct for
each distinct invocation of GCM encrypt function for any fixed key. each distinct invocation of GCM encrypt function for any fixed key.
Failure to meet this uniqueness requirement can significantly degrade Failure to meet this uniqueness requirement can significantly degrade
security. The explicit_nonce_part is carried in the IV field of the security. The explicit_nonce_part is carried in the IV field of the
GenericAEADCipher structure. Therefore, for all the algorithms GenericAEADCipher structure. For all the algorithms defined in this
defined in this section, SecurityParameters.iv_length=8. section, SecurityParameters.record_iv_length=8.
In the case of TLS the explicit_nonce_part MAY be the 64-bit sequence In the case of TLS the explicit_nonce_part MAY be the 64-bit sequence
number. In the case of Datagram TLS [RFC4347] the number. In the case of Datagram TLS [RFC4347] the
explicit_nonce_part MAY be formed from the concatenation of the 16- explicit_nonce_part MAY be formed from the concatenation of the 16-
bit epoch with the 48-bit DTLS seq_num. bit epoch with the 48-bit DTLS seq_num.
The RSA and RSA-DHE key exchange is performed as defined in The RSA, DHE_RSA, DH_RSA, DHE_DSS, DH_DSS, and DH_anon key exchanges
[I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis]. are performed as defined in [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis].
The PRF algorithms SHALL be as follows: The PRF algorithms SHALL be as follows:
For TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 and For ciphersuites ending in _SHA256 the hash function is SHA256.
TLS_RSA_DHE_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 the hash function is SHA256.
For TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 and For ciphersuites ending in _SHA384 the hash function is SHA384.
TLS_RSA_DHE_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 the hash function is SHA384.
3.1. Recommendations for Multiple Cryptographic Processors 4. TLS Versions
These ciphersuites make use of the authenticated encryption with
additional data defined in TLS 1.2 [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis]. They
MUST NOT be negotiated in older versions of TLS. Clients MUST NOT
offer these cipher suites if they do not offer TLS 1.2 or later.
Servers which select an earlier version of TLS MUST NOT select one of
these cipher suites. Because TLS has no way for the client to
indicate that it supports TLS 1.2 but not earlier, a non-compliant
server might potentially negotiate TLS 1.1 or earlier and select one
of the cipher suites in this document. Clients MUST check the TLS
version and generate a fatal "illegal_parameter" alert if they detect
an incorrect version.
5. IANA Considerations
IANA has assigned the following values for the ciphersuites defined
in this draft:
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}
CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}
CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}
CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}
CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}
CipherSuite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}
CipherSuite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}
6. Security Considerations
The security considerations in [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis] apply to
this document as well. The remainder of this section describes
security considerations specific to the cipher suites described in
this document.
6.1. Counter Reuse
AES-GCM security requires that the counter is never reused. The IV
construction in Section 3 is designed to prevent counter reuse.
6.2. Recommendations for Multiple Encryption Processors
If multiple cryptographic processors are in use by the sender, then If multiple cryptographic processors are in use by the sender, then
the sender MUST ensure that each value of the explicit_nonce_part the sender MUST ensure that, for a particular key, each value of the
that is used by each processor is distinct. In this case each explicit_nonce_part used with that key is distinct. In this case
encryption processor SHOULD include in the explicit_nonce_part a a each encryption processor SHOULD include in the explicit_nonce_part a
fixed value that is distinct for each processor. The recommended fixed value that is distinct for each processor. The recommended
format is format is
explicit_nonce_part = FixedDistinct || Variable explicit_nonce_part = FixedDistinct || Variable
where the FixedDistinct field is distinct for each encryption where the FixedDistinct field is distinct for each encryption
processor, but is fixed for a given processor, and the Variable field processor, but is fixed for a given processor, and the Variable field
is distinct for each distinct nonce used by a particular encryption is distinct for each distinct nonce used by a particular encryption
processor. When this method is used, the FixedDistinct fields used processor. When this method is used, the FixedDistinct fields used
by the different processors MUST have the same length. by the different processors MUST have the same length.
In the terms of Figure 2 in [I-D.mcgrew-auth-enc], the Salt is the In the terms of Figure 2 in [RFC5116], the Salt is the Fixed-Common
Fixed-Common part of the nonce (it is fixed, and it is common across part of the nonce (it is fixed, and it is common across all
all encryption processors), the FixedDistinct field exactly encryption processors), the FixedDistinct field exactly corresponds
corresponds to the Fixed-Distinct field, and the Variable field to the Fixed-Distinct field, and the Variable field corresponds to
corresponds to the Counter field, and the explicit part exactly the Counter field, and the explicit part exactly corresponds to the
corresponds to the explicit_nonce_part. explicit_nonce_part.
For clarity, we provide an example for TLS in which there are two For clarity, we provide an example for TLS in which there are two
distinct encryption processors, each of which uses a one-byte distinct encryption processors, each of which uses a one-byte
FixedDistinct field: FixedDistinct field:
Salt = eedc68dc Salt = eedc68dc
FixedDistinct = 01 (for the first encryption processor) FixedDistinct = 01 (for the first encryption processor)
FixedDistinct = 02 (for the second encryption processor) FixedDistinct = 02 (for the second encryption processor)
The GCMnonces generated by the first encryption processor, and their The GCMnonces generated by the first encryption processor, and their
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The GCMnonces generated by the second encryption processor, and their The GCMnonces generated by the second encryption processor, and their
corresponding explicit_nonce_parts, are corresponding explicit_nonce_parts, are
GCMNonce explicit_nonce_part GCMNonce explicit_nonce_part
------------------------ ---------------------------- ------------------------ ----------------------------
eedc68dc0200000000000000 0200000000000000 eedc68dc0200000000000000 0200000000000000
eedc68dc0200000000000001 0200000000000001 eedc68dc0200000000000001 0200000000000001
eedc68dc0200000000000002 0200000000000002 eedc68dc0200000000000002 0200000000000002
... ...
4. TLS Versions
These ciphersuites make use of the authenticated encryption with
additional data defined in TLS 1.2 [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis]. They
MUST NOT be negotiated in older versions of TLS. Clients MUST NOT
offer these cipher suites if they do not offer TLS 1.2 or later.
Servers which select an earlier version of TLS MUST NOT select one of
these cipher suites. Because TLS has no way for the client to
indicate that it supports TLS 1.2 but not earlier, a non-compliant
server might potentially negotiate TLS 1.1 or earlier and select one
of the cipher suites in this document. Clients MUST check the TLS
version and generate a fatal "illegal_parameter" alert if they detect
an incorrect version.
5. IANA Considerations
IANA has assigned the following values for the ciphersuites defined
in this draft:
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD1,TBD1}
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD2,TBD2}
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_DHE_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD3,TBD3}
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_DHE_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD4,TBD4}
6. Security Considerations
The security considerations in [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis] apply to
this document as well. The remainder of this section describes
security considerations specific to the cipher suites described in
this document.
6.1. Perfect Forward Secrecy
The perfect forward secrecy properties of RSA based TLS ciphersuites
are discussed in the security analysis of [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis].
It should be noted that only the ephemeral Diffie-Hellman based
ciphersuites (RSA_DHE) are capable of providing perfect forward
secrecy.
6.2. Counter Reuse
AES-GCM security requires that the counter is never reused. The IV
construction in Section 3 is designed to prevent counter reuse.
7. Acknowledgements 7. Acknowledgements
This draft borrows heavily from [I-D.ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac]. This draft borrows heavily from [I-D.ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac]. The
authors would like to thank Alex Lam and Pasi Eronen for providing
useful comments during the review of this draft.
8. References 8. References
8.1. Normative References 8.1. Normative References
[AES] National Institute of Standards and Technology, [AES] National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Specification for the Advanced Encryption Standard "Specification for the Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES)", FIPS 197, November 2001. (AES)", FIPS 197, November 2001.
[GCM] National Institute of Standards and Technology, [GCM] National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
Galois Counter Mode (GCM) for Confidentiality and Galois Counter Mode (GCM) for Confidentiality and
Authentication", SP 800-38D, April 2006. Authentication", SP 800-38D, April 2006.
[I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis] [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis]
Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis-07 (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis-08
(work in progress), November 2007. (work in progress), January 2008.
[I-D.mcgrew-auth-enc]
McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
Encryption", draft-mcgrew-auth-enc-05 (work in progress),
November 2007.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4346] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346, April 2006.
[RFC4347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer [RFC4347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security", RFC 4347, April 2006. Security", RFC 4347, April 2006.
[RFC5116] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
Encryption", RFC 5116, January 2008.
8.2. Informative References 8.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac] [I-D.ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac]
Rescorla, E., "TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA- Rescorla, E., "TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-
256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode", 256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode",
draft-ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac-02 (work in progress), draft-ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac-02 (work in progress),
December 2007. December 2007.
[I-D.rescorla-tls-suiteb]
Salter, M. and E. Rescorla, "Suite B Cipher Suites for
TLS", draft-rescorla-tls-suiteb-01 (work in progress),
June 2007.
[IEEE8021AE] [IEEE8021AE]
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "Media Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "Media
Access Control Security", IEEE Standard 802.1AE, Access Control Security", IEEE Standard 802.1AE,
August 2006. August 2006.
[RFC4106] Viega, J. and D. McGrew, "The Use of Galois/Counter Mode [RFC4106] Viega, J. and D. McGrew, "The Use of Galois/Counter Mode
(GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", (GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
RFC 4106, June 2005. RFC 4106, June 2005.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
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