TLS Working Group                                             J. Salowey
Internet-Draft                                              A. Choudhury
Intended status: Standards Track                               D. McGrew
Expires: August 10, October 16, 2008                            Cisco Systems, Inc.
                                                        February 7,
                                                          April 14, 2008

                     AES-GCM Cipher Suites for TLS
                     draft-ietf-tls-rsa-aes-gcm-02
                     draft-ietf-tls-rsa-aes-gcm-03

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).

Abstract

   This memo describes the use of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
   in Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) as a Transport Layer Security (TLS)
   authenticated encryption operation.  GCM provides both
   confidentiality and data origin authentication, can be efficiently
   implemented in hardware for speeds of 10 gigabits per second and
   above, and is also well-suited to software implementations.  This
   memo defines TLS ciphersuites cipher suites that use AES-GCM with RSA, DSS and
   Diffie-Hellman based key exchange mechanisms.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

   2.  Conventions Used In This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

   3.  AES-GCM Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

   4.  TLS Versions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
     6.1.  Counter Reuse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
     6.2.  Recommendations for Multiple Encryption Processors  . . . . 5

   7.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6

   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements  . . . . . . . . . . 9

1.  Introduction

   This document describes the use of AES [AES]in [AES] in Galois Counter Mode
   (GCM) [GCM] (AES-GCM) with various key exchange mechanisms as a
   ciphersuite
   cipher suite for TLS.  AES-GCM is an authenticated encryption with
   associated data (AEAD) cipher (as defined in TLS 1.2
   [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis]) providing both confidentiality and data
   origin authentication.  The following sections define cipher suites
   based on RSA, DSS and Diffie-Hellman key exchanges; ECC based cipher
   suites are defined in a separate document [I-D.ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac].

   AES-GCM is not only efficient and secure, but hardware
   implementations can achieve high speeds with low cost and low
   latency, because the mode can be pipelined.  Applications like
   CAPWAP, which uses DTLS, that
   require high data throughput can benefit from the these high-speed
   implementations when wireless termination points (WTPs) and
   controllers (ACs) have to meet requirements to support higher
   throughputs in the future.
   implementations.  AES-GCM has been specified as a mode that can be
   used with IPsec ESP [RFC4106] and 802.1AE MAC Security [IEEE8021AE].  This document defines ciphersutes based on RSA, DSS
   and Diffie-Hellman key exchanges; ECC based ciphersuites are defined
   in a separate document [I-D.ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac].  AES-GCM is an
   authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) cipher, as
   defined in TLS 1.2 [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis].  The ciphersuites
   defined in this draft may be used with Datagram TLS defined in
   [RFC4347].  This memo uses GCM in a way similar to
   [I-D.ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac].

2.  Conventions Used In This Document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] [RFC2119].

3.  AES-GCM Cipher Suites

   The following ciphersuites cipher suites use the new authenticated encryption
   modes defined in TLS 1.2 with AES in Galois Counter Mode (GCM) [GCM]:

      CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}

   These ciphersuites cipher suites use the AES-GCM authenticated encryption with
   associated data (AEAD) algorithms AEAD_AES_128_GCM and
   AEAD_AES_256_GCM described in [RFC5116].  Note that each of these
   AEAD algorithms uses a 128-bit authentication tag with GCM.  The
   "nonce" SHALL be 12 bytes long and it consisting of two parts as follows:
   (this is an example of a "partially implicit" (see explicit" nonce; see section
   3.2.1 in [RFC5116]).  Part of the nonce is generated as part
   of the handshake process and is static for the entire session and the
   other part is carried in each packet.

             Struct{

             struct{
                opaque salt[4];
                opaque explicit_nonce_part[8]; nonce_explicit[8];
             } GCMNonce GCMNonce;

   The salt is the "implicit" part of the nonce and is not sent in the
   packet.  It  Instead the salt is generated as part of the handshake
   process: it is either the client_write_IV if (when the client is sending
   sending) or the server_write_IV if (when the server is sending.  These IVs SHALL be sending).  The
   salt length (SecurityParameters.fixed_iv_length) is 4
   bytes long, therefore, for all the algorithms defined in this
   section, SecurityParameters.fixed_iv_length=4. octets.

   The explicit_nonce_part nonce_explicit is the "explicit" part of the nonce.  It is chosen
   by the sender and included is carried in each TLS record in the
   packet.
   GenericAEADCipher.nonce_explicit field.  The nonce_explicit length
   (SecurityParameters.record_iv_length) is 8 octets.

   Each value of the explicit_nonce_part nonce_explicit MUST be distinct for each distinct
   invocation of GCM encrypt function for any fixed key.  Failure to
   meet this uniqueness requirement can significantly degrade security.
   The explicit_nonce_part is carried in the IV field of the
   GenericAEADCipher structure.  For all the algorithms defined in this
   section, SecurityParameters.record_iv_length=8.

   In the case of TLS the explicit_nonce_part nonce_explicit MAY be the 64-bit sequence number.  In the case of Datagram TLS [RFC4347] the
   explicit_nonce_part MAY be formed from the concatenation of the 16-
   bit epoch with the 48-bit DTLS seq_num.

   The RSA, DHE_RSA, DH_RSA, DHE_DSS, DH_DSS, and DH_anon key exchanges
   are performed as defined in [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis].

   The PRF algorithms SHALL be as follows:

      For ciphersuites cipher suites ending in _SHA256 with _SHA256, the hash function PRF is SHA256. the TLS PRF
      [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis] with SHA-256 as the hash function.

      For ciphersuites cipher suites ending in _SHA384 with _SHA384, the hash function PRF is SHA384. the TLS PRF
      [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis] with SHA-384 as the hash function.

   Implementations MUST send TLS Alert bad_record_mac for all types of
   failures encountered in processing the AES-GCM algorithm.

4.  TLS Versions

   These ciphersuites cipher suites make use of the authenticated encryption with
   additional data defined in TLS 1.2 [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis].  They
   MUST NOT be negotiated in older versions of TLS.  Clients MUST NOT
   offer these cipher suites if they do not offer TLS 1.2 or later.
   Servers which select an earlier version of TLS MUST NOT select one of
   these cipher suites.  Because TLS has no way for the client to
   indicate that it supports TLS 1.2 but not earlier, a non-compliant
   server might potentially negotiate TLS 1.1 or earlier and select one
   of the cipher suites in this document.  Clients MUST check the TLS
   version and generate a fatal "illegal_parameter" alert if they detect
   an incorrect version.

5.  IANA Considerations

   IANA has assigned the following values for the ciphersuites cipher suites defined
   in this draft:

      CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}
      CipherSuite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}

6.  Security Considerations

   The security considerations in [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis] apply to
   this document as well.  The remainder of this section describes
   security considerations specific to the cipher suites described in
   this document.

6.1.  Counter Reuse

   AES-GCM security requires that the counter is never reused.  The IV
   construction in Section 3 is designed to prevent counter reuse.

6.2.  Recommendations for Multiple Encryption Processors

   If multiple cryptographic processors are in use by the sender, then
   the sender MUST ensure that, for a particular key, each value of the
   explicit_nonce_part
   nonce_explicit used with that key is distinct.  In this case each
   encryption processor SHOULD include in the explicit_nonce_part nonce_explicit a fixed
   value that is distinct for each processor.  The recommended format is
        explicit_nonce_part

        nonce_explicit = FixedDistinct || Variable
   where the FixedDistinct field is distinct for each encryption
   processor, but is fixed for a given processor, and the Variable field
   is distinct for each distinct nonce used by a particular encryption
   processor.  When this method is used, the FixedDistinct fields used
   by the different processors MUST have the same length.

   In the terms of Figure 2 in [RFC5116], the Salt is the Fixed-Common
   part of the nonce (it is fixed, and it is common across all
   encryption processors), the FixedDistinct field exactly corresponds
   to the Fixed-Distinct field, and the Variable field corresponds to
   the Counter field, and the explicit part exactly corresponds to the
   explicit_nonce_part.
   nonce_explicit.

   For clarity, we provide an example for TLS in which there are two
   distinct encryption processors, each of which uses a one-byte
   FixedDistinct field:

          Salt          = eedc68dc
          FixedDistinct = 01       (for the first encryption processor)
          FixedDistinct = 02       (for the second encryption processor)

   The GCMnonces generated by the first encryption processor, and their
   corresponding explicit_nonce_parts, nonce_explicit, are:

          GCMNonce                    explicit_nonce_part                    nonce_explicit
          ------------------------    ----------------------------
          eedc68dc0100000000000000    0100000000000000
          eedc68dc0100000000000001    0100000000000001
          eedc68dc0100000000000002    0100000000000002
          ...

   The GCMnonces generated by the second encryption processor, and their
   corresponding explicit_nonce_parts, nonce_explicit, are

          GCMNonce                    explicit_nonce_part                    nonce_explicit
          ------------------------    ----------------------------
          eedc68dc0200000000000000    0200000000000000
          eedc68dc0200000000000001    0200000000000001
          eedc68dc0200000000000002    0200000000000002
          ...

7.  Acknowledgements

   This draft borrows heavily from [I-D.ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac].  The
   authors would like to thank Alex Lam Lam, Simon Josefsson and Pasi Eronen
   for providing useful comments during the review of this draft.

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [AES]      National Institute of Standards and Technology,
              "Specification for the Advanced "Advanced
              Encryption Standard (AES)", FIPS 197, November 2001.

   [GCM]      National Institute of Standards and Technology,      Dworkin, M., "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
              Operation:
              Galois Counter Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) for Confidentiality and
              Authentication", GMAC", National
              Institute of Standards and Technology SP 800-38D, April 2006.
              November 2007.

   [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis]
              Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis-08 draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis-10
              (work in progress), January March 2008.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC4347]  Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
              Security", RFC 4347, April 2006.

   [RFC5116]  McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
              Encryption", RFC 5116, January 2008.

8.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac]
              Rescorla, E., "TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-
              256/384 and AES Galois Counter  Mode",
              draft-ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac-02
              draft-ietf-tls-ecc-new-mac-05 (work in progress),
              December 2007.
              April 2008.

   [IEEE8021AE]
              Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "Media
              Access Control Security", IEEE Standard 802.1AE,
              August 2006.

   [RFC4106]  Viega, J. and D. McGrew, "The Use of Galois/Counter Mode
              (GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
              RFC 4106, June 2005.

Authors' Addresses

   Joseph Salowey
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   2901 3rd. Ave
   Seattle, WA  98121
   USA

   Email: jsalowey@cisco.com

   Abhijit Choudhury
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   3625 Cisco Way
   San Jose, CA  95134
   USA

   Email: abhijitc@cisco.com

   David McGrew
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   170 W Tasman Drive
   San Jose, CA  95134
   USA

   Email: mcgrew@cisco.com

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