draft-ietf-uta-xmpp-05.txt   draft-ietf-uta-xmpp-06.txt 
Network Working Group P. Saint-Andre Network Working Group P. Saint-Andre
Internet-Draft &yet Internet-Draft &yet
Updates: 6120 (if approved) T. Alkemade Updates: 6120 (if approved) T. Alkemade
Intended status: Standards Track Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: July 27, 2015 January 23, 2015 Expires: October 16, 2015 April 14, 2015
Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) in the Extensible Messaging and Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) in the Extensible Messaging and
Presence Protocol (XMPP) Presence Protocol (XMPP)
draft-ietf-uta-xmpp-05 draft-ietf-uta-xmpp-06
Abstract Abstract
This document provides recommendations for the use of Transport Layer This document provides recommendations for the use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) in the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol Security (TLS) in the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol
(XMPP). This document updates RFC 6120. (XMPP). This document updates RFC 6120.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
skipping to change at page 1, line 34 skipping to change at page 1, line 34
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 27, 2015. This Internet-Draft will expire on October 16, 2015.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
skipping to change at page 2, line 14 skipping to change at page 2, line 14
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Support for TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3.1. Support for TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.2. Compression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3.2. Compression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.3. Session Resumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3.3. Session Resumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.4. Authenticated Connections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3.4. Authenticated Connections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.5. Unauthenticated Connections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.5. Server Name Indication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.6. Server Name Indication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.6. Human Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.7. Human Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Appendix A. Implementation Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Appendix A. Implementation Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Appendix B. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Appendix B. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) [RFC6120] The Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) [RFC6120]
(along with its precursor, the so-called "Jabber protocol") has used (along with its precursor, the so-called "Jabber protocol") has used
Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC5246] (along with its precursor, Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC5246] (along with its precursor,
Secure Sockets Layer or SSL) since 1999. Both [RFC6120] and its Secure Sockets Layer or SSL) since 1999. Both [RFC6120] and its
predecessor [RFC3920] provided recommendations regarding the use of predecessor [RFC3920] provided recommendations regarding the use of
TLS in XMPP. In order to address the evolving threat model on the TLS in XMPP. In order to address the evolving threat model on the
Internet today, this document provides stronger recommendations. Internet today, this document provides stronger recommendations.
NOTE: Unless explicitly noted otherwise, all of the In particular, this document updates [RFC6120] by specifying that
recommendations specified in [I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp] apply to XMPP. XMPP implementations and deployments MUST follow the best current
In the main, this document merely provides supplementary practices documented in the "Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS
information; those who implement and deploy XMPP technologies are and DTLS" [I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp]. This includes stronger
expected to follow the recommendations of [I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp]. recommendations regarding SSL/TLS protocol versions, fallback to
lower versions, TLS-layer compression, TLS session resumption, cipher
This document updates [RFC6120]. suites, public key lengths, forward secrecy, and other aspects of
using TLS with XMPP.
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
Various security-related terms are to be understood in the sense Various security-related terms are to be understood in the sense
defined in [RFC4949]. defined in [RFC4949].
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119]. [RFC2119].
3. Recommendations 3. Recommendations
The best current practices documented in the "Recommendations for
Secure Use of TLS and DTLS" [I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp] are included here
by reference. Instead of repeating those recommendations here, this
document mostly provides supplementary information regarding secure
implementation and deployment of XMPP technologies.
3.1. Support for TLS 3.1. Support for TLS
Support for TLS (specifically, the XMPP profile of STARTTLS) is Support for TLS (specifically, the XMPP profile of STARTTLS) is
mandatory for XMPP implementations, as already specified in [RFC6120] mandatory for XMPP implementations, as already specified in [RFC6120]
and its predecessor [RFC3920]. and its predecessor [RFC3920].
The server (i.e., the XMPP receiving entity) to which a client or The server (i.e., the XMPP receiving entity) to which a client or
peer server (i.e., the XMPP initiating entity) connects might not peer server (i.e., the XMPP initiating entity) connects might not
offer a stream feature of <starttls xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns offer a stream feature of <starttls xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns
:xmpp-tls'/>. Although in general this stream feature indicates that :xmpp-tls'/>. Although in general this stream feature indicates that
the server supports XMPP 1.0 and therefore supports TLS, it is the server supports XMPP 1.0 and therefore supports TLS, that this
possible that this stream feature might be stripped out by an stream feature might be stripped out by an attacker (see Section 2.1
attacker (see Section 2.1 of [I-D.ietf-uta-tls-attacks]). Therefore, of [RFC7457]). Similarly, the <required/> child element of the
the initiating entity SHOULD proceed with the stream negotiation even <starttls/> stream feature is used to indicate that negotiation of
if the receiving entity does not advertise support for TLS. TLS is mandatory, but could also be stripped out by an attacker.
Similarly, although a receiving entity SHOULD include the <required/> Therefore, the initiating entity MUST NOT be deterred from attempting
child element to indicate that negotiation of TLS is mandatory, an TLS negotiation even if the receiving entity does not advertise
initiating entity MUST NOT depend on receiving the <required/> flag support for TLS. Instead, the initiating entity SHOULD (based on
in determining whether TLS will be enforced for the stream. local policy) proceed with the stream negotiation and attempt to
negotiate TLS.
3.2. Compression 3.2. Compression
XMPP supports an application-layer compression technology [XEP-0138]. XMPP supports an application-layer compression technology [XEP-0138].
Although this XMPP extension might have slightly stronger security Although this XMPP extension might have slightly stronger security
properties than TLS-layer compression (since it is enabled after SASL properties than TLS-layer compression (since it is enabled after SASL
authentication, as described in [XEP-0170]), this document neither authentication, as described in [XEP-0170]), this document neither
encourages nor discourages use of XMPP-layer compression. encourages nor discourages use of XMPP-layer compression.
3.3. Session Resumption 3.3. Session Resumption
In XMPP, TLS session resumption can be used in concert with the XMPP In XMPP, TLS session resumption can be used in concert with the XMPP
Stream Management extension; see [XEP-0198] for further details. Stream Management extension; see [XEP-0198] for further details.
3.4. Authenticated Connections 3.4. Authenticated Connections
Both the core XMPP specification [RFC6120] and the "CertID" Both the core XMPP specification [RFC6120] and the "CertID"
specification [RFC6125] provide recommendations and requirements for specification [RFC6125] provide recommendations and requirements for
certificate validation in the context of authenticated connections. certificate validation in the context of authenticated connections.
This document does not supersede those specifications. Wherever This document does not supersede those specifications (e.g., it does
possible, it is best to prefer authenticated connections (along with not modify the recommendations in [RFC6120] regarding the Subject
SASL [RFC4422]), as already stated in the core XMPP specification Alternative Names or other certificate details that need to be
[RFC6120]. In particular, clients MUST authenticate servers and supported for authentication of XMPP connections using PKIX
servers MUST authenticate clients. This document does not mandate certificates).
that servers need to authenticate peer servers (see next section).
This document does not modify the recommendations in [RFC6120]
regarding the Subject Alternative Names (or other certificate
details) that need to be supported for authentication of XMPP
connections using PKIX certificates.
The Domain Name Associations (DNA) specification [I-D.ietf-xmpp-dna] Wherever possible, it is best to prefer authenticated connections
describes a framework for XMPP server authentication methods, which (along with SASL [RFC4422]), as already stated in the core XMPP
include not only PKIX but also DNS-Based Authentication of Named specification [RFC6120]. In particular, clients MUST authenticate
Entities (DANE) as defined in [I-D.ietf-dane-srv] and PKIX over servers and servers MUST authenticate clients.
Secure HTTP (POSH) as defined in [I-D.ietf-xmpp-posh].
3.5. Unauthenticated Connections This document does not mandate that servers need to authenticate peer
servers, although such authentication is strongly preferred and
servers SHOULD authenticate each other. Unfortunately, in multi-
tenanted environments it can be extremely difficult to obtain and
deploy PKIX certificates with the proper Subject Alternative Names
(see [I-D.ietf-xmpp-dna] and [I-D.ietf-xmpp-posh] for details). To
overcome that difficulty, the Domain Name Associations (DNA)
specification [I-D.ietf-xmpp-dna] describes a framework for XMPP
server authentication methods, which include not only PKIX but also
DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) as defined in
[I-D.ietf-dane-srv] and PKIX over Secure HTTP (POSH) as defined in
[I-D.ietf-xmpp-posh]. These methods can provide a basis for server
identity verification when appropriate PKIX certificates cannot be
obtained and deployed.
Given the pervasiveness of passive eavesdropping, even an Given the pervasiveness of eavesdropping [RFC7258], even an
unauthenticated connection might be better than an unencrypted unauthenticated connection might be better than an unencrypted
connection (this is similar to the "better than nothing security" connection in these scenarios (this is similar to the "better than
approach for IPsec [RFC5386]). Unauthenticated connections include nothing security" approach for IPsec [RFC5386]). Unauthenticated
connections negotiated using anonymous Diffie-Hellman algorithms or connections include connections negotiated using anonymous Diffie-
using self-signed certificates, among other scenarios. In Hellman mechanisms or using self-signed certificates, among others.
particular, because of current deployment challenges for In particular for XMPP server-to-server interactions, it can be
authenticated connections between XMPP servers (see
[I-D.ietf-xmpp-dna] and [I-D.ietf-xmpp-posh] for details), it can be
reasonable for XMPP server implementations to accept unauthenticated reasonable for XMPP server implementations to accept unauthenticated
connections when Server Dialback keys [XEP-0220] are used; although but encrypted connections when Server Dialback keys [XEP-0220] are
such keys on their own provide only weak identity verification (made used; such keys on their own provide only weak identity verification
stronger through the use of DNSSEC [RFC4033]), this at least enables (made stronger through the use of DNSSEC [RFC4033]), but this at
encryption of server-to-server connections. least enables encryption of server-to-server connections. The DNA
prooftypes described above are intended to mitigate the residual need
for unauthenticated connections in these scenarios.
3.6. Server Name Indication 3.5. Server Name Indication
Although there is no harm in supporting the TLS Server Name Although there is no harm in supporting the TLS Server Name
Indication (SNI) extension [RFC6066], this is not necessary since the Indication (SNI) extension [RFC6066], this is not necessary since the
same function is served in XMPP by the 'to' address of the initial same function is served in XMPP by the 'to' address of the initial
stream header as explained in Section 4.7.2 of [RFC6120]. stream header as explained in Section 4.7.2 of [RFC6120].
3.7. Human Factors 3.6. Human Factors
It is strongly encouraged that XMPP clients provide ways for end It is strongly encouraged that XMPP clients provide ways for end
users (and that XMPP servers provide ways for administrators) to users (and that XMPP servers provide ways for administrators) to
complete the following tasks: complete the following tasks:
o Determine if a client-to-server or server-to-server connection is o Determine if a given incoming or outgoing XML stream is encrypted
encrypted and authenticated. using TLS.
o Determine the version of TLS used for a client-to-server or o Determine the version of TLS used for encryption of a given
server-to-server connection. stream.
o If authenticated encryption is used, determine how the connection
was authenticated or verified (e.g., via PKI, DANE, POSH, or
Server Dialback).
o Inspect the certificate offered by an XMPP server. o Inspect the certificate offered by an XMPP server.
o Determine the cipher suite used to encrypt a connection. o Determine the cipher suite used to encrypt a connection.
o Be warned if the certificate changes for a given server. o Be warned if the certificate changes for a given server.
4. IANA Considerations 4. IANA Considerations
This document requests no actions of the IANA. This document requests no actions of the IANA.
skipping to change at page 5, line 41 skipping to change at page 6, line 10
compromised, leaving users utterly at the mercy of an adversary. compromised, leaving users utterly at the mercy of an adversary.
This document and related actions to strengthen the security of the This document and related actions to strengthen the security of the
XMPP network are based on the assumption that XMPP servers and XMPP network are based on the assumption that XMPP servers and
clients have not been subject to widespread compromise. If this clients have not been subject to widespread compromise. If this
assumption is valid, then ubiquitous use of per-hop TLS channel assumption is valid, then ubiquitous use of per-hop TLS channel
encryption and more significant deployment of end-to-end object encryption and more significant deployment of end-to-end object
encryption technologies will serve to protect XMPP communications to encryption technologies will serve to protect XMPP communications to
a measurable degree, compared to the alternatives. a measurable degree, compared to the alternatives.
This document covers only communication over the XMPP network and
does not take into account gateways to non-XMPP networks. As an
example, for security considerations related to gateways between XMPP
and the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) see [RFC7247] and
[I-D.ietf-stox-im].
6. References 6. References
6.1. Normative References 6.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp] [I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp]
Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS", draft- "Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS", draft-
ietf-uta-tls-bcp-08 (work in progress), December 2014. ietf-uta-tls-bcp-11 (work in progress), February 2015.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", RFC [RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", RFC
4949, August 2007. 4949, August 2007.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008. (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
skipping to change at page 6, line 25 skipping to change at page 6, line 48
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011. Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, March 2011.
6.2. Informative References 6.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-dane-srv] [I-D.ietf-dane-srv]
Finch, T., Miller, M., and P. Saint-Andre, "Using DNS- Finch, T., Miller, M., and P. Saint-Andre, "Using DNS-
Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) TLSA records Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) TLSA records
with SRV and MX records.", draft-ietf-dane-srv-08 (work in with SRV and MX records.", draft-ietf-dane-srv-12 (work in
progress), October 2014. progress), March 2015.
[I-D.ietf-uta-tls-attacks] [I-D.ietf-stox-im]
Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, "Summarizing Saint-Andre, P., Houri, A., and J. Hildebrand,
Current Attacks on TLS and DTLS", draft-ietf-uta-tls- "Interworking between the Session Initiation Protocol
attacks-05 (work in progress), October 2014. (SIP) and the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol
(XMPP): Instant Messaging", draft-ietf-stox-im-13 (work in
progress), March 2015.
[I-D.ietf-xmpp-dna] [I-D.ietf-xmpp-dna]
Saint-Andre, P. and M. Miller, "Domain Name Associations Saint-Andre, P. and M. Miller, "Domain Name Associations
(DNA) in the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (DNA) in the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol
(XMPP)", draft-ietf-xmpp-dna-08 (work in progress), (XMPP)", draft-ietf-xmpp-dna-10 (work in progress), March
October 2014. 2015.
[I-D.ietf-xmpp-posh] [I-D.ietf-xmpp-posh]
Miller, M. and P. Saint-Andre, "PKIX over Secure HTTP Miller, M. and P. Saint-Andre, "PKIX over Secure HTTP
(POSH)", draft-ietf-xmpp-posh-02 (work in progress), (POSH)", draft-ietf-xmpp-posh-04 (work in progress),
October 2014. February 2015.
[RFC3920] Saint-Andre, P., Ed., "Extensible Messaging and Presence [RFC3920] Saint-Andre, P., Ed., "Extensible Messaging and Presence
Protocol (XMPP): Core", RFC 3920, October 2004. Protocol (XMPP): Core", RFC 3920, October 2004.
[RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. [RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC
4033, March 2005. 4033, March 2005.
[RFC4422] Melnikov, A. and K. Zeilenga, "Simple Authentication and [RFC4422] Melnikov, A. and K. Zeilenga, "Simple Authentication and
Security Layer (SASL)", RFC 4422, June 2006. Security Layer (SASL)", RFC 4422, June 2006.
[RFC5386] Williams, N. and M. Richardson, "Better-Than-Nothing [RFC5386] Williams, N. and M. Richardson, "Better-Than-Nothing
Security: An Unauthenticated Mode of IPsec", RFC 5386, Security: An Unauthenticated Mode of IPsec", RFC 5386,
November 2008. November 2008.
[RFC6066] Eastlake, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions: [RFC6066] Eastlake, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions:
Extension Definitions", RFC 6066, January 2011. Extension Definitions", RFC 6066, January 2011.
[RFC7247] Saint-Andre, P., Houri, A., and J. Hildebrand,
"Interworking between the Session Initiation Protocol
(SIP) and the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol
(XMPP): Architecture, Addresses, and Error Handling", RFC
7247, May 2014.
[RFC7258] Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an
Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, May 2014.
[RFC7457] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, "Summarizing
Known Attacks on Transport Layer Security (TLS) and
Datagram TLS (DTLS)", RFC 7457, February 2015.
[XEP-0138] [XEP-0138]
Hildebrand, J. and P. Saint-Andre, "Stream Compression", Hildebrand, J. and P. Saint-Andre, "Stream Compression",
XSF XEP 0138, May 2009. XSF XEP 0138, May 2009.
[XEP-0170] [XEP-0170]
Saint-Andre, P., "Recommended Order of Stream Feature Saint-Andre, P., "Recommended Order of Stream Feature
Negotiation", XSF XEP 0170, January 2007. Negotiation", XSF XEP 0170, January 2007.
[XEP-0198] [XEP-0198]
Karneges, J., Saint-Andre, P., Hildebrand, J., Forno, F., Karneges, J., Saint-Andre, P., Hildebrand, J., Forno, F.,
skipping to change at page 7, line 41 skipping to change at page 8, line 34
Some governments enforce legislation prohibiting the export of strong Some governments enforce legislation prohibiting the export of strong
cryptographic technologies. Nothing in this document ought to be cryptographic technologies. Nothing in this document ought to be
taken as advice to violate such prohibitions. taken as advice to violate such prohibitions.
Appendix B. Acknowledgements Appendix B. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank the following individuals for their The authors would like to thank the following individuals for their
input: Dave Cridland, Philipp Hancke, Olle Johansson, Steve Kille, input: Dave Cridland, Philipp Hancke, Olle Johansson, Steve Kille,
Tobias Markmann, Matt Miller, and Rene Treffer. Tobias Markmann, Matt Miller, and Rene Treffer.
Roni Even caught several important issues in his review on behalf of
the General Area Review Team.
Thanks to Leif Johansson and Orit Levin as chairs of the UTA WG, Ben
Campbell and Joe Hildebrand as chairs of the XMPP WG, and Stephen
Farrell as the sponsoring Area Director.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Peter Saint-Andre Peter Saint-Andre
&yet &yet
Email: peter@andyet.com Email: peter@andyet.com
URI: https://andyet.com/ URI: https://andyet.com/
Thijs Alkemade Thijs Alkemade
 End of changes. 27 change blocks. 
73 lines changed or deleted 118 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.42. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/