draft-ietf-v6ops-addr-select-req-06.txt   draft-ietf-v6ops-addr-select-req-07.txt 
IPv6 Operations Working Group A. Matsumoto IPv6 Operations Working Group A. Matsumoto
Internet-Draft T. Fujisaki Internet-Draft T. Fujisaki
Intended status: Informational NTT Intended status: Informational NTT
Expires: October 30, 2008 R. Hiromi Expires: November 13, 2008 R. Hiromi
K. Kanayama K. Kanayama
Intec Netcore Intec Netcore
April 28, 2008 May 12, 2008
Requirements for address selection mechanisms Requirements for address selection mechanisms
draft-ietf-v6ops-addr-select-req-06.txt draft-ietf-v6ops-addr-select-req-07.txt
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on October 30, 2008. This Internet-Draft will expire on November 13, 2008.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008). Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
Abstract Abstract
There are some problematic cases when using default address selection There are some problematic cases when using the default address
mechanism which RFC 3484 defines. This document describes additional selection mechanism which RFC 3484 defines. This document describes
requirements co-working with RFC3484 to solve the problems. additional requirements co-working with RFC 3484 to solve the
problems.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Requirements of Address Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Requirements of Address Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Timing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.2. Timing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.3. Dynamic Behavior Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.3. Dynamic Behavior Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.4. Node-Specific Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.4. Node-Specific Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.5. Application-Specific Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.5. Application-Specific Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.6. Multiple Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.6. Multiple Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.7. Central Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.7. Central Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.8. Next-hop Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.8. Next-hop Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.9. Compatibility with RFC 3493 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.9. Compatibility with RFC 3493 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.10. Compatibility and Interoperability with RFC 3484 . . . . . 5 2.10. Compatibility and Interoperability with RFC 3484 . . . . . 5
2.11. Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.11. Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. List of threats introduced by new address-selection 3.1. List of threats introduced by new address-selection
mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. List of recommendations in which security mechanism 3.2. List of recommendations in which security mechanism
should be applied . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 should be applied . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Appendix A. Appendix. Revision History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Appendix A. Appendix. Revision History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 9 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
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topologies. Therefore, an address-selection autoconfiguration topologies. Therefore, an address-selection autoconfiguration
mechanism is necessary, especially for unmanaged hosts of typical mechanism is necessary, especially for unmanaged hosts of typical
users. users.
This document contains requirements for address-selection mechanisms This document contains requirements for address-selection mechanisms
that enable hosts to perform appropriate address selection that enable hosts to perform appropriate address selection
automatically. automatically.
2. Requirements of Address Selection 2. Requirements of Address Selection
Address-selection mechanisms have to fulfill the following seven Address-selection mechanisms have to fulfill the following eleven
requirements. requirements.
2.1. Effectiveness 2.1. Effectiveness
The mechanism can modify RFC 3484 default address-selection behavior The mechanism can modify RFC 3484 default address-selection behavior
at nodes. As documented in PS [I-D.ietf-v6ops-addr-select-ps], the at nodes. As documented in PS [I-D.ietf-v6ops-addr-select-ps], the
default rules defined in RFC 3484 do not work properly in some default rules defined in RFC 3484 do not work properly in some
environments. Therefore, the mechanism has to be able to modify environments. Therefore, the mechanism has to be able to modify the
address-selection behavior of a host. address-selection behavior of a host, and to solve the problematic
cases described in the PS document.
2.2. Timing 2.2. Timing
Nodes can obtain address selection information when necessary. If Nodes can perform appropriate address selection when they select
nodes need to have address-selection information before performing addresses.
address selection, then the mechanism has to provide a function for
nodes to obtain necessary information beforehand. The mechanism If nodes need to have address-selection information to perform
should not degrade usability. The mechanism should not enforce long appropriate address selection, then the mechanism has to provide a
address-selection processing time upon users. function for nodes to obtain the necessary information beforehand.
The mechanism should not degrade usability. The mechanism should not
enforce long address-selection processing time upon users.
Therefore, forcing every consumer user to manipulate address
selection policy table is usually not an acceptable solution. So, in
this case, some kind of autoconfiguration mechanism is desirable.
2.3. Dynamic Behavior Update 2.3. Dynamic Behavior Update
Address-selection behavior of nodes can be dynamically updated. When The address-selection behavior of nodes can be dynamically updated.
the network structure changes and address-selection behavior has to When the network structure changes and the address-selection behavior
be changed accordingly, a network administrator can modify the has to be changed accordingly, a network administrator can modify the
address-selection behavior of nodes. address-selection behavior of nodes.
2.4. Node-Specific Behavior 2.4. Node-Specific Behavior
The mechanism can support node-specific address-selection behavior. The mechanism can support node-specific address-selection behavior.
Even when multiple nodes are on the same subnet, the mechanism should Even when multiple nodes are on the same subnet, the mechanism should
be able to provide a method for the network administrator to make be able to provide a method for the network administrator to make
nodes behave differently. For example, each node may have a nodes behave differently. For example, each node may have a
different set of assigned prefixes. In such a case, the appropriate different set of assigned prefixes. In such a case, the appropriate
address-selection behavior may be different. address-selection behavior may be different.
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The mechanism can support those nodes equipped with multiple The mechanism can support those nodes equipped with multiple
interfaces. The mechanism has to assume that nodes have multiple interfaces. The mechanism has to assume that nodes have multiple
interfaces and makes address selection of those nodes work interfaces and makes address selection of those nodes work
appropriately. appropriately.
2.7. Central Control 2.7. Central Control
The address selection behavior of nodes can be centrally controlled. The address selection behavior of nodes can be centrally controlled.
A site administrator or a service provider could determine or could A site administrator or a service provider could determine or could
have effect on address-selection behavior at their users' hosts. have effect on the address-selection behavior at their users' hosts.
2.8. Next-hop Selection 2.8. Next-hop Selection
The mechanism can control next-hop-selection behavior at hosts or The mechanism can control next-hop-selection behavior at hosts or
cooperate with other routing mechanisms, such as routing protocols cooperate with other routing mechanisms, such as routing protocols
and RFC 4191 [RFC4191]. If the address-selection mechanism is used and RFC 4191 [RFC4191]. If the address-selection mechanism is used
with a routing mechanism, the two mechanisms have to be able to work with a routing mechanism, the two mechanisms have to be able to work
synchronously. synchronously.
2.9. Compatibility with RFC 3493 2.9. Compatibility with RFC 3493
The mechanism can allow an application that uses the basic socket The mechanism can allow an application that uses the basic socket
interface defined in RFC 3493 [RFC3493] to work correctly. That is, interface defined in RFC 3493 [RFC3493] to work correctly. That is,
with the basic socket interface the application can select an with the basic socket interface the application can select
appropriate source and destination addresses and can communicate with appropriate source and destination addresses and can communicate with
the destination host. This requirement does not necessarily mean the destination host. This requirement does not necessarily mean
that OS protocol stack and socket libraries should not be changed. that OS protocol stack and socket libraries should not be changed.
2.10. Compatibility and Interoperability with RFC 3484 2.10. Compatibility and Interoperability with RFC 3484
The mechanism has compatibility with RFC 3484. Now that RFC 3484 is The mechanism is compatible with RFC 3484. Now that RFC 3484 is
widely implemented, it may be most preferrable that a new address widely implemented, it may be most preferrable that a new address
selection mechanism does not conflict with the address selection selection mechanism does not conflict with the address selection
mechanisms defined in RFC 3484. mechanisms defined in RFC 3484.
If the solution mechanism changes or replaces the address selection If the solution mechanism changes or replaces the address selection
mechanism defined in RFC 3484, interoperability has to be retained. mechanism defined in RFC 3484, interoperability has to be retained.
That is, a host with the new solution mechanism and a host with the That is, a host with the new solution mechanism and a host with the
mechanism of RFC 3484 have to be interoperable. mechanism of RFC 3484 have to be interoperable.
2.11. Security 2.11. Security
The mechanism works without any security problems. Possible security The mechanism works without any security problems. Possible security
threats are described in Security Considerations section. threats are described in Security Considerations section of this
document.
3. Security Considerations 3. Security Considerations
3.1. List of threats introduced by new address-selection mechanism 3.1. List of threats introduced by new address-selection mechanism
There will be some security incidents when combining these There will be some security incidents when combining these
requirements described in Section 2 into a protocol. In particular, requirements described in Section 2 into a protocol. In particular,
there are 3 types of threats, "Leakage","Hijacking", and "Denial of there are 3 types of threats, "Leakage","Hijacking", and "Denial of
Services". Services".
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launch a flooding attack on the controller to prevent it to launch a flooding attack on the controller to prevent it to
deliver the address selection policy information to nodes, thus deliver the address selection policy information to nodes, thus
preventing these nodes to appropriately communicate in the preventing these nodes to appropriately communicate in the
absence of that information. absence of that information.
3.2. List of recommendations in which security mechanism should be 3.2. List of recommendations in which security mechanism should be
applied applied
The source address selection protocol should be afforded security The source address selection protocol should be afforded security
services listed below. It is preferable that these security services services listed below. It is preferable that these security services
are afforded via use of existing protocols(e.g. IPsec). are afforded via use of existing protocols (e.g., IPsec).
1. Integrity of the network policy information itself and the 1. Integrity of the network policy information itself and the
messages exchanging in the protocol. This is countermeasure messages exchanged in the protocol. This is a countermeasure
against "Leakage", "Hijacking", and "Denial of Services". against "Leakage", "Hijacking", and "Denial of Services".
2. Authentication and authorization of parties involved in the 2. Authentication and authorization of parties involved in the
protocol. This is countermeasure against "Leakage" and protocol. This is a countermeasure against "Leakage" and
"Hijacking". "Hijacking".
4. IANA Considerations 4. IANA Considerations
This document has no actions for IANA. This document has no actions for IANA.
5. References 5. References
5.1. Normative References 5.1. Normative References
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A new requirement item "Compatibility with RFC 3493" was added, A new requirement item "Compatibility with RFC 3493" was added,
which reflected a comment from Remi Denis-Courmont at the v6ops which reflected a comment from Remi Denis-Courmont at the v6ops
mailing list. mailing list.
05: 05:
A new requirement item "Security" was added. Security A new requirement item "Security" was added. Security
Considerations section was rewritten according to comments from Considerations section was rewritten according to comments from
SECDIR. SECDIR.
06: 06:
A new requirement item "Compatibility and Interoperability with A new requirement item "Compatibility and Interoperability with
RFC 3484" was added in response to comments from Tim Polk. RFC 3484" was added in response to comments from Tim Polk.
07:
A couple of textual and typographical changes were made in
response to comments from Alfred Hoenes.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Arifumi Matsumoto Arifumi Matsumoto
NTT PF Lab NTT PF Lab
Midori-Cho 3-9-11 Midori-Cho 3-9-11
Musashino-shi, Tokyo 180-8585 Musashino-shi, Tokyo 180-8585
Japan Japan
Phone: +81 422 59 3334 Phone: +81 422 59 3334
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Phone: +81 3 5665 5069 Phone: +81 3 5665 5069
Email: hiromi@inetcore.com Email: hiromi@inetcore.com
Ken-ichi Kanayama Ken-ichi Kanayama
Intec Netcore, Inc. Intec Netcore, Inc.
Shinsuna 1-3-3 Shinsuna 1-3-3
Koto-ku, Tokyo 136-0075 Koto-ku, Tokyo 136-0075
Japan Japan
Phone: +81 3 5665 5069 Phone: +81 3 5665 5069
Email: kanayama@inetcore.com Email: kanayama_kenichi@intec-si.co.jp
Full Copyright Statement Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008). Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008).
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
retain all their rights. retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
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