draft-ietf-webpush-vapid-03.txt   draft-ietf-webpush-vapid-04.txt 
Network Working Group M. Thomson Network Working Group M. Thomson
Internet-Draft Mozilla Internet-Draft Mozilla
Intended status: Standards Track P. Beverloo Intended status: Standards Track P. Beverloo
Expires: December 20, 2017 Google Expires: March 8, 2018 Google
June 18, 2017 September 04, 2017
Voluntary Application Server Identification (VAPID) for Web Push Voluntary Application Server Identification (VAPID) for Web Push
draft-ietf-webpush-vapid-03 draft-ietf-webpush-vapid-04
Abstract Abstract
An application server can use the method described to voluntarily An application server can use the method described to voluntarily
identify itself to a push service. This identification information identify itself to a push service. The "vapid" authentication scheme
can be used by the push service to attribute requests that are made allows a client to include its an identity in a signed token with
by the same application server to a single entity. An application requests that it makes. The signature can be used by the push
server can include additional information that the operator of a push service to attribute requests that are made by the same application
service can use to contact the operator of the application server. server to a single entity. The identification information can allow
This identification information can be used to restrict the use of a the operator of a push service to contact the operator of the
push subscription a single application server. application server. The signature can be used to restrict the use of
a push subscription to a single application server.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 20, 2017. This Internet-Draft will expire on March 8, 2018.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
skipping to change at page 2, line 16 skipping to change at page 2, line 17
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Voluntary Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Voluntary Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Application Server Self-Identification . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Application Server Self-Identification . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Application Server Contact Information . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1. Application Server Contact Information . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Additional Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2. Additional Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3. Cryptographic Agility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.3. Cryptographic Agility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.4. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.4. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Vapid Authentication Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. Vapid Authentication Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Token Parameter (t) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1. Token Parameter (t) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. Public Key Parameter (k) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.2. Public Key Parameter (k) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Subscription Restriction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4. Subscription Restriction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. Creating a Restricted Push Subscription . . . . . . . . . 7 4.1. Creating a Restricted Push Subscription . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2. Using Restricted Subscriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.2. Using Restricted Subscriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.1. Vapid Authentication Scheme Registration . . . . . . . . 9 6.1. Vapid Authentication Scheme Registration . . . . . . . . 10
6.2. Vapid Authentication Scheme Parameters . . . . . . . . . 10 6.2. Vapid Authentication Scheme Parameters . . . . . . . . . 10
6.3. application/webpush-options+json Media Type Registration 10 6.3. application/webpush-options+json Media Type Registration 11
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Web Push protocol [RFC8030] describes how an application server The Web Push protocol [RFC8030] describes how an application server
is able to request that a push service deliver a push message to a is able to request that a push service deliver a push message to a
user agent. user agent.
As a consequence of the expected deployment architecture, there is no As a consequence of the expected deployment architecture, there is no
basis for an application server to be known to a push service prior basis for an application server to be known to a push service prior
to requesting delivery of a push message. Requiring that the push to requesting delivery of a push message. Requiring that the push
service be able to authenticate application servers places an service be able to authenticate application servers places an
unwanted constraint on the interactions between user agents and unwanted constraint on the interactions between user agents and
application servers, who are the ultimate users of a push service. application servers, who are the ultimate users of a push service.
That constraint would also degrade the privacy-preserving properties That constraint would also degrade the privacy-preserving properties
the protocol provides. For these reasons, [RFC8030] does not define the protocol provides. For these reasons, [RFC8030] does not define
a mandatory system for authentication of application servers. a mandatory system for authentication of application servers.
An unfortunate consequence of this design is that a push service is An unfortunate consequence of the design of [RFC8030] is that a push
exposed to a greater risk of denial of service attack. While service is exposed to a greater risk of denial of service attack.
requests from application servers can be indirectly attributed to While requests from application servers can be indirectly attributed
user agents, this is not always efficient or even sufficient. to user agents, this is not always efficient or even sufficient.
Providing more information about the application server directly to a Providing more information about the application server directly to a
push service allows the push service to better distinguish between push service allows the push service to better distinguish between
legitimate and bogus requests. legitimate and bogus requests.
Additionally, this design also relies on endpoint secrecy as any Additionally, the design of RFC 8030 relies on maintaining the
application server in possession of the endpoint is able to send secrecy of push subscription URIs. Any application server in
messages, albeit without payloads. In situations where usage of a possession of this URI is able to send messages to the user agent.
subscription can be limited to a single application server, the If use of a subscription could be limited to a single application
ability to associate a subscription with the application server could server, this would reduce the impact of the push subscription URI
reduce the impact of a data leak. being learned by an unauthorized party.
1.1. Voluntary Identification 1.1. Voluntary Identification
This document describes a system whereby an application server can This document describes a system whereby an application server can
volunteer information about itself to a push service. At a minimum, volunteer information about itself to a push service. At a minimum,
this provides a stable identity for the application server, though this provides a stable identity for the application server, though
this could also include contact information, such as an email this could also include contact information, such as an email
address. address.
A consistent identity can be used by a push service to establish A consistent identity can be used by a push service to establish
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message volume. Contacting the operator of the application server message volume. Contacting the operator of the application server
has proven to be valuable. has proven to be valuable.
Even in the absence of usable contact information, an application Even in the absence of usable contact information, an application
server that has a well-established reputation might be given server that has a well-established reputation might be given
preference over an unidentified application server when choosing preference over an unidentified application server when choosing
whether to discard a push message. whether to discard a push message.
1.2. Notational Conventions 1.2. Notational Conventions
The words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", and "MAY" are used in this The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
document. It's not shouting, when they are capitalized, they have "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
the special meaning described in [RFC2119]. "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
The terms "push message", "push service", "push subscription", The terms "push message", "push service", "push subscription",
"application server", and "user agent" are used as defined in "application server", and "user agent" are used as defined in
[RFC8030]. [RFC8030].
2. Application Server Self-Identification 2. Application Server Self-Identification
Application servers that wish to self-identify generate and maintain Application servers that wish to self-identify generate and maintain
a signing key pair. This key pair MUST be usable with elliptic curve a signing key pair. This key pair MUST be usable with elliptic curve
digital signature (ECDSA) over the P-256 curve [FIPS186]. Use of digital signature (ECDSA) over the P-256 curve [FIPS186]. Use of
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o An "aud" (Audience) claim in the token MUST include the unicode o An "aud" (Audience) claim in the token MUST include the unicode
serialization of the origin (Section 6.1 of [RFC6454]) of the push serialization of the origin (Section 6.1 of [RFC6454]) of the push
resource URL. This binds the token to a specific push service. resource URL. This binds the token to a specific push service.
This ensures that the token is reusable for all push resource URLs This ensures that the token is reusable for all push resource URLs
that share the same origin. that share the same origin.
o An "exp" (Expiry) claim MUST be included with the time after which o An "exp" (Expiry) claim MUST be included with the time after which
the token expires. This limits the time over which a token is the token expires. This limits the time over which a token is
valid. An "exp" claim MUST NOT be more than 24 hours from the valid. An "exp" claim MUST NOT be more than 24 hours from the
time of the request. time of the request. Limiting this to 24 hours balances the need
for reuse against the potential cost and likelihood of theft of a
valid token.
This JWT is included in an Authorization header field, using an auth- This JWT is included in an Authorization header field, using an auth-
scheme of "vapid". A push service MAY reject a request with a 403 scheme of "vapid". A push service MAY reject a request with a 403
(Forbidden) status code [RFC7235] if the JWT signature or its claims (Forbidden) status code [RFC7235] if the JWT signature or its claims
are invalid. are invalid. A push service MUST NOT use information from an invalid
token.
The JWT MUST use a JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515]. The signature The JWT MUST use a JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515]. The signature
MUST use ECDSA on the NIST P-256 curve [FIPS186] which is identified MUST use ECDSA on the NIST P-256 curve [FIPS186] which is identified
as "ES256" [RFC7518]. as "ES256" [RFC7518].
2.1. Application Server Contact Information 2.1. Application Server Contact Information
If the application server wishes to provide contact details it MAY If the application server wishes to provide contact details it MAY
include a "sub" (Subject) claim in the JWT. The "sub" claim SHOULD include a "sub" (Subject) claim in the JWT. The "sub" claim SHOULD
include a contact URI for the application server as either a include a contact URI for the application server as either a
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2.2. Additional Claims 2.2. Additional Claims
An application server MAY include additional claims using public or An application server MAY include additional claims using public or
private names (see Sections 4.2 and 4.3 of [RFC7519]). Since the JWT private names (see Sections 4.2 and 4.3 of [RFC7519]). Since the JWT
is in a header field, the size of additional claims SHOULD be kept as is in a header field, the size of additional claims SHOULD be kept as
small as possible. small as possible.
2.3. Cryptographic Agility 2.3. Cryptographic Agility
The "vapid" authentication scheme is used to identify the specific The "vapid" HTTP authentication scheme (Section 3) is used to
profile of JWT defined in this document. A different authentication identify the specific profile of JWT defined in this document. A
scheme is needed to update the signature algorithm or other different authentication scheme is needed to update the signature
parameters. This ensures that existing mechanisms for negotiating algorithm or other parameters. This ensures that existing mechanisms
authentication scheme can be used rather than defining new parameter for negotiating authentication scheme can be used rather than
negotiation mechanisms. defining new parameter negotiation mechanisms.
2.4. Example 2.4. Example
An application server requests the delivery of a push message as An application server requests the delivery of a push message as
described in [RFC8030]. If the application server wishes to self- described in [RFC8030]. If the application server wishes to self-
identify, it includes an Authorization header field with credentials identify, it includes an Authorization header field with credentials
that use the "vapid" authentication scheme (Section 3). that use the "vapid" authentication scheme.
POST /p/JzLQ3raZJfFBR0aqvOMsLrt54w4rJUsV HTTP/1.1 POST /p/JzLQ3raZJfFBR0aqvOMsLrt54w4rJUsV HTTP/1.1
Host: push.example.net Host: push.example.net
TTL: 30 TTL: 30
Content-Length: 136 Content-Length: 136
Content-Encoding: aes128gcm Content-Encoding: aes128gcm
Authorization: vapid Authorization: vapid
t=eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9.eyJhdWQiOiJodHRwczovL3 t=eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9.eyJhdWQiOiJodHRwczovL3
B1c2guZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQiLCJleHAiOjE0NTM1MjM3NjgsInN1YiI6Im1ha B1c2guZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQiLCJleHAiOjE0NTM1MjM3NjgsInN1YiI6Im1ha
Wx0bzpwdXNoQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tIn0.i3CYb7t4xfxCDquptFOepC9GAu_H Wx0bzpwdXNoQGV4YW1wbGUuY29tIn0.i3CYb7t4xfxCDquptFOepC9GAu_H
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3. Vapid Authentication Scheme 3. Vapid Authentication Scheme
A new "vapid" HTTP authentication scheme [RFC7235] is defined. This A new "vapid" HTTP authentication scheme [RFC7235] is defined. This
authentication scheme carries a signed JWT, as described in authentication scheme carries a signed JWT, as described in
Section 2, plus the key that signed that JWT. Section 2, plus the key that signed that JWT.
This authentication scheme is for origin-server authentication only. This authentication scheme is for origin-server authentication only.
Therefore, this authentication scheme MUST NOT be used with the Therefore, this authentication scheme MUST NOT be used with the
Proxy-Authenticate or Proxy-Authorization header fields. Proxy-Authenticate or Proxy-Authorization header fields.
This authentication scheme does not require a challenge. Clients are The challenge for the "vapid" authentication scheme contains only the
able to generate the Authorization header field without any "auth-scheme" production. No parameters are currently defined.
additional information from a server. Therefore, a challenge for
this authentication scheme MUST NOT be sent in a WWW-Authenticate
header field.
Two parameters are defined for this authentication scheme: "t" and Two parameters are defined for this authentication scheme: "t" and
"k". All unknown or unsupported parameters to "vapid" authentication "k". All unknown or unsupported parameters to "vapid" authentication
credentials MUST be ignored. The "realm" parameter is ignored for credentials MUST be ignored. The "realm" parameter is ignored for
this authentication scheme. this authentication scheme.
This authentication scheme is intended for use by an application This authentication scheme is intended for use by an application
server when using the Web Push protocol [RFC8030], but it could be server when using the Web Push protocol [RFC8030].
used in other contexts if applicable.
3.1. Token Parameter (t) 3.1. Token Parameter (t)
The "t" parameter of the "vapid" authentication scheme carries a JWT The "t" parameter of the "vapid" authentication scheme carries a JWT
as described in Section 2. as described in Section 2.
3.2. Public Key Parameter (k) 3.2. Public Key Parameter (k)
In order for the push service to be able to validate the JWT, it In order for the push service to be able to validate the JWT, it
needs to learn the public key of the application server. A "k" needs to learn the public key of the application server. A "k"
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The "k" parameter includes an elliptic curve digital signature The "k" parameter includes an elliptic curve digital signature
algorithm (ECDSA) public key [FIPS186] in uncompressed form [X9.62] algorithm (ECDSA) public key [FIPS186] in uncompressed form [X9.62]
that is encoded using base64url encoding [RFC7515]. that is encoded using base64url encoding [RFC7515].
Note: X9.62 encoding is used over JWK [RFC7517] for two reasons. A Note: X9.62 encoding is used over JWK [RFC7517] for two reasons. A
JWK does not have a canonical form, so X9.62 encoding makes it JWK does not have a canonical form, so X9.62 encoding makes it
easier for the push service to handle comparison of keys from easier for the push service to handle comparison of keys from
different sources. Secondarily, the X9.62 encoding is also different sources. Secondarily, the X9.62 encoding is also
considerably smaller. considerably smaller.
Some implementations permit the same P-256 key to be used for signing Some elliptic curve implementations permit the same P-256 key to be
and key exchange. An application server MUST select a different used for signing and key exchange. An application server MUST select
private key for the key exchange [I-D.ietf-webpush-encryption] and a different private key for the key exchange [WEBPUSH-ENCRYPTION] and
signing the authentication token. Though a push service is not signing the authentication token. Though a push service is not
obligated to check either parameter for every push message, a push obligated to check either parameter for every push message, a push
service SHOULD reject push messages that have identical values for service SHOULD reject push messages that have identical values for
these parameters with a 400 (Bad Request) status code. these parameters with a 400 (Bad Request) status code.
4. Subscription Restriction 4. Subscription Restriction
The public key of the application server serves as a stable The public key of the application server serves as a stable
identifier for the server. This key can be used to restrict a push identifier for the server. This key can be used to restrict a push
subscription to a specific application server. subscription to a specific application server.
Subscription restriction reduces the reliance on endpoint secrecy by Subscription restriction reduces the reliance on endpoint secrecy by
requiring proof of possession to be demonstrated by an application requiring that an application server provide a signed token when
server when requesting delivery of a push message. This provides an requesting delivery of a push message. This provides an additional
additional level of protection against leaking of the details of the level of protection against leaking of the details of the push
push subscription. subscription.
4.1. Creating a Restricted Push Subscription 4.1. Creating a Restricted Push Subscription
The user agent includes the public key of the application server when A user agent that wishes to create a restricted subscription includes
requesting the creation of a push subscription. This restricts use the public key of the application server when requesting the creation
of the resulting subscription to application servers that are able to of a push subscription. This restricts use of the resulting
provide proof of possession for the corresponding private key. subscription to application servers that are able to provide a valid
JWT signed by the corresponding private key.
The public key is then added to the request to create a push The user agent then adds the public key to the request to create a
subscription. The push subscription request is extended to include a push subscription. The push subscription request is extended to
body. The body of the request is a JSON object as described in include a body. The body of the request is a JSON object as
[RFC7159]. A "vapid" member is added to this JSON object, containing described in [RFC7159]. The user agent adds a "vapid" member to this
the public key on the P-256 curve, encoded in the uncompressed form JSON object that contains a public key on the P-256 curve, encoded in
[X9.62] and base64url encoded [RFC7515]. The media type of the body the uncompressed form [X9.62] and base64url encoded [RFC7515]. The
is set to "application/webpush-options+json" (see Section 6.3 for media type of the body is set to "application/webpush-options+json"
registration of this media type). (see Section 6.3 for registration of this media type).
A push service MUST ignore the body of a request that uses a A push service MUST ignore the body of a request that uses a
different media type. For the "application/webpush-options+json" different media type. For the "application/webpush-options+json"
media type, a push service MUST ignore any members on this object media type, a push service MUST ignore any members on this object
that it does not understand. that it does not understand.
The example in Figure 3 shows a restriction to the key used in The example in Figure 3 shows a restriction to the key used in
Figure 1. Extra whitespace is added to meet formatting constraints. Figure 1. Extra whitespace is added to meet formatting constraints.
POST /subscribe/ HTTP/1.1 POST /subscribe/ HTTP/1.1
Host: push.example.net Host: push.example.net
Content-Type: application/webpush-optjons+json;charset=utf-8 Content-Type: application/webpush-options+json
Content-Length: 104 Content-Length: 104
{ "vapid": "BA1Hxzyi1RUM1b5wjxsn7nGxAszw2u61m164i3MrAIxH { "vapid": "BA1Hxzyi1RUM1b5wjxsn7nGxAszw2u61m164i3MrAIxH
F6YK5h4SDYic-dRuU_RCPCfA5aq9ojSwk5Y2EmClBPs" } F6YK5h4SDYic-dRuU_RCPCfA5aq9ojSwk5Y2EmClBPs" }
Figure 3: Example Subscribe Request Figure 3: Example Subscribe Request
An application might use the Web Push API [API] to provide the user An application might use the Web Push API [API] to provide the user
agent with a public key. agent with a public key.
4.2. Using Restricted Subscriptions 4.2. Using Restricted Subscriptions
When a push subscription has been associated with an application When a push subscription has been restricted to an application
server, the request for push message delivery MUST include proof of server, the request for push message delivery MUST include a JWT
possession for the associated private key that was used when creating signed by the private key that corresponds to the public key used
the push subscription. when creating the subscription.
A push service MUST reject a message that omits mandatory credentials A push service MUST reject a message sent to a restricted push
with a 401 (Unauthorized) status code. A push service MAY reject a subscription if that message includes no "vapid" authentication or
message that includes invalid credentials with a 403 (Forbidden) invalid "vapid" authentication. A 401 (Unauthorized) status code
status code. Credentials are invalid if: might be used if the authentication is absent; a 403 (Forbidden)
status code might be used if authentication is invalid.
"vapid" authentication is invalid if:
o either the authentication token or public key are not included in o either the authentication token or public key are not included in
the request, the request,
o the signature on the JWT cannot be successfully verified using the o the signature on the JWT cannot be successfully verified using the
included public key, included public key,
o the current time is later than the time identified in the "exp" o the current time is later than the time identified in the "exp"
(Expiry) claim or more than 24 hours before the expiry time, (Expiry) claim or more than 24 hours before the expiry time,
o the origin of the push resource is not included in the "aud" o the origin of the push resource is not included in the "aud"
(Audience) claim, or (Audience) claim, or
o the public key used to sign the JWT doesn't match the one that was o the public key used to sign the JWT doesn't match the one that was
included in the creation of the push subscription. included in the creation of the push subscription.
A push service MUST NOT forward the JWT or public key to the user A push service MUST NOT forward the JWT or public key to the user
agent when delivering the push message. agent when delivering the push message.
An application server that needs to replace its signing key needs to An application server that needs to replace its signing key needs to
create a new subscription that is restricted to the updated key. request the creation of a new subscription by the user agent that is
Application servers need to remember the key that was used when restricted to the updated key. Application servers need to remember
creating a given subscription. the key that was used when requesting the creation of a subscription.
5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
This authentication scheme is vulnerable to replay attacks if an This authentication scheme is vulnerable to replay attacks if an
attacker can acquire a valid JWT. Applying narrow limits to the attacker can acquire a valid JWT. Sending requests using HTTPS as
period over which a replayable token can be reused limits the required by [RFC8030] provides confidentiality. Additionally,
potential value of a stolen token to an attacker and can increase the applying narrow limits to the period over which a replayable token
difficulty of stealing a token. can be reused limits the potential value of a stolen token to an
attacker and can increase the difficulty of stealing a token.
An application server might offer falsified contact information. A An application server might offer falsified contact information. The
push service operator therefore cannot use the presence of application server asserts its email address or contact URI without
unvalidated contact information as input to any security-critical any evidence to support the claim. A push service operator cannot
decision-making process. use the presence of unvalidated contact information as input to any
security-critical decision-making process.
Validation of a signature on the JWT requires a non-trivial amount of Validation of a signature on the JWT requires a non-trivial amount of
computation. For something that might be used to identify legitimate computation. For something that might be used to identify legitimate
requests under denial of service attack conditions, this is not requests under denial of service attack conditions, this is not
ideal. Application servers are therefore encouraged to reuse tokens, ideal. Application servers are therefore encouraged to reuse tokens,
which permits the push service to cache the results of signature which permits the push service to cache the results of signature
validation. validation.
An application server that changes its signing key breaks linkability An application server that changes its signing key breaks linkability
between push messages that it sends under the different keys. A push between push messages that it sends under the different keys. A push
skipping to change at page 10, line 4 skipping to change at page 10, line 14
6.1. Vapid Authentication Scheme Registration 6.1. Vapid Authentication Scheme Registration
This document registers the "vapid" authentication scheme in the This document registers the "vapid" authentication scheme in the
"Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Authentication Scheme Registry" "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Authentication Scheme Registry"
established in [RFC7235]. established in [RFC7235].
Authentication Scheme Name: vapid Authentication Scheme Name: vapid
Pointer to specification text: Section 3 of this document Pointer to specification text: Section 3 of this document
Notes: This scheme is origin-server only and does not define a Notes: This scheme is origin-server only and does not define a
challenge. challenge.
6.2. Vapid Authentication Scheme Parameters 6.2. Vapid Authentication Scheme Parameters
This document creates a "Vapid Authentication Scheme Parameters" This document creates a "Vapid Authentication Scheme Parameters"
registry for parameters to the "vapid" authentication scheme. This registry for parameters to the "vapid" authentication scheme. These
registry is under the "WebPush Parameters" grouping. The registry parameters are defined for use in requests (in the Authorization
operates on the "Specification Required" policy [RFC5226]. header field) and for challenges (in the WWW-Authenticate header
field). This registry is under the "WebPush Parameters" grouping.
The registry operates on the "Specification Required" policy
[RFC5226].
Registrations MUST include the following information: Registrations MUST include the following information:
Parameter Name: A name for the parameter, which conforms to the Parameter Name: A name for the parameter, which conforms to the
"token" grammar [RFC7230] "token" grammar [RFC7230]
Purpose (optional): A brief identifying the purpose of the Purpose (optional): A brief identifying the purpose of the
parameter. parameter.
Header Fields: The header field or header fields where the parameter
can be used.
Specification: A link to the specification that defines the format Specification: A link to the specification that defines the format
and semantics of the parameter. and semantics of the parameter.
This registry initially contains the following entries: This registry initially contains the following entries:
+---------------+-------------------------+-------------------------+ +------------+------------------+---------------+-------------------+
| Parameter | Purpose | Specification | | Parameter | Purpose | Header Fields | Specification |
| Name | | | | Name | | | |
+---------------+-------------------------+-------------------------+ +------------+------------------+---------------+-------------------+
| t | JWT authentication | [[RFC-to-be]], Section | | t | JWT | Authorization | [[RFC-to-be]], |
| | token | 3.1 | | | authentication | | Section 3.1 |
| | | | | | token | | |
| k | signing key | [[RFC-to-be]], Section | | | | | |
| | | 3.2 | | k | signing key | Authorization | [[RFC-to-be]], |
+---------------+-------------------------+-------------------------+ | | | | Section 3.2 |
+------------+------------------+---------------+-------------------+
6.3. application/webpush-options+json Media Type Registration 6.3. application/webpush-options+json Media Type Registration
This document registers the "application/webpush-options+json" media This document registers the "application/webpush-options+json" media
type in the "Media Types" registry following the process described in type in the "Media Types" registry following the process described in
[RFC6838]. [RFC6838].
[[RFC editor: please replace instances of RFCXXXX in this section
with a reference to the published RFC.]]
Type name: application Type name: application
Subtype name: webpush-options+json Subtype name: webpush-options+json
Required parameters: n/a Required parameters: none
Optional parameters: n/a Optional parameters: none
Encoding considerations: binary
Encoding considerations: binary (JSON is UTF-8-encoded text)
Security considerations: See [RFC7159] for security considerations Security considerations: See [RFC7159] for security considerations
specific to JSON. specific to JSON.
Interoperability considerations: See [RFC7159] for interoperability Interoperability considerations: See [RFC7159] for interoperability
considerations specific to JSON. considerations specific to JSON.
Published specification: This document. Published specification: [[RFCXXXX]].
Applications that use this media type: Web browsers, via the Web Applications that use this media type: Web browsers, via the Web
Push Protocol [RFC8030]. Push Protocol [RFC8030].
Fragment identifier considerations: None, see [RFC7159]. Fragment identifier considerations: None, see [RFC7159].
Additional information: Additional information:
Deprecated alias names for this type: n/a Deprecated alias names for this type: n/a
Magic number(s): n/a Magic number(s): n/a
File extension(s): .json File extension(s): .json
Macintosh file type code(s): TEXT Macintosh file type code(s): TEXT
Person & email address to contact for further information: Martin Person & email address to contact for further information: Martin
Thomson (martin.thomson@gmail.com) Thomson (martin.thomson@gmail.com)
Intended usage: LIMITED USE Intended usage: LIMITED USE
skipping to change at page 11, line 36 skipping to change at page 12, line 17
Macintosh file type code(s): TEXT Macintosh file type code(s): TEXT
Person & email address to contact for further information: Martin Person & email address to contact for further information: Martin
Thomson (martin.thomson@gmail.com) Thomson (martin.thomson@gmail.com)
Intended usage: LIMITED USE Intended usage: LIMITED USE
Restrictions on usage: For use with the Web Push Protocol [RFC8030]. Restrictions on usage: For use with the Web Push Protocol [RFC8030].
Author: See "Authors' Addresses" section of this document. Author: See "Authors' Addresses" section of [[RFCXXXX]].
Change controller: Internet Engineering Task Force Change controller: Internet Engineering Task Force
7. Acknowledgements 7. Acknowledgements
This document would have been much worse than it currently is if not This document would have been much worse than it is if not for the
for the contributions of Benjamin Bangert, JR Conlin, Chris Karlof, contributions of Benjamin Bangert, JR Conlin, Chris Karlof, Costin
Costin Manolache, Adam Roach, and others. Manolache, Adam Roach, and others.
8. References 8. References
8.1. Normative References 8.1. Normative References
[FIPS186] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), [FIPS186] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", NIST PUB 186-4 , July "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", NIST PUB 186-4 , July
2013. 2013.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, [RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000, DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000, <https://www.rfc-
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818>. editor.org/info/rfc2818>.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008, DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008, <https://www.rfc-
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>. editor.org/info/rfc5226>.
[RFC6068] Duerst, M., Masinter, L., and J. Zawinski, "The 'mailto' [RFC6068] Duerst, M., Masinter, L., and J. Zawinski, "The 'mailto'
URI Scheme", RFC 6068, DOI 10.17487/RFC6068, October 2010, URI Scheme", RFC 6068, DOI 10.17487/RFC6068, October 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6068>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6068>.
[RFC6454] Barth, A., "The Web Origin Concept", RFC 6454, [RFC6454] Barth, A., "The Web Origin Concept", RFC 6454,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6454, December 2011, DOI 10.17487/RFC6454, December 2011, <https://www.rfc-
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6454>. editor.org/info/rfc6454>.
[RFC6838] Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type [RFC6838] Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type
Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13, Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13,
RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, January 2013, RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6838>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6838>.
[RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data [RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March
2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>. 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.
[RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer [RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing", Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014, RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.
[RFC7235] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer [RFC7235] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Authentication", RFC 7235, Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Authentication", RFC 7235,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7235, June 2014, DOI 10.17487/RFC7235, June 2014, <https://www.rfc-
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7235>. editor.org/info/rfc7235>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web [RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>. 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
[RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518, [RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015, DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015, <https://www.rfc-
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518>. editor.org/info/rfc7518>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token [RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015, (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC8030] Thomson, M., Damaggio, E., and B. Raymor, Ed., "Generic [RFC8030] Thomson, M., Damaggio, E., and B. Raymor, Ed., "Generic
Event Delivery Using HTTP Push", RFC 8030, Event Delivery Using HTTP Push", RFC 8030,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8030, December 2016, DOI 10.17487/RFC8030, December 2016, <https://www.rfc-
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8030>. editor.org/info/rfc8030>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[WEBPUSH-ENCRYPTION]
Thomson, M., "Message Encryption for Web Push", draft-
ietf-webpush-encryption-08 (work in progress), February
2017.
[X9.62] ANSI, "Public Key Cryptography For The Financial Services [X9.62] ANSI, "Public Key Cryptography For The Financial Services
Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
(ECDSA)", ANSI X9.62 , 1998. (ECDSA)", ANSI X9.62 , 1998.
8.2. Informative References 8.2. Informative References
[API] Beverloo, P., Thomson, M., van Ouwerkerk, M., Sullivan, [API] Beverloo, P., Thomson, M., van Ouwerkerk, M., Sullivan,
B., and E. Fullea, "Push API", May 2017, B., and E. Fullea, "Push API", May 2017,
<https://w3c.github.io/push-api/>. <https://w3c.github.io/push-api/>.
[I-D.ietf-webpush-encryption]
Thomson, M., "Message Encryption for Web Push", draft-
ietf-webpush-encryption-08 (work in progress), February
2017.
[RFC3339] Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet: [RFC3339] Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet:
Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, July 2002, Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, July 2002,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3339>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3339>.
[RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517, [RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015, DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015, <https://www.rfc-
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>. editor.org/info/rfc7517>.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Martin Thomson Martin Thomson
Mozilla Mozilla
Email: martin.thomson@gmail.com Email: martin.thomson@gmail.com
Peter Beverloo Peter Beverloo
Google Google
Email: beverloo@google.com Email: beverloo@google.com
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