draft-ietf-weirds-rdap-sec-00.txt   draft-ietf-weirds-rdap-sec-01.txt 
Internet Engineering Task Force S. Hollenbeck Internet Engineering Task Force S. Hollenbeck
Internet-Draft Verisign Labs Internet-Draft Verisign Labs
Intended status: Standards Track N. Kong Intended status: Standards Track N. Kong
Expires: March 23, 2013 CNNIC Expires: May 30, 2013 CNNIC
September 19, 2012 November 26, 2012
Security Services for the Registration Data Access Protocol Security Services for the Registration Data Access Protocol
draft-ietf-weirds-rdap-sec-00 draft-ietf-weirds-rdap-sec-01
Abstract Abstract
The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) provides "RESTful" web The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) provides "RESTful" web
services to retrieve registration metadata from domain name and services to retrieve registration metadata from domain name and
regional internet registries. This document describes information regional internet registries. This document describes information
security services and their application to RDAP. security services, specific requirements for RDAP, and approaches to
provide RDAP security services.
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on March 23, 2013. This Internet-Draft will expire on May 30, 2013.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
skipping to change at page 2, line 12 skipping to change at page 2, line 13
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Information Security Services and RDAP . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Information Security Services and RDAP . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3.1. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.2. Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1.1. Federated Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. Data Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.2. Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.4. Data Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.3. Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.5. Non-repudiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.4. Data Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) core is specified in two The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) core is specified in two
documents: "Unified Registration Data Access Protocol Query Format" documents: "Unified Registration Data Access Protocol Query Format"
[I-D.ietf-weirds-rdap-query] and "JSON Responses for the Registry [I-D.ietf-weirds-rdap-query] and "JSON Responses for the Registry
Data Access Protocol" [I-D.ietf-weirds-json-response]. One goal of Data Access Protocol" [I-D.ietf-weirds-json-response]. One goal of
RDAP is to provide security services that do not exist in the WHOIS RDAP is to provide security services that do not exist in the WHOIS
[RFC3912] protocol, including authentication, availability, data [RFC3912] protocol, including authentication, authorization,
confidentiality, data integrity, and non-repudiation (note: some of availability, and data confidentiality.
these might be a stretch).
This document describes each of these security services from the This document describes each of these security services from the
perspective of RDAP requirements and applicability. Where perspective of RDAP requirements and applicability. Where
applicable, informational references to requirements for a WHOIS applicable, informational references to requirements for a WHOIS
replacement service [RFC3707] are noted. replacement service [RFC3707] are noted.
2. Conventions Used in This Document 2. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
skipping to change at page 3, line 40 skipping to change at page 3, line 39
RDAP: Registration Data Access Protocol RDAP: Registration Data Access Protocol
RIR: Regional Internet Registry RIR: Regional Internet Registry
3. Information Security Services and RDAP 3. Information Security Services and RDAP
RDAP itself does not include native security services. Instead, RDAP RDAP itself does not include native security services. Instead, RDAP
relies on features that are available in other protocol layers to relies on features that are available in other protocol layers to
provide needed security services including authentication, provide needed security services including authentication,
availability, data confidentiality, data integrity, and non- authorization, availability, and data confidentiality. A description
repudiation. A description of each of these security services can be of each of these security services can be found in RFC 4949
found in RFC 4949 [RFC4949]. [RFC4949]. No requirements have been identified for other security
services.
3.1. Authentication 3.1. Authentication
WHOIS does not provide features to identify and authenticate clients. WHOIS does not provide features to identify and authenticate clients.
As noted in section 3.1.4.2 of RFC 3707 [RFC3707], there is utility As noted in section 3.1.4.2 of RFC 3707 [RFC3707], there is utility
in allowing server operators to offer "varying degrees of access in allowing server operators to offer "varying degrees of access
depending on policy and need". Clients have to be identified and depending on policy and need". Clients have to be identified and
authenticated to provide that utility. authenticated to provide that utility.
There are multiple ways to identify and authenticate RDAP clients. REQUIREMENT: RDAP MUST include an authentication framework that can
Candidate technologies include: accommodate anonymous access as well as verification of identities
using a range of authentication methods and credential services.
- HTTP Basic Authentication [RFC2617]: The "basic" scheme can be REQUIREMENT: The RDAP authentication framework MUST use
used to send a client's user name and password to a server in authentication methods that are fully specified and available to
plaintext, based64-encoded form. If this scheme is used another existing HTTP clients and servers.
protocol (such as HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818]) MUST be used to protect
the client's credentials from disclosure while in transit.
- HTTP Digest Authentication [RFC2617]: The "digest" scheme can be REQUIREMENT: The RDAP authentication framework MUST be capable of
used to authenticate a client without exposing the client's supporting future authentication methods defined for use with HTTP.
plaintext password.
- X.509 Digital Certificates [RFC5280]: The Transport Layer Security APPROACH: RDAP clients and servers MUST implement the authentication
Protocol [RFC5246] includes an option to identify and authenticate framework specified in RFC 2617 [RFC2617]. The "basic" scheme can be
clients who possess and present a valid X.509 digital certificate. used to send a client's user name and password to a server in
Web clients do not typically possess digital certificates so this plaintext, based64-encoded form. The "digest" scheme can be used to
option is likely impractical. authenticate a client without exposing the client's plaintext
password. If the "basic" scheme is used another protocol (such as
HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818]) MUST be used to protect the client's
credentials from disclosure while in transit (see Section 3.4).
- OAuth [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2]: The OAuth authorization framework The Transport Layer Security Protocol [RFC5246] includes an optional
describes a method for clients to access protected web resources feature to identify and authenticate clients who possess and present
using access tokens issued by a third party authorization server a valid X.509 digital certificate [RFC5280]. Support for this
with the permission of the resource owner. If widely deployed it feature is OPTIONAL.
would permit clients to access servers without having to manage
credentials on a per-server basis.
- (What else?) 3.1.1. Federated Authentication
3.2. Availability The traditional client-server authentication model requires clients
to maintain distinct credentials for every RDAP server. This
situation can become unwieldy as the number of RDAP servers
increases. Federated authentication mechanisms allow clients to use
one credential to access multiple RDAP servers and reduce client
credential management complexity. RDAP MAY include a federated
authentication mechanism that permits a client to access multiple
RDAP servers in the same federation with one credential.
An RDAP service has to be available to be useful (need to talk about REQUIREMENT: Federated authentication mechanisms used by RDAP MUST be
denial of service, anycasting, and anything else that addresses fully supported by HTTP.
availability).
3.3. Data Confidentiality POSSIBLE APPROACH: The OAuth authorization framework [RFC6749]
describes a method for users to access protected web resources
without having to hand out their credentials. Instead, clients
supply access tokens issued by an authorization server with the
permission of the resource owner. Using OAuth, multiple RDAP servers
can form a federation and the clients can access any server in the
same federation by providing one credential registered in any server
in that federation. The OAuth authorization framework is designed
for use with HTTP and thus can be used with RDAP.
WHOIS does not provide the ability to encrypt data while in transit POSSIBLE APPROACH: OpenID [OpenID] is a decentralized single sign-on
to protect it from inadvertent disclosure. Web services commonly use authentication system that allows users to log in at web sites with
HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818] to provide that protection. Examples of data one ID instead of having to create multiple unique accounts. OpenID
confidentiality utility include: is decentralized. An end user can freely choose which OpenID
provider to use, and can preserve their Identifier if they switch
OpenID providers. [To be discussed: Is it possible to introduce
OpenID into RDAP?]
- Encryption to protect plaintext passwords exchanged when using the POSSIBLE APPROACH: Section 7.4.6 of the Transport Layer Security
HTTP "basic" authentication scheme. Protocol [RFC5246] describes the specification of a client
certificate. Clients who possess and present a valid X.509 digital
certificate, issued by an entity called "Certification Authority"
(CA), could be identified and authenticated by a server who trusts
the corresponding CA. A certificate authentication method can be
used to achieve federated authentication in which multiple RDAP
servers all trust the same CAs and then any client with a certificate
issued by a trusted CA can access any RDAP server in the federation.
This certificate-based mechanism is supported by HTTPS and can be
introduced into RDAP.
- Encryption to protect personal or otherwise sensitive data 3.2. Authorization
returned in response to RDAP queries.
- (What else?) WHOIS does not provide services to grant different levels of access
to clients based on a client's authenticated identity. As noted in
section 3.1.4.2 of RFC 3707 [RFC3707], there is utility in allowing
server operators to offer "varying degrees of access depending on
policy and need". Access control decisions can be made once a
client's identity has been authenticated (see Section 3.1).
If data confidentiality is useful, we should also plan to review the REQUIREMENT: RDAP MUST include an authorization framework that is
JSON Web Encryption draft [I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-encryption]. capable of providing granular (per registration data object) access
controls according to the policies of the operator.
3.4. Data Integrity APPROACH: Server operators will offer varying degrees of access
depending on policy and need in conjunction with the authentication
methods described in Section 3.1. Some examples:
TBD: is there value in signed responses? If so, the work being done - Clients will be allowed access only to data for which they have a
in the JOSE working group (such as what's described in the JSON Web relationship.
Signature draft [I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-signature]) may be useful.
There's no mention of a "signed response" requirement in RFC 3707.
3.5. Non-repudiation - Unauthenticated or anonymous access status may not yield any
contact information.
TBD: does it make sense to talk about proof of integrity and data - Full access may be granted to a special group of authenticated
origin authentication for responses? It might in the context of law clients.
enforcement actions. Again, there's no requirement mentioned in RFC
3707. The type of access allowed by a server will most likely vary from one
operator to the next.
3.3. Availability
An RDAP service has to be available to be useful. There are no RDAP-
unique requirements to provide availability, but as a general
security consideration a service operator needs to be aware of the
issues associated with denial of service. A thorough reading of RFC
4732 [RFC4732] is RECOMMENDED.
3.4. Data Confidentiality
WHOIS does not provide the ability to encrypt data while in transit
to protect it from inadvertent disclosure. Web services commonly use
HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818] to provide that protection.
REQUIREMENT: RDAP or a protocol layer used by RDAP MUST include
features to protect plaintext client credentials used for client
authentication.
REQUIREMENT: The data confidentiality methods used by RDAP MUST be
fully specified and available to existing HTTP clients and servers.
REQUIREMENT: RDAP MUST be capable of supporting future data
confidentiality methods defined for use with HTTP.
OPTION: RDAP or a protocol layer used by RDAP MAY include features to
encrypt client-server data exchanges.
APPROACH: As noted in Section 3.1, the HTTP "basic" authentication
scheme can be used to authenticate a client. When this scheme is
used HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818] MUST be used to protect the client's
credentials from disclosure while in transit. HTTP Over TLS MAY also
be used to protect client-server data exchanges if the policy of the
server operator requires encryption. There are no current
requirements for object-level encryption, but RDAP MUST NOT preclude
support for this feature in the future.
4. IANA Considerations 4. IANA Considerations
This document does not specify any IANA actions. This document does not specify any IANA actions. This section can be
removed if this document is published as an RFC.
5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
TBD One of the goals of RDAP is to provide security services that do not
exist in the WHOIS protocol. This document describes the security
services provided by RDAP and associated protocol layers, including
authentication, authorization, availability, and data
confidentiality. Data integrity and non-repudiation services were
also considered and ultimately rejected.
Data integrity: No requirements for data integrity have been
identified. This security service is often mistakenly associated
with policy requirements focused on data accuracy, but those
requirements are out of scope for this protocol. Data integrity
could be provided by signing JSON-encoded objects. RDAP MUST NOT
preclude support for this feature in the future.
Non-repudiation: No requirements for non-repudiation with proof or
origin or proof of delivery have been identified. There are,
however, currently-deployed WHOIS servers that can return signed
responses that provide non-repudiation with proof of origin. RDAP
MUST NOT preclude support for this feature in the future.
6. Acknowledgements 6. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge the following individuals for The authors would like to acknowledge the following individuals for
their contributions to this document: Andrew Newton. their contributions to this document: Andrew Newton.
7. References 7. References
7.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-weirds-json-response] [I-D.ietf-weirds-json-response]
Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "JSON Responses for the Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "JSON Responses for the
Registy Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", Registy Data Access Protocol (RDAP)",
draft-ietf-weirds-json-response-00 (work in progress), draft-ietf-weirds-json-response-00 (work in progress),
September 2012. September 2012.
[I-D.ietf-weirds-rdap-query] [I-D.ietf-weirds-rdap-query]
Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "Unified Registration Data Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "Unified Registration Data
Access Protocol Query Format", Access Protocol Query Format",
draft-ietf-weirds-rdap-query-00 (work in progress), draft-ietf-weirds-rdap-query-01 (work in progress),
September 2012. November 2012.
[OpenID] OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Authentication 2.0 - Final",
December 2007, <http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2617] Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S., [RFC2617] Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S.,
Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP
Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication", Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication",
RFC 2617, June 1999. RFC 2617, June 1999.
[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000. [RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000.
[RFC4732] Handley, M., Rescorla, E., and IAB, "Internet Denial-of-
Service Considerations", RFC 4732, December 2006.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008. (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
7.2. Informative References [RFC6749] Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, October 2012.
[I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-encryption]
Jones, M., Rescorla, E., and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web
Encryption (JWE)", draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-05
(work in progress), July 2012.
[I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-signature]
Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature-05
(work in progress), July 2012.
[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2] 7.2. Informative References
Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
draft-ietf-oauth-v2-31 (work in progress), August 2012.
[RFC3707] Newton, A., "Cross Registry Internet Service Protocol [RFC3707] Newton, A., "Cross Registry Internet Service Protocol
(CRISP) Requirements", RFC 3707, February 2004. (CRISP) Requirements", RFC 3707, February 2004.
[RFC3912] Daigle, L., "WHOIS Protocol Specification", RFC 3912, [RFC3912] Daigle, L., "WHOIS Protocol Specification", RFC 3912,
September 2004. September 2004.
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", [RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
RFC 4949, August 2007. RFC 4949, August 2007.
Appendix A. Change Log Appendix A. Change Log
Initial -00: Adopted as working group document. Initial -00: Adopted as working group document.
-01: Extensive text additions and revisions based on in-room
discussion at IETF-85. Sections for data integrity and non-
repudiation have been removed due to a lack of requirements, but
both topics are now addressed in the Security Considerations
section.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Scott Hollenbeck Scott Hollenbeck
Verisign Labs Verisign Labs
12061 Bluemont Way 12061 Bluemont Way
Reston, VA 20190 Reston, VA 20190
US US
Email: shollenbeck@verisign.com Email: shollenbeck@verisign.com
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