Internet Engineering Task Force                            S. Hollenbeck
Internet-Draft                                             Verisign Labs
Intended status: Standards Track                                 N. Kong
Expires: March 23, May 30, 2013                                              CNNIC
                                                      September 19,
                                                       November 26, 2012

      Security Services for the Registration Data Access Protocol


   The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) provides "RESTful" web
   services to retrieve registration metadata from domain name and
   regional internet registries.  This document describes information
   security services services, specific requirements for RDAP, and their application approaches to RDAP.
   provide RDAP security services.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 23, May 30, 2013.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   2.  Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
     2.1.  Acronyms and Abbreviations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   3.  Information Security Services and RDAP  . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
     3.1.  Authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
     3.2.  Availability  . . . . . .
       3.1.1.  Federated Authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
     3.2.  Authorization . . 4
     3.3.  Data Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
     3.4.  Data Integrity . . 5
     3.3.  Availability  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
     3.5.  Non-repudiation . . . 6
     3.4.  Data Confidentiality  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 7
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 7
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 7
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 8
   Appendix A.  Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 8

1.  Introduction

   The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) core is specified in two
   documents: "Unified Registration Data Access Protocol Query Format"
   [I-D.ietf-weirds-rdap-query] and "JSON Responses for the Registry
   Data Access Protocol" [I-D.ietf-weirds-json-response].  One goal of
   RDAP is to provide security services that do not exist in the WHOIS
   [RFC3912] protocol, including authentication, authorization,
   availability, data
   confidentiality, data integrity, and non-repudiation (note: some of
   these might be a stretch). data confidentiality.

   This document describes each of these security services from the
   perspective of RDAP requirements and applicability.  Where
   applicable, informational references to requirements for a WHOIS
   replacement service [RFC3707] are noted.

2.  Conventions Used in This Document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

2.1.  Acronyms and Abbreviations

      DNR: Domain Name Registry

      RDAP: Registration Data Access Protocol

      RIR: Regional Internet Registry

3.  Information Security Services and RDAP

   RDAP itself does not include native security services.  Instead, RDAP
   relies on features that are available in other protocol layers to
   provide needed security services including authentication,
   authorization, availability, data confidentiality, data integrity, and non-
   repudiation. data confidentiality.  A description
   of each of these security services can be found in RFC 4949
   [RFC4949].  No requirements have been identified for other security

3.1.  Authentication

   WHOIS does not provide features to identify and authenticate clients.
   As noted in section of RFC 3707 [RFC3707], there is utility
   in allowing server operators to offer "varying degrees of access
   depending on policy and need".  Clients have to be identified and
   authenticated to provide that utility.


   REQUIREMENT: RDAP MUST include an authentication framework that can
   accommodate anonymous access as well as verification of identities
   using a range of authentication methods and credential services.

   REQUIREMENT: The RDAP authentication framework MUST use
   authentication methods that are multiple ways fully specified and available to identify
   existing HTTP clients and authenticate servers.

   REQUIREMENT: The RDAP clients.
   Candidate technologies include:

   -  HTTP Basic Authentication [RFC2617]: authentication framework MUST be capable of
   supporting future authentication methods defined for use with HTTP.

   APPROACH: RDAP clients and servers MUST implement the authentication
   framework specified in RFC 2617 [RFC2617].  The "basic" scheme can be
   used to send a client's user name and password to a server in
   plaintext, based64-encoded form.  The "digest" scheme can be used to
   authenticate a client without exposing the client's plaintext
   password.  If this the "basic" scheme is used another protocol (such as
   HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818]) MUST be used to protect the client's
   credentials from disclosure while in transit.

   -  HTTP Digest Authentication [RFC2617]: The "digest" scheme can be
      used to authenticate a client without exposing the client's
      plaintext password.

   -  X.509 Digital Certificates [RFC5280]: transit (see Section 3.4).

   The Transport Layer Security Protocol [RFC5246] includes an option optional
   feature to identify and authenticate clients who possess and present
   a valid X.509 digital certificate.
      Web clients do not typically possess digital certificates so certificate [RFC5280].  Support for this
   feature is likely impractical.

   -  OAuth [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2]: OPTIONAL.

3.1.1.  Federated Authentication

   The traditional client-server authentication model requires clients
   to maintain distinct credentials for every RDAP server.  This
   situation can become unwieldy as the number of RDAP servers
   increases.  Federated authentication mechanisms allow clients to use
   one credential to access multiple RDAP servers and reduce client
   credential management complexity.  RDAP MAY include a federated
   authentication mechanism that permits a client to access multiple
   RDAP servers in the same federation with one credential.

   REQUIREMENT: Federated authentication mechanisms used by RDAP MUST be
   fully supported by HTTP.

   POSSIBLE APPROACH: The OAuth authorization framework [RFC6749]
   describes a method for clients users to access protected web resources
   without having to hand out their credentials.  Instead, clients
   supply access tokens issued by a third party an authorization server with the
   permission of the resource owner.  If widely deployed it
      would permit clients to access servers without  Using OAuth, multiple RDAP servers
   can form a federation and the clients can access any server in the
   same federation by providing one credential registered in any server
   in that federation.  The OAuth authorization framework is designed
   for use with HTTP and thus can be used with RDAP.

   POSSIBLE APPROACH: OpenID [OpenID] is a decentralized single sign-on
   authentication system that allows users to log in at web sites with
   one ID instead of having to manage
      credentials create multiple unique accounts.  OpenID
   is decentralized.  An end user can freely choose which OpenID
   provider to use, and can preserve their Identifier if they switch
   OpenID providers.  [To be discussed: Is it possible to introduce
   OpenID into RDAP?]

   POSSIBLE APPROACH: Section 7.4.6 of the Transport Layer Security
   Protocol [RFC5246] describes the specification of a client
   certificate.  Clients who possess and present a valid X.509 digital
   certificate, issued by an entity called "Certification Authority"
   (CA), could be identified and authenticated by a server who trusts
   the corresponding CA.  A certificate authentication method can be
   used to achieve federated authentication in which multiple RDAP
   servers all trust the same CAs and then any client with a certificate
   issued by a trusted CA can access any RDAP server in the federation.
   This certificate-based mechanism is supported by HTTPS and can be
   introduced into RDAP.

3.2.  Authorization

   WHOIS does not provide services to grant different levels of access
   to clients based on a client's authenticated identity.  As noted in
   section of RFC 3707 [RFC3707], there is utility in allowing
   server operators to offer "varying degrees of access depending on
   policy and need".  Access control decisions can be made once a per-server basis.
   client's identity has been authenticated (see Section 3.1).

   REQUIREMENT: RDAP MUST include an authorization framework that is
   capable of providing granular (per registration data object) access
   controls according to the policies of the operator.

   APPROACH: Server operators will offer varying degrees of access
   depending on policy and need in conjunction with the authentication
   methods described in Section 3.1.  Some examples:

   -  (What else?)

3.2.  Clients will be allowed access only to data for which they have a

   -  Unauthenticated or anonymous access status may not yield any
      contact information.

   -  Full access may be granted to a special group of authenticated

   The type of access allowed by a server will most likely vary from one
   operator to the next.

3.3.  Availability

   An RDAP service has to be available to be useful (need useful.  There are no RDAP-
   unique requirements to talk about provide availability, but as a general
   security consideration a service operator needs to be aware of the
   issues associated with denial of service, anycasting, and anything else that addresses

3.3. service.  A thorough reading of RFC
   4732 [RFC4732] is RECOMMENDED.

3.4.  Data Confidentiality

   WHOIS does not provide the ability to encrypt data while in transit
   to protect it from inadvertent disclosure.  Web services commonly use
   HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818] to provide that protection.  Examples

   REQUIREMENT: RDAP or a protocol layer used by RDAP MUST include
   features to protect plaintext client credentials used for client

   REQUIREMENT: The data confidentiality methods used by RDAP MUST be
   fully specified and available to existing HTTP clients and servers.

   REQUIREMENT: RDAP MUST be capable of supporting future data
   confidentiality utility include:

   -  Encryption methods defined for use with HTTP.

   OPTION: RDAP or a protocol layer used by RDAP MAY include features to
   encrypt client-server data exchanges.

   APPROACH: As noted in Section 3.1, the HTTP "basic" authentication
   scheme can be used to authenticate a client.  When this scheme is
   used HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818] MUST be used to protect plaintext passwords exchanged when using the client's
   credentials from disclosure while in transit.  HTTP "basic" authentication scheme.

   -  Encryption Over TLS MAY also
   be used to protect personal or otherwise sensitive data
      returned in response to RDAP queries.

   -  (What else?)

   If client-server data confidentiality is useful, we should also plan to review the
   JSON Web Encryption draft [I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-encryption].

3.4.  Data Integrity

   TBD: is there value in signed responses?  If so, exchanges if the work being done
   in the JOSE working group (such as what's described in policy of the JSON Web
   Signature draft [I-D.ietf-jose-json-web-signature]) may be useful.
   server operator requires encryption.  There are no mention of a "signed response" requirement in RFC 3707.

3.5.  Non-repudiation

   TBD: does it make sense to talk about proof of integrity and data
   origin authentication current
   requirements for responses?  It might object-level encryption, but RDAP MUST NOT preclude
   support for this feature in the context of law
   enforcement actions.  Again, there's no requirement mentioned in RFC
   3707. future.

4.  IANA Considerations

   This document does not specify any IANA actions.  This section can be
   removed if this document is published as an RFC.

5.  Security Considerations


   One of the goals of RDAP is to provide security services that do not
   exist in the WHOIS protocol.  This document describes the security
   services provided by RDAP and associated protocol layers, including
   authentication, authorization, availability, and data
   confidentiality.  Data integrity and non-repudiation services were
   also considered and ultimately rejected.

   Data integrity: No requirements for data integrity have been
   identified.  This security service is often mistakenly associated
   with policy requirements focused on data accuracy, but those
   requirements are out of scope for this protocol.  Data integrity
   could be provided by signing JSON-encoded objects.  RDAP MUST NOT
   preclude support for this feature in the future.

   Non-repudiation: No requirements for non-repudiation with proof or
   origin or proof of delivery have been identified.  There are,
   however, currently-deployed WHOIS servers that can return signed
   responses that provide non-repudiation with proof of origin.  RDAP
   MUST NOT preclude support for this feature in the future.

6.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to acknowledge the following individuals for
   their contributions to this document: Andrew Newton.

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

              Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "JSON Responses for the
              Registy Data Access Protocol (RDAP)",
              draft-ietf-weirds-json-response-00 (work in progress),
              September 2012.

              Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "Unified Registration Data
              Access Protocol Query Format",
              draft-ietf-weirds-rdap-query-01 (work in progress),
              November 2012.

   [OpenID]   OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Authentication 2.0 - Final",
              December 2007, <>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC2617]  Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S.,
              Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP
              Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication",
              RFC 2617, June 1999.

   [RFC2818]  Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000.

   [RFC4732]  Handley, M., Rescorla, E., and IAB, "Internet Denial-of-
              Service Considerations", RFC 4732, December 2006.

   [RFC5246]  Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
              (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.

7.2.  Informative References

              Jones, M., Rescorla, E., and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web
              Encryption (JWE)", draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-05
              (work in progress), July 2012.

              Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
              Signature (JWS)", draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature-05
              (work in progress), July 2012.


   [RFC6749]  Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
              draft-ietf-oauth-v2-31 (work in progress), August
              RFC 6749, October 2012.

7.2.  Informative References

   [RFC3707]  Newton, A., "Cross Registry Internet Service Protocol
              (CRISP) Requirements", RFC 3707, February 2004.

   [RFC3912]  Daigle, L., "WHOIS Protocol Specification", RFC 3912,
              September 2004.

   [RFC4949]  Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
              RFC 4949, August 2007.

Appendix A.  Change Log

   Initial -00:  Adopted as working group document.
   -01:  Extensive text additions and revisions based on in-room
      discussion at IETF-85.  Sections for data integrity and non-
      repudiation have been removed due to a lack of requirements, but
      both topics are now addressed in the Security Considerations

Authors' Addresses

   Scott Hollenbeck
   Verisign Labs
   12061 Bluemont Way
   Reston, VA  20190


   Ning Kong
   China Internet Network Information Center
   4 South 4th Street, Zhongguancun, Haidian District
   Beijing  100190

   Phone: +86 10 5881 3147