draft-ietf-weirds-rdap-sec-01.txt   draft-ietf-weirds-rdap-sec-02.txt 
Internet Engineering Task Force S. Hollenbeck Internet Engineering Task Force S. Hollenbeck
Internet-Draft Verisign Labs Internet-Draft Verisign Labs
Intended status: Standards Track N. Kong Intended status: Standards Track N. Kong
Expires: May 30, 2013 CNNIC Expires: October 06, 2013 CNNIC
November 26, 2012 April 04, 2013
Security Services for the Registration Data Access Protocol Security Services for the Registration Data Access Protocol
draft-ietf-weirds-rdap-sec-01 draft-ietf-weirds-rdap-sec-02
Abstract Abstract
The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) provides "RESTful" web The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) provides "RESTful" web
services to retrieve registration metadata from domain name and services to retrieve registration metadata from domain name and
regional internet registries. This document describes information regional internet registries. This document describes information
security services, specific requirements for RDAP, and approaches to security services, specific requirements for RDAP, and approaches to
provide RDAP security services. provide RDAP security services.
Status of this Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on May 30, 2013. This Internet-Draft will expire on October 06, 2013.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2.1. Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Information Security Services and RDAP . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Information Security Services and RDAP . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3.1. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1.1. Federated Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1.1. Federated Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2. Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.3. Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.4. Data Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.4. Data Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.5. Data Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) core is specified in two The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) core is specified in two
documents: "Unified Registration Data Access Protocol Query Format" documents: "Registration Data Access Protocol Lookup Format"
[I-D.ietf-weirds-rdap-query] and "JSON Responses for the Registry [I-D.ietf-weirds-rdap-query] and "JSON Responses for the Registration
Data Access Protocol" [I-D.ietf-weirds-json-response]. One goal of Data Access Protocol (RDAP)" [I-D.ietf-weirds-json-response]. One
RDAP is to provide security services that do not exist in the WHOIS goal of RDAP is to provide security services that do not exist in the
[RFC3912] protocol, including authentication, authorization, WHOIS [RFC3912] protocol, including authentication, authorization,
availability, and data confidentiality. availability, data confidentiality, and data integrity.
This document describes each of these security services from the This document describes each of these security services from the
perspective of RDAP requirements and applicability. Where perspective of RDAP requirements and applicability. Where
applicable, informational references to requirements for a WHOIS applicable, informational references to requirements for a WHOIS
replacement service [RFC3707] are noted. replacement service [RFC3707] are noted.
2. Conventions Used in This Document 2. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2.1. Acronyms and Abbreviations 2.1. Acronyms and Abbreviations
DNR: Domain Name Registry DNR: Domain Name Registry
RDAP: Registration Data Access Protocol RDAP: Registration Data Access Protocol
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RDAP: Registration Data Access Protocol RDAP: Registration Data Access Protocol
RIR: Regional Internet Registry RIR: Regional Internet Registry
3. Information Security Services and RDAP 3. Information Security Services and RDAP
RDAP itself does not include native security services. Instead, RDAP RDAP itself does not include native security services. Instead, RDAP
relies on features that are available in other protocol layers to relies on features that are available in other protocol layers to
provide needed security services including authentication, provide needed security services including authentication,
authorization, availability, and data confidentiality. A description authorization, availability, data confidentiality, and data
of each of these security services can be found in RFC 4949 integrity. A description of each of these security services can be
[RFC4949]. No requirements have been identified for other security found in RFC 4949 [RFC4949]. No requirements have been identified
services. for other security services.
3.1. Authentication 3.1. Authentication
WHOIS does not provide features to identify and authenticate clients. WHOIS does not provide features to identify and authenticate clients.
As noted in section 3.1.4.2 of RFC 3707 [RFC3707], there is utility As noted in section 3.1.4.2 of RFC 3707 [RFC3707], there is utility
in allowing server operators to offer "varying degrees of access in allowing server operators to offer "varying degrees of access
depending on policy and need". Clients have to be identified and depending on policy and need". Clients have to be identified and
authenticated to provide that utility. authenticated to provide that utility.
REQUIREMENT: RDAP MUST include an authentication framework that can REQUIREMENT: RDAP MUST include an authentication framework that can
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The traditional client-server authentication model requires clients The traditional client-server authentication model requires clients
to maintain distinct credentials for every RDAP server. This to maintain distinct credentials for every RDAP server. This
situation can become unwieldy as the number of RDAP servers situation can become unwieldy as the number of RDAP servers
increases. Federated authentication mechanisms allow clients to use increases. Federated authentication mechanisms allow clients to use
one credential to access multiple RDAP servers and reduce client one credential to access multiple RDAP servers and reduce client
credential management complexity. RDAP MAY include a federated credential management complexity. RDAP MAY include a federated
authentication mechanism that permits a client to access multiple authentication mechanism that permits a client to access multiple
RDAP servers in the same federation with one credential. RDAP servers in the same federation with one credential.
REQUIREMENT: Federated authentication mechanisms used by RDAP MUST be Federated authentication mechanisms used by RDAP are OPTIONAL. If
fully supported by HTTP. used, they MUST be fully supported by HTTP.
POSSIBLE APPROACH: The OAuth authorization framework [RFC6749] POSSIBLE APPROACH: The OAuth authorization framework [RFC6749]
describes a method for users to access protected web resources describes a method for users to access protected web resources
without having to hand out their credentials. Instead, clients without having to hand out their credentials. Instead, clients
supply access tokens issued by an authorization server with the supply access tokens issued by an authorization server with the
permission of the resource owner. Using OAuth, multiple RDAP servers permission of the resource owner. Using OAuth, multiple RDAP servers
can form a federation and the clients can access any server in the can form a federation and the clients can access any server in the
same federation by providing one credential registered in any server same federation by providing one credential registered in any server
in that federation. The OAuth authorization framework is designed in that federation. The OAuth authorization framework is designed
for use with HTTP and thus can be used with RDAP. for use with HTTP and thus can be used with RDAP.
skipping to change at page 5, line 32 skipping to change at page 5, line 21
This certificate-based mechanism is supported by HTTPS and can be This certificate-based mechanism is supported by HTTPS and can be
introduced into RDAP. introduced into RDAP.
3.2. Authorization 3.2. Authorization
WHOIS does not provide services to grant different levels of access WHOIS does not provide services to grant different levels of access
to clients based on a client's authenticated identity. As noted in to clients based on a client's authenticated identity. As noted in
section 3.1.4.2 of RFC 3707 [RFC3707], there is utility in allowing section 3.1.4.2 of RFC 3707 [RFC3707], there is utility in allowing
server operators to offer "varying degrees of access depending on server operators to offer "varying degrees of access depending on
policy and need". Access control decisions can be made once a policy and need". Access control decisions can be made once a
client's identity has been authenticated (see Section 3.1). client's identity has been established and authenticated (see
Section 3.1).
REQUIREMENT: RDAP MUST include an authorization framework that is REQUIREMENT: RDAP MUST include an authorization framework that is
capable of providing granular (per registration data object) access capable of providing granular (per registration data object) access
controls according to the policies of the operator. controls according to the policies of the operator.
APPROACH: Server operators will offer varying degrees of access APPROACH: Server operators will offer varying degrees of access
depending on policy and need in conjunction with the authentication depending on policy and need in conjunction with the authentication
methods described in Section 3.1. Some examples: methods described in Section 3.1. Some examples:
- Clients will be allowed access only to data for which they have a - Clients will be allowed access only to data for which they have a
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operator to the next. operator to the next.
3.3. Availability 3.3. Availability
An RDAP service has to be available to be useful. There are no RDAP- An RDAP service has to be available to be useful. There are no RDAP-
unique requirements to provide availability, but as a general unique requirements to provide availability, but as a general
security consideration a service operator needs to be aware of the security consideration a service operator needs to be aware of the
issues associated with denial of service. A thorough reading of RFC issues associated with denial of service. A thorough reading of RFC
4732 [RFC4732] is RECOMMENDED. 4732 [RFC4732] is RECOMMENDED.
An RDAP service MAY use a throttling mechanism to limit the number of
queries that a single client can send in a given period of time. If
used, the server SHOULD return a 429 response code as described in
RFC 6585 [RFC6585]. A client that receives a 429 response SHOULD
decrease its query rate, and honor the Retry-After header if one is
present.
3.4. Data Confidentiality 3.4. Data Confidentiality
WHOIS does not provide the ability to encrypt data while in transit WHOIS does not provide the ability to encrypt data while in transit
to protect it from inadvertent disclosure. Web services commonly use to protect it from inadvertent disclosure. Web services commonly use
HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818] to provide that protection. HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818] to provide that protection.
REQUIREMENT: RDAP or a protocol layer used by RDAP MUST include REQUIREMENT: RDAP or a protocol layer used by RDAP MUST include
features to protect plaintext client credentials used for client features to protect plaintext client credentials used for client
authentication. authentication.
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APPROACH: As noted in Section 3.1, the HTTP "basic" authentication APPROACH: As noted in Section 3.1, the HTTP "basic" authentication
scheme can be used to authenticate a client. When this scheme is scheme can be used to authenticate a client. When this scheme is
used HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818] MUST be used to protect the client's used HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818] MUST be used to protect the client's
credentials from disclosure while in transit. HTTP Over TLS MAY also credentials from disclosure while in transit. HTTP Over TLS MAY also
be used to protect client-server data exchanges if the policy of the be used to protect client-server data exchanges if the policy of the
server operator requires encryption. There are no current server operator requires encryption. There are no current
requirements for object-level encryption, but RDAP MUST NOT preclude requirements for object-level encryption, but RDAP MUST NOT preclude
support for this feature in the future. support for this feature in the future.
3.5. Data Integrity
WHOIS does not provide the ability to protect data from modification
while in transit. Web services commonly use HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818]
to provide that protection. Digital signatures as described in RFC
4949 [RFC4949] are also used to provide data integrity. Note that
this security service is often mistakenly associated with policy
requirements focused on data accuracy; those requirements are out of
scope for this protocol. The most specific need for this service is
to provide assurance that HTTP redirection hints [RFC2616] are not
modified.
REQUIREMENT: RDAP or a protocol layer used by RDAP MUST include
features to protect HTTP 30x redirection hints from modification.
REQUIREMENT: The data integrity methods used by RDAP MUST be fully
specified and available to existing HTTP clients and servers.
OPTION: RDAP or a protocol layer used by RDAP MAY include features to
provide message integrity checks.
REQUIREMENT: RDAP MUST be capable of supporting future JSON data
integrity methods defined for use with HTTP.
OPTION: RDAP or a protocol layer used by RDAP MAY include features to
provide data integrity by signing JSON-encoded objects.
APPROACH: HTTP Over TLS MAY be used to protect client-server data
exchanges if the policy of the server operator requires message
integrity. There are no current requirements for object-level data
signing, but RDAP MUST NOT preclude support for this feature in the
future.
4. IANA Considerations 4. IANA Considerations
This document does not specify any IANA actions. This section can be This document does not specify any IANA actions. This section can be
removed if this document is published as an RFC. removed if this document is published as an RFC.
5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
One of the goals of RDAP is to provide security services that do not One of the goals of RDAP is to provide security services that do not
exist in the WHOIS protocol. This document describes the security exist in the WHOIS protocol. This document describes the security
services provided by RDAP and associated protocol layers, including services provided by RDAP and associated protocol layers, including
authentication, authorization, availability, and data authentication, authorization, availability, data confidentiality,
confidentiality. Data integrity and non-repudiation services were and data integrity. Non-repudiation services were also considered
also considered and ultimately rejected. and ultimately rejected due to a lack of requirements. There are,
Data integrity: No requirements for data integrity have been
identified. This security service is often mistakenly associated
with policy requirements focused on data accuracy, but those
requirements are out of scope for this protocol. Data integrity
could be provided by signing JSON-encoded objects. RDAP MUST NOT
preclude support for this feature in the future.
Non-repudiation: No requirements for non-repudiation with proof or
origin or proof of delivery have been identified. There are,
however, currently-deployed WHOIS servers that can return signed however, currently-deployed WHOIS servers that can return signed
responses that provide non-repudiation with proof of origin. RDAP responses that provide non-repudiation with proof of origin. RDAP
MUST NOT preclude support for this feature in the future. MUST NOT preclude support for this feature in the future.
As an HTML-based protocol RDAP is susceptible to code injection
attacks. Code injection refers to adding code into a computer system
or program to alter the course of execution. There are many types of
code injection, including SQL injection, dynamic variable or function
injection, include file injection, shell injection, and html-script
injection among others. Data confidentiality and integrity services
provide a measure of defense against man-in-the-middle injection
attacks, but vulnerabilities in both client- and server-side software
make it possible for injection attacks to succeed.
6. Acknowledgements 6. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge the following individuals for The authors would like to acknowledge the following individuals for
their contributions to this document: Andrew Newton. their contributions to this document: Marc Blanchet, Jean-Philippe
Dionne, Andrew Newton, and Linlin Zhou.
7. References 7. References
7.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-weirds-json-response] [I-D.ietf-weirds-json-response]
Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "JSON Responses for the Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "JSON Responses for the
Registy Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", draft-ietf-
draft-ietf-weirds-json-response-00 (work in progress), weirds-json-response-02 (work in progress), January 2013.
September 2012.
[I-D.ietf-weirds-rdap-query] [I-D.ietf-weirds-rdap-query]
Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "Unified Registration Data Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "Registration Data Access
Access Protocol Query Format", Protocol Lookup Format", draft-ietf-weirds-rdap-query-03
draft-ietf-weirds-rdap-query-01 (work in progress), (work in progress), March 2013.
November 2012.
[OpenID] OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Authentication 2.0 - Final", [OpenID] OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Authentication 2.0 - Final ",
December 2007, <http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0>. December 2007, <http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2617] Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S., [RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.
[RFC2617] Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P.M., Hostetler, J.L., Lawrence,
S.D., Leach, P.J., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP
Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication", Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication",
RFC 2617, June 1999. RFC 2617, June 1999.
[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000. [RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000.
[RFC4732] Handley, M., Rescorla, E., and IAB, "Internet Denial-of- [RFC4732] Handley, M., Rescorla, E., IAB, "Internet Denial-of-
Service Considerations", RFC 4732, December 2006. Service Considerations", RFC 4732, December 2006.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008. (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", [RFC6585] Nottingham, M. and R. Fielding, "Additional HTTP Status
RFC 6749, October 2012. Codes", RFC 6585, April 2012.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC
6749, October 2012.
7.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[RFC3707] Newton, A., "Cross Registry Internet Service Protocol [RFC3707] Newton, A., "Cross Registry Internet Service Protocol
(CRISP) Requirements", RFC 3707, February 2004. (CRISP) Requirements", RFC 3707, February 2004.
[RFC3912] Daigle, L., "WHOIS Protocol Specification", RFC 3912, [RFC3912] Daigle, L., "WHOIS Protocol Specification", RFC 3912,
September 2004. September 2004.
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", [RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", RFC
RFC 4949, August 2007. 4949, August 2007.
Appendix A. Change Log Appendix A. Change Log
Initial -00: Adopted as working group document. Initial -00: Adopted as working group document.
-01: Extensive text additions and revisions based on in-room -01: Extensive text additions and revisions based on in-room
discussion at IETF-85. Sections for data integrity and non- discussion at IETF-85. Sections for data integrity and non-
repudiation have been removed due to a lack of requirements, but repudiation have been removed due to a lack of requirements, but
both topics are now addressed in the Security Considerations both topics are now addressed in the Security Considerations
section. section.
-02: Fixed document names in the Introduction. Modified text in
Section 3.1.1 to clarify requirement. Added text to Section 3.3
to describe rate limiting. Added new data integrity section.
Updated security considerations to describe injection attacks.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Scott Hollenbeck Scott Hollenbeck
Verisign Labs Verisign Labs
12061 Bluemont Way 12061 Bluemont Way
Reston, VA 20190 Reston, VA 20190
US US
Email: shollenbeck@verisign.com Email: shollenbeck@verisign.com
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