draft-ietf-weirds-rdap-sec-02.txt   draft-ietf-weirds-rdap-sec-03.txt 
Internet Engineering Task Force S. Hollenbeck Internet Engineering Task Force S. Hollenbeck
Internet-Draft Verisign Labs Internet-Draft Verisign Labs
Intended status: Standards Track N. Kong Intended status: Standards Track N. Kong
Expires: October 06, 2013 CNNIC Expires: October 31, 2013 CNNIC
April 04, 2013 April 29, 2013
Security Services for the Registration Data Access Protocol Security Services for the Registration Data Access Protocol
draft-ietf-weirds-rdap-sec-02 draft-ietf-weirds-rdap-sec-03
Abstract Abstract
The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) provides "RESTful" web The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) provides "RESTful" web
services to retrieve registration metadata from domain name and services to retrieve registration metadata from domain name and
regional internet registries. This document describes information regional internet registries. This document describes information
security services, specific requirements for RDAP, and approaches to security services including authentication, authorization,
provide RDAP security services. availability, data confidentiality, and data integrity for RDAP.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on October 06, 2013. This Internet-Draft will expire on October 31, 2013.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Information Security Services and RDAP . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Information Security Services and RDAP . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3.1. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1.1. Federated Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1.1. Federated Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2. Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.3. Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.4. Data Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.4. Data Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.5. Data Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.5. Data Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) core is specified in two The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) is specified in multiple
documents: "Registration Data Access Protocol Lookup Format" documents, including "Registration Data Access Protocol Lookup
[I-D.ietf-weirds-rdap-query] and "JSON Responses for the Registration Format" [I-D.ietf-weirds-rdap-query], "JSON Responses for the
Data Access Protocol (RDAP)" [I-D.ietf-weirds-json-response]. One Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)"
goal of RDAP is to provide security services that do not exist in the [I-D.ietf-weirds-json-response], and "HTTP usage in the Registration
WHOIS [RFC3912] protocol, including authentication, authorization, Data Access Protocol (RDAP)" [I-D.ietf-weirds-using-http].
availability, data confidentiality, and data integrity.
This document describes each of these security services from the One goal of RDAP is to provide security services that do not exist in
perspective of RDAP requirements and applicability. Where the WHOIS [RFC3912] protocol, including authentication,
applicable, informational references to requirements for a WHOIS authorization, availability, data confidentiality, and data
replacement service [RFC3707] are noted. integrity. This document describes how each of these services is
achieved by RDAP. Where applicable, informational references to
requirements for a WHOIS replacement service [RFC3707] are noted.
2. Conventions Used in This Document 2. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2.1. Acronyms and Abbreviations 2.1. Acronyms and Abbreviations
DNR: Domain Name Registry DNR: Domain Name Registry
RDAP: Registration Data Access Protocol RDAP: Registration Data Access Protocol
skipping to change at page 3, line 23 skipping to change at page 3, line 26
RIR: Regional Internet Registry RIR: Regional Internet Registry
3. Information Security Services and RDAP 3. Information Security Services and RDAP
RDAP itself does not include native security services. Instead, RDAP RDAP itself does not include native security services. Instead, RDAP
relies on features that are available in other protocol layers to relies on features that are available in other protocol layers to
provide needed security services including authentication, provide needed security services including authentication,
authorization, availability, data confidentiality, and data authorization, availability, data confidentiality, and data
integrity. A description of each of these security services can be integrity. A description of each of these security services can be
found in RFC 4949 [RFC4949]. No requirements have been identified found in "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2" [RFC4949]. No
for other security services. requirements have been identified for other security services.
3.1. Authentication 3.1. Authentication
WHOIS does not provide features to identify and authenticate clients. WHOIS does not provide features to identify and authenticate clients.
As noted in section 3.1.4.2 of RFC 3707 [RFC3707], there is utility As noted in section 3.1.4.2 of "Cross Registry Internet Service
in allowing server operators to offer "varying degrees of access Protocol (CRISP) Requirements" [RFC3707], there is utility in
allowing server operators to offer "varying degrees of access
depending on policy and need". Clients have to be identified and depending on policy and need". Clients have to be identified and
authenticated to provide that utility. authenticated to provide that utility.
REQUIREMENT: RDAP MUST include an authentication framework that can RDAP MUST include an authentication framework that can accommodate
accommodate anonymous access as well as verification of identities anonymous access as well as verification of identities using a range
using a range of authentication methods and credential services. of authentication methods and credential services. To that end, RDAP
clients and servers MUST implement the authentication framework
REQUIREMENT: The RDAP authentication framework MUST use specified in "HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access
authentication methods that are fully specified and available to Authentication" [RFC2617]. The "basic" scheme can be used to send a
existing HTTP clients and servers. client's user name and password to a server in plaintext,
based64-encoded form. The "digest" scheme can be used to
REQUIREMENT: The RDAP authentication framework MUST be capable of
supporting future authentication methods defined for use with HTTP.
APPROACH: RDAP clients and servers MUST implement the authentication
framework specified in RFC 2617 [RFC2617]. The "basic" scheme can be
used to send a client's user name and password to a server in
plaintext, based64-encoded form. The "digest" scheme can be used to
authenticate a client without exposing the client's plaintext authenticate a client without exposing the client's plaintext
password. If the "basic" scheme is used another protocol (such as password. If the "basic" scheme is used, HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818]
HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818]) MUST be used to protect the client's MUST be used to protect the client's credentials from disclosure
credentials from disclosure while in transit (see Section 3.4). while in transit (see Section 3.4).
The Transport Layer Security Protocol [RFC5246] includes an optional The Transport Layer Security Protocol [RFC5246] includes an optional
feature to identify and authenticate clients who possess and present feature to identify and authenticate clients who possess and present
a valid X.509 digital certificate [RFC5280]. Support for this a valid X.509 digital certificate [RFC5280]. Support for this
feature is OPTIONAL. feature is OPTIONAL.
RDAP SHOULD be capable of supporting future authentication methods
defined for use with HTTP.
3.1.1. Federated Authentication 3.1.1. Federated Authentication
The traditional client-server authentication model requires clients The traditional client-server authentication model requires clients
to maintain distinct credentials for every RDAP server. This to maintain distinct credentials for every RDAP server. This
situation can become unwieldy as the number of RDAP servers situation can become unwieldy as the number of RDAP servers
increases. Federated authentication mechanisms allow clients to use increases. Federated authentication mechanisms allow clients to use
one credential to access multiple RDAP servers and reduce client one credential to access multiple RDAP servers and reduce client
credential management complexity. RDAP MAY include a federated credential management complexity. RDAP MAY include a federated
authentication mechanism that permits a client to access multiple authentication mechanism that permits a client to access multiple
RDAP servers in the same federation with one credential. RDAP servers in the same federation with one credential.
Federated authentication mechanisms used by RDAP are OPTIONAL. If Federated authentication mechanisms used by RDAP are OPTIONAL. If
used, they MUST be fully supported by HTTP. used, they MUST be fully supported by HTTP. OAuth, OpenID, and CA-
based mechanisms are three possible approaches to provide federated
authentication.
POSSIBLE APPROACH: The OAuth authorization framework [RFC6749] The OAuth authorization framework [RFC6749] describes a method for
describes a method for users to access protected web resources users to access protected web resources without having to hand out
without having to hand out their credentials. Instead, clients their credentials. Instead, clients supply access tokens issued by
supply access tokens issued by an authorization server with the an authorization server with the permission of the resource owner.
permission of the resource owner. Using OAuth, multiple RDAP servers Using OAuth, multiple RDAP servers can form a federation and the
can form a federation and the clients can access any server in the clients can access any server in the same federation by providing one
same federation by providing one credential registered in any server credential registered in any server in that federation. The OAuth
in that federation. The OAuth authorization framework is designed authorization framework is designed for use with HTTP and thus can be
for use with HTTP and thus can be used with RDAP. used with RDAP.
POSSIBLE APPROACH: OpenID [OpenID] is a decentralized single sign-on OpenID [OpenID] is a decentralized single sign-on authentication
authentication system that allows users to log in at web sites with system that allows users to log in at web sites with one ID instead
one ID instead of having to create multiple unique accounts. OpenID of having to create multiple unique accounts. An end user can freely
is decentralized. An end user can freely choose which OpenID choose which OpenID provider to use, and can preserve their
provider to use, and can preserve their Identifier if they switch Identifier if they switch OpenID providers.
OpenID providers. [To be discussed: Is it possible to introduce
OpenID into RDAP?]
POSSIBLE APPROACH: Section 7.4.6 of the Transport Layer Security Section 7.4.6 of the Transport Layer Security Protocol [RFC5246]
Protocol [RFC5246] describes the specification of a client describes the specification of a client certificate. Clients who
certificate. Clients who possess and present a valid X.509 digital possess and present a valid X.509 digital certificate, issued by an
certificate, issued by an entity called "Certification Authority" entity called "Certification Authority" (CA), could be identified and
(CA), could be identified and authenticated by a server who trusts authenticated by a server who trusts the corresponding CA. A
the corresponding CA. A certificate authentication method can be certificate authentication method can be used to achieve federated
used to achieve federated authentication in which multiple RDAP authentication in which multiple RDAP servers all trust the same CAs
servers all trust the same CAs and then any client with a certificate and then any client with a certificate issued by a trusted CA can
issued by a trusted CA can access any RDAP server in the federation. access any RDAP server in the federation. This certificate-based
This certificate-based mechanism is supported by HTTPS and can be mechanism is supported by HTTPS and can be introduced into RDAP.
introduced into RDAP.
3.2. Authorization 3.2. Authorization
WHOIS does not provide services to grant different levels of access WHOIS does not provide services to grant different levels of access
to clients based on a client's authenticated identity. As noted in to clients based on a client's authenticated identity. As noted in
section 3.1.4.2 of RFC 3707 [RFC3707], there is utility in allowing section 3.1.4.2 of "Cross Registry Internet Service Protocol (CRISP)
server operators to offer "varying degrees of access depending on Requirements" [RFC3707], there is utility in allowing server
policy and need". Access control decisions can be made once a operators to offer "varying degrees of access depending on policy and
client's identity has been established and authenticated (see need". Access control decisions can be made once a client's identity
Section 3.1). has been established and authenticated (see Section 3.1).
REQUIREMENT: RDAP MUST include an authorization framework that is
capable of providing granular (per registration data object) access
controls according to the policies of the operator.
APPROACH: Server operators will offer varying degrees of access RDAP MUST include an authorization framework that is capable of
depending on policy and need in conjunction with the authentication providing granular (per registration data object) access controls
methods described in Section 3.1. Some examples: according to the policies of the operator. Server operators will
offer varying degrees of access depending on policy and need in
conjunction with the authentication methods described in Section 3.1.
Some examples:
- Clients will be allowed access only to data for which they have a - Clients will be allowed access only to data for which they have a
relationship. relationship.
- Unauthenticated or anonymous access status may not yield any - Unauthenticated or anonymous access status may not yield any
contact information. contact information.
- Full access may be granted to a special group of authenticated - Full access may be granted to a special group of authenticated
clients. clients.
The type of access allowed by a server will most likely vary from one The type of access allowed by a server will most likely vary from one
operator to the next. operator to the next.
3.3. Availability 3.3. Availability
An RDAP service has to be available to be useful. There are no RDAP- An RDAP service has to be available to be useful. There are no RDAP-
unique requirements to provide availability, but as a general unique requirements to provide availability, but as a general
security consideration a service operator needs to be aware of the security consideration a service operator needs to be aware of the
issues associated with denial of service. A thorough reading of RFC issues associated with denial of service. A thorough reading of
4732 [RFC4732] is RECOMMENDED. "Internet Denial-of-Service Considerations" [RFC4732] is advised.
An RDAP service MAY use a throttling mechanism to limit the number of An RDAP service MAY use a throttling mechanism to limit the number of
queries that a single client can send in a given period of time. If queries that a single client can send in a given period of time. If
used, the server SHOULD return a 429 response code as described in used, the server SHOULD return a 429 response code as described in
RFC 6585 [RFC6585]. A client that receives a 429 response SHOULD "Additional HTTP Status Codes" [RFC6585]. A client that receives a
decrease its query rate, and honor the Retry-After header if one is 429 response SHOULD decrease its query rate, and honor the Retry-
present. After header field if one is present.
3.4. Data Confidentiality 3.4. Data Confidentiality
WHOIS does not provide the ability to encrypt data while in transit WHOIS does not provide the ability to protect data from inadvertent
to protect it from inadvertent disclosure. Web services commonly use disclosure while in transit. Web services such as RDAP commonly use
HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818] to provide that protection. HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818] to provide that protection by encrypting all
traffic sent on the connection between client and server. It is also
REQUIREMENT: RDAP or a protocol layer used by RDAP MUST include possible to encrypt discrete objects (such as command path segments
features to protect plaintext client credentials used for client and JSON-encoded response objects) at one endpoint, send them to the
authentication. other endpoint via an unprotected transport protocol, and decrypt the
object on receipt. Encryption algorithms as described in "Internet
REQUIREMENT: The data confidentiality methods used by RDAP MUST be Security Glossary, Version 2" [RFC4949] are commonly used to provide
fully specified and available to existing HTTP clients and servers. data confidentiality at the object level.
REQUIREMENT: RDAP MUST be capable of supporting future data
confidentiality methods defined for use with HTTP.
OPTION: RDAP or a protocol layer used by RDAP MAY include features to There are no current requirements for object-level data
encrypt client-server data exchanges. confidentiality using encryption. Support for this feature could be
added to RDAP in the future.
APPROACH: As noted in Section 3.1, the HTTP "basic" authentication As noted in Section 3.1, the HTTP "basic" authentication scheme can
scheme can be used to authenticate a client. When this scheme is be used to authenticate a client. When this scheme is used, HTTP
used HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818] MUST be used to protect the client's Over TLS MUST be used to protect the client's credentials from
credentials from disclosure while in transit. HTTP Over TLS MAY also disclosure while in transit. If the policy of the server operator
be used to protect client-server data exchanges if the policy of the requires encryption to protect client-server data exchanges (such as
server operator requires encryption. There are no current to protect non-public data that can not be accessed without client
requirements for object-level encryption, but RDAP MUST NOT preclude identification and authentication), HTTP Over TLS MUST be used to
support for this feature in the future. protect those exchanges.
3.5. Data Integrity 3.5. Data Integrity
WHOIS does not provide the ability to protect data from modification WHOIS does not provide the ability to protect data from modification
while in transit. Web services commonly use HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818] while in transit. Web services such as RDAP commonly use HTTP Over
to provide that protection. Digital signatures as described in RFC TLS [RFC2818] to provide that protection by using a keyed Message
4949 [RFC4949] are also used to provide data integrity. Note that Authentication Code (MAC) to detect modifications. It is also
this security service is often mistakenly associated with policy possible to sign discrete objects (such as command path segments and
requirements focused on data accuracy; those requirements are out of JSON-encoded response objects) at one endpoint, send them to the
scope for this protocol. The most specific need for this service is other endpoint via a transport protocol, and validate the signature
to provide assurance that HTTP redirection hints [RFC2616] are not of the object on receipt. Digital signature algorithms as described
modified. in "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2" [RFC4949] are commonly
used to provide data integrity at the object level.
REQUIREMENT: RDAP or a protocol layer used by RDAP MUST include
features to protect HTTP 30x redirection hints from modification.
REQUIREMENT: The data integrity methods used by RDAP MUST be fully
specified and available to existing HTTP clients and servers.
OPTION: RDAP or a protocol layer used by RDAP MAY include features to
provide message integrity checks.
REQUIREMENT: RDAP MUST be capable of supporting future JSON data
integrity methods defined for use with HTTP.
OPTION: RDAP or a protocol layer used by RDAP MAY include features to There are no current requirements for object-level data integrity
provide data integrity by signing JSON-encoded objects. using digital signatures. Support for this feature could be added to
RDAP in the future.
APPROACH: HTTP Over TLS MAY be used to protect client-server data The most specific need for this service is to provide assurance that
exchanges if the policy of the server operator requires message HTTP 30x redirection hints [RFC2616] and response elements returned
integrity. There are no current requirements for object-level data from the server are not modified while in transit. If the policy of
signing, but RDAP MUST NOT preclude support for this feature in the the server operator requires message integrity for client-server data
future. exchanges, HTTP Over TLS MUST be used to protect those exchanges.
4. IANA Considerations 4. IANA Considerations
This document does not specify any IANA actions. This section can be This document does not specify any IANA actions. This section can be
removed if this document is published as an RFC. removed if this document is published as an RFC.
5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
One of the goals of RDAP is to provide security services that do not One of the goals of RDAP is to provide security services that do not
exist in the WHOIS protocol. This document describes the security exist in the WHOIS protocol. This document describes the security
services provided by RDAP and associated protocol layers, including services provided by RDAP and associated protocol layers, including
authentication, authorization, availability, data confidentiality, authentication, authorization, availability, data confidentiality,
and data integrity. Non-repudiation services were also considered and data integrity. Non-repudiation services were also considered
skipping to change at page 7, line 41 skipping to change at page 7, line 17
5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
One of the goals of RDAP is to provide security services that do not One of the goals of RDAP is to provide security services that do not
exist in the WHOIS protocol. This document describes the security exist in the WHOIS protocol. This document describes the security
services provided by RDAP and associated protocol layers, including services provided by RDAP and associated protocol layers, including
authentication, authorization, availability, data confidentiality, authentication, authorization, availability, data confidentiality,
and data integrity. Non-repudiation services were also considered and data integrity. Non-repudiation services were also considered
and ultimately rejected due to a lack of requirements. There are, and ultimately rejected due to a lack of requirements. There are,
however, currently-deployed WHOIS servers that can return signed however, currently-deployed WHOIS servers that can return signed
responses that provide non-repudiation with proof of origin. RDAP responses that provide non-repudiation with proof of origin. RDAP
MUST NOT preclude support for this feature in the future. might need to be extended to provide this service in the future.
As an HTML-based protocol RDAP is susceptible to code injection As an HTTP-based protocol RDAP is susceptible to code injection
attacks. Code injection refers to adding code into a computer system attacks. Code injection refers to adding code into a computer system
or program to alter the course of execution. There are many types of or program to alter the course of execution. There are many types of
code injection, including SQL injection, dynamic variable or function code injection, including SQL injection, dynamic variable or function
injection, include file injection, shell injection, and html-script injection, include file injection, shell injection, and html-script
injection among others. Data confidentiality and integrity services injection among others. Data confidentiality and integrity services
provide a measure of defense against man-in-the-middle injection provide a measure of defense against man-in-the-middle injection
attacks, but vulnerabilities in both client- and server-side software attacks, but vulnerabilities in both client-side and server-side
make it possible for injection attacks to succeed. software make it possible for injection attacks to succeed.
Data integrity services are sometimes mistakenly associated with
directory service operational policy requirements focused on data
accuracy. "Accuracy" refers to the truthful association of data
elements (such as names, addresses, and telephone numbers) in the
context of a particular directory object (such as a domain name).
Accuracy requirements are out of scope for this protocol.
6. Acknowledgements 6. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge the following individuals for The authors would like to acknowledge the following individuals for
their contributions to this document: Marc Blanchet, Jean-Philippe their contributions to this document: Marc Blanchet, Ernie Dainow,
Dionne, Andrew Newton, and Linlin Zhou. Jean-Philippe Dionne, Byron Ellacott, Peter Koch, Murray Kucherawy,
Andrew Newton, and Linlin Zhou.
7. References 7. References
7.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-weirds-json-response] [I-D.ietf-weirds-json-response]
Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "JSON Responses for the Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "JSON Responses for the
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", draft-ietf- Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", draft-ietf-
weirds-json-response-02 (work in progress), January 2013. weirds-json-response-03 (work in progress), April 2013.
[I-D.ietf-weirds-rdap-query] [I-D.ietf-weirds-rdap-query]
Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "Registration Data Access Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "Registration Data Access
Protocol Lookup Format", draft-ietf-weirds-rdap-query-03 Protocol Lookup Format", draft-ietf-weirds-rdap-query-04
(work in progress), March 2013. (work in progress), April 2013.
[I-D.ietf-weirds-using-http]
Newton, A., Ellacott, B., and N. Kong, "HTTP usage in the
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", draft-ietf-
weirds-using-http-04 (work in progress), April 2013.
[OpenID] OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Authentication 2.0 - Final ", [OpenID] OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Authentication 2.0 - Final ",
December 2007, <http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0>. December 2007, <http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H., [RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999. Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.
skipping to change at page 9, line 34 skipping to change at page 9, line 23
Initial -00: Adopted as working group document. Initial -00: Adopted as working group document.
-01: Extensive text additions and revisions based on in-room -01: Extensive text additions and revisions based on in-room
discussion at IETF-85. Sections for data integrity and non- discussion at IETF-85. Sections for data integrity and non-
repudiation have been removed due to a lack of requirements, but repudiation have been removed due to a lack of requirements, but
both topics are now addressed in the Security Considerations both topics are now addressed in the Security Considerations
section. section.
-02: Fixed document names in the Introduction. Modified text in -02: Fixed document names in the Introduction. Modified text in
Section 3.1.1 to clarify requirement. Added text to Section 3.3 Section 3.1.1 to clarify requirement. Added text to Section 3.3
to describe rate limiting. Added new data integrity section. to describe rate limiting. Added new data integrity section.
Updated security considerations to describe injection attacks. Updated security considerations to describe injection attacks.
-03: Extensive updates to address WG last call comments: rewrote
introduction, removed references to draft documents, changed
"HTML" to "HTTP" in Section 5, eliminated upper case words that
could be misunderstood to be normative guidance, rewrote
Section 3.4 and Section 3.5.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Scott Hollenbeck Scott Hollenbeck
Verisign Labs Verisign Labs
12061 Bluemont Way 12061 Bluemont Way
Reston, VA 20190 Reston, VA 20190
US US
Email: shollenbeck@verisign.com Email: shollenbeck@verisign.com
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