draft-ietf-weirds-rdap-sec-04.txt   draft-ietf-weirds-rdap-sec-05.txt 
Internet Engineering Task Force S. Hollenbeck Internet Engineering Task Force S. Hollenbeck
Internet-Draft Verisign Labs Internet-Draft Verisign Labs
Intended status: Standards Track N. Kong Intended status: Standards Track N. Kong
Expires: December 05, 2013 CNNIC Expires: February 20, 2014 CNNIC
June 03, 2013 August 19, 2013
Security Services for the Registration Data Access Protocol Security Services for the Registration Data Access Protocol
draft-ietf-weirds-rdap-sec-04 draft-ietf-weirds-rdap-sec-05
Abstract Abstract
The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) provides "RESTful" web The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) provides "RESTful" web
services to retrieve registration metadata from domain name and services to retrieve registration metadata from domain name and
regional internet registries. This document describes information regional internet registries. This document describes information
security services including authentication, authorization, security services including authentication, authorization,
availability, data confidentiality, and data integrity for RDAP. availability, data confidentiality, and data integrity for RDAP.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 05, 2013. This Internet-Draft will expire on February 20, 2014.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Information Security Services and RDAP . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Information Security Services and RDAP . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3.1. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1.1. Federated Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1.1. Federated Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2. Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.3. Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4. Data Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.4. Data Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.5. Data Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.5. Data Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) is specified in multiple The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) is specified in multiple
documents, including "Registration Data Access Protocol Lookup documents, including "Registration Data Access Protocol Lookup
Format" [I-D.ietf-weirds-rdap-query], "JSON Responses for the Format" [I-D.ietf-weirds-rdap-query], "JSON Responses for the
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)" Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)"
[I-D.ietf-weirds-json-response], and "HTTP usage in the Registration [I-D.ietf-weirds-json-response], and "HTTP usage in the Registration
Data Access Protocol (RDAP)" [I-D.ietf-weirds-using-http]. Data Access Protocol (RDAP)" [I-D.ietf-weirds-using-http].
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2. Conventions Used in This Document 2. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2.1. Acronyms and Abbreviations 2.1. Acronyms and Abbreviations
DNR: Domain Name Registry DNR: Domain Name Registry
HTTP: Hypertext Transfer Protocol
JSON: JavaScript Object Notation
RDAP: Registration Data Access Protocol RDAP: Registration Data Access Protocol
RIR: Regional Internet Registry RIR: Regional Internet Registry
TLS: Transport Layer Security
3. Information Security Services and RDAP 3. Information Security Services and RDAP
RDAP itself does not include native security services. Instead, RDAP RDAP itself does not include native security services. Instead, RDAP
relies on features that are available in other protocol layers to relies on features that are available in other protocol layers to
provide needed security services including authentication, provide needed security services including authentication,
authorization, availability, data confidentiality, and data authorization, availability, data confidentiality, and data
integrity. A description of each of these security services can be integrity. A description of each of these security services can be
found in "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2" [RFC4949]. No found in "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2" [RFC4949]. No
requirements have been identified for other security services. requirements have been identified for other security services.
3.1. Authentication 3.1. Authentication
WHOIS does not provide features to identify and authenticate clients. WHOIS does not provide features to identify and authenticate clients.
As noted in section 3.1.4.2 of "Cross Registry Internet Service As noted in section 3.1.4.2 of "Cross Registry Internet Service
Protocol (CRISP) Requirements" [RFC3707], there is utility in Protocol (CRISP) Requirements" [RFC3707], there is utility in
allowing server operators to offer "varying degrees of access allowing server operators to offer "varying degrees of access
depending on policy and need". Clients have to be identified and depending on policy and need". Clients have to be identified and
authenticated to provide that utility. authenticated to provide that utility.
RDAP's authentication framework needs to accomodate anonymous access RDAP's authentication framework needs to accommodate anonymous access
as well as verification of identities using a range of authentication as well as verification of identities using a range of authentication
methods and credential services. To that end, RDAP clients and methods and credential services. To that end, RDAP clients and
servers MUST implement the authentication framework specified in servers MUST implement the authentication framework specified in
"HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication" "HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication"
[RFC2617]. The "basic" scheme can be used to send a client's user [RFC2617]. The "basic" scheme can be used to send a client's user
name and password to a server in plaintext, based64-encoded form. name and password to a server in plaintext, based64-encoded form.
The "digest" scheme can be used to authenticate a client without The "digest" scheme can be used to authenticate a client without
exposing the client's plaintext password. If the "basic" scheme is exposing the client's plaintext password. If the "basic" scheme is
used, HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818] MUST be used to protect the client's used, HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818] MUST be used to protect the client's
credentials from disclosure while in transit (see Section 3.4). credentials from disclosure while in transit (see Section 3.4).
Servers MUST support either Basic or Digest authentication; they are
not required to support both. Clients MUST support both to
interoperate with servers that support one or the other.
The Transport Layer Security Protocol [RFC5246] includes an optional The Transport Layer Security Protocol [RFC5246] includes an optional
feature to identify and authenticate clients who possess and present feature to identify and authenticate clients who possess and present
a valid X.509 digital certificate [RFC5280]. Support for this a valid X.509 digital certificate [RFC5280]. Support for this
feature is OPTIONAL. feature is OPTIONAL.
RDAP SHOULD be capable of supporting future authentication methods RDAP does not impose any unique server authentication requirements.
defined for use with HTTP. The server authentication provided by TLS fully addresses the needs
of RDAP. In general, transports for RDAP must either provide a TLS-
protected transport (e.g., HTTPS) or a mechanism that provides an
equivalent level of server authentication.
Work on HTTP authentication methods continues. RDAP ought to be
agile enough to support additional methods as they are defined.
3.1.1. Federated Authentication 3.1.1. Federated Authentication
The traditional client-server authentication model requires clients The traditional client-server authentication model requires clients
to maintain distinct credentials for every RDAP server. This to maintain distinct credentials for every RDAP server. This
situation can become unwieldy as the number of RDAP servers situation can become unwieldy as the number of RDAP servers
increases. Federated authentication mechanisms allow clients to use increases. Federated authentication mechanisms allow clients to use
one credential to access multiple RDAP servers and reduce client one credential to access multiple RDAP servers and reduce client
credential management complexity. RDAP MAY include a federated credential management complexity. RDAP MAY include a federated
authentication mechanism that permits a client to access multiple authentication mechanism that permits a client to access multiple
RDAP servers in the same federation with one credential. RDAP servers in the same federation with one credential.
Federated authentication mechanisms used by RDAP are OPTIONAL. If Federated authentication mechanisms used by RDAP are OPTIONAL. If
used, they MUST be fully supported by HTTP. OAuth, OpenID, and CA- used, they MUST be fully supported by HTTP. OAuth, OpenID, and CA-
based mechanisms are three possible approaches to provide federated based mechanisms are three possible approaches to provide federated
authentication. authentication.
The OAuth authorization framework [RFC6749] describes a method for The OAuth authorization framework [RFC6749] describes a method for
users to access protected web resources without having to hand out users to access protected web resources without having to hand out
their credentials. Instead, clients supply access tokens issued by their credentials. Instead, clients are issued access tokens by
an authorization server with the permission of the resource owner. authorization servers with the permission of the resource owners.
Using OAuth, multiple RDAP servers can form a federation and the Using OAuth, multiple RDAP servers can form a federation and the
clients can access any server in the same federation by providing one clients can access any server in the same federation by providing one
credential registered in any server in that federation. The OAuth credential registered in any server in that federation. The OAuth
authorization framework is designed for use with HTTP and thus can be authorization framework is designed for use with HTTP and thus can be
used with RDAP. used with RDAP.
OpenID [OpenID] is a decentralized single sign-on authentication OpenID [OpenID] is a decentralized single sign-on authentication
system that allows users to log in at web sites with one ID instead system that allows users to log in at multiple web sites with one ID
of having to create multiple unique accounts. An end user can freely instead of having to create multiple unique accounts. An end user
choose which OpenID provider to use, and can preserve their can freely choose which OpenID provider to use, and can preserve
Identifier if they switch OpenID providers. their Identifier if they switch OpenID providers.
Section 7.4.6 of the Transport Layer Security Protocol [RFC5246] Note that OAuth and OpenID do not consistently require data
confidentiality services to protect interactions between providers
and consumers. HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818] can be used as needed to
provide protection against man-in-the-middle attacks.
The Transport Layer Security Protocol [RFC5246], Section 7.4.6,
describes the specification of a client certificate. Clients who describes the specification of a client certificate. Clients who
possess and present a valid X.509 digital certificate, issued by an possess and present a valid X.509 digital certificate, issued by an
entity called "Certification Authority" (CA), could be identified and entity called a "Certification Authority" (CA), could be identified
authenticated by a server who trusts the corresponding CA. A and authenticated by a server who trusts the corresponding CA. A
certificate authentication method can be used to achieve federated certificate authentication method can be used to achieve federated
authentication in which multiple RDAP servers all trust the same CAs authentication in which multiple RDAP servers all trust the same CAs
and then any client with a certificate issued by a trusted CA can and then any client with a certificate issued by a trusted CA can
access any RDAP server in the federation. This certificate-based access any RDAP server in the federation. This certificate-based
mechanism is supported by HTTPS and can be introduced into RDAP. mechanism is supported by HTTPS and can be used with RDAP.
3.2. Authorization 3.2. Authorization
WHOIS does not provide services to grant different levels of access WHOIS does not provide services to grant different levels of access
to clients based on a client's authenticated identity. As noted in to clients based on a client's authenticated identity. As noted in
section 3.1.4.2 of "Cross Registry Internet Service Protocol (CRISP) section 3.1.4.2 of "Cross Registry Internet Service Protocol (CRISP)
Requirements" [RFC3707], there is utility in allowing server Requirements" [RFC3707], there is utility in allowing server
operators to offer "varying degrees of access depending on policy and operators to offer "varying degrees of access depending on policy and
need". Access control decisions can be made once a client's identity need". Access control decisions can be made once a client's identity
has been established and authenticated (see Section 3.1). has been established and authenticated (see Section 3.1).
An RDAP server MUST provide granular access controls (that is, on a Server operators SHOULD offer varying degrees of access depending on
per registration data object basis) in order to implement policy and need in conjunction with the authentication methods
authorization policies. Server operators will offer varying degrees described in Section 3.1. If such varying degrees of access are
of access depending on policy and need in conjunction with the supported, an RDAP server MUST provide granular access controls (that
authentication methods described in Section 3.1. Some examples: is, on a per registration data object basis) in order to implement
authorization policies. Some examples:
- Clients will be allowed access only to data for which they have a - Clients will be allowed access only to data for which they have a
relationship. relationship.
- Unauthenticated or anonymous access status may not yield any - Unauthenticated or anonymous access status may not yield any
contact information. contact information.
- Full access may be granted to a special group of authenticated - Full access may be granted to a special group of authenticated
clients. clients.
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unique requirements to provide availability, but as a general unique requirements to provide availability, but as a general
security consideration a service operator needs to be aware of the security consideration a service operator needs to be aware of the
issues associated with denial of service. A thorough reading of issues associated with denial of service. A thorough reading of
"Internet Denial-of-Service Considerations" [RFC4732] is advised. "Internet Denial-of-Service Considerations" [RFC4732] is advised.
An RDAP service MAY use a throttling mechanism to limit the number of An RDAP service MAY use a throttling mechanism to limit the number of
queries that a single client can send in a given period of time. If queries that a single client can send in a given period of time. If
used, the server SHOULD return a 429 response code as described in used, the server SHOULD return a 429 response code as described in
"Additional HTTP Status Codes" [RFC6585]. A client that receives a "Additional HTTP Status Codes" [RFC6585]. A client that receives a
429 response SHOULD decrease its query rate, and honor the Retry- 429 response SHOULD decrease its query rate, and honor the Retry-
After header field if one is present. After header field if one is present. Note that this is not a
defense against denial-of-service attacks, since a malicious client
could ignore the code and continue to send queries at a high rate. A
server might use another response code if it did not wish to reveal
to a client that rate limiting is the reason for the denial of a
reply.
3.4. Data Confidentiality 3.4. Data Confidentiality
WHOIS does not provide the ability to protect data from inadvertent WHOIS does not provide the ability to protect data from inadvertent
disclosure while in transit. Web services such as RDAP commonly use disclosure while in transit. Web services such as RDAP commonly use
HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818] to provide that protection by encrypting all HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818] to provide that protection by encrypting all
traffic sent on the connection between client and server. It is also traffic sent on the connection between client and server. It is also
possible to encrypt discrete objects (such as command path segments possible to encrypt discrete objects (such as command path segments
and JSON-encoded response objects) at one endpoint, send them to the and JSON-encoded response objects) at one endpoint, send them to the
other endpoint via an unprotected transport protocol, and decrypt the other endpoint via an unprotected transport protocol, and decrypt the
object on receipt. Encryption algorithms as described in "Internet object on receipt. Encryption algorithms as described in "Internet
Security Glossary, Version 2" [RFC4949] are commonly used to provide Security Glossary, Version 2" [RFC4949] are commonly used to provide
data confidentiality at the object level. data confidentiality at the object level.
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and data integrity. Non-repudiation services were also considered and data integrity. Non-repudiation services were also considered
and ultimately rejected due to a lack of requirements. There are, and ultimately rejected due to a lack of requirements. There are,
however, currently-deployed WHOIS servers that can return signed however, currently-deployed WHOIS servers that can return signed
responses that provide non-repudiation with proof of origin. RDAP responses that provide non-repudiation with proof of origin. RDAP
might need to be extended to provide this service in the future. might need to be extended to provide this service in the future.
As an HTTP-based protocol RDAP is susceptible to code injection As an HTTP-based protocol RDAP is susceptible to code injection
attacks. Code injection refers to adding code into a computer system attacks. Code injection refers to adding code into a computer system
or program to alter the course of execution. There are many types of or program to alter the course of execution. There are many types of
code injection, including SQL injection, dynamic variable or function code injection, including SQL injection, dynamic variable or function
injection, include file injection, shell injection, and html-script injection, include file injection, shell injection, and HTML-script
injection among others. Data confidentiality and integrity services injection among others. Data confidentiality and integrity services
provide a measure of defense against man-in-the-middle injection provide a measure of defense against man-in-the-middle injection
attacks, but vulnerabilities in both client-side and server-side attacks, but vulnerabilities in both client-side and server-side
software make it possible for injection attacks to succeed. software make it possible for injection attacks to succeed.
Consistently checking and validating server credentials can help
detect man-in-the-middle attacks.
As noted in Section 3.1.1, digital certificates can be used to
implement federated authentication. There is a risk of too-
promiscuous, or even rogue, CAs being included in the list of
acceptable CAs that the TLS server sends the client as part of the
TLS client-authentication handshake and lending the appearance of
trust to certificates signed by those CAs. Periodic monitoring of
the list of CAs that RDAP servers trust for client authentication can
help reduce this risk.
The Transport Layer Security Protocol [RFC5246] includes a null
cipher suite that does not encrypt data and thus does not provide
data confidentiality. This option must not be used when data
confidentiality services are needed.
Data integrity services are sometimes mistakenly associated with Data integrity services are sometimes mistakenly associated with
directory service operational policy requirements focused on data directory service operational policy requirements focused on data
accuracy. "Accuracy" refers to the truthful association of data accuracy. "Accuracy" refers to the truthful association of data
elements (such as names, addresses, and telephone numbers) in the elements (such as names, addresses, and telephone numbers) in the
context of a particular directory object (such as a domain name). context of a particular directory object (such as a domain name).
Accuracy requirements are out of scope for this protocol. Accuracy requirements are out of scope for this protocol.
Additional security considerations are described in the
specifications for HTTP [RFC2616], HTTP basic and digest access
authentication [RFC2617], HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818], and additional
HTTP status codes [RFC6585]. Security considerations for federated
authentication systems can be found in the OAuth [RFC6749] and OpenID
[OpenID] specifications.
6. Acknowledgements 6. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge the following individuals for The authors would like to acknowledge the following individuals for
their contributions to this document: Marc Blanchet, Ernie Dainow, their contributions to this document: Richard Barnes, Marc Blanchet,
Jean-Philippe Dionne, Byron Ellacott, Peter Koch, Murray Kucherawy, Ernie Dainow, Spencer Dawkins, Jean-Philippe Dionne, Byron Ellacott,
Andrew Newton, and Linlin Zhou. Stephen Farrell, Tony Hansen, Peter Koch, Murray Kucherawy, Barry
Leiba, Andrew Newton, and Linlin Zhou.
7. References 7. References
7.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-weirds-json-response] [I-D.ietf-weirds-json-response]
Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "JSON Responses for the Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "JSON Responses for the
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", draft-ietf- Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", draft-ietf-
weirds-json-response-03 (work in progress), April 2013. weirds-json-response-05 (work in progress), August 2013.
[I-D.ietf-weirds-rdap-query] [I-D.ietf-weirds-rdap-query]
Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "Registration Data Access Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "Registration Data Access
Protocol Lookup Format", draft-ietf-weirds-rdap-query-04 Protocol Query Format", draft-ietf-weirds-rdap-query-06
(work in progress), April 2013. (work in progress), August 2013.
[I-D.ietf-weirds-using-http] [I-D.ietf-weirds-using-http]
Newton, A., Ellacott, B., and N. Kong, "HTTP usage in the Newton, A., Ellacott, B., and N. Kong, "HTTP usage in the
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", draft-ietf- Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", draft-ietf-
weirds-using-http-05 (work in progress), May 2013. weirds-using-http-07 (work in progress), July 2013.
[OpenID] OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Authentication 2.0 - Final ",
December 2007, <http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H., [RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999. Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.
[RFC2617] Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P.M., Hostetler, J.L., Lawrence, [RFC2617] Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S.,
S.D., Leach, P.J., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP
Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication", Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication",
RFC 2617, June 1999. RFC 2617, June 1999.
[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000. [RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[RFC6585] Nottingham, M. and R. Fielding, "Additional HTTP Status [RFC6585] Nottingham, M. and R. Fielding, "Additional HTTP Status
Codes", RFC 6585, April 2012. Codes", RFC 6585, April 2012.
7.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[OpenID] OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Authentication 2.0 - Final ",
December 2007, <http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0>.
[RFC3707] Newton, A., "Cross Registry Internet Service Protocol [RFC3707] Newton, A., "Cross Registry Internet Service Protocol
(CRISP) Requirements", RFC 3707, February 2004. (CRISP) Requirements", RFC 3707, February 2004.
[RFC3912] Daigle, L., "WHOIS Protocol Specification", RFC 3912, [RFC3912] Daigle, L., "WHOIS Protocol Specification", RFC 3912,
September 2004. September 2004.
[RFC4732] Handley, M., Rescorla, E., IAB, "Internet Denial-of- [RFC4732] Handley, M., Rescorla, E., IAB, "Internet Denial-of-
Service Considerations", RFC 4732, December 2006. Service Considerations", RFC 4732, December 2006.
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", RFC [RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", RFC
4949, August 2007. 4949, August 2007.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC [RFC6749] Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC
6749, October 2012. 6749, October 2012.
Appendix A. Change Log Appendix A. Change Log
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Section 3.1.1 to clarify requirement. Added text to Section 3.3 Section 3.1.1 to clarify requirement. Added text to Section 3.3
to describe rate limiting. Added new data integrity section. to describe rate limiting. Added new data integrity section.
Updated security considerations to describe injection attacks. Updated security considerations to describe injection attacks.
-03: Extensive updates to address WG last call comments: rewrote -03: Extensive updates to address WG last call comments: rewrote
introduction, removed references to draft documents, changed introduction, removed references to draft documents, changed
"HTML" to "HTTP" in Section 5, eliminated upper case words that "HTML" to "HTTP" in Section 5, eliminated upper case words that
could be misunderstood to be normative guidance, rewrote could be misunderstood to be normative guidance, rewrote
Section 3.4 and Section 3.5. Section 3.4 and Section 3.5.
-04: Address AD evaluation comments: In Section 3.1 change "RDAP -04: Address AD evaluation comments: In Section 3.1 change "RDAP
MUST include an authentication framework that can accommodate" to MUST include an authentication framework that can accommodate" to
"RDAP's authentication framework needs to accomodate"; in "RDAP's authentication framework needs to accommodate"; in
Section 3.2 change "RDAP MUST include an authorization framework Section 3.2 change "RDAP MUST include an authorization framework
that is capable of providing granular (per registration data that is capable of providing granular (per registration data
object) access controls according to the policies of the operator" object) access controls according to the policies of the operator"
to "An RDAP server MUST provide granular access controls (that is, to "An RDAP server MUST provide granular access controls (that is,
on a per registration data object basis) in order to implement on a per registration data object basis) in order to implement
authorization policies"; move RFCs 4732, 5280, and 6749 from authorization policies"; move RFCs 4732, 5280, and 6749 from
normative to informative subsection. normative to informative subsection.
-05: Address IETF last call comments: Added text to Section 3.1.1 to
recommend the use of HTTP over TLS. Modified Section 3.2 to
clarify granular access control text. Added additional Security
Considerations. Made references to RFC 5246 and OpenID
informative. Minor typo fixes.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Scott Hollenbeck Scott Hollenbeck
Verisign Labs Verisign Labs
12061 Bluemont Way 12061 Bluemont Way
Reston, VA 20190 Reston, VA 20190
US US
Email: shollenbeck@verisign.com Email: shollenbeck@verisign.com
URI: http://www.verisignlabs.com/ URI: http://www.verisignlabs.com/
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