draft-ietf-weirds-rdap-sec-12.txt   rfc7481.txt 
Internet Engineering Task Force S. Hollenbeck Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) S. Hollenbeck
Internet-Draft Verisign Labs Request for Comments: 7481 Verisign Labs
Intended status: Standards Track N. Kong Category: Standards Track N. Kong
Expires: June 5, 2015 CNNIC ISSN: 2070-1721 CNNIC
December 2, 2014 March 2015
Security Services for the Registration Data Access Protocol Security Services for the Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)
draft-ietf-weirds-rdap-sec-12
Abstract Abstract
The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) provides "RESTful" web The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) provides "RESTful" web
services to retrieve registration metadata from domain name and services to retrieve registration metadata from Domain Name and
regional internet registries. This document describes information Regional Internet Registries. This document describes information
security services including access control, authentication, security services, including access control, authentication,
authorization, availability, data confidentiality, and data integrity authorization, availability, data confidentiality, and data integrity
for RDAP. for RDAP.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This is an Internet Standards Track document.
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference received public review and has been approved for publication by the
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
This Internet-Draft will expire on June 5, 2015. Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7481.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2.1. Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1. Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Information Security Services and RDAP . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Information Security Services and RDAP . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3.1. Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.2. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3.2. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.2.1. Federated Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2.1. Federated Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.3. Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4. Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.4. Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.5. Data Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.5. Data Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.6. Data Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.6. Data Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4. Privacy Threats Associated with Registration Data . . . . . . 8
5. Privacy Threats Associated with Registration Data . . . . . . 8 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) is specified in multiple The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) is specified in multiple
documents, including "Registration Data Access Protocol Lookup documents, including "Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) Query
Format" [I-D.ietf-weirds-rdap-query], "JSON Responses for the Format" [RFC7482], "JSON Responses for the Registration Data Access
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)" Protocol (RDAP)" [RFC7483], and "HTTP Usage in the Registration Data
[I-D.ietf-weirds-json-response], and "HTTP usage in the Registration Access Protocol (RDAP)" [RFC7480].
Data Access Protocol (RDAP)" [I-D.ietf-weirds-using-http].
One goal of RDAP is to provide security services that do not exist in One goal of RDAP is to provide security services that do not exist in
the WHOIS [RFC3912] protocol, including access control, the WHOIS [RFC3912] protocol, including access control,
authentication, authorization, availability, data confidentiality, authentication, authorization, availability, data confidentiality,
and data integrity. This document describes how each of these and data integrity. This document describes how each of these
services is achieved by RDAP using features that are available in services is achieved by RDAP using features that are available in
other protocol layers. Additional or alternative mechanisms can be other protocol layers. Additional or alternative mechanisms can be
added in the future. Where applicable, informational references to added in the future. Where applicable, informative references to
requirements for a WHOIS replacement service [RFC3707] are noted. requirements for a WHOIS replacement service [RFC3707] are noted.
2. Conventions Used in This Document 2. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2.1. Acronyms and Abbreviations 2.1. Acronyms and Abbreviations
DNR: Domain Name Registry DNR: Domain Name Registry
HTTP: Hypertext Transfer Protocol HTTP: Hypertext Transfer Protocol
JSON: JavaScript Object Notation JSON: JavaScript Object Notation
RDAP: Registration Data Access Protocol RDAP: Registration Data Access Protocol
RIR: Regional Internet Registry RIR: Regional Internet Registry
TLS: Transport Layer Security TLS: Transport Layer Security
3. Information Security Services and RDAP 3. Information Security Services and RDAP
RDAP itself does not include native security services. Instead, RDAP RDAP itself does not include native security services. Instead, RDAP
relies on features that are available in other protocol layers to relies on features that are available in other protocol layers to
provide needed security services including access control, provide needed security services, including access control,
authentication, authorization, availability, data confidentiality, authentication, authorization, availability, data confidentiality,
and data integrity. A description of each of these security services and data integrity. A description of each of these security services
can be found in "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2" [RFC4949]. can be found in "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2" [RFC4949].
No requirements have been identified for other security services. No requirements have been identified for other security services.
3.1. Access Control 3.1. Access Control
WHOIS does not include specific features to control access to WHOIS does not include specific features to control access to
registration information. As described in the following sections, registration information. As described in the following sections,
RDAP includes features to identify, authenticate, and authorize RDAP includes features to identify, authenticate, and authorize
clients, allowing server operators to control access to information clients, allowing server operators to control access to information
based on a client's identity and associated authorizations. based on a client's identity and associated authorizations.
Information returned to a client can be clearly marked with a status Information returned to a client can be clearly marked with a status
value (see Section 10.2.2 of [I-D.ietf-weirds-json-response]) that value (see Section 10.2.2 of [RFC7483]) that identifies the access
identifies the access granted to the client. granted to the client.
3.2. Authentication 3.2. Authentication
This section describes security authentication mechanisms and the This section describes security authentication mechanisms and the
need for authorization policies to include them. It describes need for authorization policies to include them. It describes
requirements for the implementations of clients and servers, but does requirements for the implementations of clients and servers but does
not dictate the policies of server operators. For example, a server not dictate the policies of server operators. For example, a server
operator with no policy regarding differentiated or tiered access to operator with no policy regarding differentiated or tiered access to
data will have no authorization mechanisms and will have no need for data will have no authorization mechanisms and will have no need for
any type of authentication. A server operator with policies on any type of authentication. A server operator with policies on
differentiated access will have to construct an authorization scheme differentiated access will have to construct an authorization scheme
and will need to follow the specified authentication requirements. and will need to follow the specified authentication requirements.
WHOIS does not provide features to identify and authenticate clients. WHOIS does not provide features to identify and authenticate clients.
As noted in section 3.1.4.2 of "Cross Registry Internet Service As noted in Section 3.1.4.2 of "Cross Registry Internet Service
Protocol (CRISP) Requirements" [RFC3707], there is utility in Protocol (CRISP) Requirements" [RFC3707], there is utility in
allowing server operators to offer "varying degrees of access allowing server operators to offer "varying degrees of access
depending on policy and need". Clients have to be identified and depending on policy and need." Clients have to be identified and
authenticated to provide that utility. authenticated to provide that utility.
RDAP's authentication framework needs to accommodate anonymous access RDAP's authentication framework needs to accommodate anonymous access
as well as verification of identities using a range of authentication as well as verification of identities using a range of authentication
methods and credential services. To that end, RDAP clients and methods and credential services. To that end, RDAP clients and
servers MUST implement the authentication framework specified in servers MUST implement the authentication framework specified in
"HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication" "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Authentication" [RFC7235].
[RFC7235]. The "basic" scheme can be used to send a client's user The "basic" scheme can be used to send a client's user name and
name and password to a server in plaintext, based64-encoded form. password to a server in plaintext, base64-encoded form. The "digest"
The "digest" scheme can be used to authenticate a client without scheme can be used to authenticate a client without exposing the
exposing the client's plaintext password. If the "basic" scheme is client's plaintext password. If the "basic" scheme is used, HTTP
used, HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818] MUST be used to protect the client's over TLS [RFC2818] MUST be used to protect the client's credentials
credentials from disclosure while in transit (see Section 3.5). from disclosure while in transit (see Section 3.5).
Servers MUST support either Basic or Digest authentication; they are Servers MUST support either Basic or Digest authentication; they are
not required to support both. Clients MUST support both to not required to support both. Clients MUST support both to
interoperate with servers that support one or the other. Servers may interoperate with servers that support one or the other. Servers may
provide a login page that triggers HTTP authentication. Clients provide a login page that triggers HTTP authentication. Clients
should continue sending the HTTP authentication header once they should continue sending the HTTP authentication header once they
receive an initial 401 (Unauthorized) response from the HTTP server receive an initial 401 (Unauthorized) response from the HTTP server
as long as the scheme portion of the URL doesn't change. as long as the scheme portion of the URL doesn't change.
The Transport Layer Security Protocol [RFC5246] includes an optional The Transport Layer Security protocol [RFC5246] includes an optional
feature to identify and authenticate clients who possess and present feature to identify and authenticate clients who possess and present
a valid X.509 digital certificate [RFC5280]. Support for this a valid X.509 digital certificate [RFC5280]. Support for this
feature is OPTIONAL. feature is OPTIONAL.
RDAP does not impose any unique server authentication requirements. RDAP does not impose any unique server authentication requirements.
The server authentication provided by TLS fully addresses the needs The server authentication provided by TLS fully addresses the needs
of RDAP. In general, transports for RDAP must either provide a TLS- of RDAP. In general, transports for RDAP must either provide a
protected transport (e.g., HTTPS) or a mechanism that provides an TLS-protected transport (e.g., HTTPS) or a mechanism that provides an
equivalent level of server authentication. equivalent level of server authentication.
Work on HTTP authentication methods continues. RDAP is designed to Work on HTTP authentication methods continues. RDAP is designed to
be agile enough to support additional methods as they are defined. be agile enough to support additional methods as they are defined.
3.2.1. Federated Authentication 3.2.1. Federated Authentication
The traditional client-server authentication model requires clients The traditional client-server authentication model requires clients
to maintain distinct credentials for every RDAP server. This to maintain distinct credentials for every RDAP server. This
situation can become unwieldy as the number of RDAP servers situation can become unwieldy as the number of RDAP servers
increases. Federated authentication mechanisms allow clients to use increases. Federated authentication mechanisms allow clients to use
one credential to access multiple RDAP servers and reduce client one credential to access multiple RDAP servers and reduce client
credential management complexity. RDAP MAY include a federated credential management complexity. RDAP MAY include a federated
authentication mechanism that permits a client to access multiple authentication mechanism that permits a client to access multiple
RDAP servers in the same federation with one credential. RDAP servers in the same federation with one credential.
Federated authentication mechanisms used by RDAP MUST be fully Federated authentication mechanisms used by RDAP MUST be fully
supported by HTTP. OAuth, OpenID, Security Assertion Markup Language supported by HTTP. OAuth, OpenID, Security Assertion Markup Language
(SAML), and CA-based mechanisms are all possible approaches to (SAML), and mechanisms based on Certification Authority (CA) are all
provide federated authentication. At the time of this document's possible approaches to provide federated authentication. At the time
publication, negotiation or advertisement of federated authentication of this document's publication, negotiation or advertisement of
services is still an undefined mechanism by the noted federated federated authentication services is still an undefined mechanism by
authentication protocols. Developing this mechanism is beyond the the noted federated authentication protocols. Developing this
scope of this document. mechanism is beyond the scope of this document.
The OAuth authorization framework [RFC6749] describes a method for The OAuth authorization framework [RFC6749] describes a method for
users to access protected web resources without having to hand out users to access protected web resources without having to hand out
their credentials. Instead, clients are issued access tokens by their credentials. Instead, clients are issued access tokens by
authorization servers with the permission of the resource owners. authorization servers with the permission of the resource owners.
Using OAuth, multiple RDAP servers can form a federation and the Using OAuth, multiple RDAP servers can form a federation, and the
clients can access any server in the same federation by providing one clients can access any server in the same federation by providing one
credential registered in any server in that federation. The OAuth credential registered in any server in that federation. The OAuth
authorization framework is designed for use with HTTP and thus can be authorization framework is designed for use with HTTP and thus can be
used with RDAP. used with RDAP.
OpenID [OpenID] is a decentralized single sign-on authentication OpenID [OpenID] is a decentralized single sign-on authentication
system that allows users to log in at multiple web sites with one ID system that allows users to log in at multiple web sites with one ID
instead of having to create multiple unique accounts. An end user instead of having to create multiple unique accounts. An end user
can freely choose which OpenID provider to use, and can preserve can freely choose which OpenID provider to use and can preserve their
their Identifier if they switch OpenID providers. Identifier if they switch OpenID providers.
Note that OAuth and OpenID do not consistently require data Note that OAuth and OpenID do not consistently require data
confidentiality services to protect interactions between providers confidentiality services to protect interactions between providers
and consumers. HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818] can be used as needed to and consumers. HTTP over TLS [RFC2818] can be used as needed to
provide protection against man-in-the-middle attacks. provide protection against man-in-the-middle attacks.
SAML 2.0 [SAML] is an XML-based protocol that can be used to SAML 2.0 [SAML] is an XML-based protocol that can be used to
implement web-based authentication and authorization services, implement web-based authentication and authorization services,
including single sign-on. It uses security tokens containing including single sign on. It uses security tokens containing
assertions to exchange information about an end user between an assertions to exchange information about an end user between an
identity provider and a service provider. identity provider and a service provider.
The Transport Layer Security Protocol [RFC5246], Section 7.4.6, The Transport Layer Security protocol describes the specification of
describes the specification of a client certificate. Clients who a client certificate in Section 7.4.6 of [RFC5246]. Clients who
possess and present a valid X.509 digital certificate, issued by an possess and present a valid X.509 digital certificate, issued by a
entity called a "Certification Authority" (CA), could be identified CA, could be identified and authenticated by a server who trusts the
and authenticated by a server who trusts the corresponding CA. A corresponding CA. A certificate authentication method can be used to
certificate authentication method can be used to achieve federated achieve federated authentication in which multiple RDAP servers all
authentication in which multiple RDAP servers all trust the same CAs trust the same CAs, and then any client with a certificate issued by
and then any client with a certificate issued by a trusted CA can a trusted CA can access any RDAP server in the federation. This
access any RDAP server in the federation. This certificate-based certificate-based mechanism is supported by HTTPS and can be used
mechanism is supported by HTTPS and can be used with RDAP. with RDAP.
3.3. Authorization 3.3. Authorization
WHOIS does not provide services to grant different levels of access WHOIS does not provide services to grant different levels of access
to clients based on a client's authenticated identity. As noted in to clients based on a client's authenticated identity. As noted in
section 3.1.4.2 of "Cross Registry Internet Service Protocol (CRISP) Section 3.1.4.2 of "Cross Registry Internet Service Protocol (CRISP)
Requirements" [RFC3707], there is utility in allowing server Requirements" [RFC3707], there is utility in allowing server
operators to offer "varying degrees of access depending on policy and operators to offer "varying degrees of access depending on policy and
need". Access control decisions can be made once a client's identity need." Access control decisions can be made once a client's identity
has been established and authenticated (see Section 3.2). has been established and authenticated (see Section 3.2).
Server operators MAY offer varying degrees of access depending on Server operators MAY offer varying degrees of access depending on
policy and need in conjunction with the authentication methods policy and need in conjunction with the authentication methods
described in Section 3.2. If such varying degrees of access are described in Section 3.2. If such varying degrees of access are
supported, an RDAP server MUST provide granular access controls (that supported, an RDAP server MUST provide granular access controls (that
is, on a per registration data object basis) in order to implement is, per registration data object) in order to implement authorization
authorization policies. Some examples: policies. Some examples:
- Clients will be allowed access only to data for which they have a - Clients will be allowed access only to data for which they have a
relationship. relationship.
- Unauthenticated or anonymous access status may not yield any - Unauthenticated or anonymous access status may not yield any
contact information. contact information.
- Full access may be granted to a special group of authenticated - Full access may be granted to a special group of authenticated
clients. clients.
The type of access allowed by a server will most likely vary from one The type of access allowed by a server will most likely vary from one
operator to the next. A description of the response privacy operator to the next. A description of the response privacy
considerations associated with different levels of authorization can considerations associated with different levels of authorization can
be found in Section 13 of [I-D.ietf-weirds-json-response]. be found in Section 13 of [RFC7483].
3.4. Availability 3.4. Availability
An RDAP service has to be available to be useful. There are no RDAP- An RDAP service has to be available to be useful. There are no RDAP-
unique requirements to provide availability, but as a general unique requirements to provide availability, but as a general
security consideration a service operator needs to be aware of the security consideration, a service operator needs to be aware of the
issues associated with denial of service. A thorough reading of issues associated with denial of service. A thorough reading of
"Internet Denial-of-Service Considerations" [RFC4732] is advised. "Internet Denial-of-Service Considerations" [RFC4732] is advised.
An RDAP service MAY use an HTTP throttling mechanism to limit the An RDAP service MAY use an HTTP throttling mechanism to limit the
number of queries that a single client can send in a given period of number of queries that a single client can send in a given period of
time. If used, the server SHOULD return an HTTP 429 (Too Many time. If used, the server SHOULD return an HTTP 429 (Too Many
Requests) response code as described in "Additional HTTP Status Requests) response code as described in "Additional HTTP Status
Codes" [RFC6585]. A client that receives a 429 response SHOULD Codes" [RFC6585]. A client that receives a 429 response SHOULD
decrease its query rate, and honor the Retry-After header field if decrease its query rate and honor the Retry-After header field if one
one is present. Note that this is not a defense against denial-of- is present. Note that this is not a defense against
service attacks, since a malicious client could ignore the code and denial-of-service attacks, since a malicious client could ignore the
continue to send queries at a high rate. A server might use another code and continue to send queries at a high rate. A server might use
response code if it did not wish to reveal to a client that rate another response code if it did not wish to reveal to a client that
limiting is the reason for the denial of a reply. rate limiting is the reason for the denial of a reply.
3.5. Data Confidentiality 3.5. Data Confidentiality
WHOIS does not provide the ability to protect data from inadvertent WHOIS does not provide the ability to protect data from inadvertent
disclosure while in transit. RDAP uses HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818] to disclosure while in transit. RDAP uses HTTP over TLS [RFC2818] to
provide that protection by encrypting all traffic sent on the provide that protection by encrypting all traffic sent on the
connection between client and server. HTTP Over TLS MUST be used to connection between client and server. HTTP over TLS MUST be used to
protect all client-server exchanges unless operational constraints protect all client-server exchanges unless operational constraints
make it impossible to meet this requirement. It is also possible to make it impossible to meet this requirement. It is also possible to
encrypt discrete objects (such as command path segments and JSON- encrypt discrete objects (such as command path segments and JSON-
encoded response objects) at one endpoint, send them to the other encoded response objects) at one endpoint, send them to the other
endpoint via an unprotected transport protocol, and decrypt the endpoint via an unprotected transport protocol, and decrypt the
object on receipt. Encryption algorithms as described in "Internet object on receipt. Encryption algorithms as described in "Internet
Security Glossary, Version 2" [RFC4949] are commonly used to provide Security Glossary, Version 2" [RFC4949] are commonly used to provide
data confidentiality at the object level. data confidentiality at the object level.
There are no current requirements for object-level data There are no current requirements for object-level data
confidentiality using encryption. Support for this feature could be confidentiality using encryption. Support for this feature could be
added to RDAP in the future. added to RDAP in the future.
As noted in Section 3.2, the HTTP "basic" authentication scheme can As noted in Section 3.2, the HTTP "basic" authentication scheme can
be used to authenticate a client. When this scheme is used, HTTP be used to authenticate a client. When this scheme is used, HTTP
Over TLS MUST be used to protect the client's credentials from over TLS MUST be used to protect the client's credentials from
disclosure while in transit. If the policy of the server operator disclosure while in transit. If the policy of the server operator
requires encryption to protect client-server data exchanges (such as requires encryption to protect client-server data exchanges (such as
to protect non-public data that can not be accessed without client to protect non-public data that cannot be accessed without client
identification and authentication), HTTP Over TLS MUST be used to identification and authentication), HTTP over TLS MUST be used to
protect those exchanges. protect those exchanges.
A description of privacy threats that can be addressed with A description of privacy threats that can be addressed with
confidentiality services can be found in Section 5. Section 10.2.2 confidentiality services can be found in Section 4. Section 10.2.2
of [I-D.ietf-weirds-json-response] describes status values that can of [RFC7483] describes status values that can be used to describe
be used to describe operator actions used to protect response data operator actions used to protect response data from disclosure to
from disclosure to unauthorized clients. unauthorized clients.
3.6. Data Integrity 3.6. Data Integrity
WHOIS does not provide the ability to protect data from modification WHOIS does not provide the ability to protect data from modification
while in transit. Web services such as RDAP commonly use HTTP Over while in transit. Web services such as RDAP commonly use HTTP over
TLS [RFC2818] to provide that protection by using a keyed Message TLS [RFC2818] to provide that protection by using a keyed Message
Authentication Code (MAC) to detect modifications. It is also Authentication Code (MAC) to detect modifications. It is also
possible to sign discrete objects (such as command path segments and possible to sign discrete objects (such as command path segments and
JSON-encoded response objects) at one endpoint, send them to the JSON-encoded response objects) at one endpoint, send them to the
other endpoint via a transport protocol, and validate the signature other endpoint via a transport protocol, and validate the signature
of the object on receipt. Digital signature algorithms as described of the object on receipt. Digital signature algorithms as described
in "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2" [RFC4949] are commonly in "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2" [RFC4949] are commonly
used to provide data integrity at the object level. used to provide data integrity at the object level.
There are no current requirements for object-level data integrity There are no current requirements for object-level data integrity
using digital signatures. Support for this feature could be added to using digital signatures. Support for this feature could be added to
RDAP in the future. RDAP in the future.
The most specific need for this service is to provide assurance that The most specific need for this service is to provide assurance that
HTTP 30x redirection hints [RFC7231] and response elements returned HTTP 30x redirection hints [RFC7231] and response elements returned
from the server are not modified while in transit. If the policy of from the server are not modified while in transit. If the policy of
the server operator requires message integrity for client-server data the server operator requires message integrity for client-server data
exchanges, HTTP Over TLS MUST be used to protect those exchanges. exchanges, HTTP over TLS MUST be used to protect those exchanges.
4. IANA Considerations
This document does not specify any IANA actions. This section can be
removed if this document is published as an RFC.
5. Privacy Threats Associated with Registration Data 4. Privacy Threats Associated with Registration Data
Registration data has historically included personal data about Registration data has historically included personal data about
registrants. WHOIS services have historically made this information registrants. WHOIS services have historically made this information
available to the public, creating a privacy risk by revealing the available to the public, creating a privacy risk by revealing the
personal details of registrants. WHOIS services have not had the personal details of registrants. WHOIS services have not had the
benefit of authentication or access control mechanisms to gate access benefit of authentication or access control mechanisms to gate access
to registration data. As a result of this, proxy and privacy to registration data. As a result of this, proxy and privacy
services have arisen to shield the identities of registrants. services have arisen to shield the identities of registrants.
The standardization of RDAP does not change or impact the data that The standardization of RDAP does not change or impact the data that
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In addition to privacy risks to registrants, there are also potential In addition to privacy risks to registrants, there are also potential
privacy risks for those who query registration data. For example, privacy risks for those who query registration data. For example,
the fact that a registry employee performs a particular query may the fact that a registry employee performs a particular query may
reveal information about the employee's activities that he or she reveal information about the employee's activities that he or she
would have preferred to keep private. RDAP supports the use of HTTP would have preferred to keep private. RDAP supports the use of HTTP
over TLS to provide privacy protection for those querying registrant over TLS to provide privacy protection for those querying registrant
data as well as registrants, unless operational constraints make it data as well as registrants, unless operational constraints make it
impossible to meet this requirement. impossible to meet this requirement.
6. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
One of the goals of RDAP is to provide security services that do not One of the goals of RDAP is to provide security services that do not
exist in the WHOIS protocol. This document describes the security exist in the WHOIS protocol. This document describes the security
services provided by RDAP and associated protocol layers, including services provided by RDAP and associated protocol layers, including
authentication, authorization, availability, data confidentiality, authentication, authorization, availability, data confidentiality,
and data integrity. Non-repudiation services were also considered and data integrity. Non-repudiation services were also considered
and ultimately rejected due to a lack of requirements. There are, and ultimately rejected due to a lack of requirements. There are,
however, currently-deployed WHOIS servers that can return signed however, currently deployed WHOIS servers that can return signed
responses that provide non-repudiation with proof of origin. RDAP responses that provide non-repudiation with proof of origin. RDAP
might need to be extended to provide this service in the future. might need to be extended to provide this service in the future.
As an HTTP-based protocol RDAP is susceptible to code injection As an HTTP-based protocol, RDAP is susceptible to code injection
attacks. Code injection refers to adding code into a computer system attacks. Code injection refers to adding code into a computer system
or program to alter the course of execution. There are many types of or program to alter the course of execution. There are many types of
code injection, including SQL injection, dynamic variable or function code injection, including SQL injection, dynamic variable or function
injection, include file injection, shell injection, and HTML-script injection, include-file injection, shell injection, and HTML-script
injection among others. Data confidentiality and integrity services injection, among others. Data confidentiality and integrity services
provide a measure of defense against man-in-the-middle injection provide a measure of defense against man-in-the-middle injection
attacks, but vulnerabilities in both client-side and server-side attacks, but vulnerabilities in both client- and server-side software
software make it possible for injection attacks to succeed. make it possible for injection attacks to succeed. Consistently
Consistently checking and validating server credentials can help checking and validating server credentials can help detect
detect man-in-the-middle attacks. man-in-the-middle attacks.
As noted in Section 3.2.1, digital certificates can be used to As noted in Section 3.2.1, digital certificates can be used to
implement federated authentication. There is a risk of too- implement federated authentication. There is a risk of too
promiscuous, or even rogue, CAs being included in the list of promiscuous, or even rogue, CAs being included in the list of
acceptable CAs that the TLS server sends the client as part of the acceptable CAs that the TLS server sends the client as part of the
TLS client-authentication handshake and lending the appearance of TLS client-authentication handshake and lending the appearance of
trust to certificates signed by those CAs. Periodic monitoring of trust to certificates signed by those CAs. Periodic monitoring of
the list of CAs that RDAP servers trust for client authentication can the list of CAs that RDAP servers trust for client authentication can
help reduce this risk. help reduce this risk.
The Transport Layer Security Protocol [RFC5246] includes a null The Transport Layer Security protocol [RFC5246] includes a null
cipher suite that does not encrypt data and thus does not provide cipher suite that does not encrypt data and thus does not provide
data confidentiality. This option MUST NOT be used when data data confidentiality. This option MUST NOT be used when data
confidentiality services are needed. Additional considerations for confidentiality services are needed. Additional considerations for
secure use of TLS are described in [I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp]. secure use of TLS are described in [SECURE-TLS-DTLS].
Data integrity services are sometimes mistakenly associated with Data integrity services are sometimes mistakenly associated with
directory service operational policy requirements focused on data directory service operational policy requirements focused on data
accuracy. "Accuracy" refers to the truthful association of data accuracy. "Accuracy" refers to the truthful association of data
elements (such as names, addresses, and telephone numbers) in the elements (such as names, addresses, and telephone numbers) in the
context of a particular directory object (such as a domain name). context of a particular directory object (such as a domain name).
Accuracy requirements are out of scope for this protocol. Accuracy requirements are out of scope for this protocol.
Additional security considerations are described in the Additional security considerations are described in the
specifications for HTTP [RFC7231], HTTP basic and digest access specifications for HTTP [RFC7231], HTTP Basic and Digest access
authentication [RFC7235], HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818], and additional authentication [RFC7235], HTTP over TLS [RFC2818], and additional
HTTP status codes [RFC6585]. Security considerations for federated HTTP status codes [RFC6585]. Security considerations for federated
authentication systems can be found in the OAuth [RFC6749] and OpenID authentication systems can be found in the OAuth [RFC6749] and OpenID
[OpenID] specifications. [OpenID] specifications.
7. Acknowledgements 6. References
The authors would like to acknowledge the following individuals for
their contributions to this document: Richard Barnes, Marc Blanchet,
Alissa Cooper, Ernie Dainow, Spencer Dawkins, Jean-Philippe Dionne,
Byron Ellacott, Stephen Farrell, Tony Hansen, Peter Koch, Murray
Kucherawy, Barry Leiba, Andrew Newton, and Linlin Zhou.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-weirds-json-response]
Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "JSON Responses for the
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", draft-ietf-
weirds-json-response-12 (work in progress), November 2014.
[I-D.ietf-weirds-rdap-query]
Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "Registration Data Access
Protocol Query Format", draft-ietf-weirds-rdap-query-16
(work in progress), October 2014.
[I-D.ietf-weirds-using-http] 6.1. Normative References
Newton, A., Ellacott, B., and N. Kong, "HTTP usage in the
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", draft-ietf-
weirds-using-http-15 (work in progress), November 2014.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000. [RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818>.
[RFC6585] Nottingham, M. and R. Fielding, "Additional HTTP Status [RFC6585] Nottingham, M. and R. Fielding, "Additional HTTP Status
Codes", RFC 6585, April 2012. Codes", RFC 6585, April 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6585>.
[RFC7231] Fielding, R. and J. Reschke, "Hypertext Transfer Protocol [RFC7231] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
(HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231, June 2014. Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231,
June 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>.
[RFC7235] Fielding, R. and J. Reschke, "Hypertext Transfer Protocol [RFC7235] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
(HTTP/1.1): Authentication", RFC 7235, June 2014. Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Authentication", RFC 7235, June 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7235>.
8.2. Informative References [RFC7480] Newton, A., Ellacott, B., and N. Kong, "HTTP Usage in the
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", RFC 7480, March
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7480>.
[I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp] [RFC7482] Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "Registration Data Access
Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, Protocol (RDAP) Query Format", RFC 7482, March 2015,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS", draft- <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7482>.
ietf-uta-tls-bcp-07 (work in progress), November 2014.
[RFC7483] Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "JSON Responses for the
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", RFC 7483, March
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7483>.
6.2. Informative References
[OpenID] OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Authentication 2.0 - Final", [OpenID] OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Authentication 2.0 - Final",
December 2007, <http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0>. December 2007, <http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0>.
[RFC3707] Newton, A., "Cross Registry Internet Service Protocol [RFC3707] Newton, A., "Cross Registry Internet Service Protocol
(CRISP) Requirements", RFC 3707, February 2004. (CRISP) Requirements", RFC 3707, February 2004,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3707>.
[RFC3912] Daigle, L., "WHOIS Protocol Specification", RFC 3912, [RFC3912] Daigle, L., "WHOIS Protocol Specification", RFC 3912,
September 2004. September 2004, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3912>.
[RFC4732] Handley, M., Rescorla, E., and IAB, "Internet Denial-of- [RFC4732] Handley, M., Ed., Rescorla, E., Ed., and IAB, "Internet
Service Considerations", RFC 4732, December 2006. Denial-of-Service Considerations", RFC 4732, December
2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4732>.
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", RFC [RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", FYI
4949, August 2007. 36, RFC 4949, August 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008. (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC [RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
6749, October 2012. RFC 6749, October 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
[RFC7095] Kewisch, P., "jCard: The JSON Format for vCard", RFC 7095, [RFC7095] Kewisch, P., "jCard: The JSON Format for vCard", RFC 7095,
January 2014. January 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7095>.
[SAML] OASIS, "Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) v2.0", [SAML] OASIS, "Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) v2.0",
March 2005, <https://www.oasis-open.org/ March 2005, <https://www.oasis-open.org/
standards#samlv2.0>. standards#samlv2.0>.
Appendix A. Change Log [SECURE-TLS-DTLS]
Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS", Work in
Progress, draft-ietf-uta-tls-bcp-09, February 2015.
Initial -00: Adopted as working group document. Acknowledgements
-01: Extensive text additions and revisions based on in-room
discussion at IETF-85. Sections for data integrity and non- The authors would like to acknowledge the following individuals for
repudiation have been removed due to a lack of requirements, but their contributions to this document: Richard Barnes, Marc Blanchet,
both topics are now addressed in the Security Considerations Alissa Cooper, Ernie Dainow, Spencer Dawkins, Jean-Philippe Dionne,
section. Byron Ellacott, Stephen Farrell, Tony Hansen, Peter Koch, Murray
-02: Fixed document names in the Introduction. Modified text in Kucherawy, Barry Leiba, Andrew Newton, and Linlin Zhou.
Section 3.2.1 to clarify requirement. Added text to Section 3.4
to describe rate limiting. Added new data integrity section.
Updated security considerations to describe injection attacks.
-03: Extensive updates to address WG last call comments: rewrote
introduction, removed references to draft documents, changed
"HTML" to "HTTP" in Section 6, eliminated upper case words that
could be misunderstood to be normative guidance, rewrote
Section 3.5 and Section 3.6.
-04: Address AD evaluation comments: In Section 3.2 change "RDAP
MUST include an authentication framework that can accommodate" to
"RDAP's authentication framework needs to accommodate"; in
Section 3.3 change "RDAP MUST include an authorization framework
that is capable of providing granular (per registration data
object) access controls according to the policies of the operator"
to "An RDAP server MUST provide granular access controls (that is,
on a per registration data object basis) in order to implement
authorization policies"; move RFCs 4732, 5280, and 6749 from
normative to informative subsection.
-05: Address IETF last call comments: Added text to Section 3.2.1 to
recommend the use of HTTP over TLS. Modified Section 3.3 to
clarify granular access control text. Added additional Security
Considerations. Made references to RFC 5246 and OpenID
informative. Minor typo fixes.
-06: Keepalive refresh. No content updates.
-07: Keepalive refresh. No content updates.
-08: Updated HTTP references. 2616 -> 7231, 2617 -> 7235.
-09: Address WG last call comments.
-10: Address IETF last call comments.
-11: Address IESG review comments.
-12: Added "access control" where it was missing in the abstract and
introduction. Minor IESG DISCUSS edits.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Scott Hollenbeck Scott Hollenbeck
Verisign Labs Verisign Labs
12061 Bluemont Way 12061 Bluemont Way
Reston, VA 20190 Reston, VA 20190
US United States
Email: shollenbeck@verisign.com EMail: shollenbeck@verisign.com
URI: http://www.verisignlabs.com/ URI: http://www.verisignlabs.com/
Ning Kong Ning Kong
China Internet Network Information Center China Internet Network Information Center
4 South 4th Street, Zhongguancun, Haidian District 4 South 4th Street, Zhongguancun, Haidian District
Beijing 100190 Beijing 100190
China China
Phone: +86 10 5881 3147 Phone: +86 10 5881 3147
Email: nkong@cnnic.cn EMail: nkong@cnnic.cn
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