Network
XMPP Working Group                                  P. Saint-Andre (ed.)
Internet-Draft                                                 J. Miller
Expires: April 25, 2004                                Jabber Software Foundation
                                                        October 26,
Expires: May 20, 2004                                  November 20, 2003

                               XMPP

        Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP): Core
                        draft-ietf-xmpp-core-19
                        draft-ietf-xmpp-core-20

Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other
   groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://
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   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 25, May 20, 2004.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

   This memo defines the core features of the Extensible Messaging and
   Presence Protocol (XMPP), a protocol for streaming XML [1] Extensible Markup
   Language (XML) elements in order to exchange messages and presence structured information
   in close to real time. time between any two network endpoints.  While XMPP
   provides a generalized, extensible framework for transporting structured information, exchanging XML data,
   it is used mainly for the purpose of building instant messaging and
   presence applications that meet the requirements of RFC 2779.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   1.1    Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   1.2    Terminology  . . .  3
   2.  Generalized Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  Addressing Scheme  .   6
   1.3    Discussion Venue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   1.4    Intellectual Property Notice . . . . . . . . . . .
   4.  XML Streams  . . . .   6
   2.     Generalized Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   2.1    Overview . . . .  8
   5.  Use of TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   2.2    Server . . . . . 18
   6.  Use of SASL  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   2.3    Client . . . . 26
   7.  Resource Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   2.4    Gateway . 36
   8.  Server Dialback  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
   9.  XML Stanzas  .   8
   2.5    Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
   10. Server Rules for Handling XML Stanzas  .   8
   3.     Addressing Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . 54
   11. XML Usage within XMPP  . . . . . . . . .   8
   3.1    Overview . . . . . . . . . . . 57
   12. Core Compliance Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   3.2    Domain Identifier . . . 59
   13. Internationalization Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
   14. Security Considerations  . . . .   9
   3.3    Node Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
   15. IANA Considerations  . . . . . .   9
   3.4    Resource Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
       Normative References . . . .   9
   3.5    Formal Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
       Informative References . . . . .  10
   3.6    Determination of Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
       Author's Address .  10
   4.     XML Streams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
   A.  Nodeprep .  11
   4.1    Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   4.2    Stream Attributes . 71
   B.  Resourceprep . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   4.2.1  Version Support . . . . . . 73
   C.  XML Schemas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   4.3    Namespace Declarations . . . . . . . . . . 75
   D.  Differences Between Core Jabber Protocol and XMPP  . . . . . . 82
   E.  Revision History . .  15
   4.4    Stream Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   4.5    Stream Encryption 84
       Intellectual Property and Authentication . . . Copyright Statements . . . . . . . .  15
   4.6    Stream Errors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   4.6.1  Rules  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   4.6.2  Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   4.6.3  Defined Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   4.6.4  Application-Specific Conditions  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   4.7    Simplified Stream Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   5.     Stream Encryption  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   5.1    Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   5.2    Narrative  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   5.3    Client-to-Server Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   5.4    Server-to-Server Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
   6.     Stream Authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
   6.1    Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
   6.2    Narrative  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29
   6.3    SASL Definition  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
   6.4    SASL Errors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
   6.5    Client-to-Server Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33
   6.6    Server-to-Server Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
   7.     Resource Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
   8.     Server Dialback  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41
   8.1    Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41
   8.2    Order of Events  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
   8.3    Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44
   9.     XML Stanzas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
   9.1    Common Attributes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48
   9.1.1  to . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48
   9.1.2  from . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48
   9.1.3  id . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49
   9.1.4  type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49
   9.1.5  xml:lang . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50
   9.2    Basic Semantics  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50
   9.2.1  Message Semantics  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50
   9.2.2  Presence Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50
   9.2.3  IQ Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51
   9.3    Stanza Errors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52
   9.3.1  Rules  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52
   9.3.2  Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  53
   9.3.3  Defined Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54
   9.3.4  Application-Specific Conditions  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  56
   10.    XML Usage within XMPP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  57
   10.1   Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  57
   10.2   XML Namespace Names and Prefixes . . . . . . . . . . . . .  57
   10.2.1 Streams Namespace  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  57
   10.2.2 Default Namespace  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  58
   10.2.3 Dialback Namespace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  58
   10.3   Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  59
   10.4   Inclusion of Text Declaration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  59
   10.5   Character Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  59
   11.    IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  59
   11.1   XML Namespace Name for TLS Data  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  59
   11.2   XML Namespace Name for SASL Data . . . . . . . . . . . . .  60
   11.3   XML Namespace Name for Stream Errors . . . . . . . . . . .  60
   11.4   XML Namespace Name for Resource Binding  . . . . . . . . .  60
   11.5   XML Namespace Name for Stanza Errors . . . . . . . . . . .  61
   11.6   Nodeprep Profile of Stringprep . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  61
   11.7   Resourceprep Profile of Stringprep . . . . . . . . . . . .  61
   11.8   GSSAPI Service Name  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62
   11.9   Port Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62
   12.    Internationalization Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . .  62
   13.    Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62
   13.1   High Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  62
   13.2   Client-to-Server Communications  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  63
   13.3   Server-to-Server Communications  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  64
   13.4   Order of Layers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  65
   13.5   Mandatory-to-Implement Technologies  . . . . . . . . . . .  65
   13.6   Firewalls  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  65
   13.7   Use of base64 in SASL  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  65
   13.8   Stringprep Profiles  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  66
   14.    Server Rules for Handling XML Stanzas  . . . . . . . . . .  67
   14.1   No 'to' Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  67
   14.2   Foreign Domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  67
   14.3   Subdomain  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  68
   14.4   Mere Domain or Specific Resource . . . . . . . . . . . . .  68
   14.5   Node in Same Domain  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  68
   15.    Compliance Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  69
   15.1   Servers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  69
   15.2   Clients  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  69
          Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  70
          Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  71
          Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  72
   A.     Nodeprep . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  72
   A.1    Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  72
   A.2    Character Repertoire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  73
   A.3    Mapping  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  73
   A.4    Normalization  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  73
   A.5    Prohibited Output  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  73
   A.6    Bidirectional Characters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  74
   B.     Resourceprep . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  74
   B.1    Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  75
   B.2    Character Repertoire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  75
   B.3    Mapping  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  75
   B.4    Normalization  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  75
   B.5    Prohibited Output  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  76
   B.6    Bidirectional Characters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  76
   C.     XML Schemas  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  76
   C.1    Streams namespace  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  76
   C.2    Stream error namespace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  78
   C.3    TLS namespace  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  79
   C.4    SASL namespace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  79
   C.5    Resource binding namespace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  81
   C.6    Dialback namespace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  81
   C.7    Stanza error namespace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  82
   D.     Differences Between Core Jabber Protocol and XMPP  . . . .  83
   D.1    Channel Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  84
   D.2    Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  84
   D.3    Resource Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  84
   D.4    JID Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  84
   D.5    Error Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  85
   D.6    Internationalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  85
   D.7    Stream Version Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  85
   E.     Revision History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  85
   E.1    Changes from draft-ietf-xmpp-core-18 . . . . . . . . . . .  85
   E.2    Changes from draft-ietf-xmpp-core-17 . . . . . . . . . . .  86
   E.3    Changes from draft-ietf-xmpp-core-16 . . . . . . . . . . .  87
   E.4    Changes from draft-ietf-xmpp-core-15 . . . . . . . . . . .  87
   E.5    Changes from draft-ietf-xmpp-core-14 . . . . . . . . . . .  87
   E.6    Changes from draft-ietf-xmpp-core-13 . . . . . . . . . . .  88
   E.7    Changes from draft-ietf-xmpp-core-12 . . . . . . . . . . .  88
   E.8    Changes from draft-ietf-xmpp-core-11 . . . . . . . . . . .  88
   E.9    Changes from draft-ietf-xmpp-core-10 . . . . . . . . . . .  89
   E.10   Changes from draft-ietf-xmpp-core-09 . . . . . . . . . . .  89
   E.11   Changes from draft-ietf-xmpp-core-08 . . . . . . . . . . .  89
   E.12   Changes from draft-ietf-xmpp-core-07 . . . . . . . . . . .  89
   E.13   Changes from draft-ietf-xmpp-core-06 . . . . . . . . . . .  90
   E.14   Changes from draft-ietf-xmpp-core-05 . . . . . . . . . . .  90
   E.15   Changes from draft-ietf-xmpp-core-04 . . . . . . . . . . .  90
   E.16   Changes from draft-ietf-xmpp-core-03 . . . . . . . . . . .  90
   E.17   Changes from draft-ietf-xmpp-core-02 . . . . . . . . . . .  91
   E.18   Changes from draft-ietf-xmpp-core-01 . . . . . . . . . . .  91
   E.19   Changes from draft-ietf-xmpp-core-00 . . . . . . . . . . .  91
   E.20   Changes from draft-miller-xmpp-core-02 . . . . . . . . . .  91
          Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . .  93 92

1. Introduction

1.1 Overview

   The Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) is an open XML
   [1]
   [XML] protocol for near-real-time messaging, presence, and
   request-response services.  The basic syntax and semantics were
   developed originally within the Jabber open-source community, mainly
   in 1999.  In 2002, the XMPP WG was chartered with developing an
   adaptation of the Jabber protocol that would be suitable as an IETF
   instant messaging (IM) and presence technology.  As a result of work
   by the XMPP WG, the current memo defines the core features of XMPP;
   XMPP IM [21]
   Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP): Instant Messaging
   and Presence [XMPP-IM] defines the extensions required to provide the
   instant messaging and presence functionality defined in RFC 2779 [2].
   [IMP-REQS].

1.2 Terminology

   The capitalized key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL",
   "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED",  "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC
   2119 [3]. [TERMS].

1.3 Discussion Venue

   The authors welcome discussion and comments related to the topics
   presented the topics
   presented in this document.  The preferred forum is the
   <xmppwg@jabber.org> mailing list, for which archives and subscription
   information are available at <http://www.jabber.org/cgi-bin/mailman/
   listinfo/xmppwg/>.

1.4 Intellectual Property Notice

   This document is in full compliance with all provisions of Section 10
   of RFC 2026.  Parts of this specification use the term "jabber" for
   identifying namespaces and other protocol syntax.  Jabber[tm] is a
   registered trademark of Jabber, Inc.  Jabber, Inc. grants permission
   to the IETF for use of the Jabber trademark in association with this
   specification and its successors, if any.

1.5 Contributors

   Most of the core aspects of the Extensible Messaging and Presence
   Protocol were developed originally within the Jabber open-source
   community in 1999.  This community was founded by Jeremie Miller, who
   released source code for the initial version of the jabberd server in
   January 1999.  Major early contributors to the base protocol also
   included Ryan Eatmon, Peter Millard, Thomas Muldowney, and Dave
   Smith.  Work by the XMPP Working Group has concentrated especially on
   security and internationalization; in these areas, protocols for the
   use of TLS and SASL were originally contributed by Rob Norris, and
   stringprep profiles were originally contributed by Joe Hildebrand.
   The error code syntax was suggested by Lisa Dusseault.

1.6 Acknowledgements

   Thanks are due to a number of individuals in this document. The preferred forum is addition to the
   <xmppwg@jabber.org> mailing list, for which archives and subscription
   information are available at <http://www.jabber.org/cgi-bin/mailman/
   listinfo/xmppwg/>.

1.4 Intellectual Property Notice

   This document
   contributors listed.  Although it is difficult to provide a complete
   list, the following individuals were particularly helpful in defining
   the protocols or in commenting on the specifications in full compliance with all provisions of Section 10
   of RFC 2026. Parts of this specification use memo:
   Thomas Charron, Richard Dobson, Sam Hartman, Schuyler Heath, Jonathan
   Hogg, Craig Kaes, Jacek Konieczny, Alexey Melnikov, Keith Minkler,
   Julian Missig, Pete Resnick, Marshall Rose, Alexey Shchepin,
   Jean-Louis Seguineau, Iain Shigeoka, and David Waite.  Thanks also to
   members of the term "jabber" for
   identifying namespaces XMPP Working Group and other protocol syntax. Jabber[tm] is a
   registered trademark of Jabber, Inc.  Jabber, Inc. grants permission
   to the IETF community for use of comments
   and feedback provided throughout the Jabber trademark in association with life of this
   specification and its successors, if any. memo.

2. Generalized Architecture

2.1 Overview

   Although XMPP is not wedded to any specific network architecture, to
   date it usually has been implemented via a typical client-server
   architecture, wherein a client utilizing XMPP accesses a server over
   a TCP [4] [TCP] socket.

   The following diagram provides a high-level overview of this
   architecture (where "-" represents communications that use XMPP and
   "=" represents communications that use any other protocol).

   C1 -  S1 - S2 - C3
        /  \
   C2 -     G1 = FN1 = FC1

   The symbols are as follows:

   o  C1, C2, C3 -- XMPP clients

   o  S1, S2 -- XMPP servers

   o  G1 -- A gateway that translates between XMPP and the protocol(s)
      used on a foreign (non-XMPP) messaging network

   o  FN1 -- A foreign messaging network
   o  FC1 -- A client on a foreign messaging network

2.2 Server

   A server acts as an intelligent abstraction layer for XMPP
   communications.  Its primary responsibilities are are:

   o  to manage connections from or sessions for other entities (in entities, in the
      form of XML streams (Section 4) to and from authorized clients,
      servers, and other entities) and entities

   o  to route appropriately-addressed XML stanzas (Section 9) among
      such entities over XML streams. streams

   Most XMPP-compliant servers also assume responsibility for the
   storage of data that is used by clients (e.g., contact lists for
   users of XMPP-based instant messaging and presence applications); in
   this case, the XML data is processed directly by the server itself on
   behalf of the client and is not routed to another entity. Compliant server implementations
   MUST ensure in-order processing of XML stanzas between any two
   entities.

2.3 Client

   Most clients connect directly to a server over a TCP [TCP] socket and use
   XMPP to take full advantage of the functionality provided by a server
   and any associated services.  Although there is no necessary coupling
   of an XML stream to a TCP socket (e.g., a client COULD could connect via
   HTTP [22] [HTTP] polling or some other mechanism), this specification
   defines a binding of XMPP to TCP only.  Multiple resources (e.g.,
   devices or locations) MAY connect simultaneously to a server on
   behalf of each authorized client, with each resource differentiated
   by the resource identifier of a JID an XMPP address (e.g., <node@domain/home> <node@domain/
   home> vs. <node@domain/work>) as defined under Addressing Scheme
   (Section 3).  The RECOMMENDED port for connections between a client
   and a server is 5222, as registered with the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
   (IANA) [5] IANA (see Port Numbers
   (Section 11.9)). 15.9)).

2.4 Gateway

   A gateway is a special-purpose server-side service whose primary
   function is to translate XMPP into the protocol used by a foreign
   (non-XMPP) messaging system, as well as to translate the return data
   back into XMPP.  Examples are gateways to Internet Relay Chat (IRC),
   Short Message Service (SMS), SIMPLE, SMTP, and legacy instant
   messaging networks such as AIM, ICQ, MSN Messenger, and Yahoo!
   Instant Messenger.  Communications between gateways and servers, and
   between gateways and the foreign messaging system, are not defined in
   this document.

2.5 Network

   Because each server is identified by a network address and because
   server-to-server communications are a straightforward extension of
   the client-to-server protocol, in practice the system consists of a
   network of servers that inter-communicate.  Thus user-a@domain1 is
   able to exchange messages, presence, and other information with
   user-b@domain2.  This pattern is familiar from messaging protocols
   (such as SMTP) that make use of network addressing standards.
   Communications between any two servers are OPTIONAL.  If enabled,
   such communications SHOULD occur over XML streams that are bound to TCP
   [TCP] sockets.  The RECOMMENDED port for connections between servers
   is
   5222, 5269, as registered with the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
   (IANA) [5] IANA (see Port Numbers (Section 11.9)).
   15.9)).

3. Addressing Scheme

3.1 Overview

   An entity is anything that can be considered a network endpoint
   (i.e., an ID on the network) and that can communicate using XMPP.
   All such entities are uniquely addressable in a form that is
   consistent with RFC 2396 [23]. [URI].  For historical reasons, the address
   of such an XMPP entity is called a Jabber Identifier or JID.  A valid JID
   contains a set of ordered elements formed of a domain identifier,
   node identifier, and resource identifier identifier. The syntax is defined below
   using Augmented Backus-Naur Form as defined in RFC 2234 [ABNF], where
   the "node", "domain", and "resource" identifiers are as specified in
   the following format:
   [node@]domain[/resource]. sections:

      [ node "@" ] domain [ "/" resource ]

   Each allowable portion of a JID (node identifier, domain identifier,
   and resource identifier) may MUST NOT be up to more than 1023 bytes in length,
   resulting in a maximum total size (including the '@' and '/'
   separators) of 3071 bytes.

   All JIDs are based on the foregoing structure.  The most common use
   of this structure is to identify an instant messaging user, the
   server to which the user connects, and the user's active session or
   connection (e.g., a specific client) in the form of <user@host/
   resource>.  However, node types other than clients are possible; for
   example, a specific chat room offered by a multi-user chat service
   could be addressed as <room@service> (where "room" is the name of the
   chat room and "service" is the hostname of the multi-user chat
   service) and a specific occupant of such a room could be addressed as
   <room@service/nick> (where "nick" is the occupant's room nickname).
   Many other JID types are possible (e.g., <domain/resource> could be a
   server-side script or service).

3.2 Domain Identifier

   The domain identifier is the primary identifier and is the only
   REQUIRED element of a JID (a mere domain identifier is a valid JID).
   It usually represents the network gateway or "primary" server to
   which other entities connect for XML routing and data management
   capabilities.  However, the entity referenced by a domain identifier
   is not always a server, and may be a service that is addressed as a
   subdomain of a server and that provides functionality above and
   beyond the capabilities of a server (e.g., a multi-user chat service,
   a user directory, or a gateway to a foreign messaging system).

   The domain identifier for every server or service that will
   communicate over a network SHOULD resolve to be a Fully Qualified Domain Name.
   A domain identifier MUST be not more than 1023 bytes an "internationalized domain name" as
   defined in length
   and MUST conform [IDNA], to which the Nameprep [6] [NAMEPREP] profile of
   stringprep [7]. [STRINGPREP] can be applied without failing.  Before
   comparing two domain identifiers, a server MUST (and a client SHOULD)
   first apply the Nameprep profile to the labels (as defined in [IDNA])
   that make up each identifier.

3.3 Node Identifier

   The node identifier is an optional secondary identifier placed before
   the domain identifier and separated from the latter by the '@'
   character.  It usually represents the entity requesting and using
   network access provided by the server or gateway (i.e., a client),
   although it can also represent other kinds of entities (e.g., a chat
   room associated with a multi-user chat service).  The entity
   represented by a node identifier is addressed within the context of a
   specific domain; within instant messaging and presence applications
   of XMPP this address is called a "bare JID" and is of the form
   <node@domain>.

   A node identifier MUST be no more than 1023 bytes in length and MUST
   conform to formatted such that the Nodeprep (Appendix
   A) profile of stringprep [7]. [STRINGPREP] can be applied to it without failing.
   Before comparing two node identifiers, a server MUST (and a client
   SHOULD) first apply the Nodeprep profile to each identifier.

3.4 Resource Identifier

   The resource identifier is an optional tertiary identifier placed
   after the domain identifier and separated from the latter by the '/'
   character.  A resource identifier may modify either a <node@domain>
   or mere <domain> address.  It usually represents a specific session,
   connection (e.g., a device or location), or object (e.g., a
   participant in a multi-user chat room) belonging to the entity
   associated with a node identifier.  A resource identifier is opaque
   to both servers and other clients, and is typically defined by a
   client implementation when it provides the information necessary to
   complete Resource Binding (Section 7) (although it may be generated
   by a server on behalf of a client).  An entity may MAY maintain multiple
   resources simultaneously. simultaneously, with each resource differentiated by a
   distinct resource identifier.

   A resource identifier MUST be no more than 1023 bytes in length and
   MUST conform to formatted such that the Resourceprep
   (Appendix B) profile of stringprep
   [7].

3.5 Formal Syntax

   The syntax for a JID is defined below using Augmented Backus-Naur
   Form as defined in RFC 2234 [8]. The IPv4address and IPv6address
   rules are defined in Appendix B of RFC 2373 [9]; the hostname rule is
   defined in Section 3.2.2 of RFC 2396 [23]; the allowable character
   sequences that conform to the node rule are defined by the Nodeprep
   (Appendix A) profile of stringprep [7] as documented in this memo;
   the allowable character sequences that conform [STRINGPREP] can be applied to the it without
   failing.  Before comparing two resource rule
   are defined by identifiers, a server MUST
   (and a client SHOULD) first apply the Resourceprep (Appendix B) profile of stringprep
   [7] as documented in this memo.

   jid           = [ node "@" ] domain [ "/" resource ]
   domain        = hostname / IPv4address / IPv6address

3.6 to each
   identifier.

3.5 Determination of Addresses

   After Stream Authentication SASL negotiation (Section 6) and, if appropriate, Resource
   Binding (Section 7), the receiving entity for a stream MUST determine
   the initiating entity's JID.

   For server-to-server communications, the initiating entity's JID
   SHOULD be the authorization identity, derived from the authentication
   identity as defined in RFC 2222 [13] by the Simple Authentication and Security Layer
   (SASL) specification [SASL] if no authorization identity was
   specified during stream authentication. SASL negotiation (Section 6).

   For client-to-server communications, the "bare JID" (<node@domain>)
   SHOULD be the authorization identity, derived from the authentication
   identity as defined in RFC 2222 [13] [SASL] if no authorization identity was
   specified during stream authentication; SASL negotiation (Section 6); the resource
   identifier portion of the "full JID" (<node@domain/resource>) SHOULD
   be the resource identifier negotiated by the client and server during
   Resource Binding (Section 7).

   The receiving entity MUST ensure that the resulting JID (including
   node identifier, domain identifier, resource identifier, and
   separator characters) conforms to the rules and formats defined
   earlier in this section. section; to meet this restriction, the receiving
   entity may need to replace the JID sent by the initiating entity with
   the canonicalized JID as determined by the receiving entity.

4. XML Streams

4.1 Overview

   Two fundamental concepts make possible the rapid, asynchronous
   exchange of relatively small payloads of structured information
   between presence-aware entities: XML streams and XML stanzas.  These
   terms are defined as follows:

   Definition of XML Stream: An XML stream is a container for the
      exchange of XML elements between any two entities over a network.
      An XML stream is negotiated from an initiating entity (usually a
      client or server) to a receiving entity (usually a server),
      normally over a TCP [TCP] socket, and corresponds to the initiating
      entity's "session" with the receiving entity.  The start of the
      XML stream is denoted unambiguously by an opening XML <stream> tag
      (with appropriate attributes and namespace declarations), while
      the end of the XML stream is denoted unambiguously by a closing
      XML </stream> tag.  An XML stream is unidirectional; in order to
      enable bidirectional information exchange, the initiating entity
      and receiving entity MUST negotiate one stream in each direction
      (the "initial stream" and the "response stream"), normally over
      the same TCP connection.

   Definition of XML Stanza: An XML stanza is a discrete semantic unit
      of structured information that is sent from one entity to another
      over an XML stream.  An XML stanza exists at the direct child
      level of the root <stream/> element and is said to be
      well-balanced if it matches production [43] content of the XML specification [1]). [XML]).
      The start of any XML stanza is denoted unambiguously by the
      element start tag at depth=1 of the XML stream (e.g., <presence>),
      and the end of any XML stanza is denoted unambiguously by the
      corresponding close tag at depth=1 (e.g., </presence>).  An XML
      stanza MAY contain child elements (with accompanying attributes,
      elements, and CDATA) as necessary in order to convey the desired
      information.  The only defined XML stanzas are <message/>,
      <presence/>, and <iq/> as defined under XML Stanzas (Section 9);
      an XML element sent for the purpose of stream encryption Transport Layer Security
      (TLS) negotiation (Section 5), stream authentication Simple Authentication and Security
      Layer (SASL) negotiation (Section 6), or server dialback (Section
      8) is not considered to be an XML stanza.

   Consider the example of a client's session with a server.  In order
   to connect to a server, a client MUST initiate an XML stream by
   sending an opening <stream> tag to the server, optionally preceded by
   a text declaration specifying the XML version and the character
   encoding supported (see Inclusion of Text Declaration (Section 10.4); 11.4);
   see also Character Encoding (Section 10.5)). 11.5)).  Subject to local
   policies and service provisioning, the server SHOULD then reply with
   a second XML stream back to the client, again optionally preceded by
   a text declaration.  Once the client has completed Stream Authentication SASL negotiation
   (Section 6), the client MAY send an unbounded number of XML stanzas
   over the stream to any recipient on the network.  When the client
   desires to close the stream, it simply sends a closing </stream> tag
   to the server (alternatively, the stream may be closed by the
   server), after which both the client and server SHOULD close the
   underlying TCP connection as well.

   Those who are accustomed to thinking of XML in a document-centric
   manner may wish to view a client's session with a server as
   consisting of two open-ended XML documents: one from the client to
   the server and one from the server to the client.  From this
   perspective, the root <stream/> element can be considered the
   document entity for each "document", and the two "documents" are
   built up through the accumulation of XML stanzas sent over the two
   XML streams.  However, this perspective is a convenience only, and
   XMPP does not deal in documents but in XML streams and XML stanzas.

   In essence, then, an XML stream acts as an envelope for all the XML
   stanzas sent during a session.  We can represent this in a simplistic
   fashion as follows:

   |--------------------|
   | <stream>           |
   |--------------------|
   | <presence>         |
   |   <show/>          |
   | </presence>        |
   |--------------------|
   | <message to='foo'> |
   |   <body/>          |
   | </message>         |
   |--------------------|
   | <iq to='bar'>      |
   |   <query/>         |
   | </iq>              |
   |--------------------|
   | ...                |
   |--------------------|
   | </stream>          |
   |--------------------|

4.2 Stream Attributes

   The attributes of the stream element are as follows:

   o  to -- The 'to' attribute SHOULD be used only in the XML stream
      header from the initiating entity to the receiving entity, and
      MUST be set to the JID of a hostname serviced by the receiving entity.  There
      SHOULD be no 'to' attribute set in the XML stream header by which
      the receiving entity replies to the initiating entity; however, if
      a 'to' attribute is included, it SHOULD be silently ignored by the
      initiating entity.

   o  from -- The 'from' attribute SHOULD be used only in the XML stream
      header from the receiving entity to the initiating entity, and
      MUST be set to the JID of a hostname serviced by the receiving entity that is
      granting access to the initiating entity.  There SHOULD be no
      'from' attribute on the XML stream header sent from the initiating
      entity to the receiving entity; however, if a 'from' attribute is
      included, it SHOULD be silently ignored by the receiving entity.

   o  id -- The 'id' attribute SHOULD be used only in the XML stream
      header from the receiving entity to the initiating entity.  This
      attribute is a unique identifier created by the receiving entity
      to function as a session key for the initiating entity's streams
      with the receiving entity, and MUST be unique within the receiving
      application (normally a server).  There SHOULD be no 'id'
      attribute on the XML stream header sent from the initiating entity
      to the receiving entity; however, if an 'id' attribute is
      included, it SHOULD be silently ignored by the receiving entity.

   o  xml:lang -- An 'xml:lang' attribute (as defined in Section 2.12 of
      the XML specification [1])
      [XML]) SHOULD be included by the initiating entity on the header
      for the initial stream to specify the default language of any
      human-readable XML character data it sends over that stream.  If
      the attribute is included, the receiving entity SHOULD remember
      that value as the default for both the initial stream and the
      response stream; if the attribute is not included, the receiving
      entity SHOULD use a configurable default value for both streams,
      which it MUST communicate in the header for the response stream.
      For all stanzas sent over the initial stream, if the initiating
      entity does not include an 'xml:lang' attribute, the receiving
      entity SHOULD apply the default value; if the initiating entity
      does include an 'xml:lang' attribute, the receiving entity MUST
      NOT modify or delete it (see also xml:lang (Section 9.1.5)).  The
      value of the 'xml:lang' attribute MUST be an NMTOKEN (as defined
      in Section 2.3 of [XML]) and MUST conform to the format defined in
      RFC 3066 [16]. [LANGTAGS].

   o  version -- The presence of the version attribute set to a value of
      "1.0" signals support for the stream-related protocols (including
      stream features) defined in this specification.  Detailed rules
      regarding generation and handling of this attribute are defined
      below.

   We can summarize as follows:

            |  initiating to receiving  |  receiving to initiating
   ---------+---------------------------+-----------------------
   to       |  hostname of receiver     |  silently ignored
   from     |  silently ignored         |  hostname of receiver
   id       |  silently ignored         |  session key
   xml:lang |  default language         |  default language
   version  |  signals XMPP 1.0 support |  signals XMPP 1.0 support

4.2.1 Version Support

   The following rules apply to the generation and handling of the
   'version' attribute:

   1.  If the initiating entity complies with the XML streams protocol stream-related
       protocols defined herein (including Stream Encryption Use of TLS (Section 5), Stream
       Authentication Use
       of SASL (Section 6), and Stream Errors (Section 4.6)), it MUST
       include the 'version' attribute in the XML stream header it sends
       to the receiving entity, and it MUST set the value of the
       'version' attribute to "1.0".

   2.  If the initiating entity includes the 'version' attribute set to
       a value of "1.0" in its stream header and the receiving entity
       supports XMPP 1.0, the receiving entity MUST reciprocate by
       including the 'version' attribute set to a value of "1.0" in its
       stream header response.

   3.  If the initiating entity does not include the 'version' attribute
       in its stream header, the receiving entity still SHOULD include
       the 'version' attribute set to a value of "1.0" in its stream
       header response.

   4.  If the initiating entity includes the 'version' attribute set to
       a value other than "1.0", the receiving entity SHOULD include the
       'version' attribute set to a value of "1.0" in its stream header
       response, but MAY at its discretion generate an
       <unsupported-version/> stream error and terminate the XML stream
       and underlying TCP connection.

   5.  If the receiving entity includes the 'version' attribute set to a
       value other than "1.0" in its stream header response, the
       initiating entity SHOULD generate an <unsupported-version/>
       stream error and terminate the XML stream and underlying TCP
       connection.

4.3 Namespace Declarations

   The stream element MUST possess both a streams namespace declaration
   and a default namespace declaration (as "namespace declaration" is
   defined in the XML namespaces specification [10]). [XML-NAMES]).  For
   detailed information regarding the streams namespace and default
   namespace, see Namespace Names and Prefixes (Section 10.2). 11.2).

4.4 Stream Features

   If the initiating entity includes the 'version' attribute set to a
   value of "1.0" in the initial stream header, the receiving entity
   MUST send a <features/> child element (prefixed by the streams
   namespace prefix) to the initiating entity in order to announce any
   stream-level features that can be negotiated (or capabilities that
   otherwise need to be advertised).  Currently this is used only for
   Stream Encryption to
   advertise Use of TLS (Section 5), Stream Authentication Use of SASL (Section 6), and
   Resource Binding (Section 7) as defined herein, and for Session
   Establishment as defined in XMPP IM [21]; [XMPP-IM]; however, the stream features
   functionality could be used to advertise other negotiable features in
   the future.  If an entity does not understand or support some
   features, it SHOULD silently ignore them.

4.5 Stream Encryption and Authentication Security

   When negotiating XML streams in XMPP 1.0 1.0, TLS SHOULD be encrypted used as
   defined under Stream
   Encryption Use of TLS (Section 5) and SASL MUST be authenticated used as defined
   under
   Stream Authentication Use of SASL (Section 6).  If the initiating entity attempts to
   send an XML Stanza (Section 9) before the stream has been
   authenticated, the receiving entity SHOULD return a <not-authorized/>
   stream error to the initiating entity and then terminate both the XML
   stream and the underlying TCP connection.

4.6 Stream Errors

   The root stream element MAY contain an <error/> child element that is
   prefixed by the streams namespace prefix.  The error child MUST be
   sent by a compliant entity (usually a server rather than a client) if
   it perceives that a stream-level error has occurred.

4.6.1 Rules

   The following rules apply to stream-level errors:

   o  It is assumed that all stream-level errors are unrecoverable;
      therefore, if an error occurs at the level of the stream, the
      entity that detects the error MUST send a stream error to the
      other entity, send a closing </stream> tag, and terminate the
      underlying TCP connection.

   o  If the error occurs while the stream is being set up, the
      receiving entity MUST still send the opening <stream> tag, include
      the <error/> element as a child of the stream element, send the
      closing </stream> tag, and terminate the underlying TCP
      connection.  In this case, if the initiating entity provides an
      unknown host in the 'to' attribute (or provides no 'to' attribute
      at all), the server SHOULD provide the server's authoritative
      hostname in the 'from' attribute of the stream header sent before
      termination.

4.6.2 Syntax

   The syntax for stream errors is as follows:

   <stream:error>
     <defined-condition xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-streams'/>
     <text xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-streams'>
       OPTIONAL descriptive text
     </text>
     [OPTIONAL application-specific condition element]
   </stream:error>

   The <error/> element:

   o  MUST contain a child element corresponding to one of the defined
      stanza error conditions defined below; this element MUST be
      qualified by the 'urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-streamstreams'
      namespace (this 'urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-streams' namespace name adheres to the format defined in
      The IETF XML Registry [24])

   o  MAY contain a <text/> child containing CDATA that describes the
      error in more detail; this element MUST be qualified by the
      'urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-streams' namespace and SHOULD possess
      an 'xml:lang' attribute

   o  MAY contain a child element for an application-specific error
      condition; this element MUST be qualified by an
      application-defined namespace, and its structure is defined by
      that namespace

   The <text/> element is OPTIONAL.  If included, it SHOULD be used only
   to provide descriptive or diagnostic information that supplements the
   meaning of a defined condition or application-specific condition.  It
   SHOULD NOT be interpreted programmatically by an application.  It
   SHOULD NOT be used as the error message presented to a user, but MAY
   be shown in addition to the error message associated with the
   included condition element (or elements).

4.6.3 Defined Conditions
   The following stream-level error conditions are defined:

   o  <bad-format/> -- the entity has sent XML that cannot be processed;
      this error MAY be used rather than more specific XML-related
      errors such as <bad-namespace-prefix/>, <invalid-xml/>,
      <restricted-xml/>, <unsupported-encoding/>, and
      <xml-not-well-formed/>, although the more specific errors are
      preferred.

   o  <bad-namespace-prefix/> -- the entity has sent a namespace prefix
      that is unsupported, or has sent no namespace prefix on an element
      that requires such a prefix (see XML Namespace Names and Prefixes
      (Section 10.2)). 11.2)).

   o  <conflict/> -- the server is closing the active stream for this
      entity because a new stream has been initiated that conflicts with
      the existing stream.

   o  <connection-timeout/> -- the entity has not generated any traffic
      over the stream for some period of time (configurable according to
      a local service policy).

   o  <host-gone/> -- the value of the 'to' attribute provided by the
      initiating entity in the stream header corresponds to a hostname
      that is no longer hosted by the server.

   o  <host-unknown/> -- the value of the 'to' attribute provided by the
      initiating entity in the stream header does not correspond to a
      hostname that is hosted by the server.

   o  <improper-addressing/> -- a stanza sent between two servers lacks
      a 'to' or 'from' attribute (or the attribute has no value).

   o  <internal-server-error/> -- the server has experienced a
      misconfiguration or an otherwise-undefined internal error that
      prevents it from servicing the stream.

   o  <invalid-from/> -- the JID or hostname provided in a 'from'
      address does not match an authorized JID or validated domain
      negotiated between servers via SASL or dialback, or between a
      client and a server via authentication and resource authorization.

   o  <invalid-id/> -- the stream ID or dialback ID is invalid or does
      not match an ID previously provided.

   o  <invalid-namespace/> -- the streams namespace name is something
      other than "http://etherx.jabber.org/streams" or the dialback
      namespace name is something other than "jabber:server:dialback"
      (see XML Namespace Names and Prefixes (Section 10.2)). 11.2)).

   o  <invalid-xml/> -- the entity has sent invalid XML over the stream
      to a server that performs validation (see Validation (Section
      10.3)).
      11.3)).

   o  <not-authorized/> -- the entity has attempted to send data before
      the stream has been authenticated, or otherwise is not authorized
      to perform an action related to stream negotiation; the receiving
      entity MUST NOT process the offending stanza before sending the
      stream error.

   o  <policy-violation/> -- the entity has violated some local service
      policy; the server MAY choose to specify the policy in the <text/>
      element.

   o  <remote-connection-failed/> -- the server is unable to properly
      connect to a remote resource that is required for authentication
      or authorization.

   o  <resource-constraint/> -- the server lacks the system resources
      necessary to service the stream.

   o  <restricted-xml/> -- the entity has attempted to send restricted
      XML features such as a comment, processing instruction, DTD,
      entity reference, or unescaped character (see Restrictions
      (Section 10.1)). 11.1)).

   o  <see-other-host/> -- the server will not provide service to the
      initiating entity but is redirecting traffic to another host; the
      server SHOULD specify the alternate hostname or IP address in the
      CDATA of the <see-other-host/> element.

   o  <system-shutdown/> -- the server is being shut down and all active
      streams are being closed.

   o  <undefined-condition/> -- the error condition is not one of those
      defined by the other conditions in this list; this error condition
      SHOULD be used only in conjunction with an application-specific
      condition.

   o  <unsupported-encoding/> -- the initiating entity has encoded the
      stream in an encoding that is not supported by the server (see
      Character Encoding (Section 10.5)). 11.5)).

   o  <unsupported-stanza-type/> -- the initiating entity has sent a
      first-level child of the stream that is not supported by the
      server.

   o  <unsupported-version/> -- the value of the 'version' attribute
      provided by the initiating entity in the stream header specifies a
      version of XMPP that is not supported by the server; the server
      MAY specify the version(s) it supports in the <text/> element.

   o  <xml-not-well-formed/> -- the initiating entity has sent XML that
      is not well-formed as defined by the XML specification [1]. [XML].

4.6.4 Application-Specific Conditions

   As noted, an application MAY provide application-specific stream
   error information by including a properly-namespaced child in the
   error element.  The application-specific element SHOULD supplement or
   further qualify a defined element.  Thus the <error/> element will
   contain two or three child elements:

   <stream:error>
     <xml-not-well-formed
         xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-streams'/>
       <text xml:lang='en' xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-streams'>
         Some special application diagnostic information!
       </text>
     <escape-your-data xmlns='application-ns'/>
   </stream:error>
   </stream:stream>

4.7 Simplified Stream Examples

   This section contains two simplified examples of a stream-based
   "session" of a client on a server (where the "C" lines are sent from
   the client to the server, and the "S" lines are sent from the server
   to the client); these examples are included for the purpose of
   illustrating the concepts introduced thus far.

   A basic "session":

   C: <?xml version='1.0'?>
      <stream:stream
          to='example.com'
          xmlns='jabber:client'
          xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
          version='1.0'>
   S: <?xml version='1.0'?>
      <stream:stream
          from='example.com'
          id='someid'
          xmlns='jabber:client'
          xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
          version='1.0'>
   ...  encryption, authentication, and resource binding ...
   C:   <message from='juliet@example.com'
                 to='romeo@example.net'
                 xml:lang='en'>
   C:     <body>Art thou not Romeo, and a Montague?</body>
   C:   </message>
   S:   <message from='romeo@example.net'
                 to='juliet@example.com'
                 xml:lang='en'>
   S:     <body>Neither, fair saint, if either thee dislike.</body>
   S:   </message>
   C: </stream:stream>
   S: </stream:stream>

   A "session" gone bad:

   C: <?xml version='1.0'?>
      <stream:stream
          to='example.com'
          xmlns='jabber:client'
          xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
          version='1.0'>
   S: <?xml version='1.0'?>
      <stream:stream
          from='example.com'
          id='someid'
          xmlns='jabber:client'
          xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
          version='1.0'>
   ...  encryption, authentication, and resource binding ...
   C: <message xml:lang='en'>
        <body>Bad XML, no closing body tag!
      </message>
   S: <stream:error>
       <xml-not-well-formed
           xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-streams'/>
      </stream:error>
   S: </stream:stream>

5. Stream Encryption Use of TLS

5.1 Overview

   XMPP includes a method for securing the stream from tampering and
   eavesdropping.  This channel encryption method makes use of the
   Transport Layer Security (TLS) [11] protocol, protocol [TLS], along with a
   "STARTTLS" extension that is modelled after similar extensions for
   the IMAP
   [25], [IMAP], POP3 [26], [POP3], and ACAP [27] [ACAP] protocols as described
   in RFC 2595
   [28]. [USINGTLS].  The namespace name for the STARTTLS
   extension is
   'urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-tls', which adheres to the format
   defined in The IETF XML Registry [24]. 'urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-tls'.

   An administrator of a given domain MAY require the use of TLS for
   client-to-server communications, server-to-server communications, or
   both.  Clients SHOULD use TLS to secure the streams prior to
   attempting to complete Stream Authentication SASL negotiation (Section 6), and servers
   SHOULD use TLS between two domains for the purpose of securing
   server-to-server communications.

   The following rules apply:

   1.   An initiating entity that complies with this specification MUST
        include the 'version' attribute set to a value of "1.0" in the
        initial stream header.

   2.   If the TLS negotiation occurs between two servers,
        communications MUST NOT proceed until the Domain Name System
        (DNS) hostnames asserted by the servers have been resolved (see
        Server-to-Server Communications (Section 13.3)). 14.3)).

   3.   When a receiving entity that complies with this specification
        receives an initial stream header that includes the 'version'
        attribute set to a value of "1.0", after sending a stream header
        in reply (including the version flag) it MUST include a
        <starttls/> element (qualified by the
        'urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-tls' namespace) along with the list
        of other stream features it supports.

   4.   If the initiating entity chooses to use TLS for stream
        encryption, TLS, TLS negotiation
        MUST be completed before proceeding to SASL negotiation; this
        order of negotiation is required in order to help safeguard
        authentication information sent during SASL negotiation, as well
        as to make it possible to base the use of the SASL EXTERNAL
        mechanism on a certificate provided during prior TLS
        negotiation.

   5.   During TLS negotiation, an entity MUST NOT send any white space
        characters (matching production [3] content of the XML
        specification [1]) [XML]) within the
        root stream element as separators between elements (any white
        space characters shown in the TLS examples below are included
        for the sake of readability only); this prohibition helps to
        ensure proper security layer byte precision.

   6.   The receiving entity MUST consider the TLS negotiation to have
        begun immediately after sending the closing ">" character of the
        <proceed/> element.  The initiating entity MUST consider the TLS
        negotiation to have begun immediately after receiving the
        closing ">" character of the <proceed/> element from the
        receiving entity.

   7.   The initiating entity MUST validate the certificate presented by
        the receiving entity; there are two cases:

   8.

        Case 1 -- The initiating entity has been configured with a set
        of trusted root certificates: Normal certificate validation
           processing is appropriate, and SHOULD follow the rules
           defined for HTTP over TLS [12]. [HTTP-TLS].  The trusted roots may
           be either a well-known public set or a manually configured
           Root CA (e.g., an organization's own Certificate Authority or
           a self-signed Root CA for the service as defined under High
           Security (Section 13.1)). 14.1)).  This case is RECOMMENDED.

        Case 2 -- The initiating entity has been configured with the
        receiving entity's self-signed service certificate: Simple
           comparison of public keys is appropriate.  This case is NOT
           RECOMMENDED (see High Security (Section 13.1) 14.1) for details).

   9.   If the above methods fail, the certificate SHOULD be presented
        to a human (e.g., an end user or server administrator) for
        approval; if presented, the receiver MUST deliver the entire
        certificate chain to the human, who SHOULD be given the option
        to store the Root CA certificate (not the service or End Entity
        certificate) and to not be queried again regarding acceptance of
        the certificate for some reasonable period of time.

   8.  Note well
        that certificates MUST be checked against the hostname as
        provided by the initiating entity (e.g., a user), not the
        hostname as resolved via the Domain Name System; e.g., if a user
        typed "example.com" but a DNS SRV [SRV] lookup returned
        "im.example.com", the certificate MUST be checked as
        "example.com".

   10.  If the TLS negotiation is successful, the receiving entity MUST
        discard any knowledge obtained in an insecure manner from the
        initiating entity before TLS takes effect.

   9.

   11.  If the TLS negotiation is successful, the initiating entity MUST
        discard any knowledge obtained in an insecure manner from the
        receiving entity before TLS takes effect.

   10.

   12.  If the TLS negotiation is successful, the receiving entity MUST
        NOT offer the STARTTLS extension to the initiating entity along
        with the other stream features that are offered when the stream
        is restarted.

   11.

   13.  If the TLS negotiation is successful, the initiating entity MUST
        continue with SASL negotiation.

   12.

   14.  If the TLS negotiation results in failure, the receiving entity
        MUST terminate both the XML stream and the underlying TCP
        connection.

   13.

   15.  See Mandatory-to-Implement Technologies (Section 13.5) 14.6) regarding
        mechanisms that MUST be supported.

5.2 Narrative

   When an initiating entity secures a stream with a receiving entity,
   the steps involved are as follows:

   1.  The initiating entity opens a TCP connection and initiates the
       stream by sending the opening XML stream header to the receiving
       entity, including the 'version' attribute set to a value of
       "1.0".

   2.  The receiving entity responds by opening a TCP connection and
       sending an XML stream header to the initiating entity, including
       the 'version' attribute set to a value of "1.0".

   3.  The receiving entity offers the STARTTLS extension to the
       initiating entity by including it with the list of other
       supported stream features (if TLS is required for interaction
       with the receiving entity, it SHOULD signal that fact by
       including a <required/> element as a child of the <starttls/>
       element).

   4.  The initiating entity issues the STARTTLS command (i.e., a
       <starttls/> element qualified by the
       'urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-tls' namespace) to instruct the
       receiving entity that it wishes to begin a TLS negotiation to
       secure the stream.

   5.  The receiving entity MUST reply with either a <proceed/> element
       or a <failure/> element qualified by the
       'urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-tls' namespace.  If the failure case
       occurs, the receiving entity MUST terminate both the XML stream
       and the underlying TCP connection.  If the proceed case occurs,
       the entities MUST attempt to complete the TLS negotiation over
       the TCP connection and MUST NOT send any further XML data until
       the TLS negotiation is complete.

   6.  The initiating entity and receiving entity attempt to complete a
       TLS negotiation in accordance with RFC 2246 [11]. [TLS].

   7.  If the TLS negotiation is unsuccessful, the receiving entity MUST
       terminate the TCP connection (it is not necessary to send a
       closing </stream> tag first, since the receiving entity and
       initiating entity MUST consider the original stream to be closed
       upon sending or receiving the <success/> element).  If the TLS
       negotiation is successful, the initiating entity MUST initiate a
       new stream by sending an opening XML stream header to the
       receiving entity.

   8.  Upon receiving the new stream header from the initiating entity,
       the receiving entity MUST respond by sending a new XML stream
       header to the initiating entity along with the available features
       (but NOT including the STARTTLS feature).

5.3 Client-to-Server Example

   The following example shows the data flow for a client securing a
   stream using STARTTLS (note: the alternate steps shown below are
   provided to illustrate the protocol for failure cases; they are not
   exhaustive and would not necessarily be triggered by the data sent in
   the example).

   Step 1: Client initiates stream to server:

   <stream:stream
       xmlns='jabber:client'
       xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
       to='example.com'
       version='1.0'>

   Step 2: Server responds by sending a stream tag to client:

   <stream:stream
       xmlns='jabber:client'
       xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
       id='c2s_123'
       from='example.com'
       version='1.0'>
   Step 3: Server sends the STARTTLS extension to client along with
   authentication mechanisms and any other stream features:

   <stream:features>
     <starttls xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-tls'>
       <required/>
     </starttls>
     <mechanisms xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
       <mechanism>DIGEST-MD5</mechanism>
       <mechanism>PLAIN</mechanism>
     </mechanisms>
   </stream:features>

   Step 4: Client sends the STARTTLS command to server:

   <starttls xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-tls'/>

   Step 5: Server informs client to proceed:

   <proceed xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-tls'/>

   Step 5 (alt): Server informs client that TLS negotiation has failed
   and closes both stream and TCP connection:

   <failure xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-tls'/>
   </stream:stream>

   Step 6: Client and server attempt to complete TLS negotiation over
   the existing TCP connection.

   Step 7: If TLS negotiation is successful, client initiates a new
   stream to server:

   <stream:stream
       xmlns='jabber:client'
       xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
       to='example.com'
       version='1.0'>

   Step 7 (alt): If TLS negotiation is unsuccessful, Server2 closes TCP
   connection.

   Step 8: Server responds by sending a stream header to client along
   with any available stream features:

   <stream:stream
       xmlns='jabber:client'
       xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
       from='example.com'
       id='c2s_234'
       version='1.0'>
   <stream:features>
     <mechanisms xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
       <mechanism>DIGEST-MD5</mechanism>
       <mechanism>PLAIN</mechanism>
       <mechanism>EXTERNAL</mechanism>
     </mechanisms>
   </stream:features>

   Step 9: Client continues with Stream Authentication SASL negotiation (Section 6).

5.4 Server-to-Server Example

   The following example shows the data flow for two servers securing a
   stream using STARTTLS (note: the alternate steps shown below are
   provided to illustrate the protocol for failure cases; they are not
   exhaustive and would not necessarily be triggered by the data sent in
   the example).

   Step 1: Server1 initiates stream to Server2:

   <stream:stream
       xmlns='jabber:server'
       xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
       to='example.com'
       version='1.0'>

   Step 2: Server2 responds by sending a stream tag to Server1:

   <stream:stream
       xmlns='jabber:server'
       xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
       from='example.com'
       id='s2s_123'
       version='1.0'>

   Step 3: Server2 sends the STARTTLS extension to Server1 along with
   authentication mechanisms and any other stream features:

   <stream:features>
     <starttls xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-tls'/>
       <required/>
     </starttls>
     <mechanisms xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
       <mechanism>DIGEST-MD5</mechanism>
       <mechanism>KERBEROS_V4</mechanism>
     </mechanisms>
   </stream:features>

   Step 4: Server1 sends the STARTTLS command to Server2:

   <starttls xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-tls'/>

   Step 5: Server2 informs Server1 to proceed:

   <proceed xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-tls'/>

   Step 5 (alt): Server2 informs Server1 that TLS negotiation has failed
   and closes stream:

   <failure xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-tls'/>
   </stream:stream>

   Step 6: Server1 and Server2 attempt to complete TLS negotiation via
   TCP.

   Step 7: If TLS negotiation is successful, Server1 initiates a new
   stream to Server2:

   <stream:stream
       xmlns='jabber:server'
       xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
       to='example.com'
       version='1.0'>

   Step 7 (alt): If TLS negotiation is unsuccessful, server closes TCP
   connection.

   Step 8: Server2 responds by sending a stream header to Server1 along
   with any available stream features:

   <stream:stream
       xmlns='jabber:server'
       xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
       from='example.com'
       id='s2s_234'
       version='1.0'>
   <stream:features>
     <mechanisms xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
       <mechanism>DIGEST-MD5</mechanism>
       <mechanism>KERBEROS_V4</mechanism>
       <mechanism>EXTERNAL</mechanism>
     </mechanisms>
   </stream:features>
   Step 9: Server1 continues with Stream Authentication SASL negotiation (Section 6).

6. Stream Authentication Use of SASL

6.1 Overview

   XMPP includes a method for authenticating a stream by means of an
   XMPP-specific profile of the Simple Authentication and Security Layer
   (SASL) [13]. protocol [SASL].  SASL provides a generalized method for
   adding authentication support to connection-based protocols, and XMPP
   uses a generic XML namespace profile for SASL that conforms to Section 4
   ("Profiling Requirements") of RFC 2222 [13] (the namespace name that
   qualifies XML elements used in stream authentication is
   'urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl', which adheres to the format
   defined in The IETF XML Registry [24]).
   profiling requirements of [SASL].

   The following rules apply:

   1.   If the SASL negotiation occurs between two servers,
        communications MUST NOT proceed until the Domain Name System
        (DNS) hostnames asserted by the servers have been resolved (see
        Server-to-Server Communications (Section 13.3)). 14.3)).

   2.   If the initiating entity is capable of stream authentication via
        SASL, SASL negotiation, it MUST
        include the 'version' attribute set to a value of "1.0" in the
        initial stream header.

   3.   If the receiving entity is capable of stream authentication via
        SASL, SASL negotiation, it MUST
        send one or more authentication mechanisms within a <mechanisms/> <mechanisms/
        > element qualified by the 'urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'
        namespace in reply to the opening stream tag received from the
        initiating entity (if the opening stream tag included the
        'version' attribute set to a value of "1.0").

   4.   During SASL negotiation, an entity MUST NOT send any white space
        characters (matching production [3] content of the XML
        specification [1]) [XML]) within the
        root stream element as separators between elements (any white
        space characters shown in the SASL examples below are included
        for the sake of readability only); this prohibition helps to
        ensure proper security layer byte precision.

   5.   Any character data contained within the XML elements used during
        SASL negotiation MUST be encoded using base64 [14]. base64, where the
        encoding adheres to the definition in Section 3 of RFC 3548
        [BASE64].

   6.   If provision of a "simple username" is supported by the selected
        SASL mechanism (e.g., this is supported by the selected SASL mechanism, DIGEST-MD5 and
        CRAM-MD5 mechanisms but not by the EXTERNAL and GSSAPI
        mechanisms), during authentication the initiating entity SHOULD
        provide a username during SASL negotiation. The
        username-value SHOULD be the initiating entity's its sending domain
        in (in the case of server-to-server communications, and SHOULD be
        the initiating entity's
        communications) or registered username in account name (in the case of
        client-to-server communications. communications) as the simple username.

   7.   If supported by the initiating entity wishes to act on behalf of another
        entity and the selected SASL mechanism, mechanism supports transmission of
        an authorization identity, the initiating entity MAY MUST provide an
        authorization identity during SASL
        negotiation, which SHOULD be a non-default identity for which negotiation.  If the
        initiating entity is seeking authorization to impersonate (i.e., does not wish to act on behalf of another
        entity, it MUST NOT provide an authorization identity.  As
        specified in [SASL], the default initiating entity MUST NOT provide an
        authorization identity, which identity unless the authorization identity is
        different from the default authorization identity derived from
        the authentication identity as described in RFC 2222 [13]). [SASL].  If
        provided, the authzid-value value of the authorization identity MUST be of the
        form <domain> (i.e., a domain identifier only) for servers and
        of the form <node@domain> (i.e., node identifier and domain
        identifier) for clients.

   8.   Upon successful SASL negotiation that involves negotiation of a
        security layer, the receiving entity MUST discard any knowledge
        obtained from the initiating entity which was not obtained from
        the SASL negotiation itself.

   9.   Upon successful SASL negotiation that involves negotiation of a
        security layer, the initiating entity MUST discard any knowledge
        obtained from the receiving entity which was not obtained from
        the SASL negotiation itself.

   10.  See Mandatory-to-Implement Technologies (Section 13.5) 14.6) regarding
        mechanisms that MUST be supported.

6.2 Narrative

   When an initiating entity authenticates with a receiving entity, the
   steps involved are as follows:

   1.  The initiating entity requests SASL authentication by including
       the 'version' attribute in the opening XML stream header sent to
       the receiving entity, with the value set to "1.0".

   2.  After sending an XML stream header in reply, the receiving entity
       sends a list of available SASL authentication mechanisms; each of
       these is a <mechanism/> element included as a child within a
       <mechanisms/> container element qualified by the
       'urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl' namespace, which in turn is a
       child of a <features/> element in the streams namespace.  If
       Stream Encryption Use
       of TLS (Section 5) needs to be established before a particular
       authentication mechanism may be used, the receiving entity MUST
       NOT provide that mechanism in the list of available SASL
       authentication mechanisms prior to stream encryption. TLS negotiation.  If the
       initiating entity presents a valid certificate during prior TLS
       negotiation, the receiving entity SHOULD offer the SASL EXTERNAL
       mechanism to the initiating entity during stream authentication SASL negotiation (refer
       to RFC 2222 [13]), [SASL]), although the EXTERNAL mechanism MAY be offered under
       other circumstances as well.

   3.  The initiating entity selects a mechanism by sending an <auth/>
       element qualified by the 'urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'
       namespace to the receiving entity and including an appropriate
       value for the 'mechanism' attribute; this element MAY optionally contain
       character data (in SASL terminology, the "initial response") if
       the mechanism supports or requires it.  If the initiating entity
       selects the EXTERNAL mechanism for authentication and presented a
       certificate during prior TLS negotiation, the authentication
       credentials SHOULD be taken from that certificate.

   4.  If necessary, the receiving entity challenges the initiating
       entity by sending a <challenge/> element qualified by the
       'urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl' namespace to the initiating
       entity; this element MAY optionally contain character data (which MUST be
       computed in accordance with the definition of the SASL mechanism
       chosen by the initiating entity).

   5.  The initiating entity responds to the challenge by sending a
       <response/> element qualified by the
       'urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl' namespace to the receiving
       entity; this element MAY optionally contain character data (which MUST be
       computed in accordance with the definition of the SASL mechanism
       chosen by the initiating entity).

   6.  If necessary, the receiving entity sends more challenges and the
       initiating entity sends more responses.

   This series of challenge/response pairs continues until one of three
   things happens:

   1.  The initiating entity aborts the handshake by sending an <abort/>
       element qualified by the 'urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'
       namespace to the receiving entity.  Upon receiving an <abort/>
       element, the receiving entity SHOULD allow a configurable but
       reasonable number of retries (at least 2), after which it MUST
       terminate the TCP connection; this allows the initiating entity
       (e.g., an end-user client) to tolerate incorrectly-provided
       credentials (e.g., a mistyped password) without being forced to
       reconnect.

   2.  The receiving entity reports failure of the handshake by sending
       a <failure/> element qualified by the
       'urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl' namespace to the initiating
       entity (the particular cause of failure SHOULD be communicated in
       an appropriate child element of the <failure/> element as defined
       under SASL Errors (Section 6.4)).  If the failure case occurs,
       the receiving entity SHOULD allow a configurable but reasonable
       number of retries (at least 2), after which it MUST terminate the
       TCP connection; this allows the initiating entity (e.g., an
       end-user client) to tolerate incorrectly-provided credentials
       (e.g., a mistyped password) without being forced to reconnect.

   3.  The receiving entity reports success of the handshake by sending
       a <success/> element qualified by the
       'urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl' namespace to the initiating
       entity; this element MAY optionally contain character data (in SASL
       terminology, "additional data with success") if required by the
       chosen SASL mechanism.  Upon receiving the <success/> element,
       the initiating entity MUST initiate a new stream by sending an
       opening XML stream header to the receiving entity (it is not
       necessary to send a closing </stream> tag first, since the
       receiving entity and initiating entity MUST consider the original
       stream to be closed upon sending or receiving the <success/>
       element).  Upon receiving the new stream header from the
       initiating entity, the receiving entity MUST respond by sending a
       new XML stream header to the initiating entity, along with any
       available features (but NOT including the STARTTLS feature) or an
       empty <features/> element (to signify that no additional features
       are available); any such additional features not defined herein
       MUST be defined by the relevant extension to XMPP.

6.3 SASL Definition

   Section 4

   The profiling requirements of the SASL specification [13] requires [SASL] require that the following
   information be supplied by a protocol definition:

   service name: "xmpp"

   initiation sequence: After the initiating entity provides an opening
      XML stream header and the receiving entity replies in kind, the
      receiving entity provides a list of acceptable authentication
      methods.  The initiating entity chooses one method from the list
      and sends it to the receiving entity as the value of the
      'mechanism' attribute possessed by an <auth/> element, optionally
      including an initial response to avoid a round trip.

   exchange sequence: Challenges and responses are carried through the
      exchange of <challenge/> elements from receiving entity to
      initiating entity and <response/> elements from initiating entity
      to receiving entity.  The receiving entity reports failure by
      sending a <failure/> element and success by sending a <success/>
      element; the initiating entity aborts the exchange by sending an
      <abort/> element.  Upon successful negotiation, both sides
      consider the original XML stream to be closed and new stream
      headers are sent by both entities.

   security layer negotiation: The security layer takes effect
      immediately after sending the closing ">" character of the
      <success/> element for the receiving entity, and immediately after
      receiving the closing ">" character of the <success/> element for
      the initiating entity.  The order of layers is first TCP, [TCP], then TLS,
      [TLS], then SASL, [SASL], then XMPP.

   use of the authorization identity: The authorization identity may be
      used by xmpp to denote the <node@domain> of a client or the
      sending <domain> of a server.

6.4 SASL Errors

   The following SASL-related error conditions are defined:

   o  <aborted/> -- The receiving entity acknowledges an <abort/>
      element sent by the initiating entity; sent in reply to the
      <abort/> element.

   o  <incorrect-encoding/> -- The data provided by the initiating
      entity could not be processed because the base64 [14] [BASE64] encoding is
      incorrect;
      incorrect (e.g., because the encoding does not adhere to the the
      definition in Section 3 of [BASE64]); sent in reply to a
      <response/> element or an <auth/> element with initial challenge
      data.

   o  <invalid-authzid/> -- The authzid provided by the initiating
      entity is invalid, either because it is incorrectly formatted or
      because the initiating entity does not have permissions to
      authorize that ID; sent in reply to a <response/> element or an
      <auth/> element with initial challenge data.

   o  <invalid-mechanism/> -- The initiating entity did not provide a
      mechanism or requested a mechanism that is not supported by the
      receiving entity; sent in reply to an <auth/> element.

   o  <mechanism-too-weak/> -- The mechanism requested by the initiating
      entity is weaker than server policy permits for that initiating
      entity; sent in reply to a <response/> element or an <auth/>
      element with initial challenge data.

   o  <not-authorized/> -- The authentication failed because the
      initiating entity did not provide valid credentials (this includes
      but is not limited to the case of an unknown username); sent in
      reply to a <response/> element or an <auth/> element with initial
      challenge data.

   o  <temporary-auth-failure/> -- The authentication failed because of
      a temporary error condition within the receiving entity; sent in
      reply to an <auth/> element or <response/> element.

6.5 Client-to-Server Example

   The following example shows the data flow for a client authenticating
   with a server using SASL, normally after successful TLS negotiation
   (note: the alternate steps shown below are provided to illustrate the
   protocol for failure cases; they are not exhaustive and would not
   necessarily be triggered by the data sent in the example).

   Step 1: Client initiates stream to server:

   <stream:stream
       xmlns='jabber:client'
       xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
       to='example.com'
       version='1.0'>

   Step 2: Server responds with a stream tag sent to client:

   <stream:stream
       xmlns='jabber:client'
       xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
       id='c2s_234'
       from='example.com'
       version='1.0'>

   Step 3: Server informs client of available authentication mechanisms:

   <stream:features>
     <mechanisms xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
       <mechanism>DIGEST-MD5</mechanism>
       <mechanism>PLAIN</mechanism>
     </mechanisms>
   </stream:features>
   Step 4: Client selects an authentication mechanism:

   <auth xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'
         mechanism='DIGEST-MD5'/>

   Step 5: Server sends a base64 [14]-encoded [BASE64] encoded challenge to client:

   <challenge xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
   cmVhbG09InNvbWVyZWFsbSIsbm9uY2U9Ik9BNk1HOXRFUUdtMmhoIixxb3A9ImF1dGgi
   LGNoYXJzZXQ9dXRmLTgsYWxnb3JpdGhtPW1kNS1zZXNzCg==
   </challenge>

   The decoded challenge is:

   realm="somerealm",nonce="OA6MG9tEQGm2hh",\
   qop="auth",charset=utf-8,algorithm=md5-sess

   Step 5 (alt): Server returns error to client:

   <failure xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
     <incorrect-encoding/>
   </failure>
   </stream:stream>

   Step 6: Client sends a base64 [14]-encoded [BASE64] encoded response to the challenge:

   <response xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
   dXNlcm5hbWU9InNvbWVub2RlIixyZWFsbT0ic29tZXJlYWxtIixub25jZT0i
   T0E2TUc5dEVRR20yaGgiLGNub25jZT0iT0E2TUhYaDZWcVRyUmsiLG5jPTAw
   MDAwMDAxLHFvcD1hdXRoLGRpZ2VzdC11cmk9InhtcHAvZXhhbXBsZS5jb20i
   LHJlc3BvbnNlPWQzODhkYWQ5MGQ0YmJkNzYwYTE1MjMyMWYyMTQzYWY3LGNo
   YXJzZXQ9dXRmLTgK
   </response>

   The decoded response is:

   username="somenode",realm="somerealm",\
   nonce="OA6MG9tEQGm2hh",cnonce="OA6MHXh6VqTrRk",\
   nc=00000001,qop=auth,digest-uri="xmpp/example.com",\
   response=d388dad90d4bbd760a152321f2143af7,charset=utf-8

   Step 7: Server sends another base64 [14]-encoded [BASE64] encoded challenge to client:

   <challenge xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
   cnNwYXV0aD1lYTQwZjYwMzM1YzQyN2I1NTI3Yjg0ZGJhYmNkZmZmZAo=
   </challenge>

   The decoded challenge is:

   rspauth=ea40f60335c427b5527b84dbabcdfffd

   Step 7 (alt): Server returns error to client:

   <failure xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
     <mechanism-too-weak/>
     <temporary-auth-failure/>
   </failure>
   </stream:stream>

   Step 8: Client responds to the challenge:

   <response xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'/>

   Step 9: Server informs client of successful authentication:

   <success xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'/>

   Step 9 (alt): Server informs client of failed authentication:

   <failure xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
     <temporary-auth-failure/>
   </failure>
   </stream:stream>

   Step 10: Client initiates a new stream to server:

   <stream:stream
       xmlns='jabber:client'
       xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
       to='example.com'
       version='1.0'>

   Step 11: Server responds by sending a stream header to client along
   with any additional features (or an empty features element):

   <stream:stream
       xmlns='jabber:client'
       xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
       id='c2s_345'
       from='example.com'
       version='1.0'>
   <stream:features>
     <bind xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-bind'> xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-bind'/>
     <session xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-session'> xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-session'/>
   </stream:features>

6.6 Server-to-Server Example

   The following example shows the data flow for a server authenticating
   with another server using SASL, normally after successful TLS
   negotiation (note: the alternate steps shown below are provided to
   illustrate the protocol for failure cases; they are not exhaustive
   and would not necessarily be triggered by the data sent in the
   example).

   Step 1: Server1 initiates stream to Server2:

   <stream:stream
       xmlns='jabber:server'
       xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
       to='example.com'
       version='1.0'>

   Step 2: Server2 responds with a stream tag sent to Server1:

   <stream:stream
       xmlns='jabber:server'
       xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
       from='example.com'
       id='s2s_234'
       version='1.0'>

   Step 3: Server2 informs Server1 of available authentication
   mechanisms:

   <stream:features>
     <mechanisms xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
       <mechanism>DIGEST-MD5</mechanism>
       <mechanism>KERBEROS_V4</mechanism>
     </mechanisms>
   </stream:features>

   Step 4: Server1 selects an authentication mechanism:

   <auth xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'
         mechanism='DIGEST-MD5'/>

   Step 5: Server2 sends a base64 [14]-encoded [BASE64] encoded challenge to Server1:

   <challenge xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
   dXNlcm5hbWU9InNvbWVkb21haW4iLHJlYWxtPSJzb21lcmVhbG0iLG5vbmNl
   PSJPQTZNRzl0RVFHbTJoaCIscW9wPSJhdXRoIixjaGFyc2V0PXV0Zi04LGFs
   Z29yaXRobT1tZDUtc2Vzcwo=
   </challenge>
   The decoded challenge is:

   username="somedomain",realm="somerealm",\
   nonce="OA6MG9tEQGm2hh",qop="auth",\
   charset=utf-8,algorithm=md5-sess

   Step 5 (alt): Server2 returns error to Server1:

   <failure xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
     <incorrect-encoding/>
   </failure>
   </stream:stream>

   Step 6: Server1 sends a base64 [14]-encoded [BASE64] encoded response to the challenge:

   <response xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
   dXNlcm5hbWU9InNvbWVkb21haW4iLHJlYWxtPSJzb21lcmVhbG0iLG5vbmNl
   PSJPQTZNRzl0RVFHbTJoaCIsY25vbmNlPSJPQTZNSFhoNlZxVHJSayIsbmM9
   MDAwMDAwMDEscW9wPWF1dGgsZGlnZXN0LXVyaT0ieG1wcC9leGFtcGxlLmNv
   bSIscmVzcG9uc2U9ZDM4OGRhZDkwZDRiYmQ3NjBhMTUyMzIxZjIxNDNhZjcs
   Y2hhcnNldD11dGYtOAo=
   </response>

   The decoded response is:

   username="somedomain",realm="somerealm",\
   nonce="OA6MG9tEQGm2hh",cnonce="OA6MHXh6VqTrRk",\
   nc=00000001,qop=auth,digest-uri="xmpp/example.com",\
   response=d388dad90d4bbd760a152321f2143af7,charset=utf-8

   Step 7: Server2 sends another base64 [14]-encoded [BASE64] encoded challenge to Server1:

   <challenge xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
   cnNwYXV0aD1lYTQwZjYwMzM1YzQyN2I1NTI3Yjg0ZGJhYmNkZmZmZAo=
   </challenge>

   The decoded challenge is:

   rspauth=ea40f60335c427b5527b84dbabcdfffd

   Step 7 (alt): Server2 returns error to Server1:

   <failure xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
     <invalid-authzid/>
   </failure>
   </stream:stream>
   Step 8: Server1 responds to the challenge:

   <response xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'/>

   Step 8 (alt): Server1 aborts negotiation:

   <abort xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'/>

   Step 9: Server2 informs Server1 of successful authentication:

   <success xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'/>

   Step 9 (alt): Server2 informs Server1 of failed authentication:

   <failure xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'>
     <aborted/>
   </failure>
   </stream:stream>

   Step 10: Server1 initiates a new stream to Server2:

   <stream:stream
       xmlns='jabber:server'
       xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
       to='example.com'
       version='1.0'>

   Step 11: Server2 responds by sending a stream header to Server1 along
   with any additional features (or an empty features element):

   <stream:stream
       xmlns='jabber:client'
       xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
       from='example.com'
       id='s2s_345'
       version='1.0'>
   <stream:features/>

7. Resource Binding

   After Stream Authentication SASL negotiation (Section 6) with the receiving entity, the
   initiating entity MAY want or need to bind a specific resource to
   that stream.  In general this applies only to clients: in order to
   conform to the addressing format (Section 3) and stanza delivery
   rules (Section 14) 10) specified herein, there MUST be a resource
   identifier associated with the <node@domain> of the client (which is
   either generated by the server or provided by the client
   application); this ensures that the address for use over that stream
   is a "full JID" of the form <node@domain/resource>.

   Upon receiving a success indication within the SASL negotiation, the
   client MUST send a new stream header to the server, to which the
   server MUST respond with a stream header as well as a list of
   available stream features.  Specifically, if the server requires the
   client to bind a resource to the stream after successful stream
   authentication, SASL
   negotiation, it MUST include an empty <bind/> element qualified by
   the 'urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-bind' namespace in the stream
   features list it presents to the client upon sending the header for
   the response stream sent after successful stream authentication SASL negotiation (but not
   before):

   Server advertises resource binding feature to client:

   <stream:stream
       xmlns='jabber:client'
       xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
       id='c2s_345'
       from='example.com'
       version='1.0'>
   <stream:features>
     <bind xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-bind'> xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-bind'/>
   </stream:features>

   Upon being so informed that resource binding is required, the client
   MUST bind a resource to the stream by sending to the server an IQ
   stanza of type "set" (see IQ Semantics (Section 9.2.3)) containing
   data qualified by the 'urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-bind' namespace.

   If the client wishes to allow the server to generate the resource
   identifier on its behalf, it sends an IQ stanza of type "set" that
   contains an empty <bind/> element:

   Client asks server to bind a resource:

   <iq type='set' id='bind_1'>
     <bind xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-bind'/>
   </iq>

   A server that supports resource binding MUST be able to generate a
   resource identifier on behalf of a client.  A resource identifier
   generated by the server MUST be unique for that <node@domain>.

   If the client wishes to specify the resource identifier, it sends an
   IQ stanza of type "set" that contains the desired resource identifier
   as the CDATA of a <resource/> element that is a child of the <bind/>
   element:

   Client binds a resource:

   <iq type='set' id='bind_2'>
     <bind xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-bind'>
       <resource>someresource</resource>
     </bind>
   </iq>

   Once the server has generated a resource identifier for the client or
   accepted the resource identifier provided by the client, it MUST
   return an IQ stanza of type "result" to the client, which MUST
   include a <jid/> child element that specifies the full JID for the
   client as determined by the server:

   Server informs client of successful resource binding:

   <iq type='result' id='bind_2'>
     <bind xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-bind'>
       <jid>somenode@somedomain/someresource</jid>
     </bind>
   </iq>

   A server is NOT REQUIRED to accept the resource identifier provided
   by the client, and MAY override it with a resource identifier that
   the server generates; in this case, the server SHOULD NOT return a
   stanza error (e.g., <forbidden/>) to the client but instead SHOULD
   communicate the generated resource identifier to the client in the IQ
   result as shown above.

   When a client supplies a resource identifier, the following stanza
   error conditions may occur are possible (see Stanza Errors (Section 9.3)):

   o  The provided resource identifier cannot be processed by the server
      in accordance with Resourceprep (Appendix B).

   o  The client is not allowed to bind a resource to the stream (e.g.,
      because the client has reached a limit on the number of bound
      resources allowed).

   o  The provided resource identifier is already in use. use but the server
      does not allow binding of multiple resources with the same
      identifier.

   The protocol for these error conditions is shown below.

   Resource identifier cannot be processed:

   <iq type='error' id='bind_2'>
     <bind xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-bind'>
       <resource>someresource</resource>
     </bind>
     <error type='modify'>
       <bad-request xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-stanzas'/>
     </error>
   </iq>

   Client is not allowed to bind a resource:

   <iq type='error' id='bind_2'>
     <bind xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-bind'>
       <resource>someresource</resource>
     </bind>
     <error type='cancel'>
       <not-allowed xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-stanzas'/>
     </error>
   </iq>

   Resource identifier is in use:

   <iq type='error' id='bind_2'>
     <bind xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-bind'>
       <resource>someresource</resource>
     </bind>
     <error type='cancel'>
       <conflict xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-stanzas'/>
     </error>
   </iq>

8. Server Dialback

8.1 Overview

   The Jabber protocol protocols from which XMPP was adapted includes include a "server
   dialback" method for protecting against domain spoofing, thus making
   it more difficult to spoof XML stanzas (see Server-to-Server
   Communications (Section 13.3) 14.3) regarding this method's security
   characteristics).  Server dialback also makes it easier to deploy
   systems in which outbound messages and inbound messages are handled
   by different machines for the same domain.  The server dialback
   method is made possible by the existence of the Domain Name System
   (DNS), since one server can (normally) discover the authoritative
   server for a given domain.

   Because dialback depends on DNS, inter-domain communications MUST NOT
   proceed until the DNS Domain Name System (DNS) hostnames asserted by the
   servers have been resolved (see Server-to-Server Communications
   (Section 13.3)). 14.3)).

   The method for generating and verifying the keys used in server
   dialback MUST take into account the hostnames being used, the random
   ID generated for the stream, and a secret known by the authoritative
   server's network.

   Any error that occurs during dialback negotiation MUST be considered
   a stream error, resulting in termination of the stream and of the
   underlying TCP connection.  The possible error conditions are
   specified in the protocol description below.

   The following terminology applies:

   o  Originating Server -- the server that is attempting to establish a
      connection between two domains.

   o  Receiving Server -- the server that is trying to authenticate that
      Originating Server represents the domain which it claims to be.

   o  Authoritative Server -- the server that answers to the DNS
      hostname asserted by Originating Server; for basic environments
      this will be Originating Server, but it could be a separate
      machine in Originating Server's network.

8.2 Order of Events

   The following is a brief summary of the order of events in dialback:

   1.  Originating Server establishes a connection to Receiving Server.

   2.  Originating Server sends a 'key' value over the connection to
       Receiving Server.

   3.  Receiving Server establishes a connection to Authoritative
       Server.

   4.  Receiving Server sends the same 'key' value to Authoritative
       Server.

   5.  Authoritative Server replies that key is valid or invalid.

   6.  Receiving Server informs Originating Server whether it is
       authenticated or not.

   We can represent this flow of events graphically as follows:

   Originating               Receiving
      Server                     Server
   -----------               ---------
       |                         |
       |   establish connection  |
       | ----------------------> |
       |                         |
       |   send stream header    |
       | ----------------------> |
       |                         |
       |   send stream header    |
       | <---------------------- |
       |                         |                   Authoritative
       |   send dialback key     |                       Server
       | ----------------------> |                   -------------
       |                         |                         |
                                 |   establish connection  |
                                 | ----------------------> |
                                 |                         |
                                 |   send stream header    |
                                 | ----------------------> |
                                 |                         |
                                 |  establish connection   |
                                 | <---------------------- |
                                 |                         |
                                 |   send stream header    |
                                 | <---------------------- |
                                 |                         |
                                 |   send dialback key verify request   |
                                 | ----------------------> |
                                 |                         |
                                 |  validate dialback key   send verify response  |
                                 | <---------------------- |
                                 |
       |  report dialback result |
       | <---------------------- |
       |                         |

8.3 Protocol

   The detailed protocol interaction between the servers is as follows:

   1.   Originating Server establishes TCP connection to Receiving
        Server.

   2.   Originating Server sends a stream header to Receiving Server:

   <stream:stream
       xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
       xmlns='jabber:server'
       xmlns:db='jabber:server:dialback'>

        Note: the The 'to' and 'from' attributes are NOT REQUIRED on the
        root stream element.  The inclusion of the xmlns:db namespace
        declaration with the name shown indicates to Receiving Server
        that Originating Server supports dialback.  If the namespace
        name is incorrect, then Receiving Server MUST generate an
        <invalid-namespace/> stream error condition and terminate both
        the XML stream and the underlying TCP connection.

   3.   Receiving Server SHOULD send a stream header back to Originating
        Server, including a unique ID for this interaction:

   <stream:stream
       xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
       xmlns='jabber:server'
       xmlns:db='jabber:server:dialback'
       id='457F9224A0...'>

        Note: The 'to' and 'from' attributes are NOT REQUIRED on the
        root stream element.  If the namespace name is incorrect, then
        Originating Server MUST generate an <invalid-namespace/> stream
        error condition and terminate both the XML stream and the
        underlying TCP connection.  Note well that Receiving Server is
        NOT REQUIRED to reply and MAY silently terminate the XML stream
        and underlying TCP connection depending on security policies in
        place.
        place; however, if Receiving Server desires to proceed, it MUST
        sent a stream header back to Originating Server.

   4.   Originating Server sends a dialback key to Receiving Server:

   <db:result
       to='Receiving Server'
       from='Originating Server'>
     98AF014EDC0...
   </db:result>

        Note: this This key is not examined by Receiving Server, since
        Receiving Server does not keep information about Originating
        Server between sessions.  The key generated by Originating
        Server MUST be based in part on the value of the ID provided by
        Receiving Server in the previous step, and in part on a secret
        shared by Originating Server and Authoritative Server.  If the
        value of the 'to' address does not match a hostname recognized
        by Receiving Server, then Receiving Server MUST generate a
        <host-unknown/> stream error condition and terminate both the
        XML stream and the underlying TCP connection.  If the value of
        the 'from' address matches a domain with which Receiving Server
        already has an established connection, then Receiving Server
        MUST maintain the existing connection until it validates whether
        the new connection is legitimate; additionally, Receiving Server
        MAY choose to generate a <not-authorized/> stream error
        condition for the new connection and then terminate both the XML
        stream and the underlying TCP connection related to the new
        request.

   5.   Receiving Server establishes a TCP connection back to the domain
        name asserted by Originating Server, as a result of which it
        connects to Authoritative Server.  (Note: as As an optimization, an
        implementation MAY reuse an existing trusted connection here
        rather than opening a new TCP connection.)

   6.   Receiving Server sends Authoritative Server a stream header:

   <stream:stream
       xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
       xmlns='jabber:server'
       xmlns:db='jabber:server:dialback'>

        Note: the The 'to' and 'from' attributes are NOT REQUIRED on the
        root stream element.  If the namespace name is incorrect, then
        Authoritative Server MUST generate an <invalid-namespace/>
        stream error condition and terminate both the XML stream and the
        underlying TCP connection.

   7.   Authoritative Server sends Receiving Server a stream header:

   <stream:stream
       xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
       xmlns='jabber:server'
       xmlns:db='jabber:server:dialback'
       id='1251A342B...'>

        Note: if If the namespace name is incorrect, then Receiving Server
        MUST generate an <invalid-namespace/> stream error condition and
        terminate both the XML stream and the underlying TCP connection
        between it and Authoritative Server.  If a stream error occurs
        between Receiving Server and Authoritative Server, then
        Receiving Server MUST generate a <remote-connection-failed/>
        stream error condition and terminate both the XML stream and the
        underlying TCP connection between it and Originating Server.

   8.   Receiving Server sends Authoritative Server a stanza requesting
        that Authoritative Server verify a key:

   <db:verify
       from='Receiving Server'
       to='Originating Server'
       id='457F9224A0...'>
     98AF014EDC0...
   </db:verify>

        Note: passed Passed here are the hostnames, the original identifier
        from Receiving Server's stream header to Originating Server in
        Step 3, and the key that Originating Server sent to Receiving
        Server in Step 4.  Based on this information as well as shared
        secret information within the Authoritative Server's network,
        the key is verified.  Any verifiable method MAY be used to
        generate the key.  If the value of the 'to' address does not
        match a hostname recognized by Authoritative Server, then
        Authoritative Server MUST generate a <host-unknown/> stream
        error condition and terminate both the XML stream and the
        underlying TCP connection.  If the value of the 'from' address
        does not match the hostname represented by Receiving Server when
        opening the TCP connection (or any validated domain), then
        Authoritative Server MUST generate an <invalid-from/> stream
        error condition and terminate both the XML stream and the
        underlying TCP connection.

   9.   Authoritative Server sends a stanza back to Receiving Server
        verifying whether the key was valid or invalid:

   <db:verify
       from='Originating Server'
       to='Receiving Server'
       type='valid'
       id='457F9224A0...'/>

         or

   <db:verify
       from='Originating Server'
       to='Receiving Server'
       type='invalid'
       id='457F9224A0...'/>

        Note: if If the ID does not match that provided by Receiving Server
        in Step 3, then Receiving Server MUST generate an <invalid-id/>
        stream error condition and terminate both the XML stream and the
        underlying TCP connection.  If the value of the 'to' address
        does not match a hostname recognized by Receiving Server, then
        Receiving Server MUST generate a <host-unknown/> stream error
        condition and terminate both the XML stream and the underlying
        TCP connection.  If the value of the 'from' address does not
        match the hostname represented by Originating Server when
        opening the TCP connection (or any validated domain), then
        Receiving Server MUST generate an <invalid-from/> stream error
        condition and terminate both the XML stream and the underlying
        TCP connection.  After returning the verification to Receiving
        Server, Authoritative Server SHOULD terminate the stream between
        them.

   10.  Receiving Server informs Originating Server of the result:

   <db:result
       from='Receiving Server'
       to='Originating Server'
       type='valid'/>

        Note: At this point the connection has either been validated via
        a type='valid', or reported as invalid.  If the connection is
        invalid, then Receiving Server MUST terminate both the XML
        stream and the underlying TCP connection.  If the connection is
        validated, data can be sent by Originating Server and read by
        Receiving Server; before that, all data stanzas sent to
        Receiving Server SHOULD be silently dropped.

   Even if dialback negotiation is successful, a server MUST verify that
   all XML stanzas received from the other server include a 'from'
   attribute and a 'to' attribute; if a stanza does not meet this
   restriction, the server that receives the stanza MUST generate an
   <improper-addressing/> stream error condition and terminate both the
   XML stream and the underlying TCP connection.  Furthermore, a server
   MUST verify that the 'from' attribute of stanzas received from the
   other server includes a validated domain for the stream; if a stanza
   does not meet this restriction, the server that receives the stanza
   MUST generate an <invalid-from/> stream error condition and terminate
   both the XML stream and the underlying TCP connection.  Both of these
   checks help to prevent spoofing related to particular stanzas.

9. XML Stanzas

   After Stream Encryption TLS negotiation (Section 5) if desired, Stream Authentication SASL negotiation
   (Section 6), and Resource Binding (Section 7) if necessary, XML
   stanzas can be sent over the streams.  Three kinds of XML stanza are
   defined for the 'jabber:client' and 'jabber:server' namespaces:
   <message/>, <presence/>, and <iq/>.  In addition, there are five
   common attributes for these kinds of stanza.  These common
   attributes, as well as the basic semantics of the three stanza kinds,
   are defined herein; more detailed information regarding the syntax of
   XML stanzas in relation to instant messaging and presence
   applications is provided in XMPP IM [21]. [XMPP-IM].

9.1 Common Attributes

   The following five attributes are common to message, presence, and IQ
   stanzas:

9.1.1 to

   The 'to' attribute specifies the JID of the intended recipient for
   the stanza.

   In the 'jabber:client' namespace, a stanza SHOULD possess a 'to'
   attribute, although a stanza sent from a client to a server for
   handling by that server (e.g., presence sent to the server for
   broadcasting to other entities) SHOULD NOT possess a 'to' attribute.

   In the 'jabber:server' namespace, a stanza MUST possess a 'to'
   attribute; if a server receives a stanza that does not meet this
   restriction, it MUST generate an <improper-addressing/> stream error
   condition and terminate both the XML stream and the underlying TCP
   connection with the offending server.

   If the value of the 'to' attribute is invalid or cannot be contacted,
   the entity discovering that fact (usually the sender's or recipient's
   server) MUST return an appropriate error to the sender, setting the
   'from' attribute of the error stanza to the value provided in the
   'to' attribute of the offending stanza.

9.1.2 from

   The 'from' attribute specifies the JID of the sender.

   When a server receives an XML stanza within the context of an
   authenticated stream qualified by the 'jabber:client' namespace, it
   MUST do one of the following:

   1.  validate that the value of the 'from' attribute provided by the
       client is that of an authorized resource for the associated
       entity

   2.  add a 'from' address to the stanza whose value is the full JID
       (<node@domain/resource>) determined by the server for the
       connected resource that generated the stanza (see Determination
       of Addresses (Section 3.6)) 3.5))

   If a client attempts to send an XML stanza for which the value of the
   'from' attribute does not match one of the connected resources for
   that entity, the server SHOULD return an <invalid-from/> stream error
   to the client.  If a client attempts to send an XML stanza over a
   stream that is not yet authenticated, the server SHOULD return a
   <not-authorized/> stream error to the client.  If generated, both of
   these conditions MUST result in closing of the stream and termination
   of the underlying TCP connection; this helps to prevent a denial of
   service attack launched from a rogue client.

   In the 'jabber:server' namespace, a stanza MUST possess a 'from'
   attribute; if a server receives a stanza that does not meet this
   restriction, it MUST generate an <improper-addressing/> stream error
   condition.  Furthermore, the domain identifier portion of the JID
   contained in the 'from' attribute MUST match the hostname (or any
   validated domain) of the sending server as communicated in the SASL
   negotiation or dialback negotiation; if a server receives a stanza
   that does not meet this restriction, it MUST generate an
   <invalid-from/> stream error condition.  Both of these conditions
   MUST result in closing of the stream and termination of the
   underlying TCP connection; this helps to prevent a denial of service
   attack launched from a rogue server.

9.1.3 id

   The optional 'id' attribute MAY be used by a sending entity for
   internal tracking of stanzas that it sends and receives (especially
   for tracking the request-response interaction inherent in the
   semantics of IQ stanzas).  The value of the 'id' attribute is NOT
   REQUIRED to be unique either globally, within a domain, or within a
   stream.  The semantics of IQ stanzas impose additional restrictions;
   see IQ Semantics (Section 9.2.3).

9.1.4 type

   The 'type' attribute specifies detailed information about the purpose
   or context of the message, presence, or IQ stanza.  The particular
   allowable values for the 'type' attribute vary depending on whether
   the stanza is a message, presence, or IQ; the values for message and
   presence stanzas are specific to instant messaging and presence
   applications and therefore are defined in XMPP IM [21], [XMPP-IM], whereas the
   values for IQ stanzas specify the role of an IQ stanza in a
   structured request-response "conversation" and thus are defined under
   IQ Semantics (Section 9.2.3) below.  The only 'type' value common to
   all three stanzas is "error", for which see Stanza Errors (Section
   9.3).

9.1.5 xml:lang

   A stanza SHOULD possess an 'xml:lang' attribute (as defined in
   Section 2.12 of the XML specification [1]) [XML]) if the stanza contains XML character data that
   is intended to be presented to a human user (as explained in RFC 2277 [15],
   [CHARSET], "internationalization is for humans").  The value of the
   'xml:lang' attribute specifies the default language of any such
   human-readable XML character data, which MAY be overridden by the
   'xml:lang' attribute of a specific child element.  If a stanza does
   not possess an 'xml:lang' attribute, an implementation MUST assume
   that the default language is that specified for the stream as defined
   under Stream Attributes (Section 4.2) above.  The value of the
   'xml:lang' attribute MUST be an NMTOKEN and MUST conform to the
   format defined in RFC 3066 [16]. [LANGTAGS].

9.2 Basic Semantics

9.2.1 Message Semantics

   The <message/> stanza kind can be seen as a "push" mechanism whereby
   one entity pushes information to another entity, similar to the
   communications that occur in a system such as email.  All message
   stanzas SHOULD possess a 'to' attribute that specifies the intended
   recipient of the message; upon receiving such a stanza, a server
   SHOULD route or deliver it to the intended recipient (see Server
   Rules for Handling XML Stanzas (Section 14) 10) for general routing and
   delivery rules related to XML stanzas).

9.2.2 Presence Semantics

   The <presence/> element can be seen as a basic broadcast or
   "publish-subscribe" mechanism, whereby multiple entities receive
   information (in this case, presence information) about an entity to
   which they have subscribed.  In general, a publishing entity SHOULD
   send a presence stanza with no 'to' attribute, in which case the
   server to which the entity is connected SHOULD broadcast or multiplex
   that stanza to all subscribing entities.  However, a publishing
   entity MAY also send a presence stanza with a 'to' attribute, in
   which case the server SHOULD route or deliver that stanza to the
   intended recipient.  See Server Rules for Handling XML Stanzas
   (Section 14) 10) for general routing and delivery rules related to XML
   stanzas, and XMPP
   IM [21] [XMPP-IM] for presence-specific rules in the context of
   an instant messaging and presence application.

9.2.3 IQ Semantics

   Info/Query, or IQ, is a request-response mechanism, similar in some
   ways to HTTP [22]. [HTTP].  The semantics of IQ enable an entity to make a
   request of, and receive a response from, another entity.  The data
   content of the request and response is defined by the namespace
   declaration of a direct child element of the IQ element, and the
   interaction is tracked by the requesting entity through use of the
   'id' attribute.  Thus IQ interactions follow a common pattern of
   structured data exchange such as get/result or set/result (although
   an error may be returned in reply to a request if appropriate):

   Requesting                 Responding
     Entity                     Entity
   ----------                 ----------
       |                           |
       | <iq type='get' id='1'>    |
       | ------------------------> |
       |                           |
       | <iq type='result' id='1'> |
       | <------------------------ |
       |                           |
       | <iq type='set' id='2'>    |
       | ------------------------> |
       |                           |
       | <iq type='error' id='2'>  |
       | <------------------------ |
       |                           |

   In order to enforce these semantics, the following rules apply:

   1.  The 'id' attribute is REQUIRED for IQ stanzas.

   2.  The 'type' attribute is REQUIRED for IQ stanzas.  The value SHOULD MUST
       be one of the following (all other values SHOULD be ignored): following:

   3.

       *  get -- The stanza is a request for information or
          requirements.

       *  set -- The stanza provides required data, sets new values, or
          replaces existing values.

       *  result -- The stanza is a response to a successful get or set
          request.

       *  error -- An error has occurred regarding processing or
          delivery of a previously-sent get or set (see Stanza Errors
          (Section 9.3)).

   3.

   4.  An entity that receives an IQ request of type "get" or "set" MUST
       reply with an IQ response of type "result" or "error" (which
       response MUST preserve the 'id' attribute of the request).

   4.

   5.  An entity that receives a stanza of type "result" or "error" MUST
       NOT respond to the stanza by sending a further IQ response of
       type "result" or "error"; however, as shown above, the requesting
       entity MAY send another request (e.g., an IQ of type "set" in
       order to provide required information discovered through a get/
       result pair).

   5.

   6.  An IQ stanza of type "get" or "set" MUST contain one and only one
       child element (properly-namespaced as defined in XMPP IM [21]) [XMPP-IM]) that
       specifies the semantics of the particular request or response.

   6.

   7.  An IQ stanza of type "result" MUST include zero or one child
       elements.

   7.

   8.  An IQ stanza of type "error" SHOULD include the child element
       contained in the associated "get" or "set" and MUST include an
       <error/> child; for details, see Stanza Errors (Section 9.3).

9.3 Stanza Errors

   Stanza-related errors are handled in a manner similar to stream
   errors (Section 4.6).  However, stanza errors are not unrecoverable,
   as stream errors are; therefore error stanzas include hints regarding
   actions that the original sender can take in order to remedy the
   error.

9.3.1 Rules

   The following rules apply to stanza-related errors:

   o  The receiving or processing entity that detects an error condition
      in relation to a stanza MUST return to the sending entity a stanza
      of the same kind (message, presence, or IQ) whose 'type' attribute
      is set to a value of "error" (such a stanza is called an "error
      stanza" herein).

   o  The entity that generates an error stanza SHOULD (but is NOT
      REQUIRED to) include the original XML sent so that the sender can
      inspect and if necessary correct the XML before attempting to
      resend.

   o  An error stanza MUST contain an <error/> child element.

   o  An <error/> child MUST NOT be included if the 'type' attribute has
      a value other than "error" (or if there is no 'type' attribute).

   o  An entity that receives an error stanza MUST NOT respond to the
      stanza with a further error stanza; this helps to prevent looping.

9.3.2 Syntax

   The syntax for stanza-related errors is as follows:

   <stanza-name to='sender' type='error'>
     [RECOMMENDED to include sender XML here]
     <error type='error-type'>
       <defined-condition xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-stanzas'/>
       <text xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-stanzas'>
         OPTIONAL descriptive text
       </text>
       [OPTIONAL application-specific condition element]
     </error>
   </stanza-name>

   The stanza-name is one of message, presence, or iq.

   The value of the <error/> element's 'type' attribute MUST be one of
   the following:

   o  cancel -- do not retry (the error is unrecoverable)

   o  continue -- proceed (the condition was only a warning)

   o  modify -- retry after changing the data sent

   o  auth -- retry after providing credentials

   o  wait -- retry after waiting (the error is temporary)

   The <error/> element:

   o  MUST contain a child element corresponding to one of the defined
      stanza error conditions specified below; this element MUST be
      qualified by the 'urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-stanzas' namespace.

   o  MAY contain a <text/> child containing CDATA that describes the
      error in more detail; this element MUST be qualified by the
      'urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-stanzas' namespace and SHOULD possess
      an 'xml:lang' attribute.

   o  MAY contain a child element for an application-specific error
      condition; this element MUST be qualified by an
      application-defined namespace, and its structure is defined by
      that namespace.

   The <text/> element is OPTIONAL.  If included, it SHOULD be used only
   to provide descriptive or diagnostic information that supplements the
   meaning of a defined condition or application-specific condition.  It
   SHOULD NOT be interpreted programmatically by an application.  It
   SHOULD NOT be used as the error message presented to a user, but MAY
   be shown in addition to the error message associated with the
   included condition element (or elements).

   Note: the XML namespace name 'urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-stanzas'
   that qualifies the descriptive element adheres

   Finally, to maintain backward compatibility, the format defined schema (specified in The IETF XML Registry [24].
   [XMPP-IM]) allows the optional inclusion of a 'code' attribute on the
   <error/&gr; element.

9.3.3 Defined Conditions

   The following stanza-related error conditions are defined for use in
   stanza errors.

   o  <bad-request/> -- the sender has sent XML that is malformed or
      that cannot be processed (e.g., an IQ stanza that includes an
      unrecognized value of the 'type' attribute); the associated error
      type SHOULD be "modify".

   o  <conflict/> -- access cannot be granted because an existing
      resource or session exists with the same name or address; the
      associated error type SHOULD be "cancel".

   o  <feature-not-implemented/> -- the feature requested is not
      implemented by the recipient or server and therefore cannot be
      processed; the associated error type SHOULD be "cancel".

   o  <forbidden/> -- the requesting entity does not possess the
      required permissions to perform the action; the associated error
      type SHOULD be "auth".

   o  <gone/> -- the recipient or server can no longer be contacted at
      this address (the error stanza MAY contain a new address in the
      CDATA of the <gongone/> <gone/> element); the associated error type SHOULD be
      "modify".

   o  <internal-server-error/> -- the server could not process the
      stanza because of a misconfiguration or an otherwise-undefined
      internal server error; the associated error type SHOULD be "wait".

   o  <item-not-found/> -- the addressed JID or item requested cannot be
      found; the associated error type SHOULD be "cancel".

   o  <jid-malformed/> -- the value of the 'to' attribute in the
      sender's stanza does not adhere to the syntax defined in
      Addressing Scheme (Section 3); the associated error type SHOULD be
      "modify".

   o  <not-acceptable/> -- the recipient or server understands the
      request but is refusing to process it because it does not meet
      criteria defined by the recipient or server (e.g., a local policy
      regarding acceptable words in messages); the associated error type
      SHOULD be "cancel".

   o  <not-allowed/> -- the recipient or server does not allow any
      entity to perform the action; the associated error type SHOULD be
      "cancel".

   o  <payment-required/> -- the requesting entity is not authorized to
      access the requested service because payment is required; the
      associated error type SHOULD be "auth".

   o  <recipient-unavailable/> -- the intended recipient is temporarily
      unavailable; the associated error type SHOULD be "wait" (note: an
      application MUST NOT return this error if doing so would provide
      information about the intended recipient's network availability to
      an entity that is not authorized to know such information).

   o  <redirect/> -- the recipient or server is redirecting requests for
      this information to another entity, usually temporarily (the error
      stanza MAY contain a new address in the CDATA of the <redirect/>
      element); the associated error type SHOULD be "modify".

   o  <registration-required/> -- the requesting entity is not
      authorized to access the requested service because registration is
      required; the associated error type SHOULD be "auth".

   o  <remote-server-not-found/> -- a remote server or service specified
      as part or all of the JID of the intended recipient does not
      exist; the associated error type SHOULD be "cancel".

   o  <remote-server-timeout/> -- a remote server or service specified
      as part or all of the JID of the intended recipient could not be
      contacted within a reasonable amount of time; the associated error
      type SHOULD be "wait".

   o  <resource-constraint/> -- the server or recipient lacks the system
      resources necessary to service the request; the associated error
      type SHOULD be "wait".

   o  <service-unavailable/> -- the server or recipient does not
      currently provide the requested service; the associated error type
      SHOULD be "cancel".

   o  <subscription-required/> -- the requesting entity is not
      authorized to access the requested service because a subscription
      is required; the associated error type SHOULD be "auth".

   o  <undefined-condition/> -- the error condition is not one of those
      defined by the other conditions in this list; any error type may
      be associated with this condition, and it SHOULD be used only in
      conjunction with an application-specific condition.

   o  <unexpected-request/> -- the recipient or server understood the
      request but was not expecting it at this time (e.g., the request
      was out of order); the associated error type SHOULD be "wait".

9.3.4 Application-Specific Conditions

   As noted, an application MAY provide application-specific stanza
   error information by including a properly-namespaced child in the
   error element.  The application-specific element SHOULD supplement or
   further qualify a defined element.  Thus the <error/> element will
   contain two or three child elements:

   <iq type='error' id='some-id'>
     <error type='modify'>
       <bad-request xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-stanzas'/>
       <too-many-parameters xmlns='application-ns'/>
     </error>
   </iq>

   <message type='error' id='another-id'>
     <error type='modify'>
       <undefined-condition
             xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-stanzas'/>
       <text xml:lang='en'
             xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-stanzas'>
         Some special application diagnostic information...
       </text>
       <special-application-condition xmlns='application-ns'/>
     </error>
   </message>

10. Server Rules for Handling XML Usage within XMPP Stanzas

   Compliant server implementations MUST ensure in-order processing of
   XML stanzas between any two entities.

   Beyond the requirement for in-order processing, each server
   implementation will contain its own "delivery tree" for handling
   stanzas it receives.  Such a tree determines whether a stanza needs
   to be routed to another domain, processed internally, or delivered to
   a resource associated with a connected node.  The following rules
   apply:

10.1 Restrictions

   XMPP No 'to' Address

   If the stanza possesses no 'to' attribute, the server SHOULD process
   it on behalf of the entity that sent it.  Because all stanzas
   received from other servers MUST possess a 'to' attribute, this rule
   applies only to stanzas received from a registered entity (such as a
   client) that is connected to the server.  If the server receives a simplified and specialized protocol for streaming XML
   elements in order
   presence stanza with no 'to' attribute, the server SHOULD broadcast
   it to exchange structured information in close the entities that are subscribed to real
   time. Because XMPP does not require the parsing sending entity's
   presence, if applicable (the semantics of arbitrary presence broadcast for
   instant messaging and
   complete XML documents, there is presence applications are defined in
   [XMPP-IM]).  If the server receives an IQ stanza of type "get" or
   "set" with no requirement 'to' attribute and it understands the namespace that XMPP needs to
   support
   qualifies the full XML specification [1]. In particular, content of the following
   restrictions apply.

   With regard to XML generation, an XMPP implementation stanza, it MUST NOT inject
   into an XML stream any of either process the following:

   o  comments (as defined in Section 2.5
   stanza on behalf of the XML specification [1])

   o  processing instructions (Section 2.6 therein)

   o  internal or external DTD subsets (Section 2.8 therein)

   o  internal or external sending entity references (Section 4.2 therein) with (where the exception meaning of predefined entities (Section 4.6 therein)

   o  character data or attribute values containing unescaped characters
      that map to "process" is
   determined by the predefined entities (Section 4.6 therein); such
      characters MUST be escaped

   With regard to XML processing, if semantics of the qualifying namespace) or return an XMPP implementation receives
   such restricted XML data, it MUST ignore
   error to the data. sending entity.

10.2 XML Namespace Names and Prefixes

   XML Namespaces [10] are used within all XMPP-compliant XML to create
   strict boundaries Foreign Domain

   If the hostname of data ownership. The basic function the domain identifier portion of namespaces
   is the JID contained
   in the 'to' attribute does not match one of the configured hostnames
   of the server itself or a subdomain thereof, the server SHOULD route
   the stanza to separate different vocabularies of XML elements that are
   structurally mixed together. Ensuring that XMPP-compliant XML is
   namespace-aware enables any allowable XML the foreign domain (subject to be structurally mixed
   with any data element within XMPP. Rules for XML namespace names local service
   provisioning and
   prefixes security policies regarding inter-domain
   communication).  There are defined in the following subsections.

10.2.1 Streams Namespace two possible cases:

   A streams namespace declaration is REQUIRED in all XML server-to-server stream
   headers. already exists between the two domains: The name of
      sender's server routes the streams namespace MUST be 'http://
   etherx.jabber.org/streams'. stanza to the authoritative server for
      the foreign domain over the existing stream

   There exists no server-to-server stream between the two domains: The element names
      sender's server (1) resolves the hostname of the <stream/>
   element foreign domain
      (as defined under Server-to-Server Communications (Section 14.3)),
      (2) negotiates a server-to-server stream between the two domains
      (as defined under Use of TLS (Section 5) and its <features/> Use of SASL (Section
      6)), and <error/> children MUST be qualified
   by (3) routes the streams namespace prefix in all instances. An implementation
   SHOULD generate only stanza to the 'stream:' prefix for these elements, and authoritative server for
   historical reasons MAY accept only the 'stream:' prefix.

10.2.2 Default Namespace

   A default namespace declaration
      foreign domain over the newly-established stream

   If routing to the recipient's server is REQUIRED and unsuccessful, the sender's
   server MUST return an error to the sender; if the recipient's server
   can be contacted but delivery by the recipient's server to the
   recipient is used in all XML
   streams in order unsuccessful, the recipient's server MUST return an
   error to define the allowable first-level children sender by way of the
   root stream element. This namespace declaration MUST be sender's server.

10.3 Subdomain

   If the same for hostname of the initial stream and domain identifier portion of the response stream so that both streams are
   qualified consistently. The default namespace declaration applies to JID contained
   in the stream and all stanzas sent within 'to' attribute matches a stream (unless explicitly
   qualified by another namespace, or by subdomain of one of the prefix configured
   hostnames of the streams
   namespace or server itself, the dialback namespace).

   A server implementation MUST support either process the following two default
   namespaces (for historical reasons, some implementations MAY support
   only these two default namespaces):

   o  jabber:client -- this default namespace is declared when
   stanza itself or route the
      stream is used for communications between a client and stanza to a server

   o  jabber:server -- this default namespace is declared when the
      stream specialized service that is used for communications between two servers

   A client implementation MUST support the 'jabber:client' default
   namespace, and
   responsible for historical reasons MAY support only that default
   namespace.

   An implementation MUST NOT generate namespace prefixes for elements
   in the default namespace if subdomain (if the default namespace subdomain is 'jabber:client' configured), or 'jabber:server'. An implementation SHOULD NOT generate namespace
   prefixes for elements qualified by content (as opposed
   return an error to stream)
   namespaces other than 'jabber:client' and 'jabber:server'.

   Note: the 'jabber:client' and 'jabber:server' namespaces are nearly
   identical but are used in different contexts (client-to-server
   communications for 'jabber:client' and server-to-server
   communications for 'jabber:server'). The only difference between sender (if the subdomain is not configured).

10.4 Mere Domain or Specific Resource

   If the hostname of the domain identifier portion of the
   two is that JID contained
   in the 'to' and 'from' attributes are OPTIONAL on stanzas
   sent within 'jabber:client', whereas they are REQUIRED on stanzas
   sent within 'jabber:server'. If a compliant implementation accepts attribute matches a
   stream that configured hostname of the server
   itself and the JID contained in the 'to' attribute is qualified by of the 'jabber:client' form
   <domain> or 'jabber:server'
   namespace, it <domain/resource>, the server (or a defined resource
   thereof) MUST support either process the common attributes (Section 9.1) and
   basic semantics (Section 9.2) of all three core stanza kinds
   (message, presence, and IQ).

10.2.3 Dialback Namespace

   A dialback namespace declaration is REQUIRED as appropriate for all elements used the stanza
   kind or return an error stanza to the sender.

10.5 Node in
   server dialback (Section 8). The name Same Domain

   If the hostname of the dialback namespace MUST
   be 'jabber:server:dialback'. All elements qualified by this namespace
   MUST be prefixed. An implementation SHOULD generate only domain identifier portion of the 'db:'
   prefix for such elements and MAY accept only JID contained
   in the 'db:' prefix.

10.3 Validation

   Except as noted with regard to 'to' and 'from' addresses for stanzas
   within the 'jabber:server' namespace, attribute matches a configured hostname of the server
   itself and the JID contained in the 'to' attribute is not responsible for
   validating of the XML elements forwarded to a client form
   <node@domain> or another server;
   an implementation MAY choose <node@domain/resource>, the server SHOULD deliver
   the stanza to provide only validated data elements
   but the intended recipient of the stanza as represented by
   the JID contained in the 'to' attribute.  The following rules apply:

   1.  If the JID contains a resource identifier (i.e., is of the form
       <node@domain/resource>) and there is NOT REQUIRED to do so (although an implementation MUST NOT
   accept XML available resource that is not well-formed). Clients
       matches the full JID, the recipient's server SHOULD NOT rely on deliver the
   ability to send data which does not conform
       stanza to the schemas, and
   SHOULD ignore any non-conformant elements stream or attributes on session that exactly matches the
   incoming XML stream. Validation of XML streams resource
       identifier.

   2.  If the JID contains a resource identifier and stanzas there is NOT
   REQUIRED or recommended, and schemas are included herein for
   descriptive purposes only.

10.4 Inclusion of Text Declaration

   Implementations SHOULD send a text declaration before sending a
   stream header. Applications MUST follow no
       available resource that matches the rules in full JID, the XML
   specification [1] regarding recipient's
       server SHOULD return to the circumstances under which sender a text
   declaration is included.

10.5 Character Encoding

   Implementations MUST support <service-unavailable/>
       stanza error.

   3.  If the UTF-8 (RFC 2279 [17]) transformation JID is of Universal Character Set (ISO/IEC 10646-1 [18]) characters, as
   required by RFC 2277 [15]. Implementations MUST NOT attempt to use
   any other encoding.

11. IANA Considerations

11.1 XML Namespace Name for TLS Data

   A URN sub-namespace for TLS-related data in the Extensible Messaging form <node@domain> and Presence Protocol (XMPP) is defined as follows.

   URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-tls

   Specification: [RFCXXXX]

   Description: This there is the XML namespace name at least one
       available resource available for TLS-related data in the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) as defined
      by [RFCXXXX].

   Registrant Contact: IETF, XMPP Working Group, <xmppwg@jabber.org>

11.2 XML Namespace Name for SASL Data

   A URN sub-namespace for SASL-related data in node, the recipient's server
       MUST deliver the stanza to at least one of the Extensible Messaging available
       resources, according to application-specific rules (a set of
       delivery rules for instant messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) presence applications is
       defined as follows.

   URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl

   Specification: [RFCXXXX]

   Description: This is the XML namespace name for SASL-related data in
      the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) as defined
      by [RFCXXXX].

   Registrant Contact: IETF, XMPP Working Group, <xmppwg@jabber.org>

11.3 [XMPP-IM]).

11. XML Namespace Name for Stream Errors

   A URN sub-namespace Usage within XMPP

11.1 Restrictions

   XMPP is a simplified and specialized protocol for stream-related error data streaming XML
   elements in order to exchange structured information in close to real
   time.  Because XMPP does not require the Extensible
   Messaging parsing of arbitrary and Presence Protocol (XMPP) is defined as follows.

   URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-streams

   Specification: [RFCXXXX]

   Description: This
   complete XML documents, there is no requirement that XMPP needs to
   support the XML namespace name for stream-related error
      data in full feature set of [XML].  In particular, the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) as
      defined by [RFCXXXX].

   Registrant Contact: IETF, following
   restrictions apply.

   With regard to XML generation, an XMPP Working Group, <xmppwg@jabber.org>

11.4 implementation MUST NOT inject
   into an XML Namespace Name for Resource Binding

   A URN sub-namespace for resource binding in stream any of the Extensible Messaging
   and Presence Protocol (XMPP) is following:

   o  comments (as defined as follows.

   URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-bind

   Specification: [RFCXXXX]

   Description: This is in Section 2.5 of [XML])

   o  processing instructions (Section 2.6 therein)

   o  internal or external DTD subsets (Section 2.8 therein)

   o  internal or external entity references (Section 4.2 therein) with
      the exception of predefined entities (Section 4.6 therein)

   o  character data or attribute values containing unescaped characters
      that map to the predefined entities (Section 4.6 therein); such
      characters MUST be escaped

   With regard to XML namespace name for resource binding in
      the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) as defined
      by [RFCXXXX].

   Registrant Contact: IETF, processing, if an XMPP Working Group, <xmppwg@jabber.org>

11.5 implementation receives
   such restricted XML Namespace Name for Stanza Errors

   A URN sub-namespace for stanza-related error data in the Extensible
   Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) is defined as follows.

   URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-stanzas

   Specification: [RFCXXXX]

   Description: This is data, it MUST ignore the data.

11.2 XML namespace name for stanza-related error
      data in the Extensible Messaging Namespace Names and Presence Protocol (XMPP) as
      defined by [RFCXXXX].

   Registrant Contact: IETF, XMPP Working Group, <xmppwg@jabber.org>

11.6 Nodeprep Profile Prefixes

   XML Namespaces [XML-NAMES] are used within all XMPP-compliant XML to
   create strict boundaries of Stringprep data ownership.  The Nodeprep profile basic function of stringprep
   namespaces is defined under Nodeprep
   (Appendix A). The IANA registers Nodeprep in the stringprep profile
   registry.

   Name to separate different vocabularies of this profile:

      Nodeprep

   RFC in which the profile is defined:

      [RFCXXXX]

   Indicator whether or not this XML elements that
   are structurally mixed together.  Ensuring that XMPP-compliant XML is
   namespace-aware enables any allowable XML to be structurally mixed
   with any data element within XMPP.  Rules for XML namespace names and
   prefixes are defined in the newest version of the profile:

      This following subsections.

11.2.1 Streams Namespace

   A streams namespace declaration is the first version of Nodeprep

11.7 Resourceprep Profile of Stringprep REQUIRED in all XML stream
   headers.  The Resourceprep profile name of stringprep is defined under Resourceprep
   (Appendix B). The IANA registers Resourceprep in the stringprep
   profile registry.

   Name streams namespace MUST be 'http://
   etherx.jabber.org/streams'.  The element names of this profile:

      Resourceprep

   RFC the <stream/>
   element and its <features/> and <error/> children MUST be qualified
   by the streams namespace prefix in which all instances.  An implementation
   SHOULD generate only the profile 'stream:' prefix for these elements, and for
   historical reasons MAY accept only the 'stream:' prefix.

11.2.2 Default Namespace

   A default namespace declaration is defined:

      [RFCXXXX]

   Indicator whether or not this REQUIRED and is used in all XML
   streams in order to define the newest version allowable first-level children of the profile:
   root stream element.  This is namespace declaration MUST be the first version of Resourceprep

11.8 GSSAPI Service Name

   The IANA registers "xmpp" as a GSSAPI [19] service name, as defined
   under SASL Definition (Section 6.3).

11.9 Port Numbers

   The IANA currently registers "jabber-client" and "jabber-server" as
   keywords same for TCP ports 5222
   the initial stream and 5269 respectively. the response stream so that both streams are
   qualified consistently.  The IANA shall
   change these registrations default namespace declaration applies to "xmpp-client" and "xmpp-server"
   respectively.

   These ports SHOULD be used for client-to-server
   the stream and server-to-server
   communications respectively, but their use is NOT REQUIRED.

12. Internationalization Considerations

   XML all stanzas sent within a stream (unless explicitly
   qualified by another namespace, or by the prefix of the streams
   namespace or the dialback namespace).

   A server implementation MUST be encoded in UTF-8 as specified under Character
   Encoding (Section 10.5). As specified under Stream Attributes
   (Section 4.2), an XML stream SHOULD include an 'xml:lang' attribute
   that is treated as support the following two default language for any XML character data
   sent over
   namespaces (for historical reasons, some implementations MAY support
   only these two default namespaces):

   o  jabber:client -- this default namespace is declared when the
      stream that is intended to be presented to used for communications between a human
   user. As specified under xml:lang (Section 9.1.5), an XML stanza
   SHOULD include an 'xml:lang' attribute if client and a server

   o  jabber:server -- this default namespace is declared when the stanza contains XML
   character data that
      stream is intended to be presented to a human user. used for communications between two servers

   A
   server SHOULD apply client implementation MUST support the 'jabber:client' default 'xml:lang' attribute to stanzas it
   routes or delivers on behalf of connected entities,
   namespace, and for historical reasons MAY support only that default
   namespace.

   An implementation MUST NOT
   modify or delete 'xml:lang' attributes from stanzas it receives from
   other entities.

13. Security Considerations

13.1 High Security

   For the purposes of XMPP communications (client-to-server and
   server-to-server), generate namespace prefixes for elements
   in the term "high security" refers to default namespace if the use of
   security technologies that provide both mutual authentication and
   integrity-checking; in particular, when using certificate-based
   authentication to provide high security, a chain-of-trust SHOULD be
   established out-of-band, although a shared certificate authority
   signing certificates could allow a previously unknown certificate to
   establish trust in-band.

   Standalone, self-signed service certificates default namespace is 'jabber:client'
   or 'jabber:server'.  An implementation SHOULD NOT be used;
   rather, an entity that wishes to generate a self-signed service
   certificate SHOULD first generate a self-signed Root CA certificate namespace
   prefixes for elements qualified by content (as opposed to stream)
   namespaces other than 'jabber:client' and then generate a signed service certificate. Entities that
   communicate with the service SHOULD be configured with 'jabber:server'.

   Note: The 'jabber:client' and 'jabber:server' namespaces are nearly
   identical but are used in different contexts (client-to-server
   communications for 'jabber:client' and server-to-server
   communications for 'jabber:server').  The only difference between the Root CA
   certificate rather than
   two is that the service certificate; this avoids problems
   associated with simple comparison of service certificates. 'to' and 'from' attributes are OPTIONAL on stanzas
   sent within 'jabber:client', whereas they are REQUIRED on stanzas
   sent within 'jabber:server'.  If a
   self-signed service certificate is used, an entity SHOULD NOT trust
   it if it is changed to another self-signed certificate or a
   certificate signed by an unrecognized authority.

   Implementations MUST support high security. Service provisioning
   SHOULD use high security, subject to local security policies.

13.2 Client-to-Server Communications

   A compliant implementation accepts a
   stream that is qualified by the 'jabber:client' or 'jabber:server'
   namespace, it MUST support both TLS the common attributes (Section 9.1) and SASL for
   connections to a server.

   The TLS protocol
   basic semantics (Section 9.2) of all three core stanza kinds
   (message, presence, and IQ).

11.2.3 Dialback Namespace

   A dialback namespace declaration is REQUIRED for encrypting XML streams (defined under Stream
   Encryption all elements used in
   server dialback (Section 5)) provides a reliable mechanism 8).  The name of the dialback namespace MUST
   be 'jabber:server:dialback'.  All elements qualified by this
   namespace MUST be prefixed.  An implementation SHOULD generate only
   the 'db:' prefix for helping to
   ensure such elements and MAY accept only the confidentiality 'db:'
   prefix.

11.3 Validation

   Except as noted with regard to 'to' and data integrity of data exchanged
   between two entities.

   The SASL protocol 'from' addresses for authenticating XML streams (defined under
   Stream Authentication (Section 6)) provides stanzas
   within the 'jabber:server' namespace, a reliable mechanism server is not responsible for
   validating that the XML elements forwarded to a client connecting or another server;
   an implementation MAY choose to a server provide only validated data elements
   but is who it claims NOT REQUIRED to
   be.

   Client-to-server communications do so (although an implementation MUST NOT proceed until
   accept XML that is not well-formed).  Clients SHOULD NOT rely on the DNS
   hostname asserted by
   ability to send data which does not conform to the server has been resolved. Such resolutions schemas, and
   SHOULD first attempt to resolve ignore any non-conformant elements or attributes on the hostname using an SRV [20]
   Service
   incoming XML stream.  Validation of "xmpp-client" XML streams and Proto of "tcp", resulting in resource
   records such as "_xmpp-client._tcp.example.com." (the use stanzas is NOT
   REQUIRED or recommended, and schemas are included herein for
   descriptive purposes only.

11.4 Inclusion of Text Declaration

   Implementations SHOULD send a text declaration before sending a
   stream header.  Applications MUST follow the
   string "xmpp-client" for rules in [XML] regarding
   the service identifier circumstances under which a text declaration is consistent with
   the IANA registration). If the SRV lookup fails, included.

11.5 Character Encoding

   Implementations MUST support the fallback is a
   normal IPv4/IPv6 address record resolution UTF-8 (RFC 2279 [UTF-8])
   transformation of Universal Character Set (ISO/IEC 10646-1 [UCS2])
   characters, as required by RFC 2277 [CHARSET].  Implementations MUST
   NOT attempt to determine the IP
   address, using use any other encoding.

12. Core Compliance Requirements

   This section summarizes the "xmpp-client" port specific aspects of 5222 assigned the Extensible
   Messaging and Presence Protocol that MUST be supported by servers and
   clients in order to be considered compliant implementations, as well
   as additional protocol aspects that SHOULD be supported.  For
   compliance purposes, we draw a distinction between core protocols
   (which MUST be supported by any server or client, regardless of the
   Internet Assigned Numbers Authority [5].

   The IP address
   specific application) and method of access of clients instant messaging protocols (which MUST NOT be made
   available
   supported only by a server, nor are any connections other than instant messaging and presence applications built
   on top of the
   original server connection required. This helps core protocols).  Compliance requirements that apply to protect
   all servers and clients are specified in this section; compliance
   requirements for instant messaging servers and clients are specified
   in the
   client's corresponding section of [XMPP-IM].

12.1 Servers

   In addition to all defined requirements with regard to security, XML
   usage, and internationalization, a server from direct attack or identification by third
   parties.

13.3 Server-to-Server Communications

   A compliant implementation MUST support both TLS the following
   core protocols in order to be considered compliant:

   o  Application of the [NAMEPREP], Nodeprep (Appendix A), and
      Resourceprep (Appendix B) profiles of [STRINGPREP] to addresses
      (including ensuring that domain identifiers are internationalized
      domain names as defined in [IDNA])

   o  XML streams (Section 4), including Use of TLS (Section 5), Use of
      SASL for
   inter-domain communications. For historical reasons, (Section 6), and Resource Binding (Section 7)

   o  The basic semantics of the three defined stanza kinds (i.e.,
      <message/>, <presence/>, and <iq/>) as specified in stanza
      semantics (Section 9.2)

   o  Generation (and, where appropriate, handling) of error syntax and
      semantics related to streams, TLS, SASL, and XML stanzas

   In addition, a compliant
   implementation server SHOULD also support the following core protocol:

   o  Server Dialback dialback (Section 8).

   Because service provisioning is a matter of policy, it is OPTIONAL
   for any given domain 8)

12.2 Clients

   A client MUST support the following core protocols in order to communicate with other domains, and
   server-to-server communications MAY be disabled by the administrator
   considered compliant:

   o  XML streams (Section 4), including Use of any given deployment. If a particular domain enables inter-domain
   communications, it SHOULD enable high security.

   Administrators may want to require use TLS (Section 5), Use of
      SASL for server-to-server
   communications (Section 6), and Resource Binding (Section 7)

   o  The basic semantics of the three defined stanza kinds (i.e.,
      <message/>, <presence/>, and <iq/>) as specified in order stanza
      semantics (Section 9.2)

   o  Handling (and, where appropriate, generation) of error syntax and
      semantics related to ensure both authentication streams, TLS, SASL, and
   confidentiality (e.g., on an organization's private network).
   Compliant implementations XML stanzas

   In addition, a client SHOULD support SASL for this purpose.

   Inter-domain connections MUST NOT proceed until the DNS hostnames
   asserted by the servers have been resolved. Such resolutions MUST
   first attempt following core protocols:

   o  Generation of addresses to resolve which the hostname using an SRV [20] Service of
   "xmpp-server" [NAMEPREP], Nodeprep
      (Appendix A), and Proto Resourceprep (Appendix B) profiles of "tcp", resulting
      [STRINGPREP] can be applied without failing

13. Internationalization Considerations

   XML streams MUST be encoded in resource records such UTF-8 as specified under Character
   Encoding (Section 11.5).  As specified under Stream Attributes
   (Section 4.2), an XML stream SHOULD include an 'xml:lang' attribute
   that is treated as "_xmpp-server._tcp.example.com." (the use of the string
   "xmpp-server" default language for any XML character data
   sent over the service identifier is consistent with the IANA
   registration; note well stream that the "xmpp-server" service identifier
   supersedes the earlier use of is intended to be presented to a "jabber" service identifier, since human
   user.  As specified under xml:lang (Section 9.1.5), an XML stanza
   SHOULD include an 'xml:lang' attribute if the earlier usage did not conform to RFC 2782 [20]; implementations
   desiring stanza contains XML
   character data that is intended to be backwards compatible should continue to look for or
   answer presented to a human user.  A
   server SHOULD apply the "jabber" service identifier as well). If default 'xml:lang' attribute to stanzas it
   routes or delivers on behalf of connected entities, and MUST NOT
   modify or delete 'xml:lang' attributes from stanzas it receives from
   other entities.

14. Security Considerations

14.1 High Security

   For the SRV lookup
   fails, purposes of XMPP communications (client-to-server and
   server-to-server), the fallback is a normal IPv4/IPv6 address record resolution term "high security" refers to determine the IP address, using the "xmpp-server" port use of 5269
   assigned by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority [5].

   Server dialback helps protect against domain spoofing, thus making it
   more difficult
   security technologies that provide both mutual authentication and
   integrity-checking; in particular, when using certificate-based
   authentication to spoof XML stanzas. It is not provide high security, a mechanism for
   authenticating, securing, or encrypting streams between servers as is
   done via SASL and TLS. Furthermore, it is susceptible chain-of-trust SHOULD be
   established out-of-band, although a shared certificate authority
   signing certificates could allow a previously unknown certificate to DNS
   poisoning attacks unless DNSSec [29] is used,
   establish trust in-band.

   Standalone, self-signed service certificates SHOULD NOT be used;
   rather, an entity that wishes to generate a self-signed service
   certificate SHOULD first generate a self-signed Root CA certificate
   and even if then generate a signed service certificate.  Entities that
   communicate with the DNS
   information is accurate, dialback cannot protect from attacks where service SHOULD be configured with the attacker is capable of hijacking Root CA
   certificate rather than the IP address service certificate; this avoids problems
   associated with simple comparison of the remote
   domain. Domains requiring robust security SHOULD use TLS and SASL. service certificates.  If
   SASL a
   self-signed service certificate is used for server-to-server authentication, dialback used, an entity SHOULD NOT
   be used since trust
   it if it is unnecessary.

13.4 Order of Layers

   The order of layers in which protocols MUST be stacked is as follows:

   1.  TCP

   2.  TLS

   3.  SASL

   4.  XMPP

   The rationale for this order is that TCP is the base connection layer
   used by all of the protocols stacked on top of TCP, TLS is often
   provided at the operating system layer, SASL is often provided at the
   application layer, and XMPP is the application itself.

13.5 Mandatory-to-Implement Technologies

   At changed to another self-signed certificate or a minimum, all implementations
   certificate signed by an unrecognized authority.

   Implementations MUST support the following
   mechanisms:

   for authentication: the high security.  Service provisioning
   SHOULD use high security, subject to local security policies.

14.2 Client-to-Server Communications

   A compliant implementation MUST support both TLS and SASL DIGEST-MD5 mechanism for confidentiality:
   connections to a server.

   The TLS (using the TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
      cipher) protocol for both: TLS plus SASL EXTERNAL(using the
      TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA cipher supporting client-side
      certificates)

13.6 Firewalls

   Communications using XMPP normally occur over TCP sockets on port
   5222 (client-to-server) or port 5269 (server-to-server), as
   registered with the IANA [5] (see IANA Considerations (Section 11)).
   Use of these well-known ports allows administrators to easily enable
   or disable XMPP activity through existing and commonly-deployed
   firewalls.

13.7 Use of base64 in SASL

   Both encrypting XML streams (defined under Use of TLS
   (Section 5)) provides a reliable mechanism for helping to ensure the client
   confidentiality and the server SHOULD verify any base64 [14] data
   received during integrity of data exchanged between two
   entities.

   The SASL negotiation. An implementation MUST reject (not
   ignore) any characters that are not explicitly allowed by the base64
   alphabet; this helps to guard against creation protocol for authenticating XML streams (defined under Use
   of SASL (Section 6)) provides a covert channel reliable mechanism for validating
   that could be used a client connecting to "leak" information. An implementation a server is who it claims to be.

   Client-to-server communications MUST NOT
   break on invalid input and MUST reject any sequence of base64
   characters containing the pad ('=') character if that character is
   included as something other than proceed until the last character of DNS
   hostname asserted by the data (e.g.
   "=AAA" or "BBBB=CCC"); this helps server has been resolved.  Such resolutions
   SHOULD first attempt to guard against buffer overflow
   attacks and other attacks on resolve the implementation. Base encoding
   visually hides otherwise easily recognized information, hostname using an [SRV] Service
   of "xmpp-client" and Proto of "tcp", resulting in resource records
   such as
   passwords, but does not provide any computational confidentiality.
   Base 64 encoding MUST follow the definition in Section 3 of RFC 3548
   [14].

13.8 Stringprep Profiles

   XMPP makes "_xmpp-client._tcp.example.com." (the use of the Nameprep [6] profile of stringprep [7] for
   processing of domain identifiers; string
   "xmpp-client" for security considerations related
   to Nameprep, refer the service identifier is consistent with the IANA
   registration).  If the SRV lookup fails, the fallback is a normal
   IPv4/IPv6 address record resolution to determine the appropriate section of RFC 3491.

   In addition, XMPP defines two profiles IP address,
   using the "xmpp-client" port of stringprep [7]: Nodeprep
   (Appendix A) for node identifiers and Resourceprep (Appendix B) for
   resource identifiers. 5222 registered with the IANA.

   The Unicode IP address and ISO/IEC 10646 repertoires have many characters that
   look similar. In many cases, users method of security protocols might do
   visual matching, such as when comparing the names access of trusted clients MUST NOT be made
   available by a server, nor are any connections other than the
   original server connection required.  This helps to protect the
   client's server from direct attack or identification by third
   parties.

14.3 Server-to-Server Communications

   A compliant implementation MUST support both TLS and SASL for
   inter-domain communications.  For historical reasons, a compliant
   implementation SHOULD also support Server Dialback (Section 8).

   Because it service provisioning is impossible to map similar-looking characters
   without a great deal matter of context such as knowing the fonts used,
   stringprep does nothing to map similar-looking characters together
   nor policy, it is OPTIONAL
   for any given domain to prohibit some characters because they look like others.

   A node identifier can communicate with other domains, and
   server-to-server communications MAY be employed as one part disabled by the administrator
   of an entity's address any given deployment.  If a particular domain enables inter-domain
   communications, it SHOULD enable high security.

   Administrators may want to require use of SASL for server-to-server
   communications in XMPP. One common usage is as order to ensure both authentication and
   confidentiality (e.g., on an organization's private network).
   Compliant implementations SHOULD support SASL for this purpose.

   Inter-domain connections MUST NOT proceed until the DNS hostnames
   asserted by the servers have been resolved.  Such resolutions MUST
   first attempt to resolve the username of hostname using an instant messaging
   user; another is as the name [SRV] Service of a multi-user chat room;
   "xmpp-server" and many
   other kinds of entities could use node identifiers as part of their
   addresses. The security Proto of "tcp", resulting in resource records such services could be compromised based
   on different interpretations
   as "_xmpp-server._tcp.example.com." (the use of the internationalized node
   identifier; string
   "xmpp-server" for example, a user entering a single internationalized
   node the service identifier could access another user's account information, or is consistent with the IANA
   registration; note well that the "xmpp-server" service identifier
   supersedes the earlier use of a
   user could gain access "jabber" service identifier, since
   the earlier usage did not conform to an otherwise restricted chat room [SRV]; implementations desiring
   to be backward compatible should continue to look for or
   service.

   A resource answer to
   the "jabber" service identifier can be employed as one part well).  If the SRV lookup fails,
   the fallback is a normal IPv4/IPv6 address record resolution to
   determine the IP address, using the "xmpp-server" port of an entity's 5269
   registered with the IANA.

   Server dialback helps protect against domain spoofing, thus making it
   more difficult to spoof XML stanzas.  It is not a mechanism for
   authenticating, securing, or encrypting streams between servers as is
   done via SASL and TLS.  Furthermore, it is susceptible to DNS
   poisoning attacks unless DNSSec [DNSSEC] is used, and even if the DNS
   information is accurate, dialback cannot protect from attacks where
   the attacker is capable of hijacking the IP address in XMPP. One common usage of the remote
   domain.  Domains requiring robust security SHOULD use TLS and SASL.
   If SASL is as the name used for an instant
   messaging user's active session; another server-to-server authentication, dialback SHOULD
   NOT be used since it is as the nickname unnecessary.

14.4 Order of a user
   in a multi-user chat room; and many other kinds Layers

   The order of entities could use
   resource identifiers layers in which protocols MUST be stacked is as part of their addresses. follows:

   1.  TCP

   2.  TLS

   3.  SASL

   4.  XMPP

   The security rationale for this order is that [TCP] is the base connection
   layer used by all of such
   services could be compromised based the protocols stacked on different interpretations top of TCP, [TLS] is
   often provided at the internationalized resource identifier; for example, a user could
   attempt to initiate multiple sessions with operating system layer, [SASL] is often
   provided at the same name, or a user
   could send a message to someone other than application layer, and XMPP is the intended recipient in
   a multi-user chat room.

14. Server Rules for Handling XML Stanzas

   Each server implementation will contain its own "delivery tree" for
   handling stanzas it receives. Such a tree determines whether a stanza
   needs to be routed to another domain, processed internally, or
   delivered application
   itself.

14.5 Lack of SASL Channel Binding to a resource associated with a connected node. TLS

   The
   following rules apply:

14.1 No 'to' Address

   If the stanza possesses no 'to' attribute, the server SHOULD process
   it on behalf of the entity that sent it. Because all stanzas received
   from other servers MUST possess SASL framework does not provide a 'to' attribute, this rule applies
   only mechanism to stanzas received from bind SASL
   authentication to a security layer providing confidentiality and
   integrity protection that was negotiated at a registered entity (such as lower layer.  This lack
   of a client) "channel binding" prevents SASL from being able to verify that
   the source and destination end points to which the lower layer's
   security is connected bound are equivalent to the server. end points that SASL is
   authenticating.  If the server receives a presence
   stanza with no 'to' attribute, end points are not identical, the server SHOULD broadcast it lower
   layer's security cannot be trusted to protect data transmitted
   between the
   entities that are subscribed to SASL authenticated entities.  In such a situation, a SASL
   security layer should be negotiated which effectively ignores the sending entity's presence, if
   applicable (the semantics of
   presence broadcast of the lower layer security.

14.6 Mandatory-to-Implement Technologies

   At a minimum, all implementations MUST support the following
   mechanisms:

   for instant messaging
   and presence applications are defined in authentication: the SASL DIGEST-MD5 mechanism

   for confidentiality: TLS (using the TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
      cipher)

   for both: TLS plus SASL EXTERNAL(using the
      TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA cipher supporting client-side
      certificates)

14.7 Firewalls

   Communications using XMPP IM [21]). If normally occur over [TCP] sockets on port
   5222 (client-to-server) or port 5269 (server-to-server), as
   registered with the server
   receives an IQ stanza IANA (see IANA Considerations (Section 15)).  Use
   of type "get" these well-known ports allows administrators to easily enable or "set" with no 'to' attribute
   disable XMPP activity through existing and it understands commonly-deployed
   firewalls.

14.8 Use of base64 in SASL

   Both the namespace client and the server MUST verify any [BASE64] data received
   during SASL negotiation.  An implementation MUST reject (not ignore)
   any characters that qualifies are not explicitly allowed by the content base64
   alphabet; this helps to guard against creation of the
   stanza, it a covert channel
   that could be used to "leak" information.  An implementation MUST either process the stanza NOT
   break on behalf invalid input and MUST reject any sequence of sending entity
   (where base64
   characters containing the meaning of "process" pad ('=') character if that character is determined by
   included as something other than the semantics last character of the
   qualifying namespace) data (e.g.
   "=AAA" or return an error "BBBB=CCC"); this helps to guard against buffer overflow
   attacks and other attacks on the sending entity.

14.2 Foreign Domain

   If implementation.  Base encoding
   visually hides otherwise easily recognized information, such as
   passwords, but does not provide any computational confidentiality.
   Base 64 encoding MUST follow the hostname definition in Section 3 of the domain identifier portion RFC 3548
   [BASE64].

14.9 Stringprep Profiles

   XMPP makes use of the JID contained
   in the 'to' attribute does not match one [NAMEPREP] profile of the configured hostnames [STRINGPREP] for
   processing of the server itself or a subdomain thereof, the server SHOULD route
   the stanza to the foreign domain (subject to local service
   provisioning and identifiers; for security policies regarding inter-domain
   communication). There are two possible cases:

   A server-to-server stream already exists between the two domains: The
      sender's server routes the stanza considerations related
   to Nameprep, refer to the authoritative server for
      the foreign domain over the existing stream

   There exists no server-to-server stream between the two domains: The
      sender's server (1) resolves the hostname appropriate section of the foreign domain
      (as defined under Server-to-Server Communications (Section 13.3)),
      (2) negotiates a server-to-server stream between the [NAMEPREP].

   In addition, XMPP defines two domains
      (as defined under Stream Encryption (Section 5) profiles of [STRINGPREP]: Nodeprep
   (Appendix A) for node identifiers and Stream
      Authentication (Section 6)), Resourceprep (Appendix B) for
   resource identifiers.

   The Unicode and (3) routes ISO/IEC 10646 repertoires have many characters that
   look similar.  In many cases, users of security protocols might do
   visual matching, such as when comparing the stanza names of trusted third
   parties.  Because it is impossible to map similar-looking characters
   without a great deal of context such as knowing the
      authoritative server for the foreign domain over the
      newly-established stream
   If routing fonts used,
   stringprep does nothing to the recipient's server is unsuccessful, the sender's
   server MUST return an error map similar-looking characters together
   nor to the sender; if the recipient's server prohibit some characters because they look like others.

   A node identifier can be contacted but delivery by the recipient's server to the
   recipient employed as one part of an entity's address
   in XMPP.  One common usage is unsuccessful, as the recipient's server MUST return username of an
   error to instant messaging
   user; another is as the sender by way name of the sender's server.

14.3 Subdomain

   If the hostname a multi-user chat room; and many
   other kinds of entities could use node identifiers as part of their
   addresses.  The security of such services could be compromised based
   on different interpretations of the domain internationalized node
   identifier; for example, a user entering a single internationalized
   node identifier portion could access another user's account information, or a
   user could gain access to an otherwise restricted chat room or
   service.

   A resource identifier can be employed as one part of the JID contained an entity's
   address in XMPP.  One common usage is as the 'to' attribute matches name for an instant
   messaging user's active session; another is as the nickname of a subdomain user
   in a multi-user chat room; and many other kinds of entities could use
   resource identifiers as part of one their addresses.  The security of the configured
   hostnames
   such services could be compromised based on different interpretations
   of the server itself, the server MUST either process internationalized resource identifier; for example, a user
   could attempt to initiate multiple sessions with the
   stanza itself same name, or route the stanza a
   user could send a message to someone other than the intended
   recipient in a specialized service that is
   responsible multi-user chat room.

15. IANA Considerations

15.1 XML Namespace Name for that subdomain (if TLS Data

   A URN sub-namespace for TLS-related data in the subdomain Extensible Messaging
   and Presence Protocol (XMPP) is configured), or
   return an error defined as follows.  (This namespace
   name adheres to the sender (if the subdomain format defined in The IETF XML Registry
   [XML-REG].)
   URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-tls

   Specification: XXXX

   Description: This is not configured).

14.4 Mere Domain or Specific Resource

   If the hostname of the domain identifier portion of the JID contained XML namespace name for TLS-related data in
      the 'to' attribute matches a configured hostname of the server
   itself Extensible Messaging and the JID contained Presence Protocol (XMPP) as defined
      by XXXX.

   Registrant Contact: IETF, XMPP Working Group, <xmppwg@jabber.org>

15.2 XML Namespace Name for SASL Data

   A URN sub-namespace for SASL-related data in the 'to' attribute Extensible Messaging
   and Presence Protocol (XMPP) is of the form
   <domain> or <domain/resource>, defined as follows.  (This namespace
   name adheres to the server (or a format defined resource
   thereof) MUST either process in [XML-REG].)

   URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl

   Specification: XXXX

   Description: This is the stanza XML namespace name for SASL-related data in
      the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) as appropriate defined
      by XXXX.

   Registrant Contact: IETF, XMPP Working Group, <xmppwg@jabber.org>

15.3 XML Namespace Name for Stream Errors

   A URN sub-namespace for the stanza
   kind or return an stream-related error stanza to the sender.

14.5 Node in Same Domain

   If the hostname of the domain identifier portion of the JID contained data in the 'to' attribute matches a configured hostname of the server
   itself Extensible
   Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) is defined as follows.  (This
   namespace name adheres to the JID contained format defined in the 'to' attribute [XML-REG].)

   URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-streams

   Specification: XXXX

   Description: This is of the form
   <node@domain> or <node@domain/resource>, the server SHOULD deliver
   the stanza to the intended recipient of XML namespace name for stream-related error
      data in the stanza Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) as represented
      defined by
   the JID contained in the 'to' attribute. The following rules apply:

   1.  If the JID contains a XXXX.

   Registrant Contact: IETF, XMPP Working Group, <xmppwg@jabber.org>

15.4 XML Namespace Name for Resource Binding

   A URN sub-namespace for resource identifier (i.e., is of binding in the form
       <node@domain/resource>) Extensible Messaging
   and there Presence Protocol (XMPP) is an available resource that
       matches the full JID, the recipient's server SHOULD deliver the
       stanza defined as follows.  (This namespace
   name adheres to the stream or session that exactly matches format defined in [XML-REG].)

   URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-bind

   Specification: XXXX

   Description: This is the XML namespace name for resource
       identifier.

   2.  If binding in
      the JID contains a resource identifier Extensible Messaging and there is no
       available resource that matches the full JID, the recipient's
       server SHOULD return to the sender a <service-unavailable/>
       stanza error.

   3.  If the JID is of Presence Protocol (XMPP) as defined
      by XXXX.

   Registrant Contact: IETF, XMPP Working Group, <xmppwg@jabber.org>

15.5 XML Namespace Name for Stanza Errors

   A URN sub-namespace for stanza-related error data in the form <node@domain> Extensible
   Messaging and there Presence Protocol (XMPP) is at least one
       available resource available for the node, the recipient's server
       MUST deliver the stanza defined as follows.  (This
   namespace name adheres to at least one of the available
       resources, according to application-specific rules (a set of
       delivery rules for instant messaging and presence applications is format defined in XMPP IM [21]).

15. Compliance Requirements [XML-REG].)

   URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-stanzas

   Specification: XXXX

   Description: This section summarizes is the specific aspects of XML namespace name for stanza-related error
      data in the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol that MUST be supported by servers and
   clients in order to be considered compliant implementations, as well (XMPP) as additional protocol aspects that SHOULD be supported. For
   compliance purposes, we draw a distinction between core protocols
   (which MUST be supported
      defined by any server or client, regardless XXXX.

   Registrant Contact: IETF, XMPP Working Group, <xmppwg@jabber.org>

15.6 Nodeprep Profile of the
   specific application) and instant messaging protocols (which MUST be
   supported only by instant messaging and presence applications built
   on top Stringprep

   The Nodeprep profile of the core protocols). Compliance requirements that apply to
   all servers and clients are specified stringprep is defined under Nodeprep
   (Appendix A).  The IANA registers Nodeprep in the stringprep profile
   registry.

   Name of this section; compliance
   requirements for instant messaging servers and clients are specified profile:

      Nodeprep

   RFC in which the corresponding section of XMPP IM [21].

15.1 Servers

   In addition to all defined requirements with regard to security, XML
   usage, and internationalization, a server MUST support profile is defined:

      XXXX

   Indicator whether or not this is the following
   core protocols in order to be considered compliant:

   o  Enforcement newest version of the Nameprep [6], profile:

      This is the first version of Nodeprep (Appendix A), and

15.7 Resourceprep (Appendix B) profiles Profile of stringprep

   o  XML streams (Section 4), including stream encryption (Section 5)
      using TLS, stream authentication (Section 6) using SASL, and
      resource binding (Section 7)

   o Stringprep

   The basic semantics Resourceprep profile of the three stringprep is defined stanza kinds (i.e.,
      <message/>, <presence/>, and <iq/>) as specified under Resourceprep
   (Appendix B).  The IANA registers Resourceprep in stanza
      semantics (Section 9.2)

   o  Generation (and, where appropriate, handling) the stringprep
   profile registry.

   Name of error syntax and
      semantics related to streams, TLS, SASL, and XML stanzas

   In addition, a server SHOULD support this profile:

      Resourceprep

   RFC in which the following core protocol:

   o  Server dialback (Section 8)

15.2 Clients

   A client MUST support profile is defined:

      XXXX

   Indicator whether or not this is the following core protocols in order to be
   considered compliant:

   o  XML streams (Section 4), including stream encryption (Section 5)
      using TLS, stream authentication (Section 6) using SASL, and
      resource binding (Section 7)

   o  The basic semantics newest version of the three defined stanza kinds (i.e.,
      <message/>, <presence/>, and <iq/>) profile:

      This is the first version of Resourceprep

15.8 GSSAPI Service Name

   The IANA registers "xmpp" as specified in stanza
      semantics a GSSAPI [GSS-API] service name, as
   defined under SASL Definition (Section 9.2)

   o  Handling (and, where appropriate, generation) of error syntax 6.3).

15.9 Port Numbers

   The IANA currently registers "jabber-client" and
      semantics related to streams, TLS, SASL, "jabber-server" as
   keywords for [TCP] ports 5222 and XML stanzas

   In addition, a client SHOULD support the following core protocols:

   o  Generation of addresses in accordance with the Nameprep [6],
      Nodeprep (Appendix A), 5269 respectively.  The IANA shall
   change these registrations to "xmpp-client" and Resourceprep (Appendix B) profiles of
      stringprep "xmpp-server"
   respectively.

   These ports SHOULD be used for client-to-server and server-to-server
   communications respectively, but their use is NOT REQUIRED.

Normative References

   [1]   Bray, T., Paoli, J., Sperberg-McQueen, C.

   [ABNF]     Crocker, D. and E. Maler,
         "Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.0 (2nd ed)", W3C REC-xml,
         October 2000, <http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-xml>.

   [2] P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
              Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, November 1997.

   [BASE64]   Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
              Encodings", RFC 3548, July 2003.

   [CHARSET]  Alvestrand, H., "IETF Policy on Character Sets and
              Languages", BCP 18, RFC 2277, January 1998.

   [GSS-API]  Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program
              Interface, Version 2", RFC 2078, January 1997.

   [HTTP-TLS]
              Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000.

   [IMP-REQS]
              Day, M., Aggarwal, S. and J. Vincent, "Instant Messaging /
              Presence Protocol Requirements", RFC 2779, February 2000.

   [3]   Bradner, S., "Key words

   [LANGTAGS]
              Alvestrand, H., "Tags for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
         Levels", the Identification of
              Languages", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [4]   Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7, 47, RFC 793,
         September 1981.

   [5]   Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, "Internet Assigned Numbers
         Authority", 3066, January 1998, <http://www.iana.org/>.

   [6] 2001.

   [IDNA]     Faltstrom, P., Hoffman, P. and A. Costello,
              "Internationalizing Domain Names in Applications (IDNA)",
              RFC 3490, March 2003.

   [NAMEPREP]
              Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, "Nameprep: A Stringprep
              Profile for Internationalized Domain Names (IDN)", RFC
              3491, March 2003.

   [7]

   [SASL]     Myers, J., "Simple Authentication and Security Layer
              (SASL)", RFC 2222, October 1997.

   [SRV]      Gulbrandsen, A., Vixie, P. and L. Esibov, "A DNS RR for
              specifying the location of services (DNS SRV)", RFC 2782,
              February 2000.

   [STRINGPREP]
              Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, "Preparation of
              Internationalized Strings ("stringprep")", ("STRINGPREP")", RFC 3454,
              December 2002.

   [8]   Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
         Specifications: ABNF", RFC 2234, November 1997.

   [9]   Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
         Architecture",

   [TCP]      Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7, RFC 2373, July 1998.

   [10]  Bray, T., Hollander, D. and A. Layman, "Namespaces
              793, September 1981.

   [TERMS]    Bradner, S., "Key words for use in XML", W3C
         REC-xml-names, January 1999, <http://www.w3.org/TR/
         REC-xml-names>.

   [11] RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [TLS]      Dierks, T., Allen, C., Treese, W., Karlton, P., Freier, A.
              and P. Kocher, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", RFC 2246,
              January 1999.

   [12]  Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000.

   [13]  Myers, J., "Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)",
         RFC 2222, October 1997.

   [14]  Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings",
         RFC 3548, July 2003.

   [15]  Alvestrand, H., "IETF Policy on Character Sets and Languages",
         BCP 18, RFC 2277, January 1998.

   [16]  Alvestrand, H., "Tags for the Identification of Languages", BCP
         47, RFC 3066, January 2001.

   [17]  Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646", RFC
         2279, January 1998.

   [18]

   [UCS2]     International Organization for Standardization,
              "Information Technology - Universal Multiple-octet coded
              Character Set (UCS) - Amendment 2: UCS Transformation
              Format 8 (UTF-8)", ISO Standard 10646-1 Addendum 2,
              October 1996.

   [19]  Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program
         Interface, Version 2",

   [UTF-8]    Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
              10646", RFC 2078, 2279, January 1997.

   [20]  Gulbrandsen, A., Vixie, P. 1998.

   [XML]      Bray, T., Paoli, J., Sperberg-McQueen, C. and L. Esibov, "A DNS RR for
         specifying the location of services (DNS SRV)", RFC 2782,
         February 2000. E. Maler,
              "Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.0 (2nd ed)", W3C
              REC-xml, October 2000, <http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-xml>.

   [XML-NAMES]
              Bray, T., Hollander, D. and A. Layman, "Namespaces in
              XML", W3C REC-xml-names, January 1999, <http://www.w3.org/
              TR/REC-xml-names>.

Informative References

   [21]  Saint-Andre, P.

   [ACAP]     Newman, C. and J. Miller, "XMPP Instant Messaging",
         draft-ietf-xmpp-im-18 (work in progress), October 2003.

   [22] Myers, "ACAP -- Application
              Configuration Access Protocol", RFC 2244, November 1997.

   [DNSSEC]   Eastlake, D., "Domain Name System Security Extensions",
              RFC 2535, March 1999.

   [HTTP]     Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
              Masinter, L., Leach, P. and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
              Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.

   [23]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R. and L. Masinter, "Uniform
         Resource Identifiers (URI): Generic Syntax", RFC 2396, August
         1998.

   [24]  Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry",
         draft-mealling-iana-xmlns-registry-05 (work in progress), June
         2003.

   [25]

   [IMAP]     Crispin, M., "Internet Message Access Protocol - Version
              4rev1", RFC 2060, December 1996.

   [26]

   [JSF]      Jabber Software Foundation, "Jabber Software Foundation",
              <http://www.jabber.org/>.

   [POP3]     Myers, J. and M. Rose, "Post Office Protocol - Version 3",
              STD 53, RFC 1939, May 1996.

   [27]  Newman, C.

   [URI]      Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R. and J. Myers, "ACAP -- Application Configuration
         Access Protocol", L. Masinter, "Uniform
              Resource Identifiers (URI): Generic Syntax", RFC 2244, November 1997.

   [28] 2396,
              August 1998.

   [USINGTLS]
              Newman, C., "Using TLS with IMAP, POP3 and ACAP", RFC
              2595, June 1999.

   [29]  Eastlake, D., "Domain Name System Security Extensions", RFC
         2535, March 1999.

   [30]  Jabber Software Foundation, "Jabber Software Foundation",
         <http://www.jabber.org/>.

Authors' Addresses

   [XML-REG]  Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry",
              draft-mealling-iana-xmlns-registry-05 (work in progress),
              June 2003.

   [XMPP-IM]  Saint-Andre, P., "Extensible Messaging and Presence
              Protocol (XMPP): Instant Messaging and Presence",
              draft-ietf-xmpp-im-19 (work in progress), November 2003.

Author's Address

   Peter Saint-Andre
   Jabber Software Foundation

   EMail: stpeter@jabber.org

   Jeremie Miller
   Jabber Software Foundation

   EMail: jeremie@jabber.org

Appendix A. Nodeprep

A.1 Introduction

   This appendix defines the "Nodeprep" profile of stringprep (RFC 3454
   [7]). [STRINGPREP].  As
   such, it specifies processing rules that will enable users to enter
   internationalized node identifiers in the Extensible Messaging and
   Presence Protocol (XMPP) and have the highest chance of getting the
   content of the strings correct.  (An XMPP node identifier is the
   optional portion of an XMPP address that precedes a domain identifier
   and the '@' separator; it is often but not exclusively associated
   with an instant messaging username.) These processing rules are
   intended only for XMPP node identifiers and are not intended for
   arbitrary text or any other aspect of an XMPP address.

   This profile defines the following, as required by RFC 3454 [7]: [STRINGPREP]:

   o  The intended applicability of the profile: internationalized node
      identifiers within XMPP

   o  The character repertoire that is the input and output to
      stringprep: Unicode 3.2, specified in Section 2 of this Appendix

   o  The mappings used: specified in Section 3

   o  The Unicode normalization used: specified in Section 4

   o  The characters that are prohibited as output: specified in Section
      5

   o  Bidirectional character handling: specified in Section 6

A.2 Character Repertoire

   This profile uses Unicode 3.2 with the list of unassigned code points
   being Table A.1, both defined in Appendix A of RFC 3454 [7]. [STRINGPREP].

A.3 Mapping

   This profile specifies mapping using the following tables from RFC
   3454 [7]:
   [STRINGPREP]:

      Table B.1

      Table B.2

A.4 Normalization

   This profile specifies using Unicode normalization form KC, as
   described in RFC 3454 [7]. [STRINGPREP].

A.5 Prohibited Output

   This profile specifies prohibiting use of the following tables from
   RFC 3454 [7].
   [STRINGPREP].

      Table C.1.1

      Table C.1.2

      Table C.2.1

      Table C.2.2

      Table C.3

      Table C.4

      Table C.5

      Table C.6

      Table C.7

      Table C.8

      Table C.9

   In addition, the following Unicode characters are also prohibited:

      #x22 (")

      #x26 (&)

      #x27 (')

      #x2F (/)

      #x3A (:)

      #x3C (<)

      #x3E (>)

      #x40 (@)

A.6 Bidirectional Characters

   This profile specifies checking bidirectional strings as described in
   Section 6 of RFC 3454 [7]. [STRINGPREP].

Appendix B. Resourceprep

B.1 Introduction

   This appendix defines the "Resourceprep" profile of stringprep (RFC
   3454 [7]). [STRINGPREP].  As
   such, it specifies processing rules that will enable users to enter
   internationalized resource identifiers in the Extensible Messaging
   and Presence Protocol (XMPP) and have the highest chance of getting
   the content of the strings correct.  (An XMPP resource identifier is
   the optional portion of an XMPP address that follows a domain
   identifier and the '/' separator; it is often but not exclusively
   associated with an instant messaging session name.) These processing
   rules are intended only for XMPP resource identifiers and are not
   intended for arbitrary text or any other aspect of an XMPP address.

   This profile defines the following, as required by RFC 3454 [7]: [STRINGPREP]:

   o  The intended applicability of the profile: internationalized
      resource identifiers within XMPP

   o  The character repertoire that is the input and output to
      stringprep: Unicode 3.2, specified in Section 2 of this Appendix

   o  The mappings used: specified in Section 3

   o  The Unicode normalization used: specified in Section 4
   o  The characters that are prohibited as output: specified in Section
      5

   o  Bidirectional character handling: specified in Section 6

B.2 Character Repertoire

   This profile uses Unicode 3.2 with the list of unassigned code points
   being Table A.1, both defined in Appendix A of RFC 3454 [7]. [STRINGPREP].

B.3 Mapping

   This profile specifies mapping using the following tables from RFC
   3454 [7]:
   [STRINGPREP]:

      Table B.1

B.4 Normalization

   This profile specifies using Unicode normalization form KC, as
   described in RFC 3454 [7]. [STRINGPREP].

B.5 Prohibited Output

   This profile specifies prohibiting use of the following tables from
   RFC 3454 [7].
   [STRINGPREP].

      Table C.1.2

      Table C.2.1

      Table C.2.2

      Table C.3

      Table C.4

      Table C.5

      Table C.6

      Table C.7

      Table C.8
      Table C.9

B.6 Bidirectional Characters

   This profile specifies checking bidirectional strings as described in
   Section 6 of RFC 3454 [7]. [STRINGPREP].

Appendix C. XML Schemas

   The following XML schemas are descriptive, not normative.  For
   schemas defining the 'jabber:client' and 'jabber:server' namespaces,
   refer to
   XMPP IM [21]. [XMPP-IM].

C.1 Streams namespace

   <?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>

   <xs:schema
       xmlns:xs='http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema'
       targetNamespace='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
       xmlns='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams'
       elementFormDefault='unqualified'>

     <xs:import namespace='http://www.w3.org/XML/1998/namespace'
                schemaLocation='http://www.w3.org/2001/xml.xsd'/>

     <xs:element name='stream'>
       <xs:complexType>
         <xs:sequence>
           <xs:element ref='features' minOccurs='0' maxOccurs='1'/>
           <xs:choice minOccurs='0' maxOccurs='1'>
             <xs:any namespace='jabber:client'
                     minOccurs='0'
                     maxOccurs='unbounded'/>
             <xs:any namespace='jabber:server'
                     minOccurs='0'
                     maxOccurs='unbounded'/>
           </xs:choice>
           <xs:element ref='error' minOccurs='0' maxOccurs='1'/>
         </xs:sequence>
         <xs:attribute name='to' type='xs:string' use='optional'/>
         <xs:attribute name='from' type='xs:string' use='optional'/>
         <xs:attribute name='id' type='xs:NMTOKEN' use='optional'/>
         <xs:attribute ref='xml:lang' use='optional'/>
         <xs:attribute name='version' type='xs:decimal' use='optional'/>
       </xs:complexType>
     </xs:element>
     <xs:element name='features'>
       <xs:complexType>
         <xs:sequence>
           <xs:any
               namespace='##other'
               minOccurs='0'
               maxOccurs='unbounded'/>
         </xs:sequence>
       </xs:complexType>
     </xs:element>

     <xs:element name='error'>
       <xs:complexType>
         <xs:sequence>
           <xs:any namespace='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-streams'
                   maxOccurs='2'/>
           <xs:any
               namespace='##other'
               minOccurs='0'
               maxOccurs='1'/>
         </xs:sequence>
       </xs:complexType>
     </xs:element>

   </xs:schema>

C.2 Stream error namespace

   <?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>

   <xs:schema
       xmlns:xs='http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema'
       xmlns:xml='http://www.w3.org/XML/1998/namespace'
       targetNamespace='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-streams'
       xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-streams'
       elementFormDefault='qualified'>

     <xs:import namespace='http://www.w3.org/XML/1998/namespace'
                schemaLocation='http://www.w3.org/2001/xml.xsd'/>

     <xs:element name='bad-format' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='bad-namespace-prefix' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='conflict' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='connection-timeout' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='host-gone' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='host-unknown' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='improper-addressing' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='internal-server-error' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='invalid-from' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='invalid-id' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='invalid-namespace' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='invalid-xml' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='not-authorized' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='policy-violation' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='remote-connection-failed' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='resource-constraint' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='restricted-xml' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='see-other-host' type='xs:string'/>
     <xs:element name='system-shutdown' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='undefined-condition' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='unsupported-encoding' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='unsupported-stanza-type' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='unsupported-version' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='xml-not-well-formed' type='empty'/>

     <xs:element name='text' type='xs:string'>
       <xs:complexType>
         <xs:attribute ref='xml:lang' use='optional'/>
       </xs:complexType>
     </xs:element>

     <xs:simpleType name='empty'>
       <xs:restriction base='xs:string'>
         <xs:enumeration value=''/>
       </xs:restriction>
     </xs:simpleType>

   </xs:schema>

C.3 TLS namespace

   <?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>

   <xs:schema
       xmlns:xs='http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema'
       targetNamespace='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-tls'
       xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-tls'
       elementFormDefault='qualified'>

     <xs:element name='starttls'>
       <xs:complexType>
         <xs:sequence>
           <xs:element
               ref='required'
               minOccurs='0'
               maxOccurs='1'/>
         </xs:sequence>
       </xs:complexType>
     </xs:element>

     <xs:element name='required' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='proceed' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='failure' type='empty'/>

     <xs:simpleType name='empty'>
       <xs:restriction base='xs:string'>
         <xs:enumeration value=''/>
       </xs:restriction>
     </xs:simpleType>

   </xs:schema>

C.4 SASL namespace

   <?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>

   <xs:schema
       xmlns:xs='http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema'
       targetNamespace='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'
       xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl'
       elementFormDefault='qualified'>

     <xs:element name='mechanisms'>
       <xs:complexType>
         <xs:sequence>
           <xs:element ref='mechanism' maxOccurs='unbounded'/>
         </xs:sequence>
       </xs:complexType>
     </xs:element>

     <xs:element name='mechanism' type='xs:string'/>

     <xs:element name='auth'>
       <xs:complexType>
         <xs:attribute name='mechanism'
                       type='xs:NMTOKEN'
                       use='optional'/>
       </xs:complexType>
     </xs:element>

     <xs:element name='challenge' type='xs:NMTOKEN'/>
     <xs:element name='response' type='xs:NMTOKEN'/>
     <xs:element name='abort' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='success' type='empty'/>

     <xs:element name='failure'>
       <xs:complexType>
         <xs:choice maxOccurs='1'>
           <xs:element ref='aborted'/>
           <xs:element ref='incorrect-encoding'/>
           <xs:element ref='invalid-authzid'/>
           <xs:element ref='invalid-mechanism'/>
           <xs:element ref='mechanism-too-weak'/>
           <xs:element ref='not-authorized'/>
           <xs:element ref='temporary-auth-failure'/>
         </xs:choice>
       </xs:complexType>
     </xs:element>

     <xs:element name='aborted' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='incorrect-encoding' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='invalid-authzid' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='invalid-mechanism' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='mechanism-too-weak' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='not-authorized' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='temporary-auth-failure' type='empty'/>

     <xs:simpleType name='empty'>
       <xs:restriction base='xs:string'>
         <xs:enumeration value=''/>
       </xs:restriction>
     </xs:simpleType>

   </xs:schema>

C.5 Resource binding namespace

   <?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
   <xs:schema
       xmlns:xs='http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema'
       targetNamespace='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-bind'
       xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-bind'
       elementFormDefault='qualified'>

     <xs:element name='bind'>
       <xs:complexType>
         <xs:choice minOccurs='0' maxOccurs='1'>
           <xs:element ref='resource'/>
           <xs:element ref='jid'/>
         </xs:choice>
       </xs:complexType>
     </xs:element>

     <xs:element name='resource' type='xs:string'/>
     <xs:element name='jid' type='xs:string'/>

   </xs:schema>

C.6 Dialback namespace

   <?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>

   <xs:schema
       xmlns:xs='http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema'
       targetNamespace='jabber:server:dialback'
       xmlns='jabber:server:dialback'
       elementFormDefault='qualified'>

     <xs:element name='result'>
       <xs:complexType>
         <xs:simpleContent>
           <xs:extension base='xs:NMTOKEN'>
             <xs:attribute name='from' type='xs:string' use='required'/>
             <xs:attribute name='to' type='xs:string' use='required'/>
             <xs:attribute name='type' use='optional'>
               <xs:simpleType>
                 <xs:restriction base='xs:NCName'>
                   <xs:enumeration value='invalid'/>
                   <xs:enumeration value='valid'/>
                 </xs:restriction>
               </xs:simpleType>
             </xs:attribute>
           </xs:extension>
         </xs:simpleContent>
       </xs:complexType>
     </xs:element>

     <xs:element name='verify'>
       <xs:complexType>
         <xs:simpleContent>
           <xs:extension base='xs:NMTOKEN'>
             <xs:attribute name='from' type='xs:string' use='required'/>
             <xs:attribute name='to' type='xs:string' use='required'/>
             <xs:attribute name='id' type='xs:NMTOKEN' use='required'/>
             <xs:attribute name='type' use='optional'>
               <xs:simpleType>
                 <xs:restriction base='xs:NCName'>
                   <xs:enumeration value='invalid'/>
                   <xs:enumeration value='valid'/>
                 </xs:restriction>
               </xs:simpleType>
             </xs:attribute>
           </xs:extension>
         </xs:simpleContent>
       </xs:complexType>
     </xs:element>

   </xs:schema>

C.7 Stanza error namespace

   <?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>

   <xs:schema
       xmlns:xs='http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema'
       xmlns:xml='http://www.w3.org/XML/1998/namespace'
       targetNamespace='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-stanzas'
       xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-stanzas'
       elementFormDefault='qualified'>

     <xs:import namespace='http://www.w3.org/XML/1998/namespace'
                schemaLocation='http://www.w3.org/2001/xml.xsd'/>

     <xs:element name='bad-request' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='conflict' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='feature-not-implemented' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='forbidden' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='gone' type='xs:string'/>
     <xs:element name='internal-server-error' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='item-not-found' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='jid-malformed' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='not-acceptable' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='not-allowed' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='payment-required' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='recipient-unavailable' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='redirect' type='xs:string'/>
     <xs:element name='registration-required' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='remote-server-not-found' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='remote-server-timeout' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='resource-constraint' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='service-unavailable' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='subscription-required' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='undefined-condition' type='empty'/>
     <xs:element name='unexpected-request' type='empty'/>

     <xs:element name='text' type='xs:string'>
       <xs:complexType>
         <xs:attribute ref='xml:lang' use='optional'/>
       </xs:complexType>
     </xs:element>

     <xs:simpleType name='empty'>
       <xs:restriction base='xs:string'>
         <xs:enumeration value=''/>
       </xs:restriction>
     </xs:simpleType>

   </xs:schema>

Appendix D. Differences Between Core Jabber Protocol and XMPP

   This section is non-normative.

   XMPP has been adapted from the protocols originally developed in the
   Jabber open-source community, which can be thought of as "XMPP 0.9".
   Because there exists a large installed base of Jabber implementations
   and deployments, it may be helpful to specify the key differences
   between Jabber and XMPP in order to expedite and encourage upgrades
   of those implementations and deployments to XMPP.  This section
   summarizes the core differences, while the corresponding section of
   XMPP IM [21]
   [XMPP-IM] summarizes the differences that relate specifically to
   instant messaging and presence applications.

D.1 Channel Encryption

   It is common practice in the Jabber community to use SSL for channel
   encryption on ports other than 5222 and 5269 (the convention is to
   use ports 5223 and 5270).  XMPP uses TLS over the IANA-registered
   ports for channel encryption, as defined under Stream Encryption Use of TLS (Section 5)
   herein.

D.2 Authentication

   The client-server authentication protocol developed in the Jabber
   community uses a basic IQ interaction qualified by the
   'jabber:iq:auth' namespace (documentation of this protocol is
   contained in "JEP-0078: Non-SASL Authentication", published by the
   Jabber Software Foundation [30]). [JSF]).  XMPP uses SASL for
   authentication, as defined under Stream Authentication Use of SASL (Section 6) herein.

   The Jabber community does not currently possess an authentication
   protocol for server-to-server communications, only the Server
   Dialback (Section 8) protocol to prevent server spoofing.  XMPP
   augments Server Dialback with a true server-to-server authentication
   protocol, as defined under Stream Authentication Use of SASL (Section 6) herein.

D.3 Resource Binding

   Resource binding in the Jabber community is handled via the
   'jabber:iq:auth' namespace that is also used for client
   authentication with a server.  XMPP defines a dedicated namespace for
   resource binding as well as the ability for a server to generate a
   resource identifier on behalf of a client, as defined under Resource
   Binding (Section 7).

D.4 JID Processing

   JID processing was somewhat loosely defined by the Jabber community
   (documentation of forbidden characters and case handling is contained
   in "JEP-0029: Definition of Jabber Identifiers", published by the
   Jabber Software Foundation [30]). [JSF]).  XMPP specifies the use of Nameprep
   [6]
   [NAMEPREP] for domain identifiers and supplements Nameprep with two
   additional stringprep [7] [STRINGPREP] profiles for JID processing: Nodeprep
   (Appendix A) for node identifiers and Resourceprep (Appendix B) for
   resource identifiers .

D.5 Error Handling

   Stream-related errors are handled in the Jabber community via simple
   CDATA text in a <stream:error/> element.  In XMPP, stream-related
   errors are handled via an extensible mechanism defined under Stream
   Errors (Section 4.6) herein.

   Stanza-related errors are handled in the Jabber community via
   HTTP-style error codes.  In XMPP, stanza-related errors are handled
   via an extensible mechanism defined under Stanza Errors (Section 9.3)
   herein.  (Documentation of a mapping between Jabber and XMPP error
   handling mechanisms is contained in "JEP-0086: Legacy Errors",
   published by the Jabber Software Foundation [30].) [JSF].)

D.6 Internationalization

   Although use of UTF-8 has always been standard practice within the
   Jabber community, the community did not define mechanisms for
   specifying the language of human-readable text provided in CDATA
   sections.  XMPP specifies the use of the 'xml:lang' attribute in such
   contexts, as defined under Stream Attributes (Section 4.2) and
   xml:lang (Section 9.1.5) herein.

D.7 Stream Version Attribute

   The Jabber community does not include a 'version' attribute in stream
   headers.  XMPP specifies inclusion of that attribute, with a value of
   '1.0', as a way to signal support for the stream features
   (authentication, encryption, etc.) defined under Version Support
   (Section 4.2.1) herein.

Appendix E. Revision History

   Note to RFC Editor: please remove this entire appendix, and the
   corresponding entries in the table of contents, prior to publication.

E.1 Changes from draft-ietf-xmpp-core-19

   o  Fixed several typographical errors.

   o  Restricted values of 'type' attribute for IQ stanzas to those
      defined in the schema (i.e., changed SHOULD to MUST) to ensure
      consistency with text in XMPP IM.

   o  Added reference to RFC 3548.

   o  Replaced RFC 2222 reference with reference to
      draft-ietf-sasl-rfc2222bis.

   o  Further clarified role and usage of user names in SASL mechanisms.

   o  Added mention of 'code' attribute on error element.

   o  Clarified several sentences in the dialback narrative.

   o  Clarified use of stringprep profiles and added reference to RFC
      3490.

   o  Added security consideration regarding lack of SASL channel
      binding to TLS per discussion at IETF 58 meeting.

   o  Adjusted formatting to conform to RFC Editor requirements.

E.2 Changes from draft-ietf-xmpp-core-18

   o  Added the 'xml:lang' attribute to the root <stream/> element per
      previous consensus and list discussion.

   o  Changed "jabber-server" and "jabber-client" service names to
      "xmpp-server" and "xmpp-client".

   o  Added the <gone/>, <not-acceptable/>, and <redirect/> stanza
      errors.

   o  Changed dataype of <see-other-host/> stream error and of <gone/>
      and <redirect/> stanza errors to xs:string so that these elements
      may contain programmatic information.

   o  Removed <invalid-realm/> and <bad-protocol/> SASL errors.

   o  Removed references to RFC 952 and RFC 1123 (domain name format is
      handled by reference to Nameprep).

   o  Changed address record resolution text so that it is not specific
      to IPv4.

   o  Clarified text in appendices regarding scope of Nodeprep and
      Resourceprep.

   o  Removed requirement that receiving entity terminate the TCP
      connection upon receiving an <abort/> element from or sending a
      <failure/> element to the initiating entity during SASL
      negotiation.

   o  Removed recommendation that TLS and SASL security layer should not
      both be used simultaneously.

   o  Added subsection to Security Considerations regarding use of
      base64 in SASL.

   o  Specified rules regarding inclusion of username in SASL
      negotiation.

   o  Adjusted content related to SASL authorization identities, since
      the previous text did not track RFC2222bis. SASL.

   o  Added section on resource binding to compensate for changes to
      SASL authorization identity text.

   o  Specified ABNF for JIDs.

   o  Checked all references.

   o  Completed a thorough proofreading and consistency check of the
      entire text.

E.2

E.3 Changes from draft-ietf-xmpp-core-17

   o  Specified that UTF-8 is the only allowable encoding.

   o  Added stream errors for <bad-namespace-prefix/>, <invalid-xml/>,
      and <restricted-xml/>, as well as a <bad-format/> error for
      generic XML error conditions.

   o  Folded Nodeprep and Resourceprep profiles into this document.

   o  Moved most delivery handling rules from XMPP IM to XMPP Core.

   o  Moved detailed stanza syntax descriptions from XMPP Core to XMPP
      IM.

   o  Moved stanza schemas from XMPP Core to XMPP IM.

E.3

E.4 Changes from draft-ietf-xmpp-core-16

   o  Added <conflict/> and <unsupported-encoding/> stream errors.

   o  Changed the datatype for the <see-other-host/> and
      <unsupported-version/> stream errors from 'xs:string' to 'empty'.

   o  Further clarified server handling of the basic stanza kinds.

   o  Further clarified character encoding rules per list discussion.

   o  Specified meaning of version='1.0' flag in stream headers.

   o  Added stream closure to SASL failure cases in order to mirror
      handling of TLS failures.

   o  Added section on compliance requirements for server and client
      implementations.

   o  Added non-normative section on differences between Jabber usage
      and XMPP specifications.

E.4

E.5 Changes from draft-ietf-xmpp-core-15

   o  Added <connection-timeout/> and <policy-violation/> stream errors.

   o  Added <aborted/> SASL error and clarified <bad-protocol/> error.

   o  Made 'id' required for IQ stanzas.

E.5

E.6 Changes from draft-ietf-xmpp-core-14

   o  Added SRV lookup for client-to-server communications.

   o  Changed server SRV record to conform to RFC 2782; specifically,
      the service identifier was changed from 'jabber' to
      'jabber-server'.

E.6

E.7 Changes from draft-ietf-xmpp-core-13

   o  Clarified stream restart after successful TLS and SASL
      negotiation.

   o  Clarified requirement for resolution of DNS hostnames.

   o  Clarified text regarding namespaces.

   o  Clarified examples regarding empty <stream:features/> element.

   o  Added several more SASL error conditions.

   o  Changed <invalid-xml/> stream error to <improper-addressing/> and
      added to schema.

   o  Made small editorial changes and fixed several schema errors.

E.7

E.8 Changes from draft-ietf-xmpp-core-12

   o  Moved server dialback to a separate section; clarified its
      security characteristics and its role in the protocol.

   o  Adjusted error handling syntax and semantics per list discussion.

   o  Further clarified length of node identifiers and total length of
      JIDs.

   o  Documented message type='normal'.

   o  Corrected several small errors in the TLS and SASL sections.

   o  Corrected several errors in the schemas.

E.8

E.9 Changes from draft-ietf-xmpp-core-11
   o  Corrected several small errors in the TLS and SASL sections.

   o  Made small editorial changes and fixed several schema errors.

E.9

E.10 Changes from draft-ietf-xmpp-core-10

   o  Adjusted TLS content regarding certificate validation process.

   o  Specified that stanza error extensions for specific applications
      are to be properly namespaced children of the relevant descriptive
      element.

   o  Clarified rules for inclusion of the 'id' attribute.

   o  Specified that the 'xml:lang' attribute SHOULD be included (per
      list discussion).

   o  Made small editorial changes and fixed several schema errors.

E.10

E.11 Changes from draft-ietf-xmpp-core-09

   o  Fixed several dialback error conditions.

   o  Cleaned up rules regarding TLS and certificate processing based on
      off-list feedback.

   o  Changed <stream-condition/> and <stanza-condition/> elements to
      <condition/>.

   o  Added or modified several stream and stanza error conditions.

   o  Specified only one child allowed for IQ, or two if type="error".

   o  Fixed several errors in the schemas.

E.11

E.12 Changes from draft-ietf-xmpp-core-08

   o  Incorporated list discussion regarding addressing, SASL, TLS, TCP,
      dialback, namespaces, extensibility, and the meaning of 'ignore'
      for routers and recipients.

   o  Specified dialback error conditions.

   o  Made small editorial changes to address RFC Editor requirements.

E.12

E.13 Changes from draft-ietf-xmpp-core-07

   o  Made several small editorial changes.

E.13

E.14 Changes from draft-ietf-xmpp-core-06

   o  Added text regarding certificate validation in TLS negotiation per
      list discussion.

   o  Clarified nature of XML restrictions per discussion with W3C, and
      moved XML Restrictions subsection under "XML Usage within XMPP".

   o  Further clarified that XML streams are unidirectional.

   o  Changed stream error and stanza error namespace names to conform
      to the format defined in The IETF XML Registry [24]. Registry.

   o  Removed note to RFC Editor regarding provisional namespace names.

E.14

E.15 Changes from draft-ietf-xmpp-core-05

   o  Added <invalid-namespace/> as a stream error condition.

   o  Adjusted security considerations per discussion at IETF 56 and on
      list.

E.15

E.16 Changes from draft-ietf-xmpp-core-04

   o  Added server-to-server examples for TLS and SASL.

   o  Changed error syntax, rules, and examples based on list
      discussion.

   o  Added schemas for the TLS, stream error, and stanza error
      namespaces.

   o  Added note to RFC Editor regarding provisional namespace names.

   o  Made numerous small editorial changes and clarified text
      throughout.

E.16

E.17 Changes from draft-ietf-xmpp-core-03
   o  Clarified rules and procedures for TLS and SASL.

   o  Amplified stream error code syntax per list discussion.

   o  Made numerous small editorial changes.

E.17

E.18 Changes from draft-ietf-xmpp-core-02

   o  Added dialback schema.

   o  Removed all DTDs since schemas provide more complete definitions.

   o  Added stream error codes.

   o  Clarified error code "philosophy".

E.18

E.19 Changes from draft-ietf-xmpp-core-01

   o  Updated the addressing restrictions per list discussion and added
      references to the new Nodeprep and Resourceprep profiles.

   o  Corrected error in Stream Authentication Use of SASL regarding 'version' attribute.

   o  Made numerous small editorial changes.

E.19

E.20 Changes from draft-ietf-xmpp-core-00

   o  Added information about TLS from list discussion.

   o  Clarified meaning of "ignore" based on list discussion.

   o  Clarified information about Universal Character Set data and
      character encodings.

   o  Provided base64-decoded information for examples.

   o  Fixed several errors in the schemas.

   o  Made numerous small editorial fixes.

E.20

E.21 Changes from draft-miller-xmpp-core-02

   o  Brought Stream Authentication Use of SASL section into line with discussion on list and
      at IETF 55 meeting.

   o  Added information about the optional 'xml:lang' attribute per
      discussion on list and at IETF 55 meeting.

   o  Specified that validation is neither required nor recommended, and
      that the formal definitions (DTDs and schemas) are included for
      descriptive purposes only.

   o  Specified that the response to an IQ stanza of type "get" or "set"
      must be an IQ stanza of type "result" or "error".

   o  Specified that compliant server implementations must process
      stanzas in order.

   o  Specified that for historical reasons some server implementations
      may accept 'stream:' as the only valid namespace prefix on the
      root stream element.

   o  Clarified the difference between 'jabber:client' and
      'jabber:server' namespaces, namely, that 'to' and 'from'
      attributes are required on all stanzas in the latter but not the
      former.

   o  Fixed typo in Step 9 of the dialback protocol (changed db:result
      to db:verify).

   o  Removed references to TLS pending list discussion.

   o  Removed the non-normative appendix on OpenPGP usage pending its
      inclusion in a separate I-D.

   o  Simplified the architecture diagram, removed most references to
      services, and removed references to the 'jabber:component:*'
      namespaces.

   o  Noted that XMPP activity respects firewall administration
      policies.

   o  Further specified the scope and uniqueness of the 'id' attribute
      in all stanza kinds and the <thread/> element in message stanzas.

   o  Nomenclature changes: (1) from "chunks" to "stanzas"; (2) from
      "host" to "server" and from "node" to "client" (except with regard
      to definition of the addressing scheme).

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